It is not only Alexander alone who has the right to be proud because he rules over many men, but no less right to be proud have they who have true notions concerning the gods.
This quotation from a letter of Aristotle to Antipater (fr. 664 Rose) repeatedly occurs in the Plutarchan corpus.Footnote 1 Plutarch clearly agreed. He regarded rational thinking about the gods as a human's most divine possession and as the most decisive influence on their happiness (De Is. et Os. 378C–D), and, as we have already seen, he adopted the Platonic phrase of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ (κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) (‘assimilation to God [as far as possible]’) as the final end of life (see above, Chapter II, §1).Footnote 2 In several ways, then, God is, as it were, the keystone that lends bearing power to the whole vault of Plutarch's philosophical thinking. A correct understanding of his thought therefore presupposes a deeper insight into his conception of God.
1. A god of philosophers
This, however, is by no means easy. There is no extant work by Plutarch that contains a systematic and comprehensive discussion of his view of God.Footnote 3 Thus, his image of God has to be inferred from specific arguments, isolated passages, and obiter dicta that are scattered all over his work, at the risk of unjustified generalizations. Nevertheless, the gist of his view of God is clear.Footnote 4
Essentially, Plutarch's God is the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus. In that sense, his idiosyncratic interpretation of this dialogue (see above, Chapter II, §3.1) is an important source of information for his thinking about God. Plutarch considers the highest God to be the father and maker of all things (Quaest. conv. 718A; Quaest. Plat. 1000E–1001C). This God dwells at the level of intelligible being, far removed from matter.Footnote 5 He is self-sufficient (De def. or. 413F; Comp. Arist. et Ca. Ma. 4.2) and perfectly good, and indeed lacks none of the virtues (De def. or. 423D).Footnote 6 This also implies that he cannot possibly be regarded as the cause of any evil.Footnote 7
Moreover, God is a providential God and, although he strictly stays in his intelligible realm, far away from our corporeal world, the gap between the two levels is somehow bridged.Footnote 8 Plutarch indeed repeatedly insists that God carefully observes all the details of our earthly existence (Sept. sap. conv. 161F; De sera num. 560B and 562D). The working of this divine providence consists in overseeing and directing (ἐφορᾶν καὶ κατευθύνειν), by providing everything with its first rational principles and seeds (ἀρχὰς καὶ σπέρματα καὶ λόγους) (De def. or. 426A). Such an understanding of providence perfectly squares with the role of the Demiurge, who likewise brings rational order to pre-existent matter. The impact of this ordering providence can also be detected in the course of human history, especially at decisive moments or in great evolutions like the rise of Roman power or the fall of the Roman Republic.Footnote 9 Yet it also affects the life of every single individual, as appears from On the slowness of divine punishments.
This dialogue opens on a note of consternation. ‘Epicurus’ has quite aggressively attacked the doctrine of divine providence with a series of incoherent arguments and then left the company without waiting for a reply. The rest of the group need a few moments to recover, after which they decide to refute the attack by focusing in particular on the problem of God's delay in punishing criminals.Footnote 10 For Patrocleas, such delay actually emboldens criminals (548C–549B) and Olympichus adds that it undermines belief in providence without benefiting criminals at all (549B–E). ‘Plutarch’, who appears as the main character in this dialogue, begins by underlining the need for caution. Given our human limitations, plausibility concerning such matters is the best we can hope for (549F; 550C–D). He then argues that, by postponing punishment, God acts as an example of mildness for us. The classic ideal of ὁμοίωσις θεῷ is thus the starting point of the whole argument (550D–551C). Next, he points out that a delay of punishment makes room for moral improvement and other benefits (551C–553D) and that it ensures that the penalty comes at the right moment and in the appropriate way (553D–F).
‘Plutarch’ then introduces a new perspective by explicitly questioning the implicit presuppositions of all his previous arguments. Whereas these all assume that the punishment is delayed, he now shows that criminals are punished as soon as they have gone wrong. He rhetorically elaborates on the criminals’ fears, sorrows, pangs of remorse, and so on, which make the rest of their lives one prolonged punishment (553F–556E):
Plato says of Herodicus of Selymbria, who contracted consumption, an incurable disease, and became the first person to combine medicine and exercise, that he devised for himself and others with the same ailment a protracted death; likewise all those criminals who seem to have avoided instantaneous catastrophe are in fact paying a more protracted, not more delayed penalty: they are not punished after a longer time, but for a longer time; they have not been punished on growing old, but have grown old in punishment (οὐδὲ γηράσαντες ἐκολάσθησαν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐγήρασαν κολαζόμενοι). (554C–D)Footnote 11
This, of course, is a quite different perspective. We are dealing, as it were, with two different solutions to the same zetema. Both offer aspects of the truth but neither exhausts the subject, and, while being compatible to a certain extent, they cannot simply be fused together into one comprehensive account.Footnote 12
Timon then brings on the ‘third wave’ (a clear allusion to Plato, Resp. 472a3–4), raising the question of children who are punished for their parents’ crimes (556E–557E). Again, ‘Plutarch’ insists that, with this argument about God, he enters an obscure labyrinth and that he can at best claim some plausibility (τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανόν) (558D). He then reminds his listeners of the contagiousness of vice throughout the generations and emphasizes that cities and families are a single whole (558D–560A). Furthermore, we can be confident that criminals will be punished after death and suffer even more when they see that their offspring are in a sorry plight through their fault (560C–561B). Finally, God sometimes curtails wicked intentions before they are translated into bad actions (561C–563B). The arguments of ‘Plutarch’, and the dialogue as a whole, are then crowned by the myth of Aridaeus/Thespesius (see above, Chapter II, §2).
