Assumptions about regional peacebuilding

Various ideas circulate as to why ‘the region’ would be an appropriate and more effective entry for peacebuilding. First, an important notion is that regional cooperation contributes to peace as it creates mutual benefits and dependences (Alagappa Reference Alagappa1995). In particular in Africa, there is much attention to regional bodies, such as the regional diplomatic initiatives of the African Union, and the peacekeeping mechanisms of regional economic communities such as IGAD and ECOWAS (see e.g. Juma & Mengistu Reference Juma and Mengistu2002). Such bodies are promoted on the assumption that conflicts may be earlier detected, and more easily resolved, through them.Footnote ⁴ In addition, regional bodies may reduce the necessity for the international community to intervene in conflicts, while diplomatic intervention by governments from the region is supposedly more effective (e.g. OECD-DAC 1997: par. 297). In the Great Lakes Region, a localised version of this idea proposes building on cross-border cultural and linguistic affinities, or continuities in the form of family relations, trade and intellectual exchange.

A related idea is that mutual dependence can bring parties together who otherwise are not on speaking terms. For example, a hydro-electrical power plant in the Ruzizi River at the DR Congo/Rwanda-border was never affected by conflict, and some see such economic dependences in the region as starting points for regional peace. Within debates on natural resources and conflict, a developing idea is that cooperation on shared ecological challenges might be a prelude to peacebuilding. Even if wider dialogue has come to an end, discussion on shared natural resources may be established or continue. In addition, the resolution of cross-border ecological problems may be a precondition for broader peace (Conca et al. Reference Conca, Carius and Dabelko2005; Turton et al. Reference Turton, Patrick and Julien2006), while development corridors and trans-frontier natural parks offer alternatives to regional conflict (Shaw Reference Shaw2003).

Thirdly, many people interviewed in the course of this research share the core assumption that, if conflicts in a region are connected, focusing on their manifestations in individual countries separately is ineffective. Examples of such ineffective strategies are strengthening good governance in one country in a ‘bad neighbourhood’ of failing states, and addressing fluid cross-border networks for trading small arms only in particular states (see Kaldor Reference Kaldor2001; Tschirgi Reference Tschirgi2002). This implies that strategies for peacebuilding should address conflict dynamics in different countries at the same time.

The positive version of this argument is that developments in one country may also positively influence developments in another. For example, regional approaches may help to surpass patriotic discourses, and to acknowledge how developments in one's own country impinge on the history of other countries. An exponent of this idea is Mamdani (Reference Mamdani2001), who identifies Rwanda as the epicentre of the wider crisis in the Great Lakes Region. He sees Rwanda as the source of a citizenship problem, in which full citizenship is denied to residents who are branded as ethnic strangers. In his view, a regional reform of citizenship is necessary to reform Rwanda. Political reform in Burundi could be significant, as past developments in Burundi have been read by Rwanda as prophetic signs of their common fate and vice versa (Mamdani Reference Mamdani2001: 280). In a similar vein, in 2005, expatriates in the Great Lakes Region expected a positive influence from successful elections in Burundi on the electoral process in DR Congo. Several development organisations pointed to the peacebuilding potential of the media at regional level. Exchanges and common programmes for journalists would enhance freedom of expression in individual countries, and stimulate mutual understanding in the region.

Lastly, an assumption underlying various regional perspectives is that the region offers the opportunity to surpass the country level, and go beyond individual governments and their particular sensitivities. In this perspective, the region is a forum where the international community can intervene and launch opinions, criticism and ideas, without addressing and confronting particular governments. The idea of the region as a safe haven for the generation of ideas also underlies initiatives for regional programmes with civil society organisations. This is based on the assumption that these are in a position to influence their governments to accept compromises without losing face, or to introduce new ideas. On a more practical level, regional perspectives are assumed to provide the opportunity for civil society organisations to take advantage of experiences from elsewhere in the region. To realise this potential, exchanges and meetings between different actors from the region are stimulated. The exchange of experiences is the major objective of most civil society regional initiatives so far taking place in the Great Lakes Region.

