Silence and the law may not be intimate bedfellows, but neither are they complete strangers to each other. There are classic phrases such as “silence means consent,” which has become a standard topos in the discipline; humanitarian lawyers have done their best to persuade us that the negative conclusion that the law is silent when the weapons speak (inter arma silent leges) is just not true, pointing to the many rules that govern the opening, conduct, and even conclusion of hostilities; and international criminal law afficionados may strongly feel that the law should give a voice to the victims of atrocities, thereby making up for the “silence of the lambs.”
Still, there is surprisingly little systematic and general work available on the role of silence in international law, and such studies as do exist have been devoted to specific contexts: the role of acquiescence in the acquisition of territory or in the formation of customary international law; or the notion of estoppel; or perhaps the waving of white flags on the battlefield. The latter points already to a conceptual issue: is non-verbal communication, such as the waving of flags in a particular context, to be seen as silence? Or instead as communication without verbalization, where all relevant parties understand what the signals signify?
And then there is the role of silence in the context of reservations to multilateral treaties. This is one the few places (though not the only one, as we shall see) in international law where silence has actually been given an explicit meaning: under Article 20(5) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a reservation that is not met with an objection within twelve months is formally deemed to have been accepted by the silent state.
It is much to her credit that Danae Azaria, associate professor of international law at University College London, has started to fill this gap in our collective understanding of the role and relevance of silence in international law. With the help of much-coveted funding by the European Research Council, she embarked on a five-year project to look at the role of silence in international law; the book under review, an edited volume, is the first book-length output of the project, while a monograph is in preparation.
Given the circumstance that not much is known about silence, it was a wise decision to conceive of the book under review as something of a reconnaissance exercise across various policy domains within the broad (and sprawling) field of international law. There are chapters on the role of silence in World Trade Organization (WTO) law (one by Gabreille Marceau and Rebecca Walker and one by Rob Howse); in investment law (by August Reinisch and Johannes Tropper); in the law relating to cyber space (Duncan Hollis and Barrie Sander); in the law of armed conflict (Sandesh Sivakumaran); in international criminal law (Talita Dias); in international environmental law (Malgosia Fitzmaurice); in the law of the sea (Jean-Marc Thouvenin); in space law (Lorenzo Gasbarri); in human rights law (one by Andreas Zimmermann and Nils-Hendrik Grohmann, and another by Olivia Coral Daniels and Laurence Helfer); and in the law relating to territorial title and boundaries (by Giovanni Distefano and Aymeric Hêche). The book starts with a useful conceptual chapter by Azaria and a chapter on the work of the International Law Commission (by long-standing International Law Commission member Sir Michael Wood and Omri Sender) and concludes with a stock-taking chapter by the editor: such a concluding chapter should be far more common to edited volumes than it is. Azaria’s concluding chapter usefully brings a number of strands together and indicates some points for further reflection, such as the need for clearer conceptualization of state silence and how to interpret it. All chapters do what they were expected to do: they provide an overview of the role of silence in that particular branch of international law. There is, consequently, fairly little point in discussing them one by one: the authors are subcontractors to the editor, so to speak, and it is thus far more interesting to discuss the assumptions underlying the volume.
Azaria’s intuition to set up the volume so as to provide an overview across the field proves fully justified: as it turns out, the role of silence can take on different forms in settings where, e.g., courts and quasi-tribunals play an important role, as in human rights law, resulting in authoritative interpretations of silence; or where, as in international criminal law, the principle of legality is notably involved; or where, as in the law of armed conflict, the treaty depositary plays an important role. With depositary notices, subsequent silence can hardly be construed as the result of ignorance, for instance; it is more persuasive to view silence in such a setting as intentional. In international environmental law, silence turns out to be a form of expressing consent to be bound on some occasions, through all sorts of opting out procedures or adjustment of relevant standards by consensus. Almost the opposite applies to cyber matters, due to the absence of generally available legal frameworks.
One of the book’s strengths is its inductive approach, adopted by the collectivity of its authors. This is the academic study of law starting by looking at what happens on the ground and trying to derive conclusions from careful study of the materials, rather than reasoning from “first principles” in order to arrive at specific rules. Frankly, it may well be too early, given the discipline’s understanding of silence, to derive rules from the material practices (let alone from first principles), and as the volume abundantly illustrates, such rules as can possibly be derived are unlikely to be general rules, applicable across international law—the subfields have their own peculiarities—as mentioned, a central role for a depositary may well render our interpretation of silence different from silence in other fields. That said, since all approaches have their blind spots, so too does the book’s inductive approach. The very selection of materials demands some deduction: decisions as to what materials to look at or what sub-fields to focus on cannot be dictated by the materials themselves but require some prior conceptualization. After all, there is just too much international law to throw it all in the air and see where the chips may fall; some preliminary choices are required.
Azaria is well aware of this and usefully moves beyond a mere “acoustic” working definition of silence to one that also comprises material acts—or rather, the absence thereof. Thus, she notes that the absence of acting by a state (e.g., refraining from exercising jurisdiction where doing so could be appropriate) may well be a relevant form of state silence. Also useful is her distinction between “standalone” and “reactive” silence, with the latter given pride of place. In other words, much (though perhaps not all) of the focus rests on situations where states might be expected to speak up, but refrain from doing so, e.g., when confronted with a legal claim. This helps to frame the study: the volume “focuses on the legal meaning of reactive State silence as acceptance” (p. 13).
