Introduction
In 1972, at the height of reform socialism in Hungary, Judit Ember and Gyula Gazdag shot a documentary film entitled A határozat (The Resolution).Footnote 1 This remarkable film – one of the most exceptional primary sources on East European cooperative life – combined re-enactments and real-time footage to document the workings of democracy in a producer cooperative and the pressures of one-party rule in the small village of Felcsút, located fifty kilometres from Budapest. The film offers a rare window into both the official workings and informal subversions of socialist democracy, capturing in real time how legal institutions could serve simultaneously as instruments of party control and as genuine arenas of member resistance. As will be shown below, the case of Felcsút illustrates both the possibilities and the structural limits of cooperative democracy under socialism.Footnote 2 The 1967 Producer Cooperative Act guaranteed the legal status, institutions and decision-making procedures of the producer cooperatives. This process was the foundation of the life of the producer cooperatives, which in many cases influenced the life of an entire town or region.
Yet how could these democratic principles be implemented within a system designed to uphold the power monopoly of the ruling party? The title of this article invokes the Leninist concept of the ‘vanguard’ – the idea that an advanced, class-conscious elite must lead the masses towards socialist transformation – to highlight a central paradox: producer cooperative democracy in Hungary was simultaneously presented as a training ground for socialist citizenship (hence a ‘vanguard’ institution pointing towards future communist society) and constrained by the party-state’s imperative to maintain control. This article argues that producer cooperative democracy represented a significant, if circumscribed, space for genuine collective decision-making in socialist Hungary. While the party’s dominance made community self-governance vulnerable to political interference, the imperative of agricultural modernisation and the legal recognition of collective ownership created real, if limited, opportunities for democratic participation. Producer cooperatives were, in fact, the most functional segment of socialist democracy, based primarily on the partial recognition of the legitimacy of collective ownership and collective interest. ‘Socialist democracy’ as used here refers to the ensemble of participatory institutions – workplace democracy, cooperative self-governance, local council elections – through which the party-state sought to give substantive content to its claim that socialism represented a higher form of democratic organisation than liberal democracy. The concept is used analytically, not normatively: the article examines what socialist democracy meant in institutional practice and where its limits lay, not whether it constituted genuine democracy by any external standard.Footnote 3
During the 1970s and early 1980s, numerous articles and sociological studies were published in Hungary on the subject of democracy in producer cooperatives; after the regime change, however, the topic faded from historical research. C.M. Hann’s ethnographic study of a Hungarian village provides complementary evidence on the gap between formal cooperative institutions and actual social practice.Footnote 4 Nigel Swain examined the formal rules and functioning of producer cooperative democracy from the perspective of managerial control.Footnote 5 Árpád Pünkösti’s Chosen Ones (Kiválasztottak, 1988), a work of investigative reportage drawing on questionnaire responses from some 400 cooperative presidents and extensive interviews, provides uniquely direct evidence on the lived experience of cooperative leadership and the changing relationship between democratic participation and party control across three decades.Footnote 6 Martha Lampland’s ethnographic study of a Hungarian village during the early 1980s provides crucial insight into how cooperative democracy functioned at the local level, arguing that the full commodification of labour was paradoxically completed under socialism as cooperative members were drawn into hierarchical enterprises with formal work regimens.Footnote 7 Zsuzsanna Varga’s research on the agrarian lobby shows how producer cooperative democracy appears as one factor among several – including technocratic expertise and international agricultural knowledge exchange – that contributed to the sector’s relative success.Footnote 8 More recently, József Ö. Kovács and his colleagues have emphasised the coercive dimensions of cooperative formation and the direct underdevelopment of rural social life, arguing that producer cooperatives served primarily the power and propaganda purposes of the socialist reform course.Footnote 9
This article contributes to and complicates both strands of scholarship. On one hand, it confirms Varga’s emphasis on the institutional innovations that distinguished Hungarian cooperatives from the Soviet kolkhoz model. On the other hand, it takes seriously the critical perspective of Ö. Kovács and his colleagues: the violence and social destruction of the collectivisation process they have documented are not in dispute. The article’s argument concerns a distinct period and a distinct set of questions. The post-1967 institutional framework examined here emerged from – and in some respects in response to – the coercive collectivisation process that Ö. Kovács and his colleagues have documented so thoroughly. To acknowledge the genuine democratic elements that emerged in the later period is not to deny the coercive origins of the system; it is to insist that the history of Hungarian producer cooperatives cannot be reduced to either its origins or its ideological self-presentation. The present article also departs from Varga’s interpretive framework in treating cooperative democracy as a substantive analytical category rather than one factor among several contributing to the sector’s economic performance. Where Varga’s analysis foregrounds technocratic expertise and knowledge transfer, the present article foregrounds the legal and institutional conditions of member participation and their structural limits. The evidence presented here suggests that producer cooperative democracy, while certainly constrained and sometimes manipulated, was neither mere window-dressing nor a fully autonomous sphere – it occupied a contested middle ground that deserves more careful analytical attention.
In the following, cooperative democracy is presented as both an element of socialist economic reform and an often paradoxical component of reformist socialist ideology. First, I examine the historical conditions for the emergence of producer cooperative democracy in socialist Hungary, tracing its roots in both utopian socialist thought and the international cooperative movement. I then analyse the debates of the time that focused on the principles and institutions of producer cooperative democracy, showing how reformers sought to balance collective ownership with party oversight. Finally, I contrast the social vision of producer cooperative democracy with surveys on agrarian society and the political–ideological counter-movements that indicated its limits. Throughout, I argue that cooperative democracy represented a genuine, if circumscribed, arena of participatory politics within the constraints of one-party rule.