On the slowness of divine punishments contains Plutarch's attempt at a theodicy and gives us a good idea of his considered approach towards the difficult problem of divine providence. It is characterized by a remarkable intellectual honesty. Plutarch knew well enough that he was groping in the dark and did not conceal it from his readers, hence his repeated disclaimers and his insistence on plausibility rather than certainty. Notwithstanding this caution, his view is in line with his Platonic conception of God. All aspects of God's providential working can be explained by his justice, mildness, and concern for what is good. Again, God is not the cause of evil; for Plutarch, all his decisions are perfectly justifiable in a rational way.
2. In search of a middle course
The above discussion has shown that Plutarch basically believes in one God.Footnote 13 This God, moreover, is impersonal: he is connected with true being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν), with the Good (τὸ καλόν), and so on. Yet he has some personal features as well, for the Demiurge is a father figure who takes care of the world and of man. In short, τὸ θεῖον (‘the divine’) and ὁ θεός (‘God’) are often interwoven and mixed up.Footnote 14 However that may be, the essence of Plutarch's Platonic conception of God is obviously at odds with certain aspects of traditional religion.Footnote 15 For the Homeric Olympus is crowded by many gods who often struggle with one another, who help their favourites and spitefully ruin their opponents. Moreover, many traditional rites imply a philosophically problematic view of God, in that they often attempt to prevent or placate the wrath of the gods. All of this is anathema to Plutarch, irreconcilable with his high-minded view of God.Footnote 16
No wonder, then, that Plutarch frequently rejects traditional stories about the gods as myths and false fabrications.Footnote 17 An interesting work in this respect is On superstition, a spirited attack on superstition or δεισιδαιμονία, literally ‘fear of the gods’. And this is precisely what is rejected: the erroneous conviction that the gods are the cause of pain and harm (165B). This conviction, which engenders continuous fears that mar one's whole life, ignores one of the most fundamental insights of Plutarch's thinking of God, viz. that the gods are benevolent and beneficent (166D–E; 167D–E). Everyone who disregards this insight necessarily goes wrong. In that sense, Platonic metaphysics provides us with a very important criterion for our attitude towards the gods.
This also appears from the comparison between superstition and atheism that is a connecting thread in Plutarch's argument. Atheism, too, evidently ignores the insights of Platonic metaphysics and is therefore no less problematic. Plutarch unambiguously rejects it as an intellectual mistake (a bad judgement or κρίσις φαύλη, 165B). Yet, in this work, superstition is seen as even worse, since it involves passions and irrational behaviour. Thus (169F–170A),
for my part, I should prefer that men should say about me that I have never been born at all, and there is no Plutarch, rather than that they should say ‘Plutarch is an inconstant fickle person, quick-tempered, vindictive over little accidents, pained at trifles. If you invite others to dinner and leave him out, or if you haven't the time and don't go to call on him, or fail to speak to him when you see him, he will set his teeth into your body and bite it through, or he will get hold of your little child and beat him to death, or he will turn the beast that he owns into your crops and spoil your harvest.’
The irrational and ridiculous conduct of the superstitious man is described in a lively, sometimes slightly ironic way. We learn how he is tormented by uninterrupted fears, caused by bad dreams (165D–166C). Neither death (166F–167A) nor joyful occasions like participation in the rites (169D–E) bring relief. Moreover, the superstitious man does not even ask for help but simply resigns himself to his miserable situation (168C; 168E–F) and loses himself in ignoble behaviour: he is thoroughly fumigated and smeared all over, while old crones hang on him, as on a peg, whatever they happen to find (168D–E). This evocative description of the ‘ludicrous actions and passions of superstition’ (τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας ἔργα καὶ πάθη καταγέλαστα, 171A) recalls the κρίσις component of Plutarch's psychotherapeutic writings (see above, Chapter IV, §3). It contains a particularly vivid and eye-opening diagnosis that should start off a process of improvement.
