Framing the question from Edwards's Freedom of the Will (1754)
During my ordination council, one of the pastors expressed disappointment that I did not believe, as he did, in the peccability (moral ability to sin) of Jesus while in a state of trial (vulnerable to temptation and subject to promises). ‘A true moral hero is one who could have sinned, but did not’, he said. ‘If Jesus could not have sinned, then his resistance to temptation was not genuine and therefore not worthy of unqualified praise’, he claimed. In the exposition that follows, I shall demonstrate why it is that the disposition of the soul of Jesus, according to Edwards, does not vacillate between impeccability and peccability, as if the two natures were at odds during the state of humiliation.
When the late Puritan Jonathan Edwards (1703–58) writes about the motives behind the choices that a person makes, in his philosophical and theological inquiry Freedom of the Will (1754), he refers to a moral necessity that entails an infallible connection between moral causes and effects.Footnote 1 Edwards clarifies his definition of moral causes by naming them ‘habits and dispositions of the heart’.Footnote 2 These moral causes occupy him intensely because they are the mortar that holds together the moral arguments that he is laying in his theological foundation in defence of freedom of the will. The cornerstone of this foundation is the impeccable disposition of the human and divine natures in the person of Jesus Christ.
The aim of this article is to trace out the implications of moral necessity for christology, specifically, its implications for the question of the impeccability (moral inability to sin) of the human soul of Jesus Christ. In order to achieve this aim, I shall focus on two crucial theses in Edwards's Freedom of the Will that, when viewed together, bring into sharp relief a remarkable synthesis in his theological system. The two theses are: ‘The acts of the will of the human soul of Jesus Christ [are] necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, [and] rewardable’ and ‘The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature’.Footnote 3
This study reveals a number of related strands that I shall handle for a better understanding of Edwards's christology: (1) he believes that both God and the man Jesus Christ deserve the highest praise, on account of a necessary holiness, which was present in the soul of Jesus from the moment of his incarnation; (2) he views the habits of the heart of Jesus Christ progressing in holiness from the moment of his incarnation; (3) he understands the excellencies that Christ brought to the human nature in the incarnation in no way to have added to nor to have diminished the impeccable holy disposition of his person; (4) he views the source of the impeccability of the soul of Jesus as lying in its essence, not in a cause outside his person; it lies in the very disposition of his heart; (5) he rests his theological argument on intra-trinitarian promises; not only are these promises from the Father to the Son, but from the Son to the Father, before the Son takes on human nature; and (6) Edwards views divine love as the principle that wholly influences the Son in all he does. On this last point he writes, ‘In another respect the Holy Ghost, that is, divine love, has the superiority, as that is the principle that as it were reigns over the Godhead and governs his heart, and wholly influences both the Father and the Son in all they do’.Footnote 4
Edwards's treatise, Freedom of the Will, is a body of literature rich in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysical and philosophical language. In order to handle the different strands of thought, I shall explain such terms as Arminian, freedom of the will and state of trial as they are used in the writings of Jonathan Edwards and Daniel Whitby (1638–1726).Footnote 5
In Freedom of the Will, Edwards's first step in defending the integrity of intra-trinitarian relations is taken by insisting on the impeccable habits of the heart in the soul of Jesus, ‘It was impossible, that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should, in any instance, degree or circumstance, be otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will’.Footnote 6 Edwards notes necessity by the term ‘it was impossible’ and he confirms impeccability of holy habits by the term ‘agreeable to God's nature and will’.
