Counting the Many is a rewarding book richly deserving of a wide audience in political science. Regardless of specialization, most political scientists will find insightful, useful analysis in this book. Supermajority procedures, after all, are ubiquitous—in clubs, community associations, universities, constitutions, and decision-making bodies at every level of government from local to international. Over time, they have become increasingly central to United States national politics, as a result of evolving practices in the U.S. Senate.
Melissa Schwartzberg’s central argument is that supermajority rule “has distinctive liabilities … that make it incapable of remedying the defects of majority rule” (p. 4). The book’s focus is first historical and then analytical. Schwartzberg delves into collective choice practices from antiquity and the Middle Ages to illuminate the historical origins of voting itself and its subsequent variants in the forms of majority and supermajority rule. Schwartzberg then forcefully critiques each of the modern arguments in favor of supermajoritarianism.
In this review, I will focus primarily on what Schwartzberg’s critique can say to supermajority practices in the U.S. Senate. Senate procedure has long been an object of criticism, reform proposals, and impassioned defense. These debates have intensified as rising partisan conflict has rendered supermajority requirements a higher bar to legislative action. Although the Senate is mentioned in Schwartzberg’s book, it is by no means a focus. Even so, a thoroughgoing critique of supermajoritarianism ought to have implications for a political institution that routinely requires supermajorities to function at all. To what extent can Schwartzberg’s analysis inform debates about Senate procedure?
Schwartzberg’s chief objection to supermajoritarianism is that it violates the basic democratic principle of one person, one vote. By permitting a minority to prevail over a majority, it weights some votes more heavily than others. As such, supermajority rule constitutes an “affront to the members’ dignity; it fails to treat members with equal respect” (p. 7). Although a compelling argument in the realm of logic, it is not clear how one begins to overlay Schwartzberg’s critique on current debates about Senate procedures.
At the outset, it is not at all straightforward how an argument emphasizing the importance of democratic equality applies to the Senate. Senators represent states of vastly unequal populations. It is hard to take special umbrage at procedures that weigh some senators’ votes more heavily than others in a body that grants equal representation to Wyoming’s 584 thousand residents and California’s 39 million. Of course, supermajority procedures in the Senate do nothing to counterbalance the effects of equal state representation. Depending on how Senate votes break down, supermajority requirements may further multiply the outsized voting weight of small state constituencies. Even so, it is difficult to criticize a body that deviates so far from the principle of one person, one vote in its basis of representation for failing to weigh all votes equally in its internal decision-making processes.
It is also challenging to argue that supermajoritarianism in the Senate is an “affront to members’ dignity” when it is simply not perceived as such. Despite the extraordinary frustrations of legislating in such an environment, it is astonishingly rare to hear a senator criticize the Senate’s procedures in anything resembling such strong terms. Even the most reform-minded senators do not go so far as to endorse simple majority rule for legislation. Instead, senators have come to see supermajoritarianism as a defining feature of the body. In conversations with Senate staffers over the years, I’ve often heard aides of both parties ask, “What’s the point of even having a Senate if it operates according to majority rule, just like the House of Representatives?” Two veteran Senate aides recently published a book that terms the filibuster “the soul of the Senate” (Arenberg and Dove, 2012). Theirs is simply a mainstream view among Senate insiders of both parties. Regardless of the strength of Schwartzberg’s logic, it is sure to fall flat if invoked in a body where so many members see supermajoritarianism as a constitutive part of a valued institution, rather than as an affront to their equal dignity.
In critiquing supermajority procedures, Schwartzberg refers to the important democratic value of “presumptive epistemic equality” (p. 112). “Barring very compelling evidence to the contrary,” she writes, “participants in a collective decision are presumed equally competent to judge whatever matters are put before them” (p. 112). Schwartzberg rightly emphasizes that supermajority rule weights the judgment of those favoring the status quo more heavily than those favoring change. She persuasively argues against building in biases for favored outcomes like this, except under restrictive circumstances, such as juries, where there is grave risk of an erroneous decision, as in false conviction (p. 105).