On superstition has often been regarded as a youthful work of a rationalistic Plutarch who only became interested in religion and mystery in a later period of his life.Footnote 18 This hypothesis, however, has now been generally abandoned, and rightly so, for, as a matter of fact, the attack on both superstition and atheism is one of the leitmotifs that recur in Plutarch's whole oeuvre.Footnote 19 There are a few tensions between his position in On superstition and what he defends elsewhere,Footnote 20 but they can usually be explained by the difference in context.Footnote 21 Be that as it may, On superstition illustrates several important aspects of Plutarch's attitude towards the religious tradition: (1) the importance of Platonic metaphysics as normative criterion for a correct view of God; (2) a certain sobermindedness and rationalism, averse from excessive credulity;Footnote 22 and (3) a well-balanced middle course that rejects both superstition and atheism. It is no accident that the final word of the work is piety (eusebeia).
3. Plutarch's exegetical principles
Such a piety implies that traditional religion is not completely rejected. On the contrary, many of its components can easily stand the test of Platonic philosophy. Even more, the ‘faith of the fathers’, the patrios pistis, as expressed in myths and rites, should be considered a rich source of the truth. In That the Pythia now does not give her oracles in verse, for instance, Sarapion insists that we should not abandon pious ancestral belief but rather look for solutions for seemingly problematic issues (402E; cf. also De sup. 166B and Amatorius 756B). Next to Platonic metaphysics, the patrios pistis can significantly contribute to a deeper insight into the divine.
Yet metaphysics and ancestral faith are not on the same level. The former, as said above, yields the normative criterion for the correct interpretation of myths and rites and thus has philosophical primacy over the latter: the patrios pistis should only be adopted when it expresses a philosophical truth. In other words, traditional myths and rites should always be examined for compatibility with Platonic metaphysics. This rule reflects one of the most fundamental principles of Plutarch's exegesis: everything should be carried back to reason (ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνοιστέον ἅπαντα; De Is. et Os. 378B). We should never accept myth in a thoughtless and unconsidered way (ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀλογίστως; De sup. 171E–F) but use reason as our mystagogue (De Is. et Os. 378A) and derive from established religious customs what is useful and what symbolizes philosophical truth (cf. De Is. et Os. 380F). This will also entail a solemn view of God: semnotes (‘solemnity’) is a term that repeatedly occurs in Plutarch's thinking about God and that apparently yields an additional criterion for a correct understanding of the divine.Footnote 23
Moreover, we should not easily connect one entire myth with one philosophical insight but carefully ponder different details: ‘We must not treat myths as if they were rational accounts at all, but we should adopt that which is appropriate in each myth in accordance with its verisimilitude’ (De Is. et Os. 374E). This exegetic principle illustrates both the thoroughness that the interpretation of myth requires and the mutual relation between myth and logos. What we find here is essentially a philosophical deconstruction of myth. Indeed, traditional myth should be dismantled into its separate components, which should then, if possible, be connected with (coherent or disconnected) philosophical truths.
Such a philosophical deconstruction makes it possible to integrate the patrios pistis to a great extent into Platonic philosophy, even more so since this patrios pistis is itself open to philosophical adaptation and refiguration. It shows a remarkable plasticity that mainly rests on its historical dimension.Footnote 24 For indeed, the ancestral faith can be traced back to primitive sages who, long ago, expressed their natural philosophy in myths and in a theology such as is found in mystery ceremonies (μυστηριώδης θεολογία).Footnote 25 Myths and rites therefore contain many seeds of the truth, though usually veiled, in the form of riddles and symbols.Footnote 26
Plutarch's general thinking about God and religion thus shows a delicate balance between the fundamental primacy of Platonic philosophy and the great importance of the ancestral tradition. In this balance, we find the beating heart of his Academic philosophy. It is based on an attitude that is very often mentioned in his works, that is, εὐλάβεια πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. In the Lives, this ‘caution towards the divine’ usually refers to pious respect for the gods.Footnote 27 In De sera num., Plutarch connects it explicitly with the Academy (549E–F), acknowledging that we cannot reach certain knowledge about the gods and that plausibility (τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ πιθανόν; 558D) is the best we can obtain in such matters (cf. 550C; 561B). This epistemological limitation, however, precisely stimulates creative thinking and careful questioning of the religious tradition. We should become skilled trackers of the truth (Amatorius 762A). In short, we should adopt a zetetic attitude towards the patrios pistis, while being aware that definitive certainty is beyond reach.
This, however, is only one side of Academic ‘caution towards the divine’. The recognition of our human limitation does not exclude the possibility that at least some certainty can be reached. When hearing myths about the base conduct of the gods, we should ‘spit and cleanse the mouth’ (De Is. et Os. 358E, with reference to Aeschylus, TrGF 3.354).
One should not timorously, or as though under the spell of superstition in a holy place, shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate, but should rather acquire the habit of exclaiming with confidence ‘wrong’ and ‘improper’ no less than ‘right’ and ‘proper’. (De aud. poet. 26B)
Such passages interestingly show that Academic caution towards the divine can perfectly be reconciled with a certain confidence. God does move in a mysterious way, yet there can be no doubt about the fact that he has nothing at all to do with evil. At least a limited secure insight can be reached through Platonic metaphysics.