One main Arminian doctrine is freedom of the will, entailing freedom from ‘coaction’ (free from external compulsion) and necessity, according to Whitby.Footnote 7 Crucial to the Arminian notion of freedom is liberty from accountability for that which one cannot do. ‘According to Dr Whitby, unbelief is never sin, nor faith any virtue, for he abundantly asserts that our not doing what we cannot do is not sin, and also that to do what we cannot but do is no virtue’, writes Edwards.Footnote 8 The context for this freedom without external compulsion is that of a state of trial whose purpose is ‘to render us capable to trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of praise or dispraise’.Footnote 9 While denying this freedom of indifference in the nature of God, Whitby adds the condition ‘state of trial’ to his definitions when speaking of the nature of man. ‘The liberty belonging to this question, is only that of a lapsed man in a state of trial, probation and temptation’, is the caveat he adds.Footnote 10 He argues that, while man is in a state of trial and probation, freedom, with power to the contrary, is necessary. Without freedom, the trial is meaningless. In a trial, the will has to be peccable. By framing the question this way, Whitby begs the question of Christ's freedom, as a man, by making peccability essential to a state of trial, thereby resting his conclusion in his premise.
Edwards, on the other hand, insists that, regardless of whether Jesus, man or anyone else is on trial, necessity and virtue are compatible, even when virtue is essential to the nature of the person in question. In comparison, ‘freedom without necessity is absolutely essential to virtue’, contends Whitby, ‘and yet owns that ‘tis no perfection of human nature’.Footnote 11 Therefore whatever amount of virtue man possesses, be it ever so small, it is worthy of some praise. True liberty is power to the contrary, which, if we apply what Whitby says to the disposition of the soul of Jesus while in a state of trial, implies ‘Indifference was requisite to men's freedom in the state of trial’.Footnote 12 But even in a state of trial, Edwards insists that the human will of Jesus is voluntarily and ‘unalterably determined’ to good.Footnote 13
The praiseworthiness of God, argues Edwards, is consistent with moral necessity. This consistency holds not only for the divine nature of the Godhead but also for the human nature of Jesus Christ. This is the step Edwards takes in his arguments in the Freedom of the Will. The impeccability of Jesus while in a state of trial on earth is consistent with his praiseworthiness; that is to say, the moral necessity of the holiness of Jesus and the idea of praiseworthiness are not in conflict with one another. Likewise, the blameworthiness of man is consistent with moral necessity; man cannot help but sin and is nevertheless held guilty for his inclination to sin. Arminians argue that man must have liberty, with power to the contrary, before one can blame him for sin. They claim that he must have liberty to reject or accept a command, for without such liberty there is no blame or praise. They therefore ascribe power to the will of man to act to the contrary.
The terms of the debate centre on whether liberty is consistent with necessity in human nature –whether Christ's or man's –when under trial. But did Whitby believe that Jesus was in a state of trial or probation? The answer is yes and he turns to Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, whose chief work is Against Heresies, for the explanation. Irenaeus explains that the divinity of Christ is quiescent during his earthly ministry, making him vulnerable to temptation. If Christ were not vulnerable to temptation, as we are, then writes Irenaeus:
this ground of comfort will be wholly taken from us, if Christ did only overcome him by virtue of that nature by which he was, apeirastos kakon (incapable of being vincible by temptation) . . . . In a word, that our Lord could not be overcome of Satan, was the result of the union of the human nature to the divinity; . . . because he was anointed, and ‘filled with the Holy Ghost’.Footnote 14
Whitby attributes invincibility to the hypostatic union of the two natures of Christ, and victory over sin to the assistance of the Holy Spirit.Footnote 15 In his comments on the Gospel of John, Whitby calls upon Dr Lightfoot (1602–75), Rabbinic scholar and member of the Westminster Assembly, who refers to Christ's invincibility as impeccability.
