Political myths seem deceptively simple and yet can often be deadly in their effects. Myths of origin, authority, and legitimacy, for example, are all obvious manifestations of the political imaginary with dramatically powerful impact. Nevertheless, as Chiara Bottici is at pains to suggest, this does not mean that we cannot make some kind of sense of how to think about and interpret political myth in general. Through a critical genealogy, which suggests that because myths are best understood in terms of their plurality, their “interrelational” and contextual character, and their constant renewal in the face of contemporary demands, the approach could hardly be otherwise (81, 99f, 111). What is on offer here is a critical guide to the field, an immanent critique that tries to show us what myth cannot in fact be, so that what it really is can be better understood.
Bottici begins with the vexed question of the place of myth in the ancient Greek world. She rejects claims of an obvious opposition between mythos and logos, and also counters the common suggestion that the development of philosophy is best seen as a gradual overcoming of irrational myth. Instead, she argues that rather unlike modern Western political communities, the Greeks actively promoted and easily coped with a plurality of myths, clearly understanding that a combination of both mythos and logos was necessary to their self-presentation and self-understanding (e.g., 30, 39). Only with the biblical narrative of creation, of original naming, and of the application of a definitive chronology to historical time does the idea of a distinction between myth and rational truth become firmly established (47). But the attempt to understand myth either in terms of its claims to truth, or in terms of its opposition to rational argument or indeed to some notion of truth, is doomed to failure. The broad story of these failures to explain adequately political myth constitutes the bulk of the book. Thus, we are given a guided tour of the strengths and weaknesses of numerous approaches to myth; as a variant of the dialectic of rationality and modernity, from Vico through to Kant, alongside an engaging reprise in particular of Wittgenstein's critique of Frazer. The nub of his point, that one cannot judge myths according to truth claims—for one can only judge at all from within a shared background that requires an appreciation of the entire “hurly burly of human actions” (esp. 85, 96, n. 12)—becomes central to Bottici's argument. Thus, Lévi-Strauss's work cannot explain the persistence of (irrational) myth in modern (rational) society (101). Husserl's phenomenology assumes the “reality” of myth in an unhelpful manner (105), while Cassirer's approach is limited by his suggestion that myth is a form of lower-level consciousness, apparent mostly in times of danger (107, 151, 153ff). Even Vico, despite his attempts to restore the autonomy of imagination and fancy to human history, still held to a standard of rational action that serve as a gauge with which to measure nonrational events, or fantasia (e.g., 110).
What all these approaches fail to understand is the requirement that one should not approach myth in some absolute fashion with the hope of a clear and definitive answer. For one should recognize that there is never a definitive answer to the question as to what political myth actually is, because to work on political myth is always literally—to use the title of Blumenberg's work as Bottici does—to recognize that this is always work on myth (Arbeit am Mythos). Myths are “positional” narratives that provide both meaning and significance (201, 115, 123), and crucially for us, they are continuously reinterpreted according to the demands of the present (129, 178). This is why Sorel's analysis of the myth of the proletarian general strike is so radically important as an example: it is a myth that is expressed in action or activity in the moment (184). Similarly, the importance of political myth to classical theories of the state of nature in political thought, including those outlined by Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, are given due consideration. Correlatively, and in a richly suggestive move by Bottici, Spinoza's political thought is shown to offer a key resource for students of myth. This is not only because of his focus on the question of meaning in interpretation, but also because he understands the way in which conventional human or artificial action creates exemplary figures or moments. Thus, understanding Hebrew prophecy in particular is an attempt to understand and explain the construction of exemplars to follow, and thus to bridge the divide between subjective and objective judgment (see esp. 165–75). Work on myth is as much about work on the problem of judgment.
To understand myth, we need genealogy, but this is not in itself enough because of its interrelational character. That is to say, because of its location between expression and reception and because of its centrality to the construction of a social imaginary, still wider reflection is needed to grasp political myth. Moreover, although they are closely related to one another, Bottici suggests that political myth is not reducible to political ideology. Nevertheless, one needs to be aware of the capacity for self-deception in both fields (183ff, 191ff). Myths might be ideas, but clearly not all ideas are myths (196, 217). Instead, they exist as part of the interplay between the extraordinary and the banal (247). This claim locates Bottici's account not only in the tradition of writing about political myth that stems from both Hans Blumenberg and Henry Tudor, but also that of G. S. Kirk. His celebrated Sather Lectures, published as Myth (Cambridge University Press, 1974, esp. 83, 244, 280), suggested that myths might be understood as claims able to mediate between social contradictions in their development of more complex narrative structures over time. Indeed, in synthesizing and modifying central works on the topic, Bottici has endeavored to provide a framework within which the study of myth can be usefully developed, and in this she has performed a very useful work of Lockean philosophical underlaboring. The work covers a vast amount of complex material, typically in a concise manner, though occasionally there are some repetitions of phrases and arguments (e.g., 31/77, 163/181). What remains to be seen now is whether the study of particular political myths can take this framework and use it to undertake the detailed historical work required to explain more fully the instance of particular political myths in context.
