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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 June 2005
Readers of the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics need hardly be told that each year a huge amount of very valuable work in bioethics is carried out in the academic's study and the university seminar room and appears in the pages of specialist, restricted-readership journals. However, if it is to be as effective, relevant, and influential as it deserves to be, there arguably comes a point when this work needs to leave the confines of the academy and engage the wider public. This perhaps happens less often than it should.
Readers of the Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics need hardly be told that each year a huge amount of very valuable work in bioethics is carried out in the academic's study and the university seminar room and appears in the pages of specialist, restricted-readership journals. However, if it is to be as effective, relevant, and influential as it deserves to be, there arguably comes a point when this work needs to leave the confines of the academy and engage the wider public. This perhaps happens less often than it should.
In 2004, though, the academic debate about the ethics of human cloning, both reproductive and therapeutic, was very definitely taken to the public in the United Kingdom. This commendable move was achieved chiefly (though not exclusively) through two events: the publication of John Harris's book On Cloning, which was aimed at a general, nonspecialist readership, and the airing by the BBC on December 16 of a high-profile, interactive drama-documentary entitled If … Cloning Could Cure Us. The latter also allowed a range of genetics interest groups to make their voices more widely heard, to announce their existence to the public, and to enter into public discussion with academic ethicists. Harris's short and lucid book, on the other hand, appeared in Routledge's “Thinking in Action” series, which has among its stated aims that of “taking philosophy to its public.” Julian Savulescu, in his contribution to the book's blurb, states that the volume “will change the way society views cloning.” As a prediction, this probably contains a fair measure of overstatement, yet the message is clear: This is a book that deserves and, significantly, seeks a wide audience.
It seems particularly apt that, out of all the concerns of academic bioethicists in the United Kingdom, the question of the ethics of cloning should have been placed in the public arena in this way. In November 2004, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) granted the first ever license to British scientists permitting the cloning of human embryos for stem cell research, though the HFEA had possessed the legal authority to grant such a license since 2001.1
BBC. Scientists given cloning go-ahead. 11 August 2004. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3554474.stm.
Almost as soon as the news of this development broke, a legal challenge was mounted by Peng Voong, a member of the Lawyers' Christian Fellowship.2
BBC. Legal challenge to human cloning. 17 November 2004. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/4019543.stm.
The Lawyers' Christian Fellowship. Judicial review of human cloning licence. 17 November 2004. Available at: http://www.lawcf.org/newsdetail.php?ID=99.
Voong's challenge was given vocal support by the Pro-Life Alliance, one of a number of groups in the United Kingdom publicly opposing embryonic stem cell research, and Europe's first pro-life political party, whose manifesto declares that “Absolute respect for innocent human life from the one-cell embryo stage until natural death is the keystone of justice.”4
The Pro Life Alliance. Pro Life Alliance Manifesto. 2001. Available at: http://www.prolife.org.uk/about/manifesto.htm.
The television program If … Cloning Could Cure Us, which was immediately followed by a live televised Newsnight debate, was set in 2014 and presented a fictitious court case against a doctor, Alexandra Douglas, who had experimented on cloned embryos over the age of 14 days (in 2014, it seems, the Human Embryology Act 1990—which sets this as the limit for experimentation on human embryos—will still be in force). The courtroom action was punctuated with remarks from various “talking heads” explaining the science of cloning, its risks, and the ethical issues it raises. These real-life contributors included John Harris, CORE's Josephine Quintavalle, HFEA Chair Suzi Leather, sociologist Tom Shakespeare, and a number of stem cell researchers. The debate that followed the program featured Harris again, along with Donald Bruce, Director of the Church of Scotland's Society, Religion and Technology Project (SRT); Sue Mayer, Director of Genewatch, a group that monitors developments in genetic technology and holds that the public “should have a voice in whether or how these technologies are used”;5
Gene Watch UK. Accessed 22 December 2004 at: http://www.genewatch.org/.
