Philosophy does not concern itself with children. It leaves them to pedagogy, where they are not in very good hands. Philosophy has forgotten about children.
—Bernard Schlink
In March 2006, Kurdish children took over Diyarbakir, the largest city in the Kurdish region of Turkey, for two days. With news circulating that Turkish security forces had killed Kurdish guerrillas using chemical weapons, tens of thousands of children started a street revolt against the Turkish armed forces. The press reported the uncanny moment when the Kurdish mayor of the city, Osman Baydemir, tried to negotiate with the leaders of the revolt. A thirteen-year-old boy declared himself the leader and refused to bargain: “We will fight,” he said, “to our death.” Some did indeed fight to their death; over the next two days, the Turkish army killed seven children. This revolt, which would be followed by many others, launched a new era for the Kurdish movement in Turkey, as children became prominent political actors in both the Kurdish regions and major urban areas in western Turkey. This article analyzes the experiences of Kurdish children in the city of Adana, arguing that the memory of violence transmitted by their displaced parents, combined with experiences of urban life such as exclusion, discrimination, poverty, and state violence, necessitates a reevaluation of how childhood is understood and experienced within the Kurdish community. In a context where Kurdish adults often have trouble integrating into the urban context, Kurdish children frequently challenge conventional power relations within their families and within the Kurdish movement. In contrast to the dominant public depiction in Turkish discourse that these children are being abused by politicized adults, I contend that Kurdish children are active agents who subvert not only the agendas and norms of Turkish politics but those of Kurdish politics as well.Footnote 1
Kurdish children first appeared as objects of fear in Turkish academic and public discourses following the internal displacement during the state of emergency in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The earlier image of children as innocent and vulnerable was eclipsed, as thousands of Kurdish children migrated with their families to the metropolis for economic and political reasons.Footnote 2 Through the late 1990s, these children were increasingly depicted by the Turkish media as purse-snatchers, glue-sniffers, and sexual assaulters—in general, as predisposed to violence.Footnote 3 These discourses began to shift again in the 2000s, as the violence of Kurdish children came to be seen as an evolving threat to the state and the sociopolitical order. This transformation occurred in the context of children's increasing participation in the Kurdish movement and in urban clashes against the security forces. The image of “stone-throwing children” became deeply ingrained in the Turkish public psyche. The wound that the image of the child received in the public psyche could only be healed by the arrest of hundreds of children under a quickly passed emergency terrorism statute. This measure violated a number of international conventions on children's rights signed by Turkey. Confronted with a wave of unusually young Kurdish demonstrators, Turkish state officials struggled to make sense of and comprehend the dynamics behind the politicization of Kurdish children.
Two violent events in particular have given Kurdish children a prominent role in Turkish political discourse in the 21st century. The first was their participation in the 2006 demonstrations against the killing of fourteen guerillas of the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), or Worker's Party of Kurdistan, with chemical weapons by the Turkish military. The revolts started in Diyarbakir and then spread to other provinces such as Batman and Mardin, and thirteen people, including seven children, were killed in their suppression by Turkish security forces. After being attacked by the police, some Kurdish youth stoned workplaces, banks, and the Office district (Ofis Mahallesi), Diyarbakir's wealthiest neighborhood. The reaction of the mainstream Turkish media and the state was harsh. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan threatened the Kurds, stating that “our security forces will do whatever is necessary to eliminate the terrorists, regardless of whether they are children or women. Control your children.”Footnote 4 Much of the Turkish press suggested that the children were innocent, but had been deceived and exploited by Kurdish adults aiding and abetting the PKK.Footnote 5 Hence, the agency of Kurdish children was undermined and projected onto their parents.
The Anti-Terror Act passed after these revolts legislated that Kurdish parents, who were assumed to have sent their children to the demonstrations, were also to be punished. Mustafa Toprak, the governor of Diyarbakir, announced that children who had participated in the uprising would be taken from their parents and incarcerated in asylums, somewhat perversely called “Houses of Love” (Sevgi Evleri).Footnote 6 The governor of Adana, İlhan Atış, told the Kurdish children: “We [the Turkish state] love you more than your fathers and mothers do.”Footnote 7 In spite of these claims, however, the children were severely punished. The Human Rights Association (İnsan Hakları Derneği) exposed the violence, including torture, that the Turkish state unleashed upon Kurdish children.Footnote 8 In contrast to their interest in the demonstrations, the mainstream Turkish media were silent on the punishment of Kurdish children.