The Socialist Path to Producer Cooperative Democracy
The documentary discussed above refers several times to the law on producer cooperatives, which defined the framework for their operation and democratic procedures. Even the ruling party could not openly violate the boundaries set by the law – though it controlled the courts and could influence enforcement, direct contradiction of statutory provisions would have undermined the legal legitimacy the regime sought to maintain. It is the trajectory of the cooperative sector from the inter-war period through the Second World War and Stalinist collectivisation that determined its legal regulation in the 1960s.
The cooperative idea had deep roots in both nineteenth-century socialist thoughtFootnote 10 and the international cooperative movement,Footnote 11 both of which left their mark on Hungarian agrarian thought. These traditions became relevant again during the late 1950s and 1960s, when the party-state sought to revitalise a stagnating economy and repair its legitimacy after the 1956 revolution. Hungarian agriculture, which had been technologically backward and exploited through forced requisitions during the Stalinist period, was about to be set on a new course. The cooperative idea had been abused from the very beginning by Stalinist politicians, who subordinated cooperative principles to the imperatives of rapid industrialisation and political control.
To understand the emergence of producer cooperative democracy, one must grasp the economic context of post-1956 Hungary. The Rákosi regime (1948–56) had pursued rapid industrialisation at the expense of agriculture, extracting resources from the countryside through compulsory deliveries at artificially low prices. The kolkhoz-style collective farms established in this period were marked by poor productivity, coerced membership and resentment. After 1956, the Kádár regime faced a dilemma: it needed to complete collectivisation to maintain ideological legitimacy, but it could not afford another wave of rural resistance. The solution was a ‘softer’ approach that promised material incentives, permitted household plots and – crucially – granted cooperatives genuine decision-making authority over production methods. This pragmatic turn created the space for producer cooperative democracy to develop.
In 1947, at the beginning of the nationalisation of the cooperatives, the Hungarian cooperative movement had a history of more than seventy years.Footnote 12 Those who were confident in the operation of the new state cooperatives thought at that time that the state would make great improvements in the field of cooperatives. The 1947 law on cooperatives did not include explicit provisions under the heading of ‘cooperative democracy’, but the foundational principles were present: Law XI of 1947 established the general meeting as the primary organ (42–3§) and enshrined one member, one vote (51§). These principles were repeated in subsequent legislation through 1959, which progressively added members’ rights to deliberation, proposal-making and simple majority voting. What was absent from all of this legislation was not cooperative democracy as such, but the specific innovation of compulsory secret balloting for certain decisions – an innovation that would only come with the 1967 reforms. The Stalinist rule of Mátyás Rákosi, however, sought to wither away some of the traditional cooperatives (commercial, consumer, industrial cooperatives), while the agricultural cooperatives were used to bring the rural peasantry into the state-planned economy. In this way, rural production was redirected in favour of an extensive industrial policy. The Soviet-style kolkhoz system in Hungary was notorious for its servitude and forced requisitions. After the 1945 land reform, this form of collectivisation left deeply bitter even the poorer peasantry who had just gained access to their own small parcels.Footnote 13 The withdrawal of resources, the constant pressure on the peasants and the rapid industrialisation of the economy followed the pattern established by Soviet collectivisation in the 1930s: cooperatives were not formally nationalised in the sense of becoming state property but were instead incorporated into a single-party economy in which the party infiltrated all elements of the public sphere, including cooperative governance. The suppression and exploitation of the cooperatives for these political purposes were further carried out through the nationalisation of the cooperative system in the late 1940s.Footnote 14
After Stalin’s death, Prime Minister Imre Nagy put forward an economic programme emphasising the development of producer cooperatives and giving substance to the concept of cooperative democracy not yet included in the legislation.Footnote 15 The agrarian intellectuals forming around him would later develop cooperative policy under the Kádár regime. However, a conservative turn in the Soviet Union stalled the programme: by the end of 1954, Nagy’s policy had become undesirable for the Soviet leadership, cooperative membership stopped growing and some regions dissolved their existing cooperatives.Footnote 16
In 1956, the revolutionary government led by Imre Nagy abolished the system of compulsory deliveries. The Kádár government retained this provision and issued an appeal to the peasantry condemning Stalinist collectivisation. A strong agrarian interest group formed alongside the party, led by Lajos Fehér, who headed the agricultural department of the Party Central Committee, and Ferenc Erdei, a former Peasant Party politician and long-time expert on cooperative politics. Fehér represented the pragmatic, technocratic wing of the party; Erdei brought a commitment to peasant self-organisation rooted in his pre-war sociological writings.Footnote 17 Together they published the Theses of the Agricultural Policy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt; MSZMP) in 1957.Footnote 18 The document envisioned cooperative democracy indirectly, as a consequence of the self-development work of cooperative members.
