China became a nuclear weapons state in 1964. Yet, six decades later, many parts of its nuclear history remain incomplete. A lack of access to varied authoritative primary sources, in particular declassified documents dating from precise moments in the past rather than official documents published retrospectively, results in barriers to understanding. Research has consequently turned to subject areas where a range of sources might be available from the time, and diverse methods can be employed. These areas include explaining why China went nuclear, the role of external security threats shaping Beijing’s nuclear choices and behaviour, including its evolving relationship with the United States. Others have written about China’s participation in global nuclear institutions over time. Much less has been written about the technical nitty-gritty regarding China’s nuclear tests or pathways towards warhead miniaturization. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai’s landmark book, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 1988), had some technical detail but was published almost four decades ago. Jonathan Ray’s brilliant report on the neutron bomb “Red China’s ‘Capitalist Bomb’: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program” focused on one programme and was published over ten years ago, in 2015, by the US National Defense University Press. Here enters Hui Zhang’s book, a technical account of China’s nuclear weapons development from 1955 to 1996, when China stopped testing and signed up to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The book offers new information on China’s 46 nuclear tests and warhead miniaturization projects, with more on the yields, operational codenames and the bureaucrats and scientists involved, as well as a useful appendix on the Lop Nur test site.

The main takeaway from the book is that, at a technical level, China did so much with so little, relative to other nuclear weapons states of the time. This is not a surprising finding. Although China was working from a low technical base and a weak domestic economy, the Chinese had a jump-start through Soviet aid in nuclear matters in the 1950s, and, being late to the nuclear club, they learned from the mistakes of others who tested before them. Moreover, as chapter five notes, Chinese bureaucrats and scientists were motivated to be “ahead of France” and speed up their hydrogen bomb test. Towards the end of the book, Zhang points to a domestic explanation for China’s technical success linked to central leadership and Party goals, which, given his technical focus, is not unpacked. Indeed, the book’s scholarly contribution lies in drawing from retrospective personal recollections of technical innovation and commitment. With these sources, it traces key technical milestones, from the first air-dropped bomb to the development of missile warheads and the hydrogen bomb, then the first generation of warheads for the DF-5 (China’s long-range intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM]) as well as other missile systems like the DF-21. For a quick taster of the book on the hydrogen bomb see the brilliant article “The short march to China’s hydrogen bomb” published online in April 2024 by the same author in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

Why this fuller technical account now? Archives have not suddenly opened, and documents from the time, if they exist, remain inaccessible. Places like the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP), China’s nuclear weapons laboratory, have not opened their doors for archival and interview-based research. Instead, in the last decade, selected memoirs of former Chinese strategic scientists and state ministers overseeing development have been published. Online Chinese news and blog posts have emerged too, such as an oral history series in 2020 by the China National Nuclear Corporation on 60 participants in the hydrogen bomb development. The context for these new sources is not discussed in the book, but they can be understood as part of a Chinese Communist Party effort since the late 1990s to officially commemorate selected strategic scientists, especially those associated with the liang dan, yi xing (two bombs, one satellite) programme. The book’s findings thus rest on retrospective official accounts of important known figures like Zhu Guangya, Cheng Kaijia, Deng Jiaxian, the father of China’s atomic bomb, and Yu Min, the father of China’s hydrogen bomb. Notably, the book also engages with the personal recollections of less well-known figures, such as Ye Jundao, a scientist who contributed to neutron tube work, Li Xuge, the director of the onsite atomic test committee, and Liu Xiyao, a deputy minister of the Second Ministry involved in the hydrogen bomb. As such, if archives open in the future for analysis of in situ documents of the time, this book – alongside the memoirs – will be prerequisite reading for scholars.

The book is timely. As hinted in the introduction and conclusion, China may be in the process of altering its nuclear practices and thinking. In terms of capabilities, China is now the third largest nuclear weapons state worldwide. In the mid-1990s, when the book’s technical analysis ends, China was the fifth largest nuclear weapons state. Today, China is labelled a “near-peer” by the US. At the end of the book, rather than providing an update on the CAEP and the state of domestic nuclear weapons development since 1996, there is instead a sudden focus on external security threats. Nothing is new here because the author does not have the space to go into depth. Though published in 2026, the book was written in 2024, and so was perhaps unable to address US accusations that China had conducted a nuclear test in Lop Nur in June 2020.

Ultimately, this book is a much-needed technical primer on China’s historical nuclear weapons testing and warhead miniaturization. As a specialist book, future comparative analysis can now be conducted against technical accounts of other nuclear weapons states, where these exist or emerge. For generalists, especially those outside the nuclear field, the book is more demanding but nonetheless rewarding. (Simply read the last chapter first, which ends with a non-technical summary, then go back to the start.)