In this book, author Bidyut Chakrabarty attempts to portray the development of communist parties in India from the 1950s until the present. Communism in India is thematically organized into two parts: parliamentary communist parties and violent revolutionary communist parties and movements. Using such a classification, Chakrabarty covers the post-colonial histories of most communist parties in India, from the original Communist Party of India established in 1925 to the various Maoist parties that originated in the late 1960s. Furthermore, the historical studies of the parliamentary communist parties are organized geographically, divided into state-level studies of the three major communist-dominated states of Tripura, Kerala, and West Bengal (the last receiving a two-chapter long evaluation).
Following the introductory chapter, the histories of parliamentary communist parties contained in Chapters 1 through 4 are the book’s key contributions to the study of post-colonial Indian politics. Avoiding a historiography centered on prominent leaders, Chakrabarty presents a three-dimensional history of the communist parties in these states, from the perspectives of party ideology, party as popular movement, and party in government. By doing so, the book reveals the variations that have arisen within communist parties, most notably the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India, Marxist (CPIM), across different states. In Chapters 1 and 2, the author explains why the CPIM in Tripura and communist-led coalitions in Kerala achieve and retain power by utilizing extant socio-cultural cleavages, specifically inter-ethnic conflict in the former and inter-religious competition in the latter, thereby demonstrating the strategies that communist parties have used to adapt to the exigencies of electoral politics.
In contrast, the three-decade long rule of the CPIM-led Left Bloc coalition in West Bengal testifies to the frittering away of the communist parties’ goodwill. Chakrabarty follows a creative strategy by using Chapter 3 to focus on the Left Bloc’s last landslide victory in the 2006 state legislative elections, with Chapter 4 focusing on the Left Bloc’s electoral defeat in 2011, ending its 34-year rule. The historical narratives demonstrate how the Left Bloc’s repeated victories resulted from land reform policies empowering a class of middle peasants in the late 1970s, whose control of usufruct rights subsequently became contingent on supporting the Bloc, as well as creating a party organization that channeled popular preferences, bypassing the bureaucratic and elite-dominated state apparatus.
Chapter 4 also details the asphyxiating penetration of the CPIM into all aspects of West Bengal society; the party organization’s ossifying transformation into the bearer of social conservatism; the entrenchment of corruption and nepotism; and the neglect of the rural poor, extending from tea estate workers to rural Muslims. The turn toward neo-liberal policies on acquiring agricultural land for private companies without consulting tenure holders, and the detachment of party elites from peasant demands, in favor of the urban middle-classes, are considered the proximate causes of the collapse of the CPIM and its Left Bloc partners in 2011. Thus, the author implies the rational individualistic nature of peasant politics in West Bengal, which seems to run counter to the arguments presented in this book, wherein peasants switched their support when the CPIM stopped honoring the land-for-votes contract and began to support urban-industrialization policies. This insight, perhaps inadvertently, resembles Samuel Popkin’s (The Rational Peasant (1979) and Robert Bates’ (Prosperity and Violence (2001)) understanding of individuals’ support for political elites depending on the latter’s ability to create and sustain economic systems that provide opportunities for advancement.
The remainder of the book focuses on Maoist political parties in their various avatars over time and across states. Chapter 5 notes two waves of Maoist violence: the Naxalbari-inspired movements of the late 1960s, which were crushed by the early 1970s; and the later wave beginning in the late 1980s, which continues today. However, Chakrabarty does note communist-led rural rebellions in late-colonial India, such as the Tebhaga Rebellion in northern Bengal and the Telengana Rebellion in the erstwhile princely state of Hyderabad. Unlike the state-centric history of parliamentary parties, the study of Maoists centers on the formation, splintering, and coalitions of Maoist parties extant in a vast swathe of territory in central, eastern, and southern India. The findings indicate that the latest wave of Maoism is supported by tribal populations in areas where prior lack of development and consequent poverty is exacerbated by current state collaboration with domestic and foreign mining companies. Thus, the author claims, the new movement contrasts with the earlier wave that sought to give land to peasants by rebelling against semi-feudal elites supported by the state machinery. Chapter 6 explains that despite notable successes, which have forced the issue of equitable development for areas inhabited by tribal populations into the political agenda at the national and state level, rebel excesses and increasing state strength in terms of coercive capacity and redistributive programs are defeating the Maoists. The causes and the outcomes thus dovetail with James C. Scott’s (The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (2009)) argument that peasants futilely rebel in order to protect their economic subsistence and political autonomy against modernizing states.
Despite its comprehensive coverage of communist parties, the book suffers from two theoretical drawbacks that affect the overall explanatory narrative. The first weaknesses stems from the treatment of the communist parties as discrete state-level entities. The second problem arises from the argument that the Maoist movement is a monolithic threat.
The two major parliamentary communist parties, the CPI and CPIM, are Janus-faced entities. On the one hand, their state-level leadership has to adapt to local political realities in order to remain electorally viable in state-level legislative elections. On the other hand, their national leadership focuses on achieving power at the national-level, often as partners in broader coalitions. Consequently, the policy preferences of state and national-level leaders can sometimes be in opposition, while at other times national-level dynamics bolster state-level leaders. For example, whereas the West Bengal leadership of the CPIM gained valuable resources because the national party was a member of the United Progressive Alliance coalition led by the Congress Party in 2004, the national-level party leadership left the alliance due to its opposition to Indian nuclear collaboration with the United States, a foreign-policy issue irrelevant to West Bengal politics. In contrast, the frequent national-level alliances of the Congress Party with the CPIM in the early through mid-1990s led to a détente in West Bengal politics, consequently protecting the Left Bloc in West Bengal during a time when popular preferences were changing due to the collapse of socialism and introduction of free-market policies.
Finally, Chakrabarty views the Maoists as a unified, albeit loosely organized, movement that threatens the Indian state. This assertion is well supported by a detailed study of party programs, declarations by Maoist leaders, and an analysis of various inter-party meetings seeking to create a unified Maoist movement. Nevertheless, the presentation and evaluation of the nature of Maoist activities, which are far fewer than those on party platforms and the like, reveals that Maoist groups’ attacks, revenues, and consequent preferences revolve around localized grievances of tribal populations and the control and taxation of locally available natural resources sought by private companies, in the same vein of Jeremy Weinstein’s (Prosperity and Violence (2006)) findings on rural insurgencies. Thus, this indicates the possibility that Maoists repeatedly fail to cohesively threaten the national state because the strategies of their local successes undermines their cross-regional viability.
The aforementioned drawbacks, however, should not deter from two major contributions that make this book indispensable for scholars of Indian politics, Communist parties, and political development. For students of Indian politics and Communist parties, it provides the only contemporary coverage of both the parliamentary and insurgency Communist parties in a single monograph. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it holistically conceptualizes the ideological development, praxis, successes, and failures of a distinct “Indian Communism,” which demands further study akin to its better known European and East Asian counterparts.