Defining regions

Realising that conflicts have regional dimensions is one thing, analysing them and defining regional strategies is another. Tschirgi (Reference Tschirgi2002) points out that the external dimensions of internal conflicts are often seen in terms of ‘spill-over effects’, while in fact many conflicts need to be seen as ‘trans-national’ in nature rather than as an aggregation of internal conflicts. Moreover, it is difficult to deal with the notion of ‘region’. While regions may be defined in terms of social groups or political identities (countries, provinces), in many cases regional conflicts include actors and networks that are far beyond such limitations. These may involve networks of armed groups, but also (illicit) economic or social networks, or region-wide grievances that mobilise people (Tschirgi Reference Tschirgi2002: 8). Regions should then be seen more as arenas for networked interactions than as geographic entities. Networks may expand or diminish, and their focus may shift. In the Great Lakes Region, the centre of regional conflict was perhaps located in Rwanda in the early 1990s, but later moved to DR Congo (Rubin Reference Rubin2001: 3).

An important question is then how to define regions. In daily parlance, the use of the term is confused, including for example ecological regions (the Sahel), economic regions (the European Union), and political or historical regions (the Eastern Bloc). A conceptual note on regions is thus necessary. In the remainder of this chapter, regions are referred to as social constructions resulting from identification. Such an understanding draws on constructivist perspectives within geography that try to understand regions as a result of the meaning people give to their surroundings, and the regional identity they inscribe on them (Simon Reference Simon2004). The constructed identity of a region may be accepted by others and be reproduced, or be rejected or redefined. To substantiate their interpretation of regions, people may refer to attributes such as cultural–historical inheritance, ethnicity, religion, language (Pater et al. Reference Pater, Groote and Terluow2002: 127ff). This notion comes close to the work of Anderson (1983/Reference Anderson1991), who talks of nations as ‘imagined communities’ – i.e. a nation comes into being because individuals feel related to each other and hence form a community. Similarly, regions may be seen as imagined communities that are a collective social achievement. Regions are thus constructs of their inhabitants, but also of others, such as national states, international development organisations, and analysts. Those outsiders may recognise and build on local imaginations of regions, or rather give their own meaning to what constitutes ‘the region’. The case study of the Great Lakes Region demonstrates how local and international actors have their own interpretations of what constitutes the region. Their interpretations depend on what characteristics are considered, what issues are looked at, how these are analysed, and by whom. Such interpretations are often heavily politicised. This paper explores how national civil society organisations and international organisations imagine and construct the region and try to apply this in practice.

The difficulties in regional analysis and programming

Many organisations found it difficult to analyse the regional character of conflict, and to establish how to take account of it in their programmes. A number of factors hindered collaborative analysis and programmes. A practical limitation to regional analysis and programming was that many local and international organisations lacked regional experience and expertise. Organisations which sought to give more attention to regional dynamics in their work encountered few scientific analyses on the interconnectedness of conflict, peace and development in the region (notable exceptions are Chrétien Reference Chrétien2003; Clark Reference Clark2002; Lemarchand Reference Lemarchand, Harbeson and Rothchild2000; Reijntjens Reference Reijntjens1994), let alone practical ones pointing out how to deal with regional dynamics.

Next to these practical limitations, there were theoretical difficulties in arriving at a regional understanding of conflict. In theory, a distinction could be made between common problems (for example, the exclusionist character of states, or the politicisation of ethnicity in various countries), related or cross-border problems (for example, the presence of refugees or militia from other countries, or the spill-over of identity conflicts from one country to the other), and problems without borders (for example, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and the spread of arms).Footnote ⁸ In practice, it was difficult to make such distinctions.

Land-related conflicts were identified as a (critical) regional dimension in various regional platforms of local civil society organisations.Footnote ⁹ However, it was often difficult to agree on the regional character of such conflicts, which were interpreted both as a ‘common’ regional issue and as a ‘cross-border’ problem. In North Kivu, local land problems were seen as inextricably linked to the issue of nationality. A case in point was Masisi, where over recent years large tracks of land had been bought by a small group of people, many of whom were Kinyarwanda speakers, and (senior) members of the RCD and the Rwandese politico-military establishment.Footnote ¹⁰ By some, the conflicts resulting from this development were considered a cross-border issue, a direct result of the presence of the Rwandese. However, several organisations in Goma argued that the problem was basically about citizenship, and the failure of local land administration. In their view, land problems were more a ‘common’ issue: land disputes in the region were similar in that they resulted from past failures of local land administration and the erosion of local dispute resolving mechanisms.

Hence, in regional meetings, organisations often could not agree on the extent to which local manifestations of conflict were related to cross-borders developments, rather than just showing similarities. It was even more difficult to agree on how different issues and conditions interacted. For example, to what extent could land disputes resulting from land shortage be interpreted in the same way as conflicts resulting from the abundance of natural resources? And in what ways should problems of governance – such as exclusionism or criminalisation of the state – be addressed simultaneously with other issues such as the cross-border spread of small arms?

As a result of these difficulties, it often depended more on the scope of interventions envisaged by organisations whether they considered conflict dynamics as ‘common’ or as cross-border issues, and if they focused on one or several conflict dynamics. In cases where organisations had the means to work regionally, their analysis tended to be more regional and focused also on cross-border dynamics. In cases where they worked locally, their analysis focused on similarities between countries.

As a result of these conceptual difficulties, many organisations did not really consider the regional character of particular issues. They simply saw instability spilling over from one country to the other inevitably, or always having repercussions in other countries. If instability was contagious, any problem in any country required a regional strategy. Other organisations, aware of the regional character of conflict, assumed a certain comparability in the region, on the basis of which best practices could be replicated from one country to the other. For example, considering their country in a later stage of transition from conflict, Rwandese organisations promoted their experiences for demobilisation and community reconciliation in Burundi. Various international development organisations also copied intervention strategies from one country to the other. As a result, regional and country-specific analysis was de-emphasised, at the risk of glossing over both connections and differences in the region.

In the absence of regional analyses, organisations found it particularly difficult to define regional programmes as a collaborative effort of organisations from different countries. In theory, regional issues could be addressed in different ways, including regional programmes coordinated among organisations, similar programmes copied in different countries, or local programmes that take regional dimensions into account. Interventions could target geographic areas (for example, the Kivu provinces), or influential groups that fulfil key positions in linking conflicts (for example, civil society, regional media, trade networks), or focus on key issues (for example, small arms) (Armstrong & Rubin Reference Armstrong and Rubin2002). In practice, local organisations often failed to arrive at a focused analysis, identifying different levels of intervention and related strategies, and ended with amorphous shopping lists of issues and related projects. One example was a network of women's organisations that in its regional analysis identified nine pages of themes, and projects to address them. In the end, each participant selected her preferred themes and projects, and no collective prioritisation and programming was done.

Various organisations, rather than identifying developments they considered at the core of regional conflict in the Great Lakes Region, prioritised some general themes: ‘governance’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘gender’, ‘trade in arms’. Such a strategy reduced region-specific dynamics of conflict to general trends that legitimised standard interventions. Others took a ‘minimalist’ regional approach, which only considered the (potential) influence of regional issues on their own interventions (cf. Tschirgi Reference Tschirgi2002).Footnote ¹¹

As a result, there were few regional programmes with regional activities. Exceptions were various programmes on refugees: the Catholic Church organised exchange visits between refugees and people from their home areas in order to entice refugees to go home, and the LDGL platform conducted cross-border research on the background and situation of refugees. Another exception was a cross-border radio programme organised by the US-based peace organisation Search for Common Ground.

In the end, interpretation of regional conflict dynamics and appropriate strategies depended mostly on the type and expertise of organisations and their context of operation. Analyses of international organisations often focused on issues of governance. Organisations from the region tended to see governance in the context of regional dynamics of land, ethnicity and citizenship. And while civil society organisations in Bukavu and Goma highlighted the presence of Rwandese rebels and troops on Congolese soil and their influence on the local population, organisations in Uvira emphasised local insecurity caused by the Mai-Mai. In contrast, civil society organisations in Kinshasa were more concerned about elections and the process of democratisation. Organisations from Bujumbura city highlighted the political dimensions of violence, while organisations in the countryside also considered how violence in the rural areas had gained an ethnic dimension. Staff members of human rights organisations highlighted impunity, and the deplorable record on human rights of various politicians, in their regional analyses. Farmers' organisations emphasised the problems of land and the return of refugees. Regional approaches and strategies did not logically present themselves from the context in which organisations operated. Consequently, organisations tended to focus on those themes fitting their expertise and organisational priorities.

Regional analysis and programming thus came out as processes of defining the region. How the region was constructed around particular issues depended much on how, and by whom, problems were analysed. Regional discourse is an ordering practice, creating coherence out of fragmented ideas, experiences and practices – or, in other words, a way of understanding or framing the world, by which we make sense of complexity (Law Reference Law1994). Different regional approaches developed in the practice of civil society organisations, depending on the expertise, operational context and, above all, the identification of the region by the organisations concerned. Since it was difficult for civil society organisations to arrive at a shared understanding, common regional programming was complicated. Each organisation created an image of the region that suited its programmes.

The politics of regional imagination

Civil society organisations make ideological choices, and wittingly or unwittingly play political roles. Rather than being just value-driven and apolitically taking care of the interests of local communities affected by conflict, their members personally experience the impacts of conflict, and also position themselves within conflict discourses. The emergence of civil society regional approaches therefore cannot be separated from the developing regional political context. Imagining regional approaches for the Great Lakes Region was deeply embedded in politics. Coming to a shared analysis among civil society organisations from the region was not only a theoretical endeavour, but also a political one.

A first obstacle for regional initiatives is sensitivity to instability and the day-to-day conflict experiences of the participating civil society organisations. Progress made in months could be undone in a matter of days. The anarchy after the rebellion by a group of RCD soldiers in Bukavu in June 2004 set back rapprochement programmes between the Banyamulenge (who were perceived as close to the Rwandese) and the other communities, thereby complicating the return of Banyamulenge refugees from Burundi. Continuing instability in DR Congo and Burundi brought many to question whether it was the appropriate time for regional approaches. This made some conclude that internal political change was needed before international rapprochement was possible.

Secondly, tensions between governments from the region were replicated in civil society relations, due to the closeness of civil society organisations to their governments and political movements. While in the past civil society in eastern DR Congo was often considered activist and outspoken, violence and insecurity had severely restricted organisations' freedom of action. Civil society had become ethnicised and no stranger to partisan tendencies (Romkema Reference Romkema2001). The Catholic Church was not exempt from these divisions. The bishop in Goma and many priests there were considered pro-Rwandese, while in Bukavu the Catholic Church was seen as a major symbol of resistance against the RCD. In some instances, the distinction between civil society and formal politics was blurred, with civil society organisations functioning as a springboard to state politics. In Rwanda, although there was an active associational life, NGOs had always been state-controlled, and had difficulties developing an oppositional attitude towards the government (see also Unsworth & Uvin Reference Unsworth and Uvin2002). Rwandese civil society organisations had to participate in umbrella groupings, which were said to be firmly government controlled. NGOs working in Rwanda had to perform a balancing act in the themes they could work on, and in their criticism of government policies.Footnote ¹² Congolese and Burundese organisations doubted the independence of the Rwandese organisations they encountered in meetings. There were for example indications that, for preparatory meetings to the UN regional conference, Rwandese civil society representatives had been appointed by the presidential office. In Burundi, in recent years, civil society had started to openly express itself politically, partly in opposition to and partly in conjunction with the government (Ntsimbiyabandi & Ntakarutimana Reference Ntsimbiyabandi and Ntakarutimana2004). Many insiders and outsiders doubted the independence of Burundese civil society, as associational life seemed dominated by Tutsi organisations, and rumours abounded about organisations being supported by politicians.