This silence reflects a growing demographic fear on the part of the Turkish public. In the mainstream media, the increasing number of Kurdish children in Turkey is regarded as one of the country's central problems. It is often said that if the Kurdish birthrate continues at its present rate, Kurds will outnumber Turks by 2050. Fatih Altaylı, a columnist in a mainstream newspaper, wrote that middle-class Turks, who are “wise, literate and who have the opportunity to give their children a good education,” should have more children: “We [read Turks] decrease gradually, they [read Kurds] increase gradually. The way to fight this is to have children. People like us should have more children.”Footnote 9 This discourse reminds us of how children are often, and not just in Turkey, seen as the means of “transmission of genes, ideas, imaginations, identity, and property” and that “the birth of a child” is itself “a political event.”Footnote 10 Childbirth stands for the social reproduction of society along certain lines that sustain the status quo, a “central strategy for achieving or consolidating power among the elite.”Footnote 11 According to John Collins, a similar speculation that the population of Israeli Arabs will soon exceed that of Israeli Jews is a factor in the hatred directed in the Israeli media toward Palestinian children.Footnote 12 In Turkey, this demographic threat influences the reaction to young Kurdish demonstrators as part of the symbolic wound that politically active children have opened in the Turkish public psyche.
I thus suggest that Kurdish children's exposure to various forms of violence is related in part to the very idea of childhood in public discourse. In other words, Kurdish children are exposed to violence partly because they are children. The bodies of Kurdish children are communicative; they are transmitters on which the violent history of the Kurds, the struggle of the PKK in urban space, and the future dreams of the Kurdish struggle are inscribed. Not only are these bodies always already written on, and hence never innocent, but as they circulate in urban space they are also interwoven with a growing fear in Turkish society: they embody the increasing Kurdish population, the power of a “demographic time-bomb.”Footnote 13
The other significant event that brought Kurdish children under increasing Turkish public scrutiny was the 2008 demonstrations held in response to the reported maltreatment of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK currently imprisoned in İmralı.Footnote 14 Kurdish children once again appropriated the streets and clashed with the police of both eastern (Kurdish) and western cities. Hundreds of children were arrested during those demonstrations. Once again, commentators in mainstream Turkish and even Kurdish media seemed unable to make sense of this spatially and temporally indeterminate ground of mobilization, since both conceive of politics as a sphere in which children have no place. Turkish and Kurdish elites started a public discussion on how they could rehabilitate these children.Footnote 15 Coverage in the mainstream Turkish and Kurdish media was similar to that of the 2006 demonstrations; while the Turkish media claimed that the children were brainwashed and manipulated by terrorists, the Kurdish media argued that they were traumatized and out of control. In what follows, I focus on the persistent disregard of Kurdish children's public agency in political demonstrations. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork with Kurdish children conducted in Adana in 2007, I argue that state violence, forced migration, and extreme poverty have changed familial power relations and broader age and kinship systems within the Kurdish community. Previously established roles of motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood could no longer be performed in new urban spaces saturated with violence and poverty. The politicization of Kurdish children is both a cause and a consequence of this process.
METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND
I conducted my research in 2007 in the city of Adana, in a neighborhood I am calling Gündoğan.Footnote 16 Located in southern Turkey, Adana has historically hosted waves of seasonal workers from the Kurdish region. Yet mass migration to Adana took place as a consequence of the forced displacement of the Kurdish population in the early 1990s. Unable to block popular rural Kurdish support for the PKK, the Turkish government declared emergency rule in the Kurdish region, where the war between the state and the PKK has claimed over thirty thousand lives. The state evacuated and destroyed more than four thousand villages by burning them down, and displaced millions of Kurdish peasants into the metropolitan areas of Turkey, including Adana.Footnote 17 Hundreds of thousands of Kurds displaced to Adana constructed shantytowns on the peripheries of the city, one of which is Gündoğan. The Kurdish movement has always been strong in Gündoğan, and since the year 2000 children have increasingly become pioneers of the political protests there, which is the main reason I chose it for my fieldwork.
I conducted ethnographic and oral history research with children over the course of that year. In addition to participant observation, I wanted to give my interlocutors a space in which they could tell their stories in their own words. I conducted oral interviews with fifteen boys and five girls between eleven and sixteen years of age. For several reasons, I use the term “children” (as opposed to youth) to refer to them throughout this article. First, both the Kurdish and Turkish publics use equivalent terms. The words çocuk and zarok, which are translated into English as “child,” are used in Turkish and Kurdish, respectively, to refer to members of this group. Taş atan çocuklar (in Turkish) and zarokên keviravêj (in Kurdish), both of which mean “stone-throwing children,” have come to evoke the popular image of this movement. The children also use these terms to refer to themselves. More important, as I analyze below in detail, I use the term “children” because childhood is redefined by the children themselves as a space of resistance and a distinct political subjectivity that is not available to adults.
