Kōjin Karatani's Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy is an ambitious attempt to rewrite the history of both early Greek philosophy and political thought. Building on the distinction Hannah Arendt draws in On Revolution between isonomia as “no-rule” and demokratia as majority rule, Karatani interprets the former as a model, in both principle and practice, of an egalitarian society free from class struggle, and hence, the rule of one class over another. Karatani locates the origins of isonomia in the political practice of the Ionian city-states during the archaic period, arguing that its egalitarian ethos is reflected in the thought of the Ionian philosophers (those thinkers who are more generally referred to under the label of “pre-Socratics”). The author concludes by contrasting Athenian demokratia (as the majority rule of the demos) with the principle of isonomia, while arguing that the Socratic practice of philosophy should be interpreted as an attempt to instantiate the more egalitarian principle of isonomia.
Karatani's book has, at its core, an interesting idea, rooted in the (potential) opposition between isonomia and demokratia referenced above and discussed by Arendt. And it is a book that is interested in such “big ideas,” rather than in the detailed historical and philological work needed to understand those terms in their original context. That (perhaps) is not necessarily a problem. Focusing on the trees (given how time consuming it can be—there are so many trees!) can sometimes leave little time to take in the forest, and the promise of a book like Karatani's is that it can “make you see the entire history of philosophy in a new way,” as Slavoj Žižek enthusiastically claims in a blurb on the front cover of Karatani's book. I do not agree. Unfortunately, the account of isonomia that emerges from Karatani's analysis is at once overly vague and deeply problematic.
Karatani begins with a rather fanciful account of the origins of isonomia. Without any evidence whatsoever, we are told that “Isonomia (no-rule) was not simply an idea but a living reality in the city-states of Ionia” (15). Isonomia arose in Ionia, Karatani contends, since the Ionian city-states were founded as colonies of the Greek city-states, and the colonists hence severed any ties to existing clan and tribal traditions, which freed them from traditional ruling relations, and allowed them to live as both political and economic equals. Yes, the city-states in Ionia were founded by Greek colonists; but beyond that, this account of their political structure is, at best, highly speculative, and is made without any effort to justify it by reference to ancient accounts or modern scholarship on the period.
This lack of attention to historical and literary context is rampant throughout Karatani's book. Take, for example, his claim that Solon attempted to implement isonomia in Athens during his archonship in 594 BCE (18, 103). It is strange to attach the label isonomia to Solon's reforms. Solon describes himself as mediating between mass and elite, rather than attempting to institute some kind of equality between them. His political reforms expanded the archonship to allow both elites by birth and by wealth to hold that office, but such reforms hardly constituted an egalitarian political structure. Finally, the term that Solon himself uses to refer to his reforms is eunomia, rather than isonomia. Unfortunately, here as in many other places in the book, Karatani is content to simply assert his claim regarding Solon's reforms rather than attempt to justify his interpretation, or even acknowledge the extent to which it would constitute a significant re-intepretation of Solon's actions.
The connection Karatani draws between “Ionian philosophy” and isonomia is likewise tenuous. Karatani begins his interpretation of Ionian philosophy by claiming that Thales and other philosophers were responding to a political climate in which divisions between rich and poor were emerging in the Ionian city-states, and hence, their isonomic regimes were beginning to break down. He then writes: “It was in order to counter such a climate that Thales and the natural philosophers of Miletus offered an explanation of the world without reference to the gods. … This was linked to the strategy to rebuild a society without the ruler–ruled relation, which is to say, reestablishing isonomia. Natural philosophy is, in this sense, fundamentally social philosophy” (57). It is from such a tenuous thread of suspect claims that Karatani establishes the idea that Ionian philosophy, and much of what he terms “post-Ionian thought,” is essentially political in intent, and centers on the concept of isonomia.
This leads Karatani to associate isonomia with almost any idea he finds in early Greek philosophy. Take, for example, his account of Heraclitus. Karatani is invested in defending Heraclitus from the claim that he was an aristocratic thinker; using the distinction between isonomia as no-rule and demokratia as class rule, Karatani thus maintains that while Heraclitus was antidemocratic, he was also antiaristocratic insofar as his thought espouses the principle of isonomia. Yet again, the “evidence” for this claim is rather forced. Karatani writes, “Isonomia, or no-rule, is not just a rejection of ruler–ruled relations internal to the state, but by definition includes a rejection of foreign rule. … For Heraclitus, ‘the people of a city should fight for their laws as they would for their city walls’” (81–82). So the evidence for the claim that isonomia requires political autonomy is to be found in the fragment of Heraclitus (where the word does not occur), and, it would seem, the fragment also serves to associate Heraclitus's thought with isonomia. It is not difficult to see why this is problematic.
And here is perhaps the biggest problem with Karatani's book: its nearly complete lack of attention to the actual use of the term isonomia in classical Greek thought (and to the modern scholarship on the term). While he does acknowledge Herodotus's use of the term, he quickly dismisses such evidence since, by the time Herodotus was writing, “isonomia had become an abstraction indistinguishable from the democracy he encountered in Athens” and he thus, incorