Colonial scholars and administrators in the latter half of the nineteenth century were the first to subject South Asia to modern historicist scrutiny. Using coins, inscriptions, and chronicles, they determined the dates and identities of numerous kings and dynasties within an apparently scrupulous empiricist framework. From the 1930s, with the widespread rise of nationalist sentiment, South Asian scholars began to write about their own past. The particular configurations of colonial and early nationalist historiography of South Asia have proved immensely consequential for subsequent generations of historians.Footnote 1 Not only did this historiography value certain types of evidence, particularly Indic language epigraphy, Persian chronicles, and archaeology (while at the same time devaluing others like literature and religious texts), it set some of the enduring thematic and topical parameters which have shaped the course of the field. The initial focus was on the careers and personalities of rulers or the genius of races as the key causative forces in history, but eventually dynastic history became the dominant mode of writing about the past.
To make sense of the myriad dynasties and lineages discovered in the sources, historians made use of epochal and chronological divisions. Early on, Orientalists, company-administrators and historians had divided the past either into civilisational ages, including the concept of the ‘golden age’, or into the apparently more descriptive division of ‘Hindu’, ‘Muslim’, and ‘British’ periods. By the early decades of the twentieth century, both colonial and nationalist historians had begun to map the tripartite scheme of ‘ancient’, ‘medieval’, and ‘modern’ onto the latter framework. The rise of nationalist sentiment meant that a number of complex ideological inflections came to bear on this periodisation. Among these was a tendency to construct, drawing on earlier Orientalist scholarship, a ‘glorious age’ which acted as an originary moment in historical narratives. While there were differences among writers as to what empire or sub-period should hold this honour (typically the Mauryan or Gupta empires), an inevitable corollary of this idea required a subsequent period of political, economic, and cultural decline. For most, the Turkic conquests and establishment of the Delhi Sultanate between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, seen in historiography to herald a ‘Muslim’ or ‘medieval’ period, provided a convenient occasion for this decline. Indeed, most nationalist writers saw this as a ‘dark’, ‘ominous’ or, at best, a euphemistically ‘difficult’ period in India's history. And even when, in post-independence India, religiously marked periods were finally abandoned for the apparently secular terminology of ‘ancient,’ ‘medieval,’ and ‘modern’ in university history departments, chronological divisions ensured not only a persistent identification of ‘ancient’ with ‘Hindu-Buddhist’, and ‘medieval’ with ‘Muslim’, but a continued association of ancient India with Hindu glory and medieval India with Muslim decline.
There were, of course, uncomfortable aspects of this periodisation which related to all its elements, but most particularly its ‘medieval’ portion. The period between the Gupta Empire (either its rise or fall, depending on how one saw it) and the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate in the thirteenth century, for example — a period of potentially 900 years — posed a serious problem, being at once ‘post-ancient’ and ‘pre-medieval’. As early as the 1920s scholars had conceived of a ‘Hindu Medieval India’.Footnote 2 There were geographical problems as well. The model was seriously biased toward the north. For at the very onset of an apparently Muslim dominated ‘medieval’ India, or alternatively, the nadir of ‘Hindu Medieval India’, south India witnessed its day in the sun, with the powerful Hindu empires of the Cōlas and Cāḷukyas. The chronological and regional applicability of the idea of medieval India was, as a consequence, fairly unstable. Yet even as these qualifications and refinements were established, academic departments were consolidated in Indian universities around broad divisions of ancient and medieval, implicitly understood as Buddhist/Hindu and Muslim. Nevertheless, research continued on post-Gupta history using Sanskrit and other Indic language sources, conceiving of itself as distinct from ‘ancient’ history even though it was conducted from departments of ‘ancient’ history.
