David Romano analyzes Kurdish nationalism in the 20th century from the perspective of social-movement theories. This book is important in two respects. First, it examines a neglected issue in the literature on the Middle East. Second, as the examination of the modern resistance of Kurds in the book is informed by a theoretical framework, Romano's work is not merely another factual narrative.
The book consists of eight chapters. In Chapter 1, Romano examines the theory of social movements in terms of political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and cultural framing and proposes to build a synthesis of the three approaches as a way to understand Kurdish nationalism.
Chapter 2 provides a structural analysis of the birth and development of Kurdish nationalist opposition in Turkey. Romano focuses on the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, elite support, state capacity and propensity for repression, and the international environment throughout the 20th century. In Romano's view, the Kurdish opposition in Turkey tended to operate legally when the institutionalized political system appeared more open and vice versa. For this reason, Kurdish nationalists resorted to armed struggle in the early republican period and in the post-1970s, whereas, to the contrary, a relative openness during World War I and the Turkish War of Independence led the Kurds to cooperate with Turkish elites. Had the system been less open, Romano implies, the Kurds could have opted for an independent state. Following this, Kurdish opposition in the 1920s and 1930s was backed by a traditional elite composed of tribal leaders and religious shaykhs. The movement remained “conservative, melding religion, tribal politics, and Kurdish nationalism together, but not seeking to transform Kurdish society” (p. 62). However, the elite supporters of Kurdish nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s were mostly members of the professional classes and left-wing intellectuals. Accordingly, the Kurdish opposition of this period “espoused a socialist and revolutionary brand of Kurdish nationalism” (p. 62).
In Chapter 3 Romano analyzes Kurdish opposition of the last two decades in Turkey in terms of resource mobilization and the rational choices of the actors involved. He concedes it is difficult to explain the growing strength of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the leading nationalist organization since the 1980s, by reference to resource mobilization, because resources available to the PKK cadres were remarkably scant, especially in the early 1980s, following the military takeover. Likewise, “as opportunities within Turkey for Kurds willing to assimilate to Turkish culture are good” (p. 69), rational behavior for an ordinary Kurd would be to side with the Turkish state, not with the PKK. However, PKK advocacy of the interests of poor peasants may be considered a possible “rational” explanation for the support it received. Of greater importance has been the mobilization strategy pursued by PKK founders: “by offering goals that mattered to the people, selective (dis)incentives, astute organization and coordination, and the establishment of credibility with the local Kurdish population through ideology, self-sacrifice, and demonstrative actions against Turkish security forces, the founders of the PKK were able to turn their movement into a mass-based, significant challenge to the Turkish state” (p. 92).
Chapter 4 covers the use of cultural tools by both the PKK and the state throughout the 20th century. Providing a rich examination of both sets of framings, Romano argues that the Turkish state “pursued cultural framings that would mold a unified Turkish nation within the state boundaries it had attained” (p. 169). The state basically intended to “crush Kurdish identity and assimilate Kurds into Turkish ethnie” (p. 169). In response, the Kurdish opposition emphasized “Kurdish nationhood, repression directed at the Kurds because of their identity as Kurds, and the illegitimacy of the ruling state” (p. 169). In Romano's view, in the early stages of this contest of cultural framing the state was more successful due to its control over education and media. However, this picture changed by the 1960s, when advances in communications technology and world events shifted “some power into the hands of Kurdish insurgents” (p. 169).
In Chapter 5 Romano suggests that opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and cultural framings have all interacted dynamically in the trajectory of the Kurdish nationalist movement. The following two chapters are devoted to a brief examination of the Kurdish opposition in Iraq and Iran utilizing this type of a synthetic approach.
Romano's work is an important contribution to a generally weak literature. However, it is not free from some weaknesses. Romano gives the impression that the synthesis he provides is no more than a combination of existing theoretical tools. Another weakness is the asymmetry between consequent chapters. Although Chapter 2 analyzes the Kurdish movement from its birth to its present situation, the examination of resource mobilization in Chapter 3 is limited to the last two decades. A more substantial weakness is a “double reduction”: in Romano's narration the Kurdish nationalist struggle over the past two decades is reduced to the struggle of the PKK, which is reduced to an armed organization. Despite the PKK's prominence, legal political parties from the People's Labor Party to the Democratic Society Party, nongovernmental organizations such as the Human Rights Association, local governmental bodies such as municipalities headed by Kurdish nationalists, and the Kurdish diaspora in Europe have all been instrumental in promoting Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Although Romano recognizes that the PKK has employed “political” as well as military means, his argumentation gives the impression that the Kurdish resistance of the last period has been organized from one single center. Rather, it is thanks to the multilayered character of the Kurdish movement that the mass street demonstrations or mass meetings at the Newroz festival have in several instances been more “scandalous” and “telling” than the armed struggle.
There are also some factual mistakes. The founder of the illegal Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey was not Yusuf Azizoğlu (p. 43), who happened to be the minister of health in the early sixties but was Said ElÇi and then Faik Bucak, who was assassinated in 1966. Likewise, the Turkish Worker's Party's first statement concerning Kurds was not made in 1970, in the fourth congress of the party (p. 44). Statements concerning Kurds began to appear in party documents around 1964. There are also a few editing mistakes. For example, writing the names of the illegal organizations Tekoş in and Yekbun with capital letters gives the impression that these are acronyms, although they are not. Tekoş in means “struggle/fight” and Yekbun means “unity” in Kurdish.
To conclude, although Romano's book has some weaknesses in assessing the Kurdish nationalist movement of the 20th century, it still is an invaluable contribution to the literature on the issue.