In order to expand the producer cooperatives movement, the spontaneity approach, which does not require continuous educational work to help working peasants to convert to cooperatives and leaves to their own devices, must be challenged. On the contrary, this process should be facilitated by regular educational work. The members of the existing producer cooperatives have a decisive role to play in this process, and they must play the main role in enlightening the peasants who still farmed individually.Footnote 19
The MSZMP implemented its policy of cooperative organisation among the Hungarian peasantry in three years through political agitation, the work of party organisations and, to a large extent, administrative coercion – including intense pressure from local officials, manipulation of tax obligations and in some cases physical intimidation (though rarely the outright violence of the early Stalinist period). At the beginning of the 1960s, there was a need to increase productivity, as Hungarian agriculture was achieving lower yields than it had before the restructuring. A lack of resources hindered the mechanisation of producer cooperatives and the development of production. In many producer cooperatives it was not only that the members could not collect their remuneration from the cooperative, but also that the members had to help the cooperative financially. The agricultural downturn had ripple effects on domestic industry (which depended on agricultural raw materials and exports) and threatened the Kádár regime’s strategy of securing political acquiescence through rising living standards.
At the turn of 1961–2, a new reform process of the cooperative sector was under way, with several objectives: the establishment of a new price, tax and financial system; a restructuring of cooperative management; and the preparation of a new law on cooperatives. At that time, the 1959 Presidential Council Decree on Producer Cooperatives and Producer Cooperative Groups was still in force, but it was far from being able to regulate the operation of cooperatives. The agricultural reform was closely linked to and eventually integrated into the efforts to reform the new economic mechanism (NEM). The NEM, introduced in 1968, was Hungary’s most ambitious attempt to reform its planned economy. It reduced the scope of mandatory plan targets, allowed enterprises greater autonomy in production and investment decisions, introduced profit incentives and permitted limited price flexibility. While the state retained control over major strategic sectors, the NEM created space for a ‘market socialism’ that distinguished Hungary from other Soviet bloc economies. For the cooperative sector specifically, the NEM meant that producer cooperatives could make independent decisions about what to produce, how to organise labour and how to distribute profits among members.
The 1967 legislative package in fact comprised two distinct laws, each of which made a contribution to the institutional foundations of cooperative democracy that has not always been fully appreciated. The first, Law III of 1967 on Agricultural Producer Cooperatives, consolidated and extended the democratic provisions that had been present in Hungarian cooperative legislation since 1947. It reaffirmed the general meeting as the highest organ of the cooperative (16§), confirmed members’ rights to deliberation, voting and the making of proposals, as well as their right to request information from the leadership (20§), and retained the principle of simple majority voting as the default. What was genuinely new, however, was the introduction of compulsory secret balloting for a specific and significant category of decisions: the election or dismissal of leaders, and the merger or dissolution of the cooperative (21§). This innovation – the mandatory secret ballot for decisions directly affecting members’ relationship to cooperative leadership and the cooperative’s existence – was designed to strengthen the practical reality of cooperative democracy by insulating these decisions from direct social pressure and informal coercion. It is this provision that is depicted in The Resolution: the vote on the recall of a cooperative chairman – as documented in the case examined below – was conducted by secret ballot as not merely a matter of custom but also a legal requirement under the 1967 law.
The second law, Law IV of 1967 on the further development of landed property and land use, made a contribution equally significant and arguably more unusual in the context of the Soviet bloc. Unlike any other socialist country, Hungary’s 1967 legislation enabled the producer cooperative to actually own land rather than merely use it under state administration. Cooperatives were empowered – and indeed expected – to purchase land from existing and former members at minimal prices, thereby converting it into genuine cooperative property. This measure was unique within the bloc, and it reinforced the concept of cooperative democracy in a fundamental way: members were now not merely workers in a collectively administered enterprise but also co-owners of the land they farmed. The legal recognition of cooperative land ownership gave the democratic procedures of the general meeting a material grounding that distinguished Hungarian producer cooperatives sharply from the Soviet kolkhoz model, where land remained state property and cooperative democracy lacked this proprietary foundation. Together, the two laws of 1967 thus provided both the procedural innovation of the compulsory secret ballot and the substantive innovation of cooperative land ownership. These were the institutional and material pillars on which the democratic possibilities examined in the following section rested.
Rezső Nyers, the MSZMP’s secretary for economic policy and the main organiser of the reform, was sympathetic to the plans for the autonomy of producer cooperatives from the very beginning. A crucial party resolution established the legal framework for cooperative democracy, addressing the nature of membership, the powers of state administration, the principles of regional and national cooperative organisations, the status of household production and – most importantly – the rights of the general meeting and the rules governing cooperative management. The principles of the resolution were adopted at the ninth Congress of the MSZMP in 1966, and the legislation and the organisation of producer cooperatives at the national level began the following year. The process culminated in the two laws of 1967 – Law III on producer cooperatives and Law IV on landed property and land use – whose institutional and material innovations have been outlined above. The new economic mechanism came into force at the beginning of 1968, and from 1969 the producer cooperatives were allowed to start work on their collectively owned land.Footnote 20
Principles of Producer Cooperative Democracy
In the late 1950s, the Kádár regime sought to clarify why it was beneficial for the individual farmer to join the newly created producer cooperatives. In addition to the continued administrative pressure, the agitation and propaganda departments of party organisations mobilised great powers of persuasion. Communist activists swarmed the countryside to agitate in favour of the cooperatives, in an attempt to honour what the 1957 Theses had already emphasised, namely that the new cooperative system should avoid the previous practice of admission based on the use of force alone.