While some Kurdish girls attend political demonstrations in the neighborhood, the majority of children involved in them are boys. Yet during my fieldwork, I learned that many young people had joined the guerillas and, strikingly, that the majority of them were girls. This phenomenon shows that gender plays an important role in the formation of political space, as some spaces are more available for boys and some for girls. Joining the guerillas might be more appealing to girls than joining street demonstrations as a way to challenge the authority of the family and the state, as it enables them to move between the confinement of the home and the guerilla camps located in the mountains. Another possible reason for this choice is that young people who attend political demonstrations in the neighborhood often end up in prison. Due to incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the police stations and prisons, street protests are often seen as more appropriate for boys and the guerilla camp a more appropriate political space for young women. Thus, the girls’ preference signifies an implicit contract between them and their families as much as it does a challenge to parental authority.Footnote 18
MODALITIES OF CHILDHOOD AND POLITICS
Anthropologists and social historians have long conceived of childhood as a construction, and thus have focused on changes in how childhood is experienced and represented across time and space.Footnote 19 Informed by this literature, this section analyzes how Kurdish children themselves perceive and express the notion of childhood in their specific time and space.
Fourteen-year-old Murat, born in Adana, is originally from Mardin. A primary school student, he works in a tea shop in the neighborhood. His family was displaced by the security forces at the beginning of the 1990s. While we were discussing the participation of children in the Kurdish movement, I asked him what childhood meant for him. He replied:
Murat: I'll be grown up by the time what I say is [finally] taken seriously.
Haydar: Well, what are the differences when you compare yourself to a twenty year-old in the neighborhood?
M: He is older [and] does not face any problems.
H: What do you mean?
M: I mean, a little kid [cocuk] like me who smokes, for instance, but doesn't have any cigarettes. He has to go and steal [to buy cigarettes]. But grown-ups have no such problems. They have money, so have no problems [buying cigarettes].
H: Well, then is it mostly the kids who steal?
M: Yes.
H: Have you ever done so?
M: I have.
H: What did you take?
M: We stole a bicycle, right over there.
H: What did you do with it?
M: We sold it. We made 6 liras. One of the tires was flat, so we sold it for cheap.
H: So, you say kids have more problems and no one listens to them.
M: Yes, for instance we see that in the party [BDP, Party of Peace and Democracy] as well. When a kid says something, they don't take it seriously. They immediately pay attention if a grown-up talks. So, I will attend [party] meetings when I grow up, as that is a place where my words will be valuable, and what I want will be done. It's really hard for kids to have their words listened to [because] grown-ups assume they know better.
Murat's understanding of childhood differs from the way childhood is often represented in Turkish public discourse. Childhood, to Murat, is not a category that connotes innocence, ignorance, or vulnerability but rather a state of being with many burdens and in which what one says is not heard by adults. He also implies that the idea of childhood as ignorance is just a construction of adults, who “assume they know better.”
Halil, thirteen years old, was born in Adana; he is now a primary school student and works in a bakery. He is the youngest of thirteen children in his family, which was displaced from Mardin at the beginning of the 1990s. I asked Halil, too, what childhood means to him.
Halil: One has to live one's life and we do it too. Well, we were walking around and saw everyone swimming in a pool, [so] we too went there and swam. You know about kids: [once] one of them does something, the others also join the game. One says “let's play hide and seek,” and we play. I think childhood is a beautiful thing. It's full of fun. It's better to be a child. You don't have the worries of adults, like no money for electricity, no money for water. Like money for taxes, that table you have to buy for the house; you have countless troubles like that. Yet mine is not full childhood; it's half and half. Half childhood, half politics. Sometimes we have fun, go swim, or walk around with the neighborhood kids. At other times, say there is a demonstration, we go attend it with the neighborhood kids. Half and half.
Haydar: What is it like for children to participate in politics?
Halil: It's great, honestly. We get to know who is good and who is bad.
Haydar: When are you going to be an adult?
Halil: Two years, three years.
Haydar: Does childhood end then?
Halil: Childhood ends one day, so does [one's] youth, one's elderly days, and then [finally], one's life.
Haydar: Do you want your childhood to end?
Halil: Well, I [of course] do want it to end, [for] is this life? Look into my pocket, I don't even have fifty kurus.