The last is Dr. Lightfoot, who, in his note on Mark 13:32 saith, ‘We must distinguish between the excellences and perfections of Christ, which flowed from the hypostatical union of the two natures, and those which flowed from the donation and anointing of the Holy Spirit. From the hypostatical union of the natures flowed the infinite dignity of his person, his impeccability.’Footnote 16
The difference between the Arminian scheme and Edwards lies in how each views Christ both in and out of a state of trial. What Whitby sees as necessary to surrender in a state of trial, Edwards is happy to retain. Whitby believes it necessary that Christ's perfections be rendered quiescent; Edwards sees his holiness and perfections increase on the foil of temptation and last sufferings. In the garden of Gethsemane we see acquiescence to the will of the Father, not quiescence; there is voluntary submission, not indifference.Footnote 17
Edwards does not need to view Christ differently in his state of trial. This is due to his view of intra-trinitarian relationships between Christ and his Father and Christ and the Holy Spirit, a view that I shall more fully develop below. The crux of the Freedom of the Will dispute turns on one's ability to understand and affirm compatibility in the God-man in terms of a synthesis (reconciliation) of prevailing holy habits of the heart (dispositions) of Jesus and freedom (freedom to do what one wills), when in a state of trial.
In principle, both Edwards and Whitby describe Jesus as being in a state of trial during his earthly ministry; the debate, however, concerns the meaning of true liberty. Is liberty, characterised by indifference, essential to the definition or not? The opponents of Edwards argue that indifference is essential to liberty.
The position of Whitby leads one to believe that Jesus is only confirmed in the disposition of his soul sometime after successfully having passed the state of trial. Edwards, as I shall more fully spell out, defends the integrity of the God-man; such that Jesus, even when in a state of trial, freely and necessarily obeys the Father.
The terms of the debate – freedom of the will, necessity and virtue, habits of the heart – are set in the context of a state of trial. What follows are some of the men who set those terms.
Situating some benchmarks on necessity and virtue and on impeccability
A benchmark Puritan theologian, John Owen (1616–83), holds to an impeccable human nature in Christ. The disposition of the human will of Jesus is the same after the resurrection as before, contrary to the teaching of Whitby that the human will of Jesus is peccable while on trial on earth. This he argues is necessary for a genuine, meritorious will.
Owen refutes those who seek to deprive the Lord Jesus of his priestly office while on earth. He argues that their view of Christ binds them to ‘open blasphemy’ because they cast out the impeccability of Jesus. Owen insists on the freedom of Christ when he writes,
Here is a supposition included, that all the difference between Christ and us, whilst he was in this world, consisted only in the use of his freedom unto the perfect obedience wherein we fail and come short. That his nature was absolutely holy and impeccable, ours sinful and defiled, is cast out of consideration; and yet to deny this difference between him and us is no less blasphemous than what we before rejected.Footnote 18
Owen contends that those who argue that Jesus is not necessarily holy or impeccable until after his ascension into heaven do harm to the nature of the person of Christ. He thereby refutes the idea of a peccable will in Jesus that claims that mutability of the inclination of the will is essential to a person under trial.
To suppose that [Christ] was obnoxious to infirmity and mortality because he was not yet holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners, is injurious unto his person, and derogatory from his love; for it was not from the necessity of his own condition in human nature that he was exposed unto sufferings or unto death, but he became so by voluntary condescension for our sakes.Footnote 19
Not only does Owen establish a benchmark on the impeccability of the human nature of Christ, as an expositor in whom Edwards trusted, he expounds the immutability of the disposition of Christ's holy human nature.Footnote 20 ‘However that nature be glorified, it is the same essentially that it was when he was in this world’, insists Owen.Footnote 21
While engaged in the controversy with the Arminians, Edwards turns to two trusted guides: François TurretinFootnote 22 and Peter van Mastrict. Turretin (1623–87), succeeding Calvin as Geneva's premier theologian, and an excellent guide on the ‘five points’ according to Edwards, refutes Arminians who demand peccability as essential to the offices that Christ holds. He argues for the impeccability of the person of Christ and refutes the claim, ‘That Christ, although he never sinned, still was not absolutely unable to sin; and that it is not repugnant to his nature, will or office to be able to sin? This blasphemy EpiscopiusFootnote 23 and other Remonstrants have not blushed to put forth.’Footnote 24 Here is the battle for the immutably holy and impeccable nature, will and office of Jesus Christ.