As a result of this, civil society organisations often associated themselves with national discourses of conflict in their home countries. Many representatives of international and local organisations interviewed over the course of this research considered the involvement of civil society in conflict politics as the major challenge to regional civil society peacebuilding. As a result of the affiliation of civil society to national political discourses, regional encounters were a platform for political confrontation, as well as for exchange.

At the time of fieldwork, the relationship between the Burundese and Rwandese governments was fair, with the electoral victory of the ethnically mixed CNDD-FDD in Burundi in late 2005 even resulting in further rapprochement. Rwandese–Congolese relationships continued to be tense. Serious political divisions continued within the Kivu provinces, in particular between political leaders connected to the RCD power-holders, and those supporting the Kinshasa government. These tensions were directly reflected in relations between civil society groups from the region.

A crucial point of disagreement between civil society groups from Rwanda and North Kivu was their different understanding of the presence of the Interahamwe. The Rwandese authorities had blamed the Congolese for not taking action against the presence of those militia – main perpetrators in the Rwanda genocide – on Congolese territory, and this had been the legitimisation for entering DR Congo. However, several Congolese civil society organisations considered the Rwanda government part of the problem because it would not provide space for dialogue on the possible return of the Interahamwe. Its presence in DR Congo was also seen to cover up interests in resource exploitation. Furthermore, many Congolese organisations in Bukavu were disappointed by the lack of understanding from their Rwandese colleagues for the suffering the Interahamwe were inflicting on their people. This issue broke up many regional initiatives.

At a regional women's conference in Kigali in mid-2004, as a preparation for the UN Great Lakes regional conference, the participants were unable to reach agreement on what peace in the Great Lakes Region should look like. Before the meeting, the representatives from DR Congo were urged ‘not to go and talk to our attackers’. At the meeting, Rwandese and Congolese organisations had difficulty in distancing themselves from the discourses of their governments. The Rwandese women focused on the genocide in their country, and the ensuing right of Rwanda to fight the militia responsible that were still residing on Congolese soil. To the Congolese women, it appeared that the Rwandese women condoned the violence from their government in DR Congo, and failed to see that ‘peace for the Rwandese is a continuation of human rights violations by the Interahamwe in our areas’.Footnote ¹³

In other cases, the political positions taken by civil society organisations turned regional encounters into events where power was renegotiated, positions could be strengthened and legitimised, and the definition of the region could be contested. At various regional exchanges, the status of participants was fiercely debated, especially between organisations from eastern DR Congo and Rwanda. Often, the Congolese regarded civil society from Rwanda as representing the vision of their authorities rather than of their Rwandese constituents. At the same time, various Congolese organisations interpreted singling out the eastern Kivu provinces in donor programmes as supporting claims for a different status in the Congolese state, and threatening national sovereignty.

In 2002, the CECI-Acipa programme deliberately included Kinshasa-based organisations, to counter the impression among Congolese groups that it favoured Kivu civil society, which was perceived as collaborating with Rwanda. In a workshop in 2004, a full day was lost on discussing the new location of the secretariat. The Rwanda and Burundi delegations proposed Goma, and strongly opposed Kinshasa, afraid of problems with Congolese migration offices when travelling there. Goma, however, was unacceptable to most Congolese, who considered it under Rwandese influence, and argued that their capital was Kinshasa. The Congolese proposed Bukavu as a middle course, which was refused by Rwanda and Burundi. Finally the office remained in Rwanda.Footnote ¹⁴

Rather than civil society organisations serving as forces for peace, and a counterbalance to their national governments or sub-national contenders for political power, civil society organisations were deeply involved in regional politics. The political complications of regional civil society initiatives, and the fact that several regional civil society meetings had been accused of partisan tendencies, made some donors hesitant about getting involved in regional approaches.