Although Halil claims childhood is better than adulthood because adults have more responsibilities, such as having to pay for electricity and water, he is currently working to contribute to the livelihood of his family. In fact, in Halil's family, children work instead of the parents, who are illiterate and do not speak Turkish. While Kurdish children of displaced families were born into the urban space, their parents often experienced difficulties integrating into that space. In most displaced families I observed during my fieldwork, fathers did not work and children were the primary economic actors in the household. Although adult males had the highest status in the socioeconomic structure of the village, when they came to the city they often lost that status. Their agricultural skills did not translate into urban space, severely limiting their job opportunities as unskilled workers, often in the markets selling vegetables and fruit, as street hawkers, or in the construction sector, though many Kurdish men consider these jobs beneath them. Kurdish children often have more opportunities, such as working as apprentices in barber, furniture, and tailor shops. Most children speak Turkish better than their parents since they have grown up in the city and receive eight years mandatory education. Their linguistic skills are crucial for their families; they conduct business with the Turkish bureaucracy to receive aid and take family members to the hospital. This role contributes to some enhanced power within their families. In spite of this, however, Halil downplays the fact that he has to work as a child to supply income to his family. Although he yearns to be an adult in order to earn an income, he does not point out that he already earns one; he just does not have the right to spend it because he is a child. Yet Halil is unaware of this irony.
This excerpt also demonstrates how Kurdish children of the neighborhood are affected by hegemonic discourses on childhood in society. Halil defines himself as a child. And yet, the way he talks about children is quite significant: “You know about kids; [once] one of them does something, the others also join the game.” Here, Halil speaks like an adult who reflects on childhood. In other words, he speaks from the outside, not as one who experiences but as one who observes childhood. He also represents politics as something that belongs to adults, even though as “young revolutionaries” the children enter politics in order to “know” people, to determine who is bad and who is good, thereby establishing their moral parameters. Murat states:
We sometimes have political debates with the [teachers]. For instance, we have a teacher of Turkish revolutionary history; he never wants to engage in political debates with us. He knows the truth, but hides it. For instance, we say “our [Kurdish] youth are put in prison although they are not guilty”; he responds, “be quiet” or something like that, [like] “you do not know the truth.” The teacher said to me “I have been in [the field of] history for the past twenty years” [and] I said “is that such a big thing, I [have also been] in politics for the past three years.” And that [response] shut the teacher up then and there.
For these children, it is not education but politics that provides the route to knowledge about life and people. They closely follow political incidents related to Kurds across Turkey, especially through the internet and television. Murat said of the news that a child was killed by police in the city of Hakkari:
I learned it through the internet, we got upset about it, he was one of us. He was almost the same age as me. They hit his head. For instance, the news always says something like “the terrorist organization again gave them stones.” Some speak well, though; they said that the one who did this should be discharged. Star TV again says they, the terrorists, put the children forward.
Fifteen-year-old Quto is from Batman. His family was exposed to displacement in the early 1990s. Now he works in a barbershop in the neighborhood. Quto's comments on Obama's 2009 speech in the Turkish Grand National Assembly illustrates how the children follow current political discussions:
We were in Turkish class, I started the discussion. I asked the teacher “why did they stop the broadcast when Ahmet Türk spoke in Kurdish?” [The teacher] said, “it is the assembly, Turkish is meant to be spoken there.” I said, “Obama spoke in English, they speak in various languages.” He said, “shut up.” I said, “why did they exile Ahmet Kaya?” I said, “they exiled him because he said he will release an album in Kurdish, you are suppressing the Kurds, my teacher.” He says “shut up” every time, otherwise he comes and hits us. Ede bese [enough is enough].
In my interviews with Murat and other children, I also tried to get them to talk about “nonpolitical” issues, for example their relationship to their families. Yet they immediately became bored. Halil responded, “let's talk about politics.” It is the political space in general and their political experiences in particular that empower them and make them knowing subjects. That is why Murat thinks that the knowledge he acquired in three years paying attention to politics is more valuable for him than what his teacher accumulated in twenty years outside politics. The category of childhood as it is understood in public discourse is challenged by these children's involvement in politics and the meaning they attribute to political knowledge. Another child, Erhan—who was put in jail when he was eight and again when he was twelve—discursively challenges this category by succinctly exposing the contradictions in the state's treatment of Kurdish children.
They shouldn't have been able to imprison me at that age; there is no such law, there was also no evidence [against me]. Also you can't vote till you are eighteen. If [you are thus a minor], then you have no reasoning power and if you cannot reason then they don't have the right to imprison you. If they imprison me, then they should let me vote. I mean I must be able to vote then.
Questioning the logic of how the law and the state more broadly treats the category of childhood, Erhan is aware that whether he is considered a child or an adult depends on context and not entirely on age. Since he cannot benefit from the protection that the law provides for children, he demands to be considered an adult so that he can enjoy the rights of full citizens, including the right to vote.