4. Demonology
Even on such fundamental issues, Academic eulabeia (‘caution’) prevents unjustified overconfidence. For here we encounter a particularly difficult problem: the ancestral tradition overflows with stories about the bad behaviour of the gods. If we have to prune all of them away, we risk ending up with a drastically mutilated patrios pistis. If we really want to take the ancestral tradition seriously as a source of wisdom, we should take pains to throw light on these aspects as well (see De Pyth. or. 402E). Covering all this up is not really an example of penetrating zetesis and it is to Plutarch's credit that he does not shy away from the problem but tries to find plausible solutions.
One such solution is provided by an elaborate theory of daimones.Footnote 28 This theory gives him a particularly interesting way to explain the wicked actions of malicious gods without contradicting his own Platonic view of God. Along the lines of this demonological approach, the wicked deeds that the tradition attributes to the gods should be ascribed to bad demons, intermediate beings that possess divine powers but also share in human passions.Footnote 29 That Plutarch did not a priori rule out the existence of such bad demons is suggested by several famous passages from the Lives of Dion and Brutus.Footnote 30 At the outset of this pair, he recalls that both heroes saw an apparition shortly before their death (Dion 2.3–6). Dion saw a great woman like a tragic Fury (55.1–3). Brutus, for his part, saw a dreadful figure that was standing silently by his side and that subsequently identified itself as ‘I am your evil demon (ὁ σὸς δαίμων κακός) and you'll see me at Philippi’ (Brut. 36.6–7; cf. 48.1; Caes. 69.9–11). Although Plutarch shows a certain reluctance in accepting the truth of these stories,Footnote 31 this reluctance should be regarded as one more example of the Academic eulabeia that does not fall into the trap of excessive credulity. In fact, there are enough indications that Plutarch took seriously the explanations offered by the demonological interpretation.Footnote 32
Plutarch's demonology yields two important advantages: it enables him to make sense of several elements of the patrios pistis – that is, demonology has a conservative function; and it enables him to keep his view of God pure – demonology also has a cathartic function. This also explains why the demonological interpretation usually comes quite early in a zetetic structure. In such interpretations, Plutarch develops a cathartic perspective that makes room for further, more positive speculations about the divine. At the same time, this demonological perspective plays an important part in the argumentative dynamics of the zetema: its purifying role is part and parcel of Plutarch's position and is never taken back.
This, however, is only half of the story. Alongside such bad demons, there also exist good ones. The most important source about the latter is one of Plutarch's best works, On Socrates’ divine sign. This literary dialogue contains an account of the liberation of Thebes in 379 bc. Plutarch tells how a group of conspirators make preparations to deliver their city from Spartan occupation and how they eventually succeed in their mission. Now and then, the action is interrupted by philosophical discussions, so that the whole work shows a sophisticated combination of logoi and praxeis.Footnote 33 The most important topic for discussion concerns Socrates’ notorious divine sign. In a kind of embedded zetema that is smoothly integrated into the rest of the work, several characters look for an explanation of this daimonion. According to the seer Theocritus, it was a kind of vision (580C–F), whereas Galaxidorus understands it as a trivial occurrence such as a sneeze or a random utterance that shows the way in a situation of equality between two propositions (580F–581A; 581F–582C). Simmias then develops an interesting physicalist explanation: Socrates’ pure mind was able to perceive the wordless messages of demons (588C–589F).Footnote 34 He then tells the myth of Timarchus (see above, Chapter II, §2), which identifies a demon with the nous (589F–592F). Finally, Theanor argues that demons are disembodied souls that assist other souls that have reached the end of the cycle of metempsychosis (593A–594A).
Again, we are given a salient example of painstaking zetesis in which various perspectives are used, step by step, in order to throw light on the different dimensions of this complex problem. Here as well, demonology yields an interesting interpretative key to approach the tradition, albeit in a different, complementary sense. Alongside its conservative and cathartic function, it also provides positive insights into our human nature and into the communication between God and man. As such, it is part and parcel of Plutarch's philosophy.
5. The Pythian dialogues
Unlike Socrates, most people have no direct access to the unuttered messages of demons and need the mediation of oracles. Thus we arrive at another important aspect of Plutarch's thinking about God. In the so-called Pythian dialogues,Footnote 35 Plutarch, who served Apollo as his priest in Delphi (see above, Chapter I, §3), discusses several questions that are directly related to the Delphic shrine.
On the E at Delphi deals with the meaning of the mysterious E that had been dedicated in Apollo's temple at Delphi.Footnote 36 The dialogue contains an extensive account of a conversation that Plutarch had in his youth, when he frequented Ammonius’ circle. This account, however, is prefaced by an interesting introduction that places the work into its proper philosophical perspective. Plutarch argues that, while Apollo solves the problems of our lives by his oracles, he raises other problems that challenge our reasoning capacities, thus stimulating a yearning for the truth (384F). This conviction thus constitutes the starting point of the conversation itself. Ammonius claims that Apollo is no less a philosopher than a seer, for riddles like the E cause wonder and thus stimulate enquiry (ζητεῖν), which is the beginning of philosophy (385B–C; a clear reference to Plato, Tht. 155d2–4; cf. Quaest. conv. 680C–D). Thus we again find the dynamics of zetetic thinking with which we are familiar by now: the philosophical dialogue which follows is once again introduced as a vehicle for an open-minded search for the truth.
