In Law, Language, and Science, Diana Jeater tells a story about the ‘failure’ of encounters between the various white immigrant and African communities in Melsetter district in Southern Rhodesia (today Zimbabwe) during the first forty years of white occupation. Specifically, Jeater traces the historical origins of what she calls ‘the invention of the “native mind”’ in Southern Rhodesian ethnography as that emerged around the mid-1920s (p. xx). Probing processes of translation and using the concept of hegemony as an analytic tool, she argues that from the very beginning of their encounter in the 1890s, the white settlers and the local people of the Chimanimani area each failed to understand successfully and translate properly the other's cultural apparatus and epistemic order.
After devoting two initial chapters to setting up the historical context, Jeater divides her narrative into three major sections, each reflecting a chronological phase in her periodization of African–white cross-cultural interaction in Southern Rhodesia: the phase of first encounters (1890s to 1900s), the phase of translation (1910s to 1920s) and the phase of separation (1920s to 1930s). Ultimately she concludes that having gone through these three stages, the two communities reached a point where the possibility of a ‘bridge’ between European and African epistemologies was completely closed.
Drawing on an extensive range of archival materials, Jeater displays an impressive mastery of the two very different world views that characterized the Africans' and whites' modes of thought as they attempted to understand each other during each of the three phases. One of the most poignant analyses concerns the European and the African legal systems. She shows that whereas the former tends to be text-based and more rigid, the latter tends to be orally based and more responsive to contextual considerations. This difference had profound implications, as exemplified in the ways in which the consistent failure in the translation of each culture's jurisprudence into the other's terms directly reflects the fundamental differences between each side's standard of values.
Yet despite the book's interesting argument and insightful observations, many readers will find problematic aspects of Jeater's study is her unclear usage of such important concepts as ‘rationality’ and ‘science’. On the one hand, Jeater wants her historical scholarship to undermine the exclusive association of ‘rationality’ with Eurocentric ‘science’ as these terms appeared in the writings of the European colonial officials and American missionaries she studies. According to Jeater, the white immigrants' assumptions about the ‘irrationality’ of African epistemic foundations impeded any fruitful interaction between the two cultures. At the same time, however, Jeater fails to acknowledge that such understanding of ‘rationality’ or ‘irrationality’ would potentially be an inadequate point of departure for interpreting the local order of knowledge, especially historically. For instance, when Jeater writes that the ‘concept of rationality was based on the scientific principles of observation, empirical reasoning, and organization by abstract principle’, or when she introduces her sentence with phrases such as ‘The discipline of science, as it developed in Europe’, the reader is left to wonder where and how African science, if one can call it such, comes into the story (p. 107). One could argue that by depicting ‘rationality’ and ‘science’ as overly simplified, monolithic European constructs, Jeater's analysis does not allow a ‘rational’ African culture to be conceivable from the outset; or to put the point the other way, indigenous African knowledge is always already ‘non-scientific’ to begin with. To a certain degree, ‘science’, in the way it is implicated in this story, becomes a straw man or a foil against which other forms of knowledge are juxtaposed.
Another weakness of Jeater's study lies in its overwhelmingly descriptive mode of analysis and lack of explanatory power. This problem is apparent when one considers on its own terms her first section, attempting to reconstruct the ‘initial encounters’ between the white settlers and the local Africans. Because the period between 1890 and 1910 is where the bulk of her narrative begins, this first part of the book is crucial to the way she builds her overall argument. Yet, as one moves through the four chapters in this section, one finds that Jeater never explains why the white missionaries and native commissioners, on the one hand, and the local African people, on the other, critically ‘missed’ the cultural grid of each other's system of knowledge. Time and again Jeater merely redescribes the differences in their respective conceptual cosmologies rather than providing explanations for the ‘failure’ of their cultural encounters. Thus the two different styles of legal proceeding mentioned earlier themselves become the very explanation for why the local or the European jurisprudence failed to be translated into another's terms, while they were initially framed as providing the basis for finding a historical explanation for such failure. This kind of circular reasoning captures the explanatory weakness of Jeater's account.
Notwithstanding the flaws in the book's first part, however, Jeater's nuanced exploration of the processes of legal, cultural and religious translation between the white and African communities in the two subsequent parts of the book benefits from her sensitivity to their diverging structures of epistemology and legal practice. As such, Law, Language, and Science stands as an important contribution to the social historiography of colonial Africa. It is also an undoubtedly fascinating study of the disciplinary development of a branch of the human sciences in southern Africa.