The way these children give meaning to their actions also contrasts significantly with mainstream media representations that often claim that Kurdish children view their political actions as “a game.” Several of the Kurdish children I spoke to state that it is not they but rather adults who view politics as a game. According to them, adults do not take politics as seriously as they do. They pointed out, for example, that adults attend cultural activities such as concerts and Newroz celebrations but do not show up for “more serious” political demonstrations that take place almost every day in the neighborhood. Even when children play games, it is evident that they take politics seriously. This is clear from the most common game Kurdish children play, called “Apoism” (Apoculuk), a term that stems from Apo, the abbreviation of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's name.
Halil: We play Apoism in the neighborhood. As four to five cops and four or five revolutionaries, we shout Biji Serok Apo [long live Apo]. We scream Öcalan's name. And the [other children who take on the role of] cops attack us.
Haydar: Who wins in the end?
Halil: Who would? Of course, the Apoists. We sling [rocks] at [our friends who are] the police.
Murat: But when we do that, we are indeed attacking our own nation.
Halil: But it's just for fun, just a joke.
Murat: What if [the rocks] hit someone's head? What if someone's head is fractured?
Halil: We just [aim at and] hit their knees.
Murat: That's even worse, [because our friends who take on the role of policemen] won't be able to run during the protest.
The line between play and reality is blurred as such informal games do indeed turn into public demonstrations:
Halil: We prepare the neighborhood [for conflict]. Three to four of us [play the role of] cops, [and] three to four [that of] of revolutionaries; I am among the revolutionaries [and] have two kids next to me, and we shout in this neighborhood [to then go] to that neighborhood, where the fascists live. All women in [that] neighborhood are AKP [Justice and Development Party] supporters. We shouted “the bastards of Erdogan cannot bring us down,” so they looked at us and one of them told me not to [shout]; I replied “it's none of your business, you fascist.” She really pissed me off. I said to myself, “we are in a demonstration now.” We ran, we fought the cops [when] the cops were actually our friends. We all went into side streets, broke the windows of the cars in the fascists’ neighborhood. The woman screamed at us; we beat the woman; she fell down with a thud and we then smashed her house windows with our slings.
How can one define childhood when even games turn explicitly political, and when adults are accused of playing when they claim to be political?
The children's equation of adulthood with playing games stems from how they define politics. True politics, for these children, is not seen as part of “growing up” or “maturing,” but rather as a refusal to enter adulthood. It refers to violent street clashes, which they call “street politics” (sokak siyaseti). This is in part a reaction against the emergence of a politics of representation starting in the mid-1990s, with the institutionalization and legalization of the Kurdish movement led by adults. The PKK changed its strategy via a unilateral ceasefire declared in 1998. Rather than trying to establish a separate nation-state, the PKK has since aimed at becoming a democratizing force in Turkey. Accordingly, the PKK militants who were still present in urban spaces began to retreat to the rural areas. Meanwhile, the pro-Kurdish Democratic People's Party was elected to metropolitan municipalities in the Kurdish region in 1999, and at the 1999 Helsinki summit Turkey was accepted as a candidate for full European Union membership, all of which prepared the base upon which a new Kurdish (counter)public emerged.Footnote 20 This new public space—which was shaped by the debut of many NGOs, civic foundations, cultural and art centers, local journals, and the like—contributed to the feeling that the Kurdish question could be solved by nonviolent means.Footnote 21 There were now two main registers of Kurdish politics: on the one hand, the guerillas force of the PKK, which remained largely as a threat to reinforce the process of negotiation, attacking the state solely in response to the latter's military and other operations against the guerillas and the Kurds in general; on the other hand, the legal register formed by the BDP's parliamentary politics and by civic activism within the new public space.Footnote 22
This process began to break down, starting with the upheaval of children of displaced families in the slum areas of Diyarbakir in 2006. This incident and many subsequent ones proved that two dynamics largely invisible before the negotiation period would now determine the future of Kurdish politics: class and generational difference. I would suggest that the children's movement emerged as the third register of Kurdish politics, one that is based on a radical street politics rather than “rational” negotiation. “The child,” in this process, became not only a political category as a signifier of “radicalism” but also a category with which urbanized and displaced Kurds began to identify, irrespective of their age. Indeed, many of the self-identified “children” were well into adolescence. Twenty-year-old youth in the neighborhood who had been involved in clashes with the police identified themselves to me as children. This identification marked them as a member of a resisting group famously referred to as “stone-throwing children.” The political activities of these children thus should not be seen solely as a rite of passage to adulthood, as Peteet and Collins argue in the case of Palestine. In their works, Palestinian children's engagement with violence and “the political” are normatively attributed to the process of becoming an adult, signified by the disappearance of childhood.Footnote 23 Yet, the Kurdish case shows that childhood is necessarily not lost but rather can be constituted and reclaimed through participation in violent resistance. To put it differently, childhood in this context refers to a space of morality and resistance and a distinct political subjectivity that is not available to adults.