Six speakers then put forward divergent interpretations. According to Lamprias, the E should be understood as the number five: it was dedicated by the five Wise Men (Chilon, Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus) in order to make clear that they were only five in number and that Cleobulus and Periander were mere impostors (385D–386A). An unnamed member of the company recalls the theory of a Chaldaean visitor, that epsilon is the second vowel and the sun the second planet. The two therefore belong together, since nearly all the Greeks identify the sun with Apollo (386A–B). Nicander the priest adopts the communis opinio that is also endorsed by the guides of the shrine: the E means ‘if’ – understanding E as EI, an old spelling – and introduces the questions of those who consult the god (inquiring ‘if’ they should do something) as well as their wishes (beginning with εἰ γάρ or εἴθε) (386B–D). Nicander's criticism of the logicians naturally entails a reaction from Theon, who emphasizes the importance of the copulative conjunction ‘if’ that forms the basis of the hypothetical syllogism and as such has a crucial part to play in the philosophical search for the truth (386D–387D). Next, Eustrophus suggests that the E is a symbol of the pempad and invites the young ‘Plutarch’ to develop this view. The latter enthusiastically sings the praise of the number five (387D–391E).
Finally, Ammonius proposes a metaphysical interpretation (392A):
It is an address and salutation to the god, complete in itself, which, by being spoken, brings him who utters it to thoughts of the god's power. For the god addresses each one of us as we approach him here with the words ‘Know Thyself,’ as a form of welcome, which certainly is in no wise of less import than ‘Hail’; and we in turn reply to the god ‘Thou art,’ as rendering unto him a form of address which is truthful, free from deception, and the only one befitting him only, the assertion of being.
For, as Ammonius goes on, we human beings belong to the world of becoming and are in a permanent Heraclitean flux, whereas the god exists in all eternity, belonging to the realm of motionless, timeless being, of τὸ ὄντως ὄν (392A–394C). His speech thus forms an illustrative example of Plutarch's general strategy of placing a metaphysical outlook above the ancestral tradition. The two domains retain their own autonomy and the interplay between them is a very complex one. Strictly speaking, Ammonius never explicitly identifies Apollo with being.Footnote 37 His metaphysical speculations throw light on a significant aspect of the god. They do not, however, exhaustively lay bare Apollo's essence but rather his power (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως; 392A) or his mode of being (ὡς ὄντα διὰ παντός; 394A). In short, Ammonius uses one element of the tradition (viz. the puzzling E) as an interesting source that reveals a philosophical truth concerning the god.
In That the Pythia now does not give her oracles in verse, we follow a group of learned men on a guided tour of the Delphic sanctuary and witness their philosophical reactions to different monuments.Footnote 38 When the company finally arrive at Apollo's temple, they sit down on its steps in order to investigate why the oracles are no longer given in verse. In a lengthy speech, Theon develops several considerations that at least partly complement each other. In his view, Apollo makes use of the Pythia as his instrument (ὄργανον). This human instrument, however, also has its own characteristics which the god cannot simply ignore. Apollo acts upon the Pythia's soul through an external impulse, but the specific nature of the Pythia's soul plays its part too. Thus, we should not expect grandiloquent verse from a pure but uncultivated young woman.
This well-balanced ὄργανον theory enables Theon to do full justice to the divine origin of the Delphic oracle while at the same time taking into account its human aspects, and most of his speech concerns the latter.Footnote 39 He insists on the importance of historical evolutions and circumstances, and thus adopts a strikingly down-to-earth approach towards the whole issue. Such an attitude obviously has nothing to do with naïve, unreflecting devotion to the god, nor does it suggest any scepticism or disbelief regarding Apollo's active involvement in the oracular process. The goal of Theon's speech is aptly characterized in its very last words: it is an attempt to reach the god's thought through reasoning (ἐξικνεῖσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ διάνοιαν; 409D).
On the obsolescence of oracles contains a similarly meandering conversation among learned men.Footnote 40 The principal topic, interrupted by several lengthy digressions, concerns the question of why so many oracle sites have been abandoned in Plutarch's day. As usual, different solutions are proposed. Didymus points to the universal wickedness that has caused the departure of the gods (412F–413B), while Ammonius explains the situation by the general depopulation of Greece (413F–414C). These answers basically resemble the approach in That the Pythia now does not give her oracles in verse of giving due attention to both the god's role and the relevance of historical circumstances. Cleombrotus then argues at length that the oracles are not administered by the gods but by demons. When one of these decides to depart, his oracle obviously falls silent (414E–418D). Finally, Lamprias suggests that the soul itself has a prophetic capacity, which is stimulated by vapours and streams coming from the earth. Since these vapours sometimes disappear in one place and come to the surface elsewhere, the oracles inevitably lose their power (431D–434C).