János Kádár himself made the following statement in the Vörös Csillag (Red Star) producer cooperative in Barcs (south-west Hungary) at the end of 1957:
We can’t deceive anybody, we’re not going to stick people into the cooperative because we’ve learned that’s not the way to do it. Here’s your vote, which one is better?: co-operatives or going back to the old capitalist misery? […] Violence must not be used. It is important to explain things clearly. People do not like being pushed towards a door; they will come of their own accord if you explain to them what they need to do and where they need to go.Footnote 21
Articles published in the theoretical and party-organising journals of the MSZMP during this period, like Kádár’s speech, argued in favour of cooperative membership on the basis of promises of material and social improvement. They contended that cooperative democracy facilitated the development of a community spirit and the reconciliation of conflicting interests. In one of the early texts on the cooperative movement, its difficult start was attributed to the nature of peasants’ social consciousness. According to István Bak, agronomist and editor of the 1958 book Hungarian Agriculture after the Counter-Revolution (A magyar mezőgazdaság az ellenforradalom után Footnote 22), the rural peasantry was still lulled by the old illusion of peasant freedom. This tied in with aspirations inherited from the old capitalist system, that is, the aspiration to climb the social ladder and become a ‘rich peasant’. The cooperative, on the other hand, promised a tenant democracy, able to provide a secure sense of belonging to the community and a backdrop for a peasantry fragmented and engaged in local disputes. Bak did not argue in favour of institutionalised forms of cooperative democracy before the official start of the formation of cooperatives but promised to strengthen ‘the collective spirit of collective work’.Footnote 23
Two years later, István Dobi, president of the Presidential Council, painted a more optimistic picture of the progress of the cooperative system in the pages of the MSZMP’s theoretical journal, Társadalmi Szemle (Social Review). He saw the growth of cooperatives as a break with the logic of the capitalist small-parcel system and was hopeful that the community spirit would overcome peasant selfishness. Dobi asserted that only the cooperative could attain ‘peasant life worthy of the people’. At the same time, the social stratification of cooperative membership could initially bring to the surface, or even intensify, local antagonisms that had hitherto been latent. He saw the solution to the problem in cooperative democracy and in the socialist consciousness that emerges from the expression of democratic will. In the functioning of cooperative democracy, ‘the first step is to answer all questions honestly and openly in order to convince the interested parties that they have made the right choice when they embarked on the cooperative path’.Footnote 24 Then, according to Dobi, the establishment of the cooperative work system, settling the question of private market gardening and establishing management structures would all serve to strengthen cooperative democracy.
Lajos Fehér explained that after establishing the cooperative system, the party’s policy continued to encourage the reduction of private property and work-based taxation. The progressive reduction in the salience of private property created a new form of ownership, termed ‘collective property’ (csoporttulajdon) – distinct from both private property and ‘public’ or ‘social property’ (össztársadalmi tulajdon) administered by the state. This distinction was crucial: collective property gave cooperative members a genuine stake in their enterprise and a legitimate claim to participate in its governance. Writing in Társadalmi Szemle, Fehér argued that ‘enforcing producer cooperatives’ democracy consistently has a great role to play in shaping the thinking of the peasantry in the cooperative, in shaping their attitude towards the community and in educating the members in a socialist spirit’.Footnote 25 Cooperative democracy was thus both a means of peasant education and a mechanism for institutionalising member decision-making. As Imre Molnár stressed, the equality of ownership implied equality of rights: ‘the members of the management board should have no more personal rights than the other members of the cooperative – this is the main personal guarantee that the identity of interest between the management and the membership is not broken down’.Footnote 26
The 1960s reform process accepted and even strengthened the principle of equal membership and the phenomenon of group ownership. The economic reasons for this are well known: group ownership and equal membership increase the stake in cooperative production. After the party decided in the early 1960s that the old way of paying workers based on their labour needed changes, they tested new payment systems in some cooperatives with the members’ approval. One of these alternative accounting systems was the sharecropping arrangement that originated from the Vörös Csillag (Red Star) producer cooperative in Nádudvar.Footnote 27 It is worth noting, however, that sharecropping was not primarily directed at strengthening members’ sense of collective ownership; its principal appeal was the maximisation of individual or family income by tying remuneration directly to the size of the crop rather than to labour inputs alone. It was adopted in sectors that still required large inputs of manual labour and, while it sat uneasily with socialist norms of labour-based remuneration, it spread gradually throughout collectivised agriculture precisely because it provided effective material incentives. The innovation lay less in its cooperative–democratic implications than in its pragmatic accommodation of individual economic motivation within a collective framework.