The late 1950s and 1960s, however, saw the rise of social history, as historians turned to new sorts of evidence and new topics of historical research. The legal and documentary sections of inscriptions were carefully scrutinised for information on state institutions, political structures, revenue systems and agrarian relations, while archaeology and numismatics were used to gauge levels of trade and economic activity. Marxist scholars led the way in this innovation, proposing ‘mode of production’ and ‘social formation’ as analytical models.Footnote 3 Those working on earlier sources elaborated a theory of ‘Indian feudalism’. These scholars argued that the alienation of rights to land revenue from higher to lower levels of political authority, through land grants, a process which began in Gupta times and accelerated afterwards, led to a generally ‘feudalised’ polity. Archaeological evidence of the decline of many major Gangetic cities was interpreted as de-urbanisation resulting from a decline in international trade with the Mediterranean. Internal trade exchanges lessened due to the increasing isolation and closure of the village economy in the context of feudalisation. Economic exchanges were gradually de-monetised, as coins became scarce. In many ways, Marxists developed a historical model of feudalism which was heavily influenced by particular studies of European history like those of Henri Pirenne. One of the notable effects of the turn to social history and the thesis of ‘Indian feudalism’ was to accentuate an already perceived distinction between pre- and post-Gupta India. The idea of an ‘early’ or ‘pre’ medieval period, from the Gupta Empire to the Sultanate, was slowly gaining ground.
The propositions of Indian ‘feudalism’ were widely discussed, debated and refined in historical journals during the 1960s and 70s. By the late 1970s debates over ‘modes of production’, partly driven by the moment of high-theory in Marxist social science, climaxed in heated discussions regarding the relevance of ‘feudalism’ to Indian history.Footnote 4 By the 1980s, some fundamental assumptions of the feudalist model had been undermined. These evidentiary challenges included a dispute over the interpretation of the land-grants and the supposed urban decay and decline in trade and coinage. It was pointed out early on that the numerous land-grants which the feudalists took to represent the alienation of state revenues to political subordinates were, in fact, usually gifts to religious functionaries, and thus did not contribute to a feudalisation of political authority.Footnote 5 The theory of urban decay was complicated by the suggestion that the decline of ancient urban centres was accompanied by the expansion of new urban settlements which were different in nature.Footnote 6 Whereas the great cities of ancient India were linked ‘horizontally’ in a ‘thin’, but geographically dispersed network of regular exchange, urban centres of post-Gupta India seem to have been more rooted in regional context and local exchange networks. The number and density of urban settlements in early medieval India seems to have increased, a point which has seriously undermined any notion of a countryside composed of economically isolated villages. And finally, economic historians, using methods different from those of numismatists argued that coinage in post-Gupta India, while not constituting a great variety of types distinguished by issuing authorities, nevertheless increased in numbers, indicating that the volume of exchange transactions between 600–1000 ce was comparable to that of other periods in north Indian history.Footnote 7
The effect of these criticisms was largely to discredit feudalism as an historical model, but not Marxist or social scientific approaches as such. By the 1980s, historians had begun to introduce new methodologies and theories inspired by anthropology and sociology as much as Marxist frameworks. While the central concern of this literature remained an analysis of the state, historical focus shifted from ‘feudal polity and society’ to ‘state formation’. Anthropological models were introduced to explain the apparent lack of a centralised bureaucratic structure in early states as imagined by colonialist and nationalist scholarship. In South India, Burton Stein drew on Aidan Southall's study of acephelous societies in Africa to propose a ‘segmentary model’ for the Cōla Empire and Nicholas Dirks explored the changing role of kingship and caste as the ‘little kingdom’ of the ancien régime was gradually hollowed out by the colonial regime.Footnote 8
By the end of the 1980s, however, the dominant approach to the state in medieval historiography, led by B. D. Chattopadhyaya and Hermann Kulke, came to be known as the ‘integrative’ or ‘processural’ model.Footnote 9 It stressed agrarian expansion, urban transformation, localisation and regional state formation as productive rather than regressive or fragmenting developments during the putative period of ‘Indian feudalism’. The medieval state in these formulations was seen neither as a pre-given entity as in nationalist scholarship, nor the result of political fragmentation as in feudalist historiography, but instead as having developed in a ‘continuous process from below’. More generally, Chattopadhyaya argued that the transition to ‘early medieval’ India should not be seen primarily as a ‘cessation’, ‘fragmentation’, or ‘decline’ of existing structures, but instead as positive development of new social phenomena.Footnote 10 The purported political fragmentation of post-Gupta India was explained as a proliferation rather than a devolution of ‘state structures’. Integral to such a perspective was the re-evaluation of the early or classical ‘state’ (the Gupta and Mauryan), from the centralised bureaucratic entity of nationalist and, to a certain extent, Marxist historiography to a more nodal and loosely structured entity.Footnote 11 This meant that the emergence of polities in the nodal zones of former Mauryan polity, for example, could be seen as new and onward developments rather than the devolving fragments of central authority.