The political engagement of civil society in regional politics strongly affected the analysis of regional issues. The affiliation of regional civil society organisations to their home governments fuelled suspicions on the sincerity and intentions of the other players in regional encounters. This reduced the willingness to talk openly about issues of regional concern.

To deal with returning refugees and rationalise land use, in 1996 the Rwanda government started a programme for villagisation and resettlement (Imidugudu) (see van Leeuwen Reference van Leeuwen2001). During preparatory meetings for a regional workshop on land issues in Bujumbura, organised by the Catholic organisation CED-Caritas, representatives of Rwandese organisations were quite critical of the programme and underlined the practical problems in its implementation. In the meeting itself, those same people gave presentations of the programme that were fully in line with the position of the Rwandese government. This also happened at other regional meetings. Subsequently, several organisations in Burundi came to consider the Imidugudu programme a good example for dealing with land problems in their own country.

A frustrating experience for international organisations was that often the preparation of regional meetings was a transparent process, in which civil society organisations from different countries or regions voiced their independent opinions, while during the regional encounters they moved towards the positions of their governments. Suspicion of the intentions of others and identification with the positions of their respective governments obstructed a genuine exchange of experiences.

Various international development organisations, in convening regional meetings between their partners, deliberately chose not to discuss regional politics, considering this too sensitive. Regional political issues were also circumvented because of their sensitivity at the November 2004 regional forum of ACEAC discussed above. In the formal parts of the encounter, participants made little reference to government politics at national level, and discussed conflict in their home regions without the slightest reference to the regional conflict history.

A few days before the forum, the first of a series of UN regional conferences had taken place in Dar-es-Salaam. During the breaks between sessions, participants discussed the outcomes of this conference, and commented on the renewed threat of the Rwandese president after the conference to intervene militarily in DR Congo, disregarding commitments made a few days earlier. No comments were made on this in the formal parts of the forum. During the breaks, I had also various discussions with participants from DR Congo on the role of Rwandese military in the insecurity affecting their areas. People also commented on the likely cooperation between militia from DR Congo and the Burundese FNL, and the latter's involvement in the Gatumba massacre in August 2004 (see HRW 2004). Representatives from different countries participated in, or listened attentively to, such discussions. In the official parts of the forum, regional politics was not talked about.

Such political sensitivities had consequences for the regional strategies envisaged. In the case of the ACEAC forum, the unwillingness or inability of participants to address regional conflict issues resulted in a concern for the effects of conflict (and how to deal with them), rather than the causes. To circumvent conflict between the participants, regional strategies focused on technical rather than political cooperation, such as exchange of experiences, and replicating best practices.Footnote ¹⁵

In many regional encounters considering solutions for regional problems, the outcomes likewise reflected a preference for national strategies rather than regional ones. For example, various expatriates considered that land scarcity in Burundi and Rwanda implied a need for a regional solution, including regional economic specialisation and more flexibility in migration policies. Organisations from the region considered the scarcity of land in their own countries as a given, and to them the problem was the failure of governments to develop agriculture or promote alternative ways of making a living. To them, the considerations of the expatriates would become relevant only after their heads of state had reached regional agreements. Suggestions on regional solutions to national land problems were also way ahead of what could be imagined by organisations from North Kivu, considering the problematic presence of Kinyarwanda speakers in the region and the perception of a historical process of Rwandese infringement on Congolese borders.

