Jerome Moran's article ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia (“Happiness”)’ in Think 17(48) (2018) focused on Aristotle. In this brief reply I do not want to question Moran's interpretation of Aristotle, but only to rebut what appears to be Moran's assumption that self-interest can play no part in moral philosophy.
Moran argues that because Aristotle claims the virtues are good for their possessor his ‘is not a moral argument at all, but rather a prudential one since it is a self-regarding argument. A moral argument should surely be grounded on the interests of others.’Footnote 1
This reminded me of an old joke: ‘We are all here on earth to help others; what on earth the others are here for I don't know.’Footnote 2 This is funny because it assumes that we can help the others without their having any interests of their own and without our knowing what would be in their best interests. The implication is that an other-directed morality without an answer to the question ‘What is of genuine benefit to a person?’ is incomplete – indeed a non-starter. Even if we accept that what benefits another is whatever they think benefits them, that is still an answer to the question. It is a question any other-regarding moral philosophy must answer.
So if in the Ethics Aristotle really is only asking the question, ‘What is good for an individual?’, this does not show that his is not a contribution to moral philosophy – whether or not we agree with his answer.
Moran accuses the ancient Greek philosophers of conflating self-regard and other-regard: ‘Socrates and Plato believed that doing good to others was also good for oneself.’ Whereas, he argues, ‘The moral versus prudential distinction is akin to the altruism versus egoism distinction. It is a case of either/or not of both/and. Seeking the good of others whilst at the same time seeking one's own good is not altruism’ and so ‘Much of ancient Greek moral philosophy has little to do with morality as we understand it.’Footnote 3
Now it may be implausible to equate moral virtue with individual benefit. Don't individual interests sometimes clash with virtue? It may be for the best that a courageous soldier dies for his comrades, but is it therefore best for the soldier – as Aristotle might seem bound to say? But on the other hand, for a social animal like us, the complete separation of morality and self-interest seems implausible. When we strive to bring up our children to be good people we don't see this as sacrificing their interests for the general good, but rather as a part of helping our children towards a successful and satisfying life – as well as for the general good.
And it is not only the ancient Greeks who involved self-interest in morality. Think of the Christian or Muslim idea of salvation. Even Kant, the original deontologist who stressed a duty which is independent of personal inclination, also sometimes draws on self-interest. He begins from the idea that the only purely good thing is a good will, one that is guided only by duty, which he then analyses as action in conformity with the categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim which one can at the same time will to be a universal law. But when it comes to the ‘meritorious’ duty to help others, he argues that one could not will a law that others’ needs should be ignored since one may well come to need help oneself and, ‘by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself’.Footnote 4
Perhaps the morally relevant distinction is not between the wholly other-regarding and the partly self-regarding, but rather between a ‘we’ attitude and a ‘me’ attitude. The moral question is not ‘How should I behave for my benefit?’ but rather, ‘How should we behave for our benefit?’ And here I, with my interests, still count as one of us. Kant, again, brings out this collective aspect of morality when he considers that the categorical imperative can also be expressed in terms of a ‘kingdom of ends’, where each imagines themselves as both ruler and subject and acts, as subject, in accord with that legislation which, as ruler, they would enact.Footnote 5 Aren't I here imagining the kind of state which I, with my interests, could will to live in?
Problems arise (and perhaps this is what Moran meant) only if one seeks a philosophy or metaphysic which guarantees that the answers to the questions ‘What is best for me?’ and ‘What is best for us?’ are always the same, and which thus seeks to reduce virtue to self-interest. But that is not to say that self-interest should have no role in moral philosophy.
Thus it seems mistaken to suppose that the question of what is in a person's own interest is not a moral question, and implausible to suppose that considerations of self-interest can play no part in moral philosophy.