The Law of 1967 allowed for the recognition of collective ownership, removing land from the collection of means of production that the socialist state system required to be under direct state control. Collective cooperative ownership thus became a legally distinct form of ownership under socialism, alongside private ownership and state property. The institutions and functioning of cooperative democracy, and the enforceability of democratic principles, were based on this form of ownership. Ferenc Erdei summarised the foundations of cooperative democracy in his 1968 introductory article on the cooperative idea:
The cooperative movement has developed organisational principles which are recognised in both civil and socialist cooperatives: the autonomy of cooperatives as collective enterprises and at the same time as social organisations, cooperative self-government (self-management) and the principle of collective (corporate) management, both in individual cooperatives and in higher cooperative ties. All these together constitute cooperative democracy, and collective cooperative ownership is their common basis.Footnote 28
Collective ownership thus implied the need for democratic procedures and a clarification of the scope for state intervention and planning. In a debate published in Társadalmi Szemle in 1968, which lasted nearly a year, the majority of contributors agreed on the equal status of collective property with that of state property in socialist society. Paradoxically, there was already some disagreement on the question of whether this form of ownership should be transitional – that is, whether the cooperative form should gradually approach the status of state-owned enterprises. At stake was the independence of individual producer cooperatives, and the main question was to what extent democratic centralism – the basic principle of party-state organisation under socialism, whereby decisions flow down from the centre while information flows up – would affect the cooperative sector. Those who sought to limit the application of democratic centralism to cooperatives started with the collective nature of the producer cooperatives and the democratic character of their management. As one contributor argued:
The point is that, as a consequence of group ownership, centralism is less important in a cooperative than in a state-owned enterprise; but the membership must be more involved in democratic management and control. The main reason for this is that in collective units, individual responsibility prevails, whereas in cooperatives, collective management prevails.Footnote 29
Other contributors argued that democratic centralism applied differently to cooperative and state property, with some going so far as to claim that cooperative ownership of the means of production was equivalent to full socialisation.Footnote 30
Those arguing in favour of the economic interest argued about the partial prevalence of centralism and the coexistence of the apparently contradictory principles and practices of centralism and democratism. Rezső Nyers, who was also involved in the debate on cooperatives, gave a pragmatic answer to the question of the principle of democratic centralism and cooperative independence: ‘We used to speak of communism as a system of general public property, but what form or forms communist property will actually take, it is hardly possible to say today.’Footnote 31
For Nyers, democratic centralism operated differently in political, economic and social life. While fully operational for the party and state bodies, the undemocratic operation of cooperatives would spread bureaucratic administration and jeopardise agricultural production by reducing members’ material stake. Cooperatives could not be based on the principle of centralism: ‘it is only right to consider the cooperative as the starting point of the movement, as its autonomous organ, and to build on this autonomy a network of territorial and central federations on a federal basis’.Footnote 32
Therefore, the emergence of producer cooperatives required the enforcement of cooperative democracy from both external and internal sources. The former could mean the independence of the producer cooperatives from the centre of the state-planned economy in determining their production and economic goals. The latter outlined a mechanism for joint decision-making, management and control. Internal democracy gained its institutional structure in the reform process of the 1960s. This structure was maintained, albeit with some refinements, until the late 1980s.
The debates examined above crystallised into two competing views on the status of cooperative property and the scope of cooperative democracy, views that would shape the political fortunes of the reform programme throughout the 1970s. According to the reformist position – championed by Fehér, Erdei and Nyers – producer cooperative property was collective property held by the members of the cooperative, standing on equal footing with state property in the socio-political system of socialism. This view, consolidated in the reform process of the second half of the 1960s, underpinned the autonomy of agricultural production and created genuine space for democratic decision-making at the local level.
The opposing, orthodox view held that cooperative property, as a form of collective rather than fully socialised ownership, represented a lower historical stage of development than state property. On this reading, the cooperative form was transitional, and the ultimate aim of socialist development should be to bring cooperatives progressively towards the management principles and property system of state industry. This position found its social base in the so-called workers’ opposition within the party – industrial workers and their representatives who resented the relative prosperity of cooperative farmers and the market-oriented aspects of the NEM. As the reform momentum of the late 1960s slowed in the following decade, this orthodox position gained ground, though it could only temporarily constrain the development of the producer cooperatives rather than reverse it. Understanding this political tension is essential for grasping why the democratic institutions examined in the following section were structurally vulnerable even when they functioned as intended.
Institutions of Producer Cooperative Democracy
The Resolution gives the historical observer an unusually direct insight into the decision-making process of a small producer cooperative. To understand the film’s significance, however, it is worth noting the circumstances of its production. Gazdag and Ember had originally planned to film at a different cooperative, having heard reports of tensions among members that might prove interesting for a documentary. Party officials discouraged them from that site and directed them instead to the Felcsút cooperative, which appeared reliably compliant with party directives. What followed confounded those expectations entirely.
The story centres on the removal of József Ferenczi, the chairman of the Felcsút cooperative, a move initiated by the district committee MSZMP in early 1972. Ferenczi had steered the cooperative from near-bankruptcy to financial success, doing so in a manner fully consistent with the spirit of the new economic mechanism – including diversification into non-agricultural activities, one of the new opportunities the NEM had opened to entrepreneurial farm managers. The real reasons behind the removal effort, and the identity of those who initiated it, have never been fully established. What is clear is that the district party committee sought to achieve its objective by not direct administrative fiat – which would have openly violated the cooperative law – but rather engineering consent: softening up first the cooperative’s presidium, then its party organisation and finally manipulating the mood ahead of the general meeting, including a press smear campaign and threats that the cooperative’s pending state loan of approximately ten million forints might be jeopardised.
This context is important because it was not unusual. From the mid-1960s onwards, cooperative leaders who made full use of the new legal freedoms – diversifying into food processing, non-agricultural sideline activities or other profitable ventures – periodically found themselves the targets of administrative and legal proceedings. Zsuzsanna Varga has documented this pattern in detail, describing a series of what amounted to ‘show trials’ of successful cooperative managers whose independence was perceived as a challenge to party authority and to the interests of the industrial working class represented within the party.Footnote 33 The Felcsút case fits squarely within this broader pattern: Ferenczi’s offence was not mismanagement but success, and the independence that success implied.