In the drama, Dr. Douglas had experimented on 19-day-old embryos, supposedly to find a cure for the paralyzing spinal injury sustained by a young man, Andrew Holland, in a climbing accident. As a result of his injury, Andrew had developed severe and life-threatening complications, and it was these complications that formed the cornerstone of the case for the defense. That is, although Dr. Douglas' actions were clearly illegal, a defense of necessity was being argued by her lawyer: The claim was that her actions were necessary to save Andrew's life. It was necessary to experiment with 19- rather than 14-day-old embryos, as at this stage in the embryos' development differentiated stem cells could be isolated, thus reducing the risk of Andrew's therapy causing tumors.
Both Andrew and Dr. Douglas were possessed of film-star good looks, and the story was peppered with various dramatic devices, apparently designed to hold the attention of those for whom the science and the ethics proved too demanding. So, it transpired that Dr. Douglas had enjoyed a short-lived affair with the chief witness for the prosecution, the viewing audience was treated to repeated shots of Andrew's dramatic climbing accident and rescue by helicopter, the courtroom was invaded by people shouting “baby killers!”, and Andrew was sprayed with fake blood through his letter box. Interestingly, Dr. Douglas was portrayed throughout as arrogant (which, I suppose, is one influential stereotype of the pioneering scientist), and it was strongly hinted that Andrew had been reckless in attempting his fateful climb.
The central issue of the drama, then, was whether experimentation on 19-day-old cloned human embryos could be justified if it would be likely to save an adult human life. However, seemingly in order more accurately to represent the many facets of the cloning debate, other issues were “shoehorned” into the story. So, for instance, one of the witnesses for the prosecution was a scientist who had unsuccessfully attempted reproductive human cloning (in true hubristic, mad scientist fashion, the person he had attempted to clone was himself). The presence of this scientist seemed designed merely to point out to the viewing audience the dangers of reproductive cloning: His attempts had resulted in miscarriages, deformed fetuses, and the death of a woman in whose womb a cloned embryo had been implanted. The conclusion was that reproductive cloning was “grossly unsafe.” Though its educational purpose was clear, it was not immediately obvious what relevance this section of the story had to the issue of therapeutic cloning. Admittedly, the witness' speculative claim was that all cloned cells produced through cell nuclear replacement (CNR) might have a tendency to mutate, including any stem cells produced in this way for therapeutic purposes. It was admitted, however, that there is no evidence to support this view.
Even more extraneous to the central issue of the court case was the calling to the witness stand of a Chechen woman who had suffered severe complications after selling eggs for use in embryonic stem cell research. Her selling of eggs had been carried out solely to avoid poverty. Again, the program-makers' educational intent was clear: to draw attention to the important issue of the risks incurred by egg donors and to their possible exploitation. Nonetheless, this section of the drama had little bearing on the question of whether Dr. Douglas' defense of necessity was sound. It did, however, give Josephine Quintavalle the chance to comment that, as well as avoiding the destruction of embryos, research into and use of adult stem cells in preference to embryonic stem cells would avoid potential injustice to women, in the shape of “inevitable exploitation.” Tom Shakespeare, too, warned of a potential “bidding war for eggs” and of the commodification of women. This standpoint was balanced by the suggestion that by 2014, stem cells themselves might be used to create the eggs to be used in CNR. This last point was reiterated by John Harris in the debate that followed the drama-documentary.
Quintavalle's main argument, however, and that of the fictitious case for the prosecution, was that there could be no justification for destroying one human life (in the shape of a cloned embryo) to save another. Where Quintavalle and the prosecution parted company was in the former's insistence that even embryos up to the age of 14 days (which is the stage at which the “primitive streak” appears) ought not to be used in stem cell research or therapy. And, Quintavalle maintained, there is simply no need to use embryonic stem cells given that adult stem cells can be used instead.