Up to this point, we can easily detect the usual zetetic structure behind the façade of the literary dialogue. Indeed, the lively conversation hardly conceals a series of juxtaposed alternative solutions. Yet Lamprias’ final contribution now raises a powerful objection from Ammonius (435A–B):
A little while ago, we somehow managed to let the argument shift the responsibility for prophecy from the gods to certain daimones; and now we seem to be expelling these also from the oracle and the tripod here, by resolving the principle, or rather the very essence and force of prophecy, into a matter of ‘spirits’, vapours, and exhalations. For the more these balances and warmings and temperings are bound up with physical causes, the more they turn our thoughts away from the gods.Footnote 41
Why, then, should we still sacrifice to the gods and perform the rites before consulting the oracle, if our soul turns out to possess the prophetic power itself and if its inspiration can indeed be explained by purely physical factors? Ammonius here puts his finger on a tricky problem. We have seen before that zetemata usually show an ascending structure in which the more plausible solutions are placed at the end. In this case, however, the god progressively disappears from sight and we end up with a purely material explanation. Should this, then, be considered the most plausible view?
Lamprias recognizes the problem and is forced to situate his point of view in a broader perspective, that is, the theory of two causes. By distinguishing between a material and a divine cause, he is able to maintain his physical explanation (436E–F) while simultaneously ascribing a role to demons (436F–437A) and acknowledging the presence of the god (437A–C). Thus he arrives at a (partial) fusion of the different perspectives, something that we only occasionally find in Plutarch's works. This rare attempt at a comprehensive synthesis is probably Plutarch's way of preventing or correcting the unjustified inference that the descending structure of the argument (from god over demons to the human soul and material causes) also implies an ascending structure with regard to plausibility. A solution that ignores the divine cause is as one-sided as the one that neglects the material cause (436D–E).
Does this imply that, for once, the philosophical enquiry has yielded a definitive solution? Not at all. Typically enough, Lamprias emphasizes that his view is open to many objections and he invites his friends to re-examine the issue frequently (438D–E). The last word, then, is not one of triumph or even self-confidence, but one of caution and willingness to continue the search for the truth.
6. Wisdom from abroad: delving into the Egyptian lore
The leitmotif of the picture so far is Plutarch's continuous search for a delicate balance between the ancestral religious tradition and philosophical insight, between nomos and logos. A similar circumspect approach returns in his reception of the myths and rites of non-Greek people.Footnote 42 This appears especially in On Isis and Osiris. This lengthy treatise, dedicated to his friend Clea, a priestess at Delphi,Footnote 43 gives a good idea of his attitude towards Egyptian religion in both its breadth and its depth.Footnote 44
After a programmatic introduction (351C–355D)Footnote 45 and the account of the myth (355D–359D), Plutarch proposes four different interpretations. According to the euhemeristic point of view, Osiris was originally a king (359D–360D), whereas the demonological interpretation considers Osiris and Isis as demons who became gods through their virtue (360D–363D). Along the lines of a physical allegory, Osiris can also be understood as the general principle and power of moisture, while Typhon is associated with everything dry and fiery (363D–369A). All of these interpretations throw interesting light on several aspects of the Egyptian myth and rites, although none of them is entirely unproblematic. The last interpretation deals with the matter from a metaphysical point of view. Everything that is orderly and good should be honoured as the image of Osiris (371A–B; 377A). The god is far removed from the earth, is the first intelligible principle (382C), and shows some features of the Platonic Idea of the Good (383A). Isis is understood as the receptive power that longs for the order of Osiris but who also leaves room for Typhon, the origin of everything that is harmful and bad.
Thus, the zetetic dynamics of Plutarch's thinking once again yield a particularly rich and multifaceted interpretation that lays bare the different dimensions (and tensions) of the Egyptian myth. The fundamental exegetical principles on which the treatise is based are neatly summarized in the following passage, taken from the last part of the work (377F–378A):
Nor do we think of the gods as different gods among different peoples, nor as barbarian gods and Greek gods, nor as southern and northern gods; but, just as the sun and the moon and the heavens and the earth and the sea are common to all, but are called by different names by different peoples, so for that one rationality which keeps these things in order and the one Providence which watches over them and the ancillary powers that are set over all, there have arisen among different peoples, in accordance with their customs, different honours and appellations. Thus men make use of consecrated symbols, some employing symbols that are obscure, but others those that are clearer, in guiding the intelligence toward things divine, though not without a certain hazard. For some go completely astray and become engulfed in superstition; and others, while they fly from superstition as from a quagmire, on the other hand unwittingly fall, as it were, over a precipice into atheism.