These children's narratives reveal the changing geography of childhood within the Kurdish community. The memories they inherit, the violence that targets them, their transformed family relations, and the harsh conditions in which they live mark and constitute Kurdish children in Turkey. In turn, they appropriate these mostly adverse conditions and transform them into a source of power, indeed becoming an “alien nation”Footnote 24 in relation to both the Turkish state and Kurdish elites.
THE REPERTOIRE: CHILDREN'S NARRATIVES OF THE PAST
During the interviews, I asked the children questions about their everyday practices, political and “nonpolitical,” in the present. Yet they mostly talked about their familial past—and in particular about how their families had been exposed to brutal forms of state violence—though the children themselves have actually encountered numerous forms of violence in the urban space of Adana. Unlike in the 1990s, it is children rather than older people who now undertake the struggle of Kurds in the neighborhood; the police thus particularly focus on children, routinely using violent methods. Day and night, civil and official policemen walk through the main street of the neighborhood and randomly stop children to ask for their ID cards. The police also carry out regular operations in Kurdish homes. The majority of the children I talked to have been arrested and/or put in prison at least once on criminal charges such as theft and fighting as well as for their political activities. One of my interviewees was put in prison many times, mostly due to theft. Violence in their urban life also comes in the forms of discrimination, exclusion, humiliation, and poverty. Due to the discrimination and humiliation to which they are exposed in the larger city, for example, these children largely confine themselves to the neighborhood to escape from the gaze of those who identify them with criminality and terror.Footnote 25 And yet, children talked about the present largely in relation to recent major political incidents affecting the Kurds rather than their own day-to-day experiences. I suggest that telling the stories of state violence their families experienced in the past was in part a way of expressing the largely invisible and subtle forms of violence they experience now.
Berivan is thirteen years old. Her family is from Mardin and migrated to Adana in response to state violence when she was nine. She works in a barbershop. She narrates:
There are not many things that I remember; I just remember when they beat my mom and dad in the house. They left no stone unturned . . . they took every single cassette and book they found. They burned all the things they discovered. Well, we had some albums, some photos from the mountain; they burned them all. Awful things happened. There were civilian police at that time and they were really cruel. You couldn't guess when they would come in. They would break down the doors. I still have in mind the moment they beat my mom. They beat my dad and they picked my mom up by her hair. I felt so offended. They dragged my sister out of the house. I do remember that, [my sister and brother] were put into prison for one night. There all my sisters and my brothers were tortured.
The majority of my interviewees were born in Adana and did not personally experience the state violence inflicted on their families in the villages they left behind. What they grew up with was the stories of violence transmitted to them by the older generations. Murat narrates the story of his family's migration and experiences:
My family, honestly I don't remember. But, they came from a district of Mardin called Savur. They came here because our village there was shut down. The gendarmes shut it down . . . What happened . . . well . . . [The gendarmes] raided. One of our relatives died, you see, he was martyred there. Now before that they arrested my uncle for aiding and abetting the guerillas. They gave him electric shocks. His lungs collapsed, and then he died there. And we couldn't survive in the village. Besides, I have an aunt. One of the police called her, did dirty things to her. He raped her and so on. They did such [bad] things; I mean, there were also good [policemen]. One of them took her and asked her where her house was. And after that [my family] came here. Now we are here.
Although Murat did not experience these incidents of violence or the forced displacement that followed, he did listen to his parents’ stories and narrates them as if he personally witnessed and experienced them. A circulated story is transformed into testimony not only by the detailed information he provides and his clear and fluid way of narration but also, and more importantly, by the grammar he employs. There are two different past tense morphemes in Turkish, which express a grammatical distinction between direct and indirect experience of the speaker in reporting a past event. The suffix –miş expresses indirect experience and functions to describe resultant states in addition to carrying modal functions of inference and hearsay; the suffix –di refers to directly experienced events.Footnote 26 Here Murat's suffix preference reveals his attitude toward the past events he narrates: he frequently uses –di even though he did not experience the events directly. He employs -miş only when he narrates the story of the rape, a difficult issue for him to talk about and from which he thus distances himself. The usage of –di indicates that Murat narrates these transmitted events as if he directly experienced them, having internalized them and turned them into his own testimony. Another significant aspect of his narrative is his use of “we,” as in “we could not survive in the village,” even though he was not yet born.