Interestingly, two days before the program was transmitted, a CORE press release found Quintavalle praising the BBC, stating that “I think this is the first time the debate has been presented in the UK in a relatively objective way…. The BBC2 take on the issue will hopefully make the public aware at last of the actual rather than hyped reality of the debate.”6
CORE (Comment on Reproductive Ethics). BBC rekindles adult v embryo stem cell cloning debate. 14 December 2004. Available at: http://www.corethics.org/document.asp?id=cpr141204.txt&se=2&st=5.
The much publicised BBC2 programme on cloning for stem cell therapy sadly did not deliver the goods…. Patients and the public deserve to be told the absolute truth about the embryo versus the adult stem cell, and I'm very sorry that BBC science delivered such an approximate version of fact…. Journalist Andrew Slorance, participant in the … debate which followed the programme, and who was injured by a fall at 14, in particular is encouraged to check out the true state of affairs in spinal cord repair. One obviously has sympathy for his disability, but his agreement with the ubiquitous John Harris that not only embryos but also aborted fetuses should be put at the disposal of adults for treatment purposes was chilling.7
CORE. “Futuristic” BBC2 cloning programme ten years behind actual science. 17 December 2004. Available at: http://www.corethics.org/document.asp?id=cpr171204.txt&se=2&st=5.
The press release goes on to comment that “there are today a number of centres in the world already providing such therapy [centers in Lisbon, Russia, and Korea are cited], using uncontroversial adult stem cell therapies.” Although the program admittedly did not mention these centers specifically, it did allow for ample (though not unopposed) statement of the view that research on adult stem cells is preferable to research on embryonic stem cells. This position was forcefully expressed in the courtroom drama and by Quintavalle herself, as well as—in slightly more cautious tones—by Sue Mayer in the subsequent debate. Perhaps, then, Quintavalle's change of opinion was occasioned by the presence of “the ubiquitous John Harris,” who pointed out the inconsistency in British society's attitudes toward the moral status of embryos. That is, the law in the United Kingdom forbids experimentation on embryos over the age of 14 days, but permits the (sometimes very late) abortion of fetuses. There should, Harris argued, be uniformity here: If a line is to be drawn marking when an embryo or fetus is entitled to protection, it ought always to be drawn in the same place.
Here the program ironically brought out an area of agreement between Quintavalle and Harris. That is, Quintavalle, too, thinks that the line ought always to be drawn in the same place. She, however, as a member of the pro-life lobby, thinks that it ought to be drawn at conception, an assessment with which, needless to say, Harris does not agree.
It seems that the program's viewers sided, on the whole, with Harris. At the end of the drama, viewers were given the chance to act as jury in the court case and phone in their verdict. Only 19% of those who called the BBC number considered Dr. Douglas to be guilty; the remaining 81% found her not guilty. To these people, at least, the defense of necessity had appeared convincing. Of course, it is hard to know how representative of the U.K. public's opinion in general this verdict is. (An e-mail sent to the BBC asking precisely how many people had called to register their opinion and what the viewing figures for the program had been drew no response at all.) The result is nevertheless interesting, especially as the U.K. public is often portrayed as deeply suspicious of genetic technologies. And comments sent to a BBC web site after the program again found a majority—23 out of 39, with 1 neutral—in favor of therapeutic cloning8
BBC. Embryonic stem cell therapy: have your say. 20 December 2004. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/if/4058371.stm.
The points made in the debate that followed the drama for the most part mirrored those already put forth and, like the drama, focused in the main on the science and ethics of therapeutic, rather than reproductive, cloning. Harris and Slorance came out strongly in favor of the development of therapeutic cloning techniques, whereas Sue Mayer and Donald Bruce, though not vehemently opposed, expressed more caution. Bruce in particular expressed some skepticism about the promises made by scientists for the efficacy of embryonic stem cells, and both restated concerns about where the eggs to be used in therapeutic cloning would come from. Slorance advanced the argument, echoed by Harris, that women who supply eggs ought to be financially rewarded, to encourage more of them to help in, as he put it, “fixing people.”