The diversity of divine names and religious customs can thus be traced back to a more fundamental unity. This conviction enables Plutarch to reconcile gods like Osiris and Isis unproblematically with the fait primitif of the patrios pistis. In On superstition he warns against dishonouring and transgressing ‘the divine and ancestral dignity of piety’ (τὸ θεῖον καὶ πάτριον ἀξίωμα τῆς εὐσεβείας) by using barbarian phrases (166B).Footnote 46 A similar note of caution appears at the end of the passage quoted above, where he likewise points to the dangers of both superstition and atheism (see also 355C–D). Yet Plutarch also shows the way in which these dangers can be overcome.
In his view, the religious tradition should be regarded as a rich source of symbols that lead thought to the divine (τὰ θεῖα). The same conviction occurs elsewhere in the treatise as well. Egyptian theology is called a riddling wisdom (αἰνιγματώδη σοφίαν; 354C) that contains reflections and refractions of the truth (ibid.) and that needs philosophical reason as a mystagogue (378A).Footnote 47 This philosophical logos provides interpretative beacons, for not everything conduces to a deeper insight into the truth about the gods. Plutarch explicitly says that he omits several ‘useless and superfluous’ parts of the myth (355D; cf. 358E). In the present passage, he even reduces all the different traditions to their very essence, that is, the one rationality and the one providence with its ancillary powers. Thus, he once again looks at religious customs from the perspective of his Platonic philosophy. This obviously implies an interpretatio graeca of Egyptian religion: for Plutarch, Isis is a Greek word (351F)Footnote 48 and the whole story about the Egyptian gods basically represents Plato's account of the generation of the universe in the Timaeus.
Does this also imply that Plutarch ultimately failed to do justice to the Egyptian perspective by forcing it into the straitjacket of Greek philosophical thinking? To a certain extent it does,Footnote 49 although we should add that he deals with Egyptian religion as with his own patrios pistis. In both cases, the same exegetical rules apply. Moreover, Plutarch really took seriously the Egyptian lore and his characterization of it as a riddling wisdom is no empty term. Indeed, it is remarkable how many elements from Egyptian wisdom are discussed in the treatise. Not only the myth in all its details but also many rites and customs are mentioned and interpreted. All this should be appreciated as precious paths to the truth.Footnote 50 In the end, however, the input of philosophy is decisive: the true votary of Isis is not the one who confines himself or herself to external aspects of her cult but who philosophically investigates the truth it contains (352C). Here, as ever, zetesis has the last word.
7. The gods of the patrios pistis
We have seen how Plutarch succeeds in reconciling many components of the patrios pistis with his Platonic conception of God through a many-sided and thorough zetetic reinterpretation. The interpretative horizon of his thinking is his conception of one intelligible God. The key passage from On Isis and Osiris discussed above (§6) suggests a monotheistic point of view. Such a position is obviously opposed to ancestral polytheism. Many negative aspects of the behaviour of the traditional gods can be explained away through a demonological interpretation, of course, but we now have to face a much more radical suggestion: should we not completely abandon the traditional belief in many gods and replace it by a philosophically justified belief in the one truly existent and perfect God?
This is not the impression we get when reading Plutarch's works, where polytheism is often endorsed without any problem. Plutarch recognizes that different gods have their own domains (De tranq. an. 472A–B) and are associated with different rituals (Adv. Col. 1119E–F). He also refers to many traditional surnames of the gods.Footnote 51 All this, however, entails a crucial question: what is the relation between the highest God, father and maker of the universe, the Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus, on the one hand, and the hotchpotch of all too human Olympians, on the other hand?
A Jove principium. There is no doubt that Plutarch, in line with tradition, considers Zeus as the supreme deity.Footnote 52 He is characterized by Thrasyllus as ‘the great leader in heaven’ (Quaest. conv. 722D: ὁ μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ; cf. Non posse 1102E). In Crete, so Plutarch says, there is a statue of Zeus without ears, which makes sense since ‘it is not fitting for the ruler and lord of all to listen to anyone’.Footnote 53 Zeus's superiority rests on his knowledge and wisdom (De Is. et Os. 351D–E; see also De aud. poet. 32A). Not everything the poets tell us about the gods is correct (De aud. poet. 17A and 25F) but they sometimes offer helpful insights. Pindar's characterization of Zeus as the ‘best of artificers’ is entirely fitting for a providential Demiurge;Footnote 54 and the early tragic poet Thespis’ view of the god is perfectly in line with Plato's (De aud. poet. 36B–C). We thus see the same exegetical method at work again: problematic aspects of the traditional image of Zeus are either rejected as offensive and wrong, or simply ignored as useless, whereas other elements are strategically selected and reoriented towards a philosophical perspective.