Highlighting the national character of problems and solutions rather than their regional political aspects was probably also a political strategy in itself. Though the Rwanda government has emphasised the harmful presence of Hutu militia, and the ethnicisation of community relations in eastern DR Congo, regional dynamics seldom play a role in the discourse of the Rwandese government explaining the build-up to the 1994 genocide.Footnote ¹⁶ Nor was this issue much discussed between Burundese and Rwandese civil society organisations. One could speculate that emphasising such regional dimensions might have drawn the character of the Rwandese and Burundese state into the analysis. This was an issue which organisations were willing to discuss in private, but not in meetings with representatives from the other countries, as they did not want to be seen criticising their respective governments.

The ‘politics of regional imagination’ thus played an important role in how regional civil society peacebuilding in the end came about. In many cases, the difficulties in reaching a shared analysis were the result not so much of a lack of analytical power, but of deep political cleavages. One might even speculate that the difficulties discussed earlier in arriving at collaborative regional analyses were not so much a technical or conceptual problem, but resulted from organisations circumventing thorny political issues, and de-emphasising the regional linkages between problems. Emphasising shared victimhood was then a first step in coming closer to each other.

The regional imaginations of international organisations

As a final point, in reviewing the difficulties in realising regional civil society peacebuilding, the ambitions of donors and international development organisations supporting such efforts require review. International organisations often assumed that regional exchanges and cooperation would be to the advantage of their partners, who would learn from each other, and whose collaborative efforts would be more effective than their separate programmes. It was however questionable how far organisations from the region shared this assumption. Rwandese organisations interviewed in the course of fieldwork often suggested that organisations from other countries could profit from their experiences, but did not assume they could learn anything from others. This attitude did not contribute to their motivation to participate in regional meetings. Various representatives of local and international organisations observed that, without motivation from donors to exchange experiences, local partners were not inclined to meet. For many local civil society organisations, it was already problematic to work in synergy at a national level, let alone the regional level. They considered this the major shortcoming of civil society regional initiatives, which in their eyes were ‘talk shops’ in which organisations participated to entice their donors, but which did not translate into action.

Further, apart from those specialised in lobbying and advocacy, civil society organisations often found it difficult to imagine regional strategies with direct relevance for their ongoing work. Most (peace) activities of local organisations were on a local scale. Though experiencing the impact of regional developments on their local interventions, they had the feeling that they could continue business as usual, with or without a regional approach.

As noted earlier, various regional platforms of local civil society organisations discussed land-related disputes. Many of the participants – having expertise in agricultural programmes for enhancing community conflict resolution – were primarily concerned about the impact of land conflicts. They acknowledged that similarities existed with other parts of the region, and were interested in exchanging experiences on local reconciliation practices. The cross-border causes of land conflicts were less of an issue to them, as these were beyond the reach of their interventions.

Many local organisations felt no urgent need for regional exchange and cooperation. In their daily practice, regional approaches and strategies did not logically present themselves. While for some organisations regional cooperation had advantages (being a member of a network provided protection), for other organisations such advantages were far less. It was thus questionable whether the imagined advantages of regional exchange and cooperation were as important for civil society organisations from the region as they were for their international supporters.

Moreover, in the perception of local civil society organisations, the international insistence on regional approaches contrasted starkly with the fact that only a few donors were willing to fund regional activities – often because regional activities did not fit their funding practices, which were organised on a country basis. This further decreased the motivation of local organisations for regional analysis and programming.

Finally, international organisations and donors considered regional strategies with civil society as alternative or complementary to diplomacy. In their view, they provided an opportunity to circumvent the sovereignty of states. Through working with civil society at a regional level, international organisations would contribute opinions, criticism and ideas, without confronting particular governments. As such, regional civil society encounters were complementary to regional initiatives at diplomatic level. The question was whether the political aspirations of supporting organisations matched the ambitions, mandates and expertise of their partners in this respect. These aspirations built on an image of civil society as a counterweight to governments, a role to which many of their partners did not aspire.