The violence experienced in the villages as well as in the city was transformed into anonymous experiences through the circulation of stories in the public and private spheres in the neighborhood. I came to realize this during my interviews, particularly after the ones that I conducted with eleven-year-old Eren. I intended to interview a child who was not involved in the children's movement in order to understand what factors pave the way for the politicization and mobilization of Kurdish children. I knew Eren and his family personally and I thought he was not a “stone-throwing,” politicized child. Yet he told me that he had attended many demonstrations organized in the neighborhood, offering detailed information about how the demonstrators came together and clashed with the police:
In our neighborhood, here, there is a field; we would go there, light a fire, chant slogans, and then run away. We organize demonstrations for our people's freedom. Once we did so and the police came, they came after us, we threw stones, and escaped. We went into the side streets. So no one forces us [to engage in such activities]. We go put three or four tires on top of each other, burn [them], and the police come. We then throw stones at the police. When the police catch us, they really beat us up pretty bad. That time too there were policemen, we chanted slogans, then the police started coming toward us. We immediately grabbed stones and threw them at the police. The police were coming slowly. We escaped to the side streets. We do such things for our people's freedom.
This was one of the most surprising interviews I conducted in the field. Immediately after we had finished it, Eren said that he had lied during most of it in order to help me. He had apparently overheard my conversations with others and gathered that I was having trouble finding stone-throwing informants due to the recent intensification of Turkish state repression of Kurdish organizations. What is interesting is that the invented story he told was very similar to those of the politicized children I had interviewed, and it was narrated in a consistent, detailed, and fluid manner. My interview with Eren points to how Kurdish children in this neighborhood of Adana have developed collective narratives of violence and resistance, which they are familiar with regardless of whether they have personally participated in the incidents. The figure of the “politicized child” may have become an established role that Kurdish children can inhabit at any time. What Eren did was in some ways like the games of children who play-act at being revolutionaries.
It was my conduct of some interviews in crowded places that led me to think about the relation between community and narrative. During these interviews, the narratives were often interrupted by friends of the interviewees who inserted their own stories. At first, I tried to stop these interruptions, but I then came to understand that the children were collectively participating in the narration, and even constructing a single collective story. The narrative of the interviewee set the theme, and through the line of his life story others added their own stories. For example, when an interviewee mentioned the burning down of his village by Turkish forces, others interrupted to tell of how their villages were also burnt down. When he talked about the police attacking his home in the neighborhood in the early 1990s, others interjected with stories of their homes being similarly attacked. Conversely, the testimonies of others helped remind my interviewee of stories he had not told me. It came to seem that I was listening to different stories becoming a single story through repetition. They all talked about publicly unclaimed, collectively anonymous experiences.
This practice of the children calls for us to approach violence through the relationship between the act of telling and community. Although the children have not experienced it themselves, they coherently and lucidly describe the past events of village burnings, torture, death, and loss. Among the children, experiences and narratives of violence in the village become a collective repertoire that any of them can then utilize, elaborate, and perform. This repertoire acts as a means of meaning-making, establishing a link between the symbolic and economic forms of violence that children then confront in the city. It thus forms the ground upon which the oppositional subjectivities of the children express themselves, providing a frame for the representation of the present grievances and discrimination in urban space. This repertoire allows Kurdish children to narrate what is directly unspeakable for them, including the poverty, discrimination, and humiliation they experience in the present. The day-to-day present is difficult to narrate without the infection of the dominant discourses of poverty, education, and rehabilitation, all of which lead to the constitution of the Kurdish subject as a negative space based on lack, rather than presence. By employing these stories of the past instead of dominant discourses, Kurdish children are able to transform themselves into self-knowing subjects.
The concept of “postmemory” can be useful for conceptualizing this process. The term has been used primarily by scholars studying individuals who live in a postconflict present, especially second- and third-generation Holocaust survivors. Marianne Hirsch defines postmemory as “the relationship of the second generation to powerful, often traumatic, experiences that preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right.”Footnote 27 Thus, “to grow up with such overwhelming inherited memories, to be dominated by narratives that preceded one's birth or one's consciousness, is to risk having one's own stories and experiences displaced, even evacuated, by those of a previous generation.”Footnote 28 Risking one's own experience and narrative stems from the “responsibility” and “desire” of the second generation to “repair” the previous generation's loss.Footnote 29 At issue is thus the weight of the past in the present, as the effects of past events continue in the present.Footnote 30 In the Kurdish context, however, we cannot talk about a postconflict present, since the struggle continues, which complicates the relation between the past and the present in the discussion of postmemory: for Kurdish children in Turkey, the present is not shadowed or put at risk but instead made meaningful and understandable by the past. Past events are not “remembered” in order to repair an irreversible loss that occurred in the past but rather to render comprehensible the invisible and subtle forms of violence that are experienced in the present. In other words, in the Kurdish context, instead of the present bearing traces of the past, it is the stories of the past that bear traces of the present.