From father Zeus to his son Apollo. Plutarch's view of the oracular god has received far more attention.Footnote 55 Scholars focus especially on the dialogue On the E at Delphi, which is not merely regarded as the most important source for Plutarch's understanding of Apollo but even for his conception of God.Footnote 56 The awkward implication of this view is that Apollo, rather than Zeus, occupies the highest position in Plutarch's pantheon, which has reasonably surprised several scholars.Footnote 57 Yet, although the dialogue, and notably Ammonius’ contribution, is definitely interesting, we should not overemphasize its importance.Footnote 58 We should not forget that Ammonius’ view is strongly conditioned by the specific matter under discussion: the mysterious E. This letter reveals one important aspect of the god, no doubt, but not his complete essence (see above, §5). The traditional Apollo is much more than τὸ ὄντως ὄν or the One.Footnote 59 Several aspects of Apollo are indeed ignored by Ammonius, although Plutarch no doubt considered them relevant.Footnote 60 Moreover, the caveat of Academic eulabeia towards the divine remains relevant for Ammonius’ explanation as well.Footnote 61 In short, his speech illustrates the rich opportunities that a Platonic interpretation of the traditional god Apollo offers, but reveals only one aspect of the truth, which is rooted in the specific focus of the context. It would be rash to conclude on the basis of this speech that Apollo has, for Plutarch, taken the place of Zeus.
A similar approach can be found in the Dialogue on love, where Eros appears as a great god. In a lengthy speech, ‘Plutarch’ elaborates on the god's power and benefactions (756A–766B). Eros there appropriates several essential characteristics of the Platonic Demiurge, but again, this does not imply that he replaces Zeus or Apollo or should be identified with them.Footnote 62 The same holds true for Osiris in On Isis and Osiris. Time and again, Plutarch looks at different gods in different contexts through the lens of his Platonic metaphysics. This results in a sublime image of the individual gods that makes them acceptable in the context of his Platonic thinking. While it is true that all these individual gods thus begin to resemble one another, being all in turn associated with the same intelligible realm of true Being and Beauty, Plutarch nowhere says that we can extrapolate his comments on individual gods to one theologically coherent and monotheistic system.
It is no coincidence that Plutarch never clarifies the mutual relations between the different gods, since this is a real problem for his thinking. He prefers to zoom in on one individual god and deal with him (or her) from his philosophical perspective. This implies that everything that he says about the traditional gods is related to its specific context. It is also evident from one of the most prominent images of God (or particular gods) in his works, viz. the sun. Again, the traditional patrios pistis (which identifies Apollo with the sunFootnote 63) there encounters Plato's metaphysics (where the sun appears as the image of the Idea of the Good; cf. Plato, Resp. 508b12–509b9), and there too, the latter provides the normative hermeneutic key for the interpretation of the former. Since every god is by definition good, the sun can be the image of every god: of Apollo, but no less of Zeus, Eros, Osiris, or simply of the highest God.Footnote 64
8. Conclusion
Plutarch's thinking about God and the gods has been characterized in many ways. It has often been connected with a celebrated passage from On the obsolescence of oracles, where Cleombrotus’ project is introduced as an enquiry (ἱστορία) to serve as material (ὕλην) for a philosophy that has theology as its goal (410B).Footnote 65 Others regard it as a ‘philosophical monotheism with loopholes for polytheism’,Footnote 66 as ‘henotheism’,Footnote 67 or as ‘polylatric monotheism’.Footnote 68 Each of these labels throws light on important aspects of Plutarch's position but, to a certain extent, they also risk obscuring the dynamics of his sophisticated approach towards the rich religious and philosophical tradition. Its beating heart is the zetetic attitude, averse from over-systematization, characterized by a great respect for the patrios pistis but also by sobermindedness, a critical spirit, and eulabeia towards the divine. Plutarch considered myths and rites with far-reaching benevolence and mobilized all the subtleties of his philosophical thinking in order to enthrone them as precious sources of wisdom. Nevertheless, while doing so, he always observed the clear standards of reason. These guided him on a pious middle course that avoids both atheism and superstition and that entails a philosophical purification of the ancestral religious tradition. Reason is the driving force of a kind of sublimation process,Footnote 69 in which distinct features of the traditional gods are sacrificed on the altar of philosophy. Colourful figures like the Homeric Zeus or Apollo are thus clothed in the tunic of ‘true Being’ or the cloak of ‘the Good’.
Whereas the traditional Olympians mainly inspire awe and fear, the divine in Plutarch's view now inspires admiration, even love. The lover indeed turns his regard to the divine and intelligible Beauty (Amatorius 766A: πρὸς τὸ θεῖον καὶ νοητὸν καλόν; cf. 765D and 765F) – the impersonal phrasing is noteworthy in this context of love. A similar process may occur after death. In the eschatological myth of On the face that appears in the orb of the moon, Plutarch relates how the mind (νοῦς) is separated from the soul ‘by love for the image in the sun through which shines forth manifest the desirable and fair and divine and blessed (τὸ ἐφετὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ θεῖον καὶ μακάριον) towards which all nature in one way or another yearns’ (944E).
Again, the same impersonal phrasing. We could wish such a fate on Plutarch himself. We could even wish that he became a hero after his death, and then a daimon, and even a god.Footnote 70 But whether he really expected to encounter his ‘beloved Apollo’ (De E 384E) as a personal god after his death is far from clear. It is a question which I prefer, with due Plutarchan eulabeia, to leave open, while, in an equally Plutarchan vein, insisting on the need for further zetesis.