Despite the sustained pressure, the general meeting of the Felcsút cooperative voted against the recall of the chairman. The cameras captured this moment – members casting individual, secret ballots, as the 1967 law required for decisions of this kind – making visible what the party apparatus had sought to keep invisible: that cooperative members could and did exercise genuine democratic agency, even against the explicit preferences of the party-state. The film is thus exceptional as not merely a document of one case but also evidence of a structural possibility built into the legal framework of cooperative democracy.
Yet the film’s ending points equally to the limits of that framework. A few months after the general meeting’s decision, the district party committee found other means to achieve its original goal: administrative proceedings were initiated against Ferenczi on the grounds of fire safety violations. He received a four-month suspended prison sentence in 1975 and never worked in agriculture again – a telling indication that the party’s opposition stemmed from not any genuine regulatory failure but rather his independence and the challenge his success posed to party authority. The film thus documents both sides of the equation: the real, legally grounded capacity of cooperative members to resist party pressure through democratic procedures, and the party-state’s ultimate capacity to circumvent those procedures when the formal mechanism failed to deliver the desired outcome. This dual dynamic – genuine democratic possibility constrained by extra-legal party power – is confirmed by other evidence from the period. Nigel Swain’s study of patriarchy and paternalism on a Hungarian collective farm offers a complementary perspective, showing how informal hierarchies and management authority shaped the limits of democratic practice even where formal procedures were observed.Footnote 34 C.M. Hann’s ethnographic account of Tázlár similarly records the gap between formal democratic institutions and actual patterns of deference and compliance among cooperative members.Footnote 35
According to official statements in the Kádár era, cooperative democracy was part of workplace democracy but differed significantly by virtue of the equality of ownership and membership. The general meeting was the most important institution: it could discuss any matter, while the 1967 law’s key innovation was the mandatory secret ballot for the election or dismissal of leaders and the merger or dissolution of the cooperative – insulating these decisions from informal social pressure. Unlike cooperative democracy in capitalist economies, which shared the same formal principles of one member, one vote, Hungarian producer cooperative democracy was distinctive in its context: it functioned within a one-party state where the party retained the capacity to intervene through informal pressure, personnel decisions and administrative proceedings. When the general meeting’s meetings were blocked or in between two general assemblies, partial general assemblies were held, at which decisions were always made by a group of members. In large producer cooperatives, especially after the wave of centralisation in the 1970s, it was almost impossible to hold or participate in general meetings. Thus, electing delegates and holding delegates’ meetings emerged as a new element of cooperative democracy. This system became more common as a result of the concentration of the cooperatives, but the legislation had not caught up with the new practice before the end of the decade.Footnote 36
In the process of economic development, lower units were also differentiated. Whereas in the early 1960s small-group decision-making by work schedule, in brigades or other collective working groups, was more common, the 1970s saw the emergence of workplace communities – that is, semi-formal work units that integrated cooperative members, their family members and wage employees into a common organisational framework below the level of the general meeting – involving members, their families and employees. This development had political backing because it was believed to suit better the dual labour requirements – the simultaneous obligation to contribute labour to the collective cooperative enterprise and to maintain the household plot, which remained a significant source of family income throughout the period – of cooperatives and individual households. Standing and ad hoc committees monitored the implementation of decisions, while party, trade, women’s and youth organisations were intended to represent the ‘social’ side of the cooperatives and the interests of individual workers.Footnote 37
Finally, the producer cooperatives’ management played an important role. The management board was elected by the general meeting, and its members had the same rights as those who elected them. The leader, who also held an elected office, represented both the economic and social interests of the producer cooperatives. These two interests were sometimes in conflict, especially as the cooperatives began to become increasingly autonomous economic actors. Several proposals split the management into two posts, a president and a director, in the 1960s and 1970s.Footnote 38
The institutions of producer cooperative democracy thus reflected the functions of classical parliamentarianism: the general meeting elected or dismissed the executive leadership, while standing and ad hoc committees monitored implementation. Yet this arrangement had to cope with the dual nature of the cooperative as both an economic association and a social unit, requiring the reconciliation of expert-based decisions with collective member preferences. The ideological debates examined in the preceding sections risk presenting cooperative democracy as a purely discursive phenomenon. The survey evidence and ethnographic observation considered here provide a necessary corrective, grounding the analysis in the actual experiences of cooperative members and the gap between institutional form and social practice. The functioning of producer cooperatives was documented by surveys carried out in the 1970s. The results of one such survey from 1972, which collected questionnaire responses in thirty producer cooperatives, from 3,066 members and employees, were published in an internal publication of the Cooperative Research Institute. They showed that when asked whether they expressed an opinion in a producer cooperative forum, 37.8 per cent of the respondents said yes – a figure that, while perhaps lower than ideological claims would suggest, represents substantial active participation comparable to participation rates in many Western democratic institutions. Meanwhile, 53.1 per cent said no; among these, 13 per cent said that they ‘do not understand the affairs of the large farm’; 11.9 per cent said that they are listened to but do not get results, while 9.8 per cent said that they are not listened to at all. The highest number of respondents said, ‘It is better for those who do not speak out’.Footnote 39
A further study, carried out by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences across fifteen cooperatives in 1972–3, showed that ten out of fifteen believed ‘the majority opinion prevails’ at the general meeting, with economically successful cooperatives most likely to hold this view.Footnote 40 Domé’s survey data on secret balloting requires careful interpretation: the five decision categories surveyed were precisely those for which the 1967 law mandated a secret ballot, making the significant finding not which category was most often decided by secret vote but that across all cooperatives surveyed, more than half of legally mandated secret ballot decisions were in practice not so decided.Footnote 41 Members’ contributions were also more focused on farming operations (gazdálkodás) than organisational management (vezetés), suggesting that participation was most active where local knowledge gave members a genuine basis for independent judgement.Footnote 42 In only six out of fifteen cooperatives did a majority believe the general meeting always decided the most important matters; in the remaining nine, management and the president shared the decision.Footnote 43