Turretin, like Edwards, argues for consistency between necessity and virtue in the person of Christ. Indifference is no virtue, but a ‘defect of liberty’.
What objection can be made here? Is the divine liberty the same as ours? We answer that just in proportion to God's liberty being more perfect than ours, so ought it to be farther removed from indifference (which instead of being a virtue is a defect of liberty).Footnote 25
He writes: ‘Liberty does not consist in indifference . . . neither in God . . . nor in Christ’. Indeed, both God and Christ are necessarily and immutably holy. The obedience of Christ Jesus to the will of the Father, according to Turretin, is praiseworthy because he obeys freely, without compulsion. Nevertheless, the question remains unanswered if Turretin would have gone so far as to affirm this definition of liberty for Jesus in his human nature when in a state of trial.Footnote 26
Mastricht (1630–1706), professor of divinity in Utrecht, the Netherlands – the second trusted guide – is above all others most highly esteemed by Edwards for his theology.Footnote 27 Mastricht clearly expresses the view that Christ could in no way sin. The decisive concept is the theanthropic person of Christ. He explains that the God-man, as a theanthropic person, could in no way sin. He writes, ‘Non autem cum eo, qui peccare nullo modo potest, qualis Christus; implicat enim (theanthropon)esse peccatorem’, which is corroborated in the Dutch version, ‘maar niet met hem, die op generhande wijze kan zondigen, hoedanig een Christus is; want het sluit ene tegenstrijdigheid in, dat de God-mens een zondaar is’ (not however with him, who in no way can sin, as the Christ; for it implies a contradiction that the God-man is a sinner).Footnote 28
In the Arminian scheme, it appears necessary that Christ, at some point, must surrender his impeccability and become peccable as a condition for entering a genuine state of trial. This is not a point that Owen, Edwards or Mastricht are willing to concede.
Today, studies in orthodox christology, such as those of Jaroslav Pelikan, Gerald O'Collins and Wolfhart Pannenberg, also affirm the impeccability of Jesus Christ. For Pelikan, Chalcedon confirmed the integrity and impeccability of the two natures of Christ. Twelfth-century Latin scholasticism, according to Pannenberg, saw the Council of Constantinople in 553 as decisive for ‘inability to sin (impeccabilitas) in Jesus’ human nature’. O'Collins's exposition proposes a resolution with respect to the question of how meritorious Jesus’ resistance to sin was, when under trial, given his a priori impeccability. While affirming that Jesus was impeccable de jure, O'Collins distinguishes between being and knowing and proposes that ‘Jesus could be truly tempted and tested, provided that he did not know that he could not sin’.Footnote 29
Examining the biblical context of Edwards's trinitarian christology in Freedom of the Will
The interpretative key to locating the source of impeccability turns in the disposition of the two natures of Christ. In order to examine the relationship of the human and divine natures in the person of Christ, and his intra-trinitarian relationship with God the Father, I will turn to two of Edwards's sermons that give exposition on his trinitarian christology. When considering the two natures of the one person of the God-man, the question arises of whether or not the divine attributes are communicated to the human nature and, in particular, whether or not the attribute of impeccability is communicated to the human nature of Christ. Moral impeccability is one attribute that is communicated; otherwise, a quiescent divine nature could, in theory, leave the human nature to apostatise and if it did, it would contribute guilt to the person of Christ; for Christ, being one person, would bear responsibility. Moreover, to isolate the question upon the human nature alone would cast aspersion upon the person of Christ and brush dangerously close to the heresy of Nestorius; that is, treating the human nature as if it had its own hypostasis.Footnote 30
In order to understand Edwards's thought on Christ's assumption of human nature, I turn to a sermon based on the text of the Gospel of John 10:18 entitled ‘The free and voluntary suffering and death of Christ’. Edwards sets forth an argument for the perfectly free and independent choice of Christ to assume the human nature, to suffer and die and to actively use the occasion of his last sufferings to show forth his perfections. For Edwards, clearly, Christ had not only the sufferings in view beforehand, but also the rewards of obedience; that is, he had in view the purchase of glory for sinners and the satisfaction of the justice of God. The doctrine set forth is: ‘Christ was voluntary in subjecting himself to these sufferings that he underwent’.Footnote 31 It is as though Edwards has the issue of consistency between necessary obedience and perfect freedom fully in view when he teaches, ‘‘Tis inconsistent with his Godhead that he should be any other wise than perfectly free and voluntary in it’. With penetrating insight into relations within the Trinity he asserts:
Christ was not only willing in consequence of his Father's commandments, but he was free and willing with an absolute independency, and not as subject to a rule. He was willing antecedent to his Father's commandment; for it was in consequence of this willing of his, that he became subject to the Father's commandment in this affair.Footnote 32
If ever there were inducements to obey, and promises to keep, contrary to the Arminian scheme for a state of trial, which this sermon strongly overturns, Christ had them: the glory of God in view, even while in a state of trial and suffering, and the satisfaction of his Father's demand for justice. In his mind, Edwards sees no inconsistencies,
And therefore Christ . . . laying down his life, and having his right in his own life, and also his laying it down in obedience to the Father, all together in the verse of the text, as not being inconsistent the one with the other. ‘No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father.’Footnote 33
Edwards sees no need to surrender the infallible inclination of Jesus’ soul to comply with his Father's commands, even when he is in a state of trial. The isolation of the soul of Jesus in the God-man for a period of trial or probation was unthinkable for Edwards. And it is precisely this habit of the heart of Jesus to incline to the Father more and more throughout his life that is the key to understanding the source of the impeccability of the human soul of Jesus Christ.Footnote 34
The crucifixion betrays the question of consistency between necessity and liberty in the execution of intra-trinitarian promises. Does Jesus voluntarily offer himself up on the cross? And if yes, then is this inconsistent with necessity? Yes, he voluntarily offers himself up and, no, it is not inconsistent with the intra-trinitarian decree, ‘since – as the Arminians themselves strenuously maintain – a decree of God infers necessity; hence it became necessary that Christ should persevere, and actually work out salvation for us, and that he should not fail by the commission of sin’.Footnote 35
The second important christological sermon of Edwards is ‘The Excellency of Christ’ (1738). ‘There is an admirable conjunction of diverse excellencies in Jesus Christ’ is his thesis.Footnote 36 This sermon confirms a key belief in Edwards's christology - he understands the excellencies that Christ brought to the human nature in the incarnation in no way to have added to nor to have diminished the impeccable holy disposition of his person.
Christ has no more excellency in his person, since his incarnation, than he had before; for divine excellency is infinite, and can't be added to: yet his human excellencies are additional manifestations of his glory and excellency to us, and are additional recommendations of him to our esteem and love, who are of finite comprehension.Footnote 37
There is no acknowledgement of quiescence of the divine excellencies of Christ in a state of trial as there is in Whitby's understanding of the incarnation. This is a crucial point in Edwards's argument for compatibility between necessity and virtue that appears later in his Freedom of the Will. Edwards sees no need to surrender the impeccable disposition of Christ's soul when in a state of trial; Whitby does. The last sufferings of Christ only serve to show how strong his inclination to holiness is: ‘Christ's holiness never so illustriously shone forth, as it did in his last sufferings’.Footnote 38
In this sermon, Edwards makes an allusion to the compatibility of virtue and necessity in the human nature that Christ unites to his divine nature. He says:
But there is an inclination in the creature, not only to the adoration of a Lord and sovereign, but to complacence in some one as a friend, to love and delight in some one that may be conversed with as a companion. And virtue and holiness don't destroy or weaken this inclination of our nature. But so hath God contrived in the affair of our redemption, that a divine person may be the object even of this inclination of our nature.Footnote 39
The intention on Edwards's part is to encourage his listeners by stating that one purpose of Christ in assuming human nature is to assume a nature that is fit for conversation and allows relationship. It is this human nature that Christ unites to his person. Virtue and holiness in the divine nature of Christ do not weaken, conflict or detract from the praiseworthiness of the inclination of his human nature whose inclination is to delight in the Lord. For Edwards, Christ was free and willing to suffer and die with an absolute independency in his decision, nor is there quiescence of the divine attributes of Christ when in a state of trial, nor during his last sufferings.