Possibly the most intriguing assumption underlying the volume is the idea, put forward in the editor’s introduction, that states may be silent for reasons other than legal reasons: “there can be—and indeed, often there are—various extralegal (political, economic, or other) reasons behind State silence” (p. 6). This may well be accurate enough in its own right, but it does beg the question who gets to decide this, and on what basis: how to ascertain whether a state was silent for legal reasons rather than any other reason, and what other acceptable reasons could there even be? Underlying this is a rationalist outlook, assuming (as is well-nigh inevitable) that states do things—whatever things—for some instrumental reason, and that law and politics are distinct fields that are best kept separate. But what if the silence is the result of an oversight? Or flippancy? Or the head of state throwing a tantrum? Surely, these cannot meaningfully be categorized as, e.g., silence “for political reasons” or “for economic reasons.” And even silence “for political reasons” may still carry weight: the approach here suggests a distinction between law and politics (as well as law and economics, for that matter) which may be useful for some heuristic purposes, but which may eventually be difficult to sustain.
If the determination of the relevance of state silence is left to the silent state itself, then that state can always claim its silence should not be given legal effect—and thus silence can play no role whatsoever. Conversely, if the meaning of silence is not determined by the silent state alone, then the relevance of state intent is diminished, but this might be difficult to accept for any classically trained international lawyer, despite the hopeful observation that “international law has shifted from bilateralism to the protection of community interests” (p. 5). Azaria’s conception of international law finds its place somewhere within the tension between apology and utopia (to borrow a phrase). That is not meant as a devastating critique (allow me to rely on my own intention here …): for the last thirty-odd years scholarly work in international law has realized it is impossible to escape that tension, except perhaps by turning to history or some other neighboring discipline, leaving the law behind altogether.
Likewise, it is hardly a criticism of the volume to suggest that silence possibly plays a role in yet other branches of the law, not covered here. In health law and air law, there are, as in environmental law, opting out mechanisms available. This has proved rather successful with respect to the various iterations of the International Health Regulations, for instance, and suggests that here silence can be a means of expressing consent to be bound—as in international environmental law. Something similar may apply within international organizations taking their decisions by consensus, touched upon mostly in the chapters on the WTO but not explored with respect to other international organizations. For if consensus marks a “resigned let-it-go,” there seems to be little need for the attitude to be verbalized.
It is the hallmark of excellent academic work (as this book certainly represents) that it does not merely answer questions but also raises new ones. One that comes to my mind is the question of state responsibility for silence, and the Rwandan genocide may well be emblematic here: if there is a genocide ongoing but it is never called out as such, would it be possible—never mind plausible—to hold those to account who should have known better but did not speak up? This comes close to responsibility not just for acts but also omissions (here too Rwanda provides a grim reminder) but arguably goes a step further still. If words make our world, as first-generation constructivists have suggested for the last couple of decades, then the use or non-use of words is not inconsequential. And as the people of Rwanda found out the hard way, not labeling their plight a genocide entailed that state parties to the Genocide Convention could avoid giving effect to their core obligation “to prevent and to punish.” While admittedly some punishment of genocidaires has taken place afterward, their linguistic enablers stayed outside the line of fire.
Another question is what happens if states change their “language of silence”: what if they explicitly decide to work outside the law, for instance, as is often suggested, by concluding so-called non-legally binding agreements; or setting up informal “coalitions of the willing” or other “governance mechanisms”; or invoking considerations of legitimacy rather than law to justify action; or combining non-recognition of a state (i.e., silence) with the happy conclusion of all sorts of agreements (legal or otherwise) with the rider that none of these engender the legal effect of recognition? If matters are deliberately located in the extra-legal sphere (assuming such is a realistic possibility), does that mean that for legal purposes these matters qualify as a resounding silence, of no interest whatsoever? Azaria may have tapped into a goldmine: the idea of looking at international law through the prism of silence opens up many avenues for further study and reflection, for future projects.
The overwhelming impression oozing from State Silence Across International Law is just how much international law there is, and with it the obligation on states to stay alert, to regularly speak up, to make their voices heard, to report, to respond and react. Those who doubt the existence of international law had better take note, although this also suggests that much international law has become bureaucratized. The point for present purposes is however that with all this activity going on, it will not always be feasible for states to respond to everything that goes on in the world, and this, in turn, raises the question of what one might refer to as the “political economy of silence.” And in particular if silence can have legally relevant effects, it becomes relevant to ask who can afford to be silent. It is already a familiar problem that the smaller permanent missions in Geneva have difficulties following everything that is going in the WTO, the World Health Organization, and the dozens of other international organizations based in Geneva, resulting in practical forms of inequality among states: the United States and the European Union will typically be better informed than Botswana or Belize, will have been able to reflect in greater depth, and thus will have a natural advantage in activities both normative and managerial. The more international law there is, the more inequality of this kind there will be. This may be less eye-catching than pointing to other aspects of international law’s troubled connection to inequality, but probably no less important.
In the end, Danae Azaria is to be congratulated on having produced an excellent and pioneering volume. Having assembled a stellar cast of authors, recognized as specialists within their sub-disciplines, the book provides both an authoritative overview of the role of state silence across international law (living up to the promise of its title) and raises a number of further questions, as suggested above. Some of those, it is hoped, will be addressed by Azaria in the monograph she is preparing. With that prospect in mind, the current volume certainly whets the appetite.