Pünkösti’s data on cooperative elections provides a complementary quantitative perspective on this ambivalence. His survey shows that contested elections – a rough proxy for genuine democratic participation in chairmanship selection – were most common during the reform era of 1968–72, when roughly one in five chairmen was elected following open debate among members. After the conservative turn of 1973, this proportion fell to one in six or seven, as the role of higher party organs in nominating candidates increased and the direct role of the membership correspondingly declined. The introduction of the compulsory secret ballot under the 1967 law had itself met with resistance from some cooperative leaders, who argued that the peasantry was insufficiently developed for such a procedure. Yet Pünkösti documents cases in which members used precisely this mechanism to override party-backed candidates – in one instance forcing a repeat vote after the party’s preferred candidate failed to win, only to lose again in the second round as well. The pattern is consistent with the survey evidence examined above: genuine democratic possibilities existed within the institutional framework, but their realisation was structurally constrained and historically contingent.Footnote 44
These survey results reveal the ambivalent reality of cooperative democracy. On one hand, over a third of members actively participated in discussions – a significant level of engagement. On the other hand, the reasons given for non-participation – technical complexity, perceived futility and fear of speaking out – point to real constraints on democratic practice. The correlation between education level and positive assessment of democratic procedures suggests that those best equipped to navigate the institutional system were also those most likely to benefit from it. This raises important questions about whether cooperative democracy served all members equally or primarily benefited a more educated stratum.
Ethnographic evidence from the period confirms this mixed picture. Martha Lampland, who conducted fieldwork in a Fejér County village during the early 1980s – the same county in which the Felcsút cooperative documented in The Resolution was located – observed that ‘villagers recall heady, contentious meetings lasting through the night’ in the early years of cooperative production, when members debated how to meet production quotas. She noted that ‘a level of shared understanding regarding agricultural practices existed which could form the basis of relatively democratic discussions’, since work was still labour-intensive and members were ‘fairly interchangeable in terms of knowledge and skills’.Footnote 45 However, this participatory democracy was progressively undermined by mechanisation and the rise of technocratic management. By the 1980s, Lampland found that workers ‘had been weaned of the habit of speaking up’; managers justified their control by claiming that average workers were ‘not competent to judge the complex problems of farm organization’. Formal meetings were held and votes were taken, but genuine participation had been hollowed out by technocratic ideology and cultivated passivity.Footnote 46
Pünkösti’s data on the social composition of the cooperative presidency confirms this picture at the aggregate level. After 1973, the proportion of locally rooted, peasant-background chairmen declined sharply, while university-educated party members came to dominate the presidency; the proportion of chairmen with prior agricultural or local community ties fell significantly compared to the reform era. The direct democracy of the general meeting was increasingly replaced by delegate assemblies as cooperatives grew in size – a structural shift that, as Pünkösti observes, reflected not merely organisational necessity but also a broader erosion of participatory culture that parallels Lampland’s ethnographic findings at the village level.Footnote 47
The Transformation and Dissolution of the Peasant Class
The preceding sections have shown that producer cooperative democracy rested on a specific legal and institutional foundation: the recognition of collective property rights and the democratic procedures that flowed from them. This section examines a tension internal to the socialist project itself that placed structural limits on those democratic possibilities – a tension that no legal reform could fully resolve. The party’s ideological programme for the cooperative sector aimed not merely to organise agricultural production democratically but also to use cooperative democracy as an instrument for transforming peasant consciousness and ultimately dissolving the peasantry as a distinct class. Yet this transformative goal was in fundamental conflict with the very basis on which cooperative democracy rested: if the peasantry’s collective ownership and collective identity were to be superseded by a uniform socialist worker consciousness, the distinctive stake that grounded cooperative self-governance would disappear with them.
Discussions, articles and educational materials on producer cooperatives did not fail to mention that, as important as their role in the economy was, the social function of producer cooperatives was also significant. While economic activity was represented by productive-economic units in which democracy prevailed, the social aspect of cooperative democracy was to be maintained or developed by political-social bodies.Footnote 48 In socialist thinking, cooperative democracy focused on creating and improving connected welfare services and helping the peasant class grow in awareness of their history. The debates on labour law and remuneration, the development of the pension and social security systems and women’s and youth policies marked out the direction in which the system of popular welfare was to operate. These issues were dealt with by the party and mass organisations mentioned above, and attempts were made to encourage and assist the development of the peasantry’s consciousness. Education was prioritised as a key component of this process. As Lajos Fehér wrote in the early 1960s: ‘The strengthening of socialist relations and the socialist education of the co-operative peasantry can and will significantly advance the solution of the specifically economic tasks.’Footnote 49
In the 1970s, the Kádár regime highlighted the transformation of agricultural production as evidence of the peasantry’s growing socialist consciousness. The president of the National Council of Producer Cooperatives (Termelőszövetkezetek Országos Tanácsa; TOT), István Szabó, drew the lessons of the historical transformation as follows:
Just over a decade separates us from the private peasant world where the concept of ‘mine’, the accumulation of wealth, was the meaning and purpose of life. In the early years of the formation of cooperatives, very few people could replace the concept of “mine” with ‘ours’.’Footnote 50
This was not merely descriptive but prescriptive: party documents consistently framed cooperative democracy as a means of engineering this transformation. The president of TOT expressed this eloquently: ‘But the cooperative is the furnace in which the new socialist type of man is formed. There is the dross of work, which must not be feared; but again and again, without tiring, consistently, but with more patience than at present, the dross must be separated from the good material.’Footnote 51
The transformation of peasant consciousness also foreshadowed its disappearance. More precisely, the argument posited that the process of socialist democratisation would lead to the abolition of the peasantry as a class. In its place, a new ‘producer cooperative peasant class’ would emerge, marking a higher stage of overall social development, the results of class unification. Cooperative democracy, then, appeared as an instrument in the process of the peasantry’s legal and increasingly material equality and unification.