In his Freedom of the Will, with Whitby's discourse on the ‘Freedom of the will of man’ in his sights, Edwards argues for consistency between necessity and virtue in the human soul of Jesus by advancing eleven points consisting of promises made to our first parents in paradise, to the prophets, to the church in the Old Testament and even to Mary, the mother of Jesus. ‘The moral conduct and practice of our Lord Jesus Christ, which he exhibited in his human nature here, in his state of humiliation, . . . I would show, that this holy behaviour was necessary; or that it was impossible it should be otherwise’, writes Edwards.Footnote 40 ‘It was impossible, that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should, in any instance, degree or circumstance, be otherwise than holy, and agreeable to God's nature and will.’Footnote 41 ‘The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom and success, in his office and character of a mediator: which glory could not have been obtained, if his holiness had failed, and he had been guilty of sin’, he writes.Footnote 42 Scriptural promises show, he concludes, ‘it to be impossible that Christ should not have persevered in perfect holiness’Footnote 43 and ‘it was impossible, that the Messiah should fail of persevering in integrity and holiness’.Footnote 44 It is inconsistent with the eternal purpose and decree of God that ‘it should have been possible that Christ should sin’.Footnote 45 An intra-trinitarian covenant secures the obedience of the Son to the Father. He insists, ‘It was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the will of the Father in the human nature’.Footnote 46
Edwards's theological argument rests on intra-trinitarian promises, promises from the Father to the Son, and from the Son to the Father, before the Son takes on human nature. Edwards invokes the holy disposition of the Son and insists, ‘That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father's will, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son, by the Logos that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took human nature: as may be seen in Psalm 40:6, 7, 8.’Footnote 47 Edwards reminds the reader that, though the Son makes the promise as the divine Logos, he fulfils the promise in the human nature:
If the Logos, who was with the Father, before the world, and who made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the will of the Father in the human nature, and the promise, was as it were recorded, that it might be made sure, doubtless it was impossible that it should fail; and so it was impossible that Christ should fail of doing the will of the Father in the human nature.Footnote 48
We have seen, then, that Edwards, like Turretin and Mastricht, rests impeccability on the theanthropic person of Christ; but unlike his predecessors, he argues from intra-trinitarian promises made by the Son to the Father that are recorded in scripture. What is more, Edwards, by highlighting the holy disposition of Jesus’ heart, emphasises that the Logos engages to do the will of the Father in the human nature: Psalm 40:8.
Assessing the implications of Edwards’ trinitarian christology for impeccability: habits of the heart and intra-trinitarian promises
I shall now assess how deeply embedded the trinitarian christology of Edwards sits in his theological worldview by consulting selections from his writings, in particular his Writings on the Trinity (a collection of doctrinal essays), his Miscellanies (a series of theological and philosophical essays), and his treatise Freedom of the Will.