* * *

The above quotation shows the belief of several interviewees that regional discourses were no more than a fashion in the development scene. To them, regional discourses reflected an institutional need to regularly come up with new notions to legitimise the existence of the sector. Alternatively, they considered talking of regional approaches a discursive practice to hide the failure of national and international organisations to effectively address conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Nonetheless, many representatives of national and international organisations considered regional approaches imperative because they contributed to a better understanding of what conflict was about, and indicated the need to operate regionally. For a variety of reasons, however, the shift to regional approaches remains more theoretical than practical.

Many local and international organisations found it difficult to analyse the connectedness of regional issues in a way that would result in regional programming, and to arrive at a shared regional understanding. Regional discourses were different ways of making sense of complex conflict dynamics. Improved understanding of complexity, however, did not provide for strategies to deal effectively with this complexity.

Moreover, regional discourses on peacebuilding were shaped in a political process and related to the political space for civil society organisations, and their relationship with their governments. Civil society organisations appeared to be fundamentally political in nature, and deeply involved in the everyday politics of peace and conflict. This political nature of organisations meant that regional platforms for peace were not necessarily peaceful. Rather than working towards an ‘imagined regional community’ (cf. Anderson 1983/Reference Anderson1991) of civil society organisations – as hoped for by many outsiders – state borders and the regional political map continued to play an important role in how civil society identified itself. As a result, it was difficult to facilitate exchange of experiences and establish regional cooperation, and to realise shared understanding of regional issues and regional solutions. Rather than providing neutral spaces for generating ideas and launching opinions and criticism, regional fora and exchanges were often interfaces where different regional discourses met, representing different readings of conflict. At many regional exchanges, such differences were silenced to circumvent conflict between the participants. The outcomes were depoliticised regional strategies that focused on the similarly experienced consequences of regional conflict, rather than on the underlying political differences.

The challenge of civil society regional peacebuilding is thus not just about acknowledging the regional character of conflict, but more about reconciling the differences between the civil society organisations involved, and coming to a shared regional imagination. Some considered that, in order for this rapprochement to happen, agreement between governments was first required. However, a less pessimistic picture evolves when considering existing networks that had overcome regional differences to some extent. The question is whether civil society organisations will be able to challenge the regional policies of their governments or other regional players, as long as they have not overcome the differences between themselves. This may be too much to expect of civil society organisations. As Mamdani (Reference Mamdani2001) suggests, regional reform may also come about through the example set by other countries in the region. Perhaps the most important role civil society organisations can play in achieving regional peacebuilding is bringing about political reform within their own countries. In this, regional dialogues may inspire processes of reform in other countries.

What could be the role of international organisations in this? Civil society regional approaches for peace require the fostering of regional identification between civil society organisations, rather than assuming it. International organisations might support and facilitate this. Regional identification will never come about without encountering the other players from the region; thus I agree with Galtung (1996/Reference Galtung2003: 271) on the need to ‘let one thousand conferences blossom’. To achieve a shared regional identification, maybe the sharing of similar experiences is indeed more important than exchanging dissimilar views on what conflict is about. Exchanges and platforms may therefore be more important than regional civil society programmes. More prominence could also be given to enhancing already existing regional contacts, such as those between universities and trade networks. Even if the resulting exchanges are depoliticised, we should consider them as a first necessary step in a process of regional identification and (finally) reconciliation. At the same time, we should not disregard the relevance of meeting backstage in regional encounters, where politics may be discussed informally, and acknowledgement of regional connectedness may be achieved.

Finally, international organisations should not have too high ambitions in supporting regional civil society peacebuilding. They should be careful not to expect levels of cooperation that often do not even exist at a national level, or to assume that their local partners share their expectations of the benefits of regional programmes and exchange. Donors' imagination of a regional civil society doing what their governments failed to do – bringing regional peace – was far beyond the realities of their partners. Before drafting programmes and setting expectations, donors should realise that there is no such thing as a Great Lakes Region in a singular sense, and ask instead how local people imagine (the possibilities of) their region.