Sándor Orbán’s narrative about the history of socialist agrarian transformation in Hungary exemplifies this perspective. According to Orbán, an agricultural historian of the socialist era, the feudal and semi-feudal peasantry of the ‘last four hundred years’ had been merely a prefigurement – a preliminary historical form that could only become a genuine revolutionary force through alliance with the industrial working class. However, the fragmented, static nature of the peasant class was set in motion by the cooperative system, which placed the peasantry on a developmental path converging with that of the working class. Orbán presented this transformation in the early 1970s:
Paradoxical as it may sound, one could say, with a little exaggeration, that the historically belated disintegration of the peasantry and the embourgeoisement so urged by the advocates of the former progressive reforms, in fact took place in the context of the socialist transformation. And the unity so often and vainly desired throughout our modern history, after no small detour, seems to have been achieved when, as a class, the peasantry no longer exists or only in a negligible proportion.Footnote 52
This ideological programme contained a fundamental tension that shaped the possibilities and limits of cooperative democracy. The party’s attempt to ‘sever the tie between property and production’ – to elevate ‘labourer’ identity over ‘owner’ identity – was in structural conflict with the very basis of cooperative democracy, which rested on the recognition of collective property rights.Footnote 53 Cooperative democracy was premised on members’ stake in collectively owned property; yet the party’s deeper goal was to eliminate property-based identity entirely, replacing it with a uniform socialist worker consciousness. If the peasantry ceased to exist as a class defined by its relation to land and collective ownership, what would remain of the collective interest that grounded cooperative self-governance? Nevertheless, despite these structural tensions, cooperative democracy represented a genuine, if circumscribed, arena for participatory politics. The secret ballot, the general meeting, the ability to challenge unpopular decisions – these institutional features created real opportunities for members to voice their preferences, even when party pressure sought to override them. The case documented in The Resolution exemplifies both the possibilities and the limits of this arrangement: cooperative members could and did assert their preferences against party pressure, even if the party-state ultimately retained the capacity to achieve its ends through other means.
Conclusions
The evidence presented in this article suggests that producer cooperative democracy occupied a distinctive position in the landscape of socialist governance. It was neither the mere facade that critics of collectivisation have sometimes portrayed, nor the fully autonomous sphere of self-management that reformist rhetoric promised. Rather, it represented a genuinely contested terrain where legal provisions, economic interests, local solidarities and party imperatives intersected in complex ways. The case of the Felcsút cooperative, captured in The Resolution, illustrates both the possibilities and the limits of this arrangement: cooperative members could and did assert their preferences against party pressure, but the party-state retained the capacity to achieve its ends through other means.
The ultimate goal of producer cooperatives, according to official ideology, was the integration of village society into a homogeneous socialist society, the ideal type of which was the socialist worker. The transformation of the peasantry into a working class was the social ideological goal of the early 1980s, as summarised in a short monograph on producer cooperative democracy from that time:
cooperative democracy can help to develop the social features of the peasantry, to increase its material well-being, to increase its social activity, and thus to strengthen the political basis of our society, the worker–peasant alliance. In the construction of an advanced socialist society, it is therefore in the public interest, the task of all of us, to strengthen socialist democracy – including cooperative democracy – to explore its new features and to build its future.Footnote 54
Yet this very process of transformation – the dissolution of the peasantry into a unified working class – would ultimately undermine the distinctive basis of cooperative democracy. If the peasantry ceased to exist as a class, what would remain of the collective ownership and collective interest that grounded cooperative self-governance? This paradox points to a deeper tension within the socialist project itself: between its commitment to participatory democracy and its teleological vision of a classless society administered by a vanguard party.
It took four years after the publication of the 1982 monograph on cooperative democracy for The Resolution to be shown in cultural theatres, film clubs and university colleges. The party-state attempted to ban the film – though it was never officially released, it circulated in semi-official venues, a testament to the limits of censorship in late socialism. As we now know, the documentary showed how the local party committee did eventually bring proceedings against the chairperson of the producer cooperative. This was a clear indication that the local party’s opposition to him stemmed from not any genuine administrative failure but rather the challenge he posed to party authority. But perhaps, in a longer view, the ill-fated Ferenczi had the last laugh, because The Resolution won international recognition. It was included in a listing by the American Film Academy among the hundred best documentaries ever made, and, when it was finally shown in Hungarian cinemas in 1993, it did so to great acclaim.Footnote 55
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Adela Hîncu and Yiannis Kokosalakis for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article, and three anonymous reviewers whose detailed and constructive engagement significantly strengthened the final version.