In Freedom of the Will Edwards argues from the habits of the heart: ‘The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart, and acts of the will, lies not in their cause, but their nature’.Footnote 49 The obedience of Jesus to the charge of his Father is from prevailing habits of the heart, not from external causes. For Edwards, the habits of the heart of Jesus are ever inclined to obey the Father and these habits are necessarily disposed from within, not from a cause without, which would have a cause ad infinitum. He explains this inner causal necessity as follows: ‘When there is a habit or disposition, it functions like a prescriptive law that certain events will – not only may – occur whenever certain circumstances prevail. Habits and dispositions, in short, are ontologically real and causally active law like powers.’Footnote 50
The occasion of the obedience of Jesus to the Father must be placed in the context of the intra-trinitarian covenant; and his response to the commands of his Father is an exercise that displays the holy attributes of the dispositions of his soul. The disposition of the will of the human soul of Jesus governs his free acts and guards the meritorious character of his acts of virtue. The argument that Edwards advances from the essential nature of the Godhead is of fundamental importance and he marshals it to the defence of the compatibility of necessity and virtue in God and Jesus. Of this Fatherly disposition, Edwards writes of Jesus, ‘He has the same spirit or disposition towards the Father; not as believers have a filial spirit, or spirit of children, but he has the Spirit of the only begotten of the Father. He is disposed towards the Father as being his own Father in the manner that he is the Father of the Logos.’Footnote 51
What is more, the Miscellanies of Edwards reveal that he believes that the human will of Jesus is both finite and progressive in its inclination to holiness.
We may learn how Christ was sanctified in his last sufferings . . . But this could not be done without a proportionable increase of his aversion and hatred to sin, and consequently of his inclination to the contrary, which is the same thing as an increase of the holiness of his nature . . . Those last sufferings of Christ were in some respects like a fire, to refine the gold . . . it added to the finite holiness of the human nature of Christ.Footnote 52
Born holy, Jesus could progress in holiness. His will had been inclined to holiness since the incarnation; His hatred of sin was a consequence of the inclination of his soul to holiness. No other conclusion can be reached, for Edwards: ‘Though Christ was conceived in the womb, . . . that which was conceived and formed must needs be a perfectly holy thing; as Luke 1:35’.Footnote 53
Edwards defends the integrity of intra-trinitarian relations by first insisting on the compatibility of necessity and virtue in God and then moving seamlessly to display the impeccable habits of the heart in the soul of Jesus. These prevailing habits of the heart of Jesus are ever increasing in their holy disposition. Edwards understands the progression in holiness in Jesus to differ significantly from Arminian schemes. In the latter, the inclination of the human will of Jesus is peccable when under trial, and at some point the inclination of his human will is perfected in holiness; that is to say, it is confirmed as impeccable.Footnote 54 Against another scheme, that of Isaac Watts (1674–1748), who advances the notion of the pre-existence of Christ's human soul, Edwards accuses Watts of wrongly placing Christ's greatest honour before his incarnation, trial and subsequent exaltation. Watts's scheme would scuttle Edwards's argument for a perfectly free and independent choice of Christ to assume human nature, to suffer, die and to actively use the occasion of his last sufferings to show forth his perfections and obtain his greatest honour.
On this scheme it will follow that the covenant of redemption was made with a person that was not sui juris, and not at liberty to act his own mere good pleasure with respect to undertaking to die for sinners, but was obliged to comply on the first intimation that it would be well-pleasing to God and what he chose.Footnote 55
Could we suppose, as O'Collins has, that Jesus was impeccable, but did not know it? Edwards believed that Jesus felt the assault of sin upon his impeccable human nature to a higher degree than ever peccable man could and on this account he is more than qualified to be our hero. Edwards expresses these sentiments in a sermon, ‘He [Christ] greatly rejoiced to think how God would be glorified in his sufferings; how this would be an occasion of showing forth his perfections to the views of men and angels’.Footnote 56
If we have achieved the aim stated at the outset, then Edwards has assured us that the Saviour, Jesus, ever faithfully fulfils his promises and obligations as Son to his Father. Without duplicity, Edwards shapes a synthesis between freedom and moral impeccability in the human nature of Christ, thereby resisting twin barbs, whether Arminian or Hobbist, Nestorian or Apollinist. The impeccable, holy habits of Jesus, guarantee that he never could have, nor can or ever shall fail the Father in any of his offices that he has held till now and will hold through eternity.