Dwelling in Gündoğan, where various forms of oppression based on poverty and exclusion continue, enables Kurdish children living there to create, use, consume, and contribute to a collective repertoire that defines violence. This repertoire is accumulated from the collective oppression that occurred in the village and has now been transferred to the city. The repertoire also enables children in Gündoğan to continue the struggle today, framing the way they express their current oppression. Continuing to struggle and to remake themselves through the information available to them becomes the means for them to be, to dwell, and to belong. The political in Gündoğan is thus transformed into an everyday phenomenon shaped by the performance, the expression, and the recollection of the past. I would even contend that in Gündoğan, it is the circulation of these stories, more than any ethnic commonality, that constitutes the content of Kurdishness. As a result of these narratives, Kurdishness, often thought of as a lack, or worse as an incapacity to speak in publicly intelligible ways, becomes a nodal point for articulating injustice and violence. Instead of being nonknowledge, a disintegration of language and world, suffering becomes a source of knowing otherwise.
Children's relation to the previous generation's experiences and narratives also reveals a lot about how they construct themselves as subjects. Charles Piot states that individuals cannot be “considered apart from their ontologically prior social context—from the community of relationships into which they are born and within which they live.”Footnote 31 He argues that, in the West African society that is the subject of his ethnographic research, individuals are “constantly involved in, and defined through, relations.”Footnote 32 He continues: “If, however, social relationship is presupposed, if the person is always an aspect of various relationships, we should see this person as composed of, or constituted by, relationships, rather than as situated in them. Persons here do not ‘have’ relations; they are relations.”Footnote 33 Piot depicts a “fluid, diffuse” self that is “multiple and permeable, and infused with the presences of others.”Footnote 34 It seems that the recalling of shared memories, and the retelling of shared histories and experiences by Kurdish children, builds them up as relational subjects, determining to a large extent how Kurdish childhood is experienced. By opening themselves to history, to others’ experiences and narratives, Kurdish children blur the lines between the self and the other, experience and (post)memory, the past and the present. It is through these blurred lines that we can understand Kurdish children's agency and subject formation.
CONCLUSION
After I returned from the field, almost everyone with whom I shared my findings asked me the same question: “What do these children demand?” Since politics is often equated with negotiation and demands, children's politics that rejects any rational bargaining with the state is seen as an irrational force and hence dangerous. The Kurdish movement, too, has represented Kurdish children as traumatized and dangerous. Kurdish leaders have suggested that the violent actions of activist children will derail any peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict, arguing that if the state does not resolve this problem by negotiating with Kurdish adults, who are “rational” and non-violent, they will have to deal with traumatized children who espouse irrational and destructive politics.Footnote 35 The representatives of the Kurdish movement thus use politicized children as a bargaining tool with the state, representing them as remnants of a dark past and bearers of an undesirable future that is chaotic and violent, in contrast to a peaceful future that can be built through the process of negotiation.
This understanding overlooks children's distinct political subjectivity, which is based on a different perception of the Kurdish question and a different solution to it. For children, the Kurdish question is not only about the ban on the Kurdish language and culture or the denial of Kurdish identity. It refers to a violent history, to what has been lost in almost all Kurdish households due to the irreversibility of the destruction of a homeland. But more important, to these children the Kurdish question means the inability to belong due to numerous forms of violence in urban life. The history that the BDP, led by Kurdish adults, is ready to forgive, in order to pursue a politics of reconciliation based on bargaining with the state, is insistently evoked by the children to continue a radical struggle. Their struggle is not demand oriented; it is the means by which they can belong to urban life. Erhan says: “I mean, we will always be reactive to it [the state]. Even if it will not come true, even if we fail, even if we won't gain anything, we will always be reacting.”
It is Kurdish children's unconventional understanding of politics that has created anxiety toward them in both Turkish and Kurdish mainstream discourse. Exploring the particular subject position of Kurdish children sheds light on why they accuse Kurdish adults, especially political elites, of “playing games” with their discursive and material negotiations, through which violence against Kurds is isolated to particular events and domains, thus denying its pervasiveness and plurality. The politics of Kurdish children implies that the Kurdish question is negotiated every day through violent politics, through remaking the urban space by means of violence. These children teach us that politics is not only a tool to make something happen but also a way of being in the world and the very condition of existence.