Toward the end of the debate, a short time was given to questions of the ethics of reproductive cloning. Harris maintained, as he does in On Cloning, that the only ethical difficulty with reproductive cloning lies in its tendency, in experiments with nonhuman animals, to result in a high rate of failure and abnormality. However, he stressed that normal sexual reproduction also has a high rate of failure and abnormality, and that if the rates associated with reproductive cloning could be equalized with those of “normal” reproduction, the only objection to the practice would have been eliminated. This exemplifies a fundamental principle used by Harris in his book and in an article coauthored with Julian Savulescu.9
Savulescu J, Harris J. The creation lottery: Final lessons from natural reproduction: Why those who accept natural reproduction should accept cloning and other Frankenstein reproductive technologies. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;13:90–5.
While Mayer opined, without explanation, that human reproductive cloning would open a “Pandora's box,” Bruce urged that to predetermine someone's genetic makeup is a “wrong act in itself.” It is a shame that the debate was cut short at this point, as Bruce's remark seemed set to lay before the public arguments on the issue of uniqueness and dignity—an issue that has played a large part in the specialist literature on the ethics of cloning.
Harris's On Cloning, being perhaps the most comprehensive survey of the ethics of reproductive and therapeutic cloning yet produced, of course covers many more arguments than those surrounding the issue of uniqueness. However, what he has to say on that issue, taken together with what Bruce says on the SRT project's site, allows the public to engage with the debate that, had time allowed, would doubtless have erupted between Harris and Bruce in the BBC's studios.
Judging by what he writes on the SRT site,10
Bruce D. Should we clone humans? Church of Scotland Society, Religion and Technology Project. 19 November 1998. Available at: http://www.srtp.org.uk/clonhum2.htm.
See note 10, Bruce, 1998.
WHO considers the use of cloning for the replication of human individuals to be ethically unacceptable as it would violate some of the basic principles which govern medically assisted procreation. These include respect for the dignity of the human being.12
Quoted in Harris J. On Cloning. London: Routledge, 2004:34.
Harris is quick to point out that clones frequently occur naturally, in the shape of monozygotic twins, and that we do not typically take the “dignity” of such twins to be violated by the fact that they share their genetic constitution with somebody else. Why, then, assume that the dignity of an artificially produced clone would suffer? This is a familiar point from the cloning literature, but one that it is supremely worthwhile to make to the general public. Quite apart from the point about dignity, it behooves the public to recognize that clones are nothing more than (and, due to a small genetic contribution from the egg donor, something a little less than) identical twins. That is, there is a common misconception that a clone is in some mysterious sense the same organism as that from which it was cloned. Only such a confused view could lead to the five requests that Scotland's Roslin Institute (which produced the world's first cloned mammal, Dolly the sheep) has received from wealthy pet owners, requesting that their beloved animals be “resurrected” through cloning.13
Goldenberg S, Jha A. The world's first cloned pet (cost $50,000). The Guardian. December 24, 2004:2.
Bruce, however, insists that there are ethically significant differences between naturally occurring twinning on the one hand and cloning on the other: These differences, it would appear, would be responsible for the violation of the dignity of human clones. One of these differences is precisely that cloning is deliberate: “It is an intentional controlled action to produce a specific known end.” It might seem that Bruce's argument here is as follows: When twinning occurs naturally, it is ethically unproblematic, because it is not the result of anyone's intentional action. It only becomes unethical when it is intentionally brought about.
The problem with this argument is that, as it stands, it seems to rely on the highly questionable belief that naturally occurring twinning is in some sense unfortunate. If it were not unfortunate, why would it be morally wrong to bring it about intentionally? Indeed, Tuija Takala of the University of Manchester makes just this criticism against another of Bruce's papers on reproductive cloning.14
Takala T. The many wrongs of human reproductive cloning. In: Häyry M, Takala T, Herissone-Kelly P, eds. Bioethics and Social Reality. Amsterdam/New York: Rodopi; 2005:56.