The fallout of the all of this historiographical foment beginning in the 1960s was to firmly place economy and society (rather than dynastic- or personality-based narratives) at the centre of historical concern. The structure, organisation, and formation of the regional state was henceforth a topic of intrinsic and enduring interest. The turn to this sort of social history weakened the established periodisation. The religious associations often closely imbricated with the framework of ancient, medieval and modern were called into question while narratives of social formation, state typology and modes of production failed to align neatly with these divisions.Footnote 12 Preoccupations with a golden age of political unity and economic prosperity, usually associated with the ancient empires, were largely abandoned.Footnote 13 Chattopadhyaya's work influentially enunciated what had been long in the making, that of a refined periodisation of ‘early medieval’ India. Notably, unlike earlier applications of the ‘medieval’ simply transposed onto Indian history, this idea emerged after sustained consideration of actual social, economic and political developments.
Later ‘medieval’ history in South Asia, on the other hand, experienced even greater change. The Mughal Empire had surely formed the most active field of research in pre-colonial Indian history since its inception. It was endowed with colonialist and nationalist histories, and from the 1960s with a prolific Marxist historiography centered at Aligarh Muslim University.Footnote 14 By the 1980s, however, enough research had accumulated on the regional dynamics of the Mughal Empire to complicate the ‘military-fiscalist’ model of the Aligarh school. In addition, new non-state centered histories of social communities and dynamic labour markets grew considerably.Footnote 15 Building on these critiques and new approaches, a number of scholars sought to place the Mughal empire within a more global and trans-regional framework. This trend also took account of an emergent scholarship which emphasised South Asian mercantile linkages in the Indian Ocean from the 1500s, of calls for greater understanding of shared historical trajectories of the Mughal Empire with its Safavid and Ottoman neighbours, and of a vigorous reinterpretation of the eighteenth century (the last century of Mughal rule), which posited dynamic rather than failing regional economies across northern and central India.Footnote 16
These developments in Mughal history, combined with increasing work in Indian Ocean studies and a vibrant historiography of South India conspired, unevenly but perhaps fortuitously, to create what has now been widely called an ‘early modern’ period of Indian history. The most salient feature of this historiography has been to link India from the sixteenth century not only with the world of the Indian Ocean and greater ‘Eurasia’, but also with a global historical paradigm. For while the category of medieval has gradually been evacuated of any definitive substance in most national historiographies, in favour of a sort of cacophony of regional isolates simply holding the fort until the cavalry arrives, the ‘early modern’, contrastingly, has been an epoch of bold attributes. While the ‘early medieval’ framework developed by scholars working on earlier periods was largely a descriptor, attempting to clear the way for historians to develop theories of society and change through a close analysis of the sources, the ‘early modern’ framework as practiced by many historians was endowed with definitive attributes and accepted teleologies (much like, ironically, the feudalist historiography so disparaged by its proponents). Its well-known features include the widespread existence of global trade markets, the rise to power of merchant capitalists distinguished from the older land-based nobility, partly bureaucratised and centralised monarchic states with large armies which made use of firearms and, finally, a series of cultural developments anticipating ‘modernity’. While there has been a recognition that not all of these features apply to South Asia, and even critiques of the overall model of ‘early modern’,Footnote 17 this model has nevertheless gained a surprisingly tenacious currency among historians, particularly in studies of the regions at the periphery of, or beyond, the Mughal empire. As might be expected, the concept of early modern has often been invested with a heavy sense of teleology. Given the colonial arguments for the exogenous origins of historical change in South Asia, it has been in vogue to argue that various elements of ‘modernity’ may be found in ‘indigenous’ cultural forms between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.Footnote 18 The arguments for ‘early modernism’ or ‘early modernity’ in South Asia however, have often relied, rather ironically, on the very tropes of the ‘medieval’ once used to consign the Mughal Empire itself to a backward ‘medieval period’. At this level, early modern historiography has not so much rectified images of medieval stagnation as simply pushed back their boundaries to pre-Mughal times.
The future of the ‘medieval’ as a category in South Asian historical writing will be tied to how the debates about the ‘early modern’ are played out. While the interest in ‘early modern’ history has surely challenged the present myopia of much modern South Asian historiography, its protagonists have sometimes sadly breathed new ideological life into historical writings which have traditionally hampered the study of medieval societies.