Nevertheless, it is a challenge to relate a critique grounded in the democratic value of “epistemic equality” to debates over Senate rules. Senators, of course, do engage in independent judgment and reasoning about policy questions. But, at least as importantly, they are also representatives of political parties and the coalitions of interests that elect them and sustain their reelection. Senators and other elected representatives are very different from the ordinary citizens selected to participate in the “deliberative assemblies” Schwartzberg holds up as exemplars. She cites the case of a British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly appointed in 2004 to consider a set of electoral reform proposals, the members of which were randomly drawn from voter registration lists (pp. 188–91). It might be reasonable to assume that assembly members selected at random from among the citizenry would be primarily engaged in exercising judgment about the policy questions put before them. But senators’ responsibilities extend far beyond the exercise of reason and judgment about policy. They must attend to their political stakes. They take policy positions and cast votes with an eye not just to their own individual reason and judgment, but in reference to the need to maintain the political coalitions that elected them. As such, they have prior commitments to the parties, interests, and individuals who are essential to their political survival. In this sense, deliberation in a representative assembly bears little similarity to jury-style deliberations among ordinary citizens. A critique that emphasizes the importance of weighing equally the independent judgments of equal individuals applies awkwardly to bodies made up of partisan elected representatives.
Schwartzberg, of course, is well aware that senators themselves, along with many other practitioners and theorists, continue to argue in favor of supermajority procedures. Taking these arguments in turn, she persuasively challenges each of the major claims, namely that supermajoritarianism: “(1) helps ensure institutional stability, (2) promotes consensus building, and (3) grants protection to vulnerable minorities” (p. 9).
She first challenges the extent to which supermajority procedures even work to achieve their stated aims. In particular, she observes, there is no guarantee that supermajority procedures only or even primarily help vulnerable minorities. They can also strengthen privileged or advantaged minorities. After all, institutional rules are endogenous to political power in the first place: “If a minority group is powerful enough to secure for itself threshold representation, it probably does not require special protections against abuse” (p. 174). Supermajority rules also fail to promote consensus under conditions when the status quo itself no longer commands majority support. Under those circumstances, “a requirement of a supermajority . . . increases the number of those who must live under laws they oppose” (p. 12), instead of nurturing broader consensus.
But even when supermajority procedures do achieve such aims, they are not necessary for those purposes. Other procedural devices that do not undercut the democratic value of equal votes can be designed to preserve institutional stability, foster consensus building, and protect vulnerable minorities. Such devices—what Schwartzberg terms “complex majoritarianism”—include lengthy deliberation, multiple majorities, voter referendums, and majority quorums.
Still, I doubt that any of these rational arguments or procedural alternatives would carry all that much sway among senators. Supermajority rules have political value to senators (and to decision makers in other institutions) that are not accounted for here. Supermajority rules serve these political purposes, regardless of whether they are helpful to rational policymaking. In the context of the Senate, one of the most significant is that supermajority procedures empower individuals. An individual senator’s ability to hold up legislative action gives him or her great leverage to obtain concessions. The hold is a valued Senate prerogative.
Another political purpose served by supermajority procedures might be termed cover or blame avoidance. Supermajoritarian rules guarantee that new policies adopted on controversial questions always have wide support. In a partisan institution like the Senate, this almost always means that the policy choice commands support from both parties, hence affording at least some bipartisan cover to those who voted in favor.
Whatever other purposes supermajority institutions serve, they have the important political effect of diffusing responsibility for policy changes. Even when a status quo no longer commands majority support, current officeholders bear little or no political responsibility for it. They cannot and will not be blamed for a status quo they did not create. But even when a status quo is objectionable to many or most people, the act of changing it entails political risks. If the policies lawmakers enact turn out not to work well or have unanticipated downsides or generate backlash, supermajority rules guarantee that one party or one narrow majority will not bear the blame alone.
Majoritarian procedures concentrate political responsibility. This responsibility constitutes a burden as well as an opportunity for legislators. It is perhaps not surprising that risk-averse politicians may well appreciate the political cover provided by supermajority procedures, even at the cost of being able to achieve some of their favored policy aims. I suspect that this is a key reason why supermajority procedures are so widely used in decisionmaking bodies of all kinds. They diffuse potential blame for policies adopted or decisions taken.