A closer examination of that argument appears to show that it holds the wrongness of cloning to reside in the conjunction of two facts. These are the fact that it is a deliberate act and the fact that clones are examples of identical twins with noncontemporaneous lives. In other words, reproductive cloning is wrong not simply because it is an intentional, controlled action that makes it the case that two people have the same genetic constitution (in which case, natural twinning would have to be held to be unfortunate), but because it is “an intentional controlled action to produce a specific known end,” the known end being (presumably) the genotype of the clone. As Bruce says:
Twinning is a random, unpredictable event, involving the duplicating of a genetic composition which has never existed before and which at that point is unknown. Cloning would choose the genetic composition of some existing person and make another individual with the same genes [my emphasis].15
See note 10, Bruce 1998.
We can surmise, then, that natural twinning avoids being unfortunate on account of the genotype of neither twin being known at the time of birth. It seems to follow that if natural twinning routinely occurred in such a way that there were a gap of, say, 20 years between the birth of the first and the second twin, then it would be unfortunate.
However, it seems that the argument is not quite that straightforward. That is, Bruce appears to move back and forth between locating the wrongness of reproductive cloning in its being an extreme form of control (insofar as it predetermines a person's genetic constitution), and in its being an extreme form of control that produces a known end, insofar as it replicates an existing genetic constitution. Perhaps we can take his considered view to be this:
So far as (1) is concerned, Harris appears to argue that we already choose the genetic constitution of our children in normal sexual reproduction, presumably in virtue of our choice of partner.16
See note 12, Harris 2004:45.
Be that as it may, we can still question the grounds for Bruce's adherence to (1). For instance, it will be quite easy to argue that there is a range of cases in which it straightforwardly would be wrong to select someone's genetic makeup, namely, cases in which that selection would result in a person being born with genetic defects that cause a good deal of suffering. But Bruce's claim is not that it is wrong to select someone's genetic constitution in a restricted range of cases, but that it is always wrong. Furthermore, the act of selection is, as Bruce asserted in the televised debate, wrong in itself, rather than because of any bad consequences it may have. But why is it wrong in itself?
One possible reason that could be given is that the choice of a person's genetic constitution is somehow a choice of that person's very self, or of her essence. The problem with this suggestion is that it appears to involve commitment to a rather crude, and therefore dubious, genetic reductionism—the belief that we are our genes. And, indeed, Bruce explicitly rejects such a reductionist picture of the human being as incompatible with the Christian picture of humankind:
The biblical picture of humanity implies that we are far more than just our genes, or even our genes plus environmental influences, there is also our spiritual dimension, made in God's image, constituting a holistic notion of being, in which the relational element is as important as the individual.17
See note 10, Bruce 1998.
Although we are not identical with our genes, Bruce nevertheless characterizes our genes as a “fundamental part of our makeup.”18
See note 10, Bruce 1998.
I accept it is perfectly possible that I have not correctly identified Bruce's reasons for maintaining the truth of (1) and (2). If so, however, I am unable to see what those reasons are. And it appears that I am in good company: In his book, noting the main difference between naturally occurring twinning on the one hand and cloning on the other, Harris comments:
One identical twin does not set out to “make” her sibling (as may sometimes be the case with CNR), although why this difference if it occurs is morally relevant is difficult to say.19
See note 12, Harris 2004:36.
To conclude, we can confidently assert that, no matter which side of the debates on therapeutic and reproductive cloning the majority of the U.K. public eventually accepts, it is an unqualified good that it has, in the past year, had the issues so clearly and eloquently set before it. Harris's book, the BBC's television program, and the web sites and other publicity materials of the various interest groups can all be said to be offering a valuable public service, in helping the public reach an informed decision on this pressing ethical issue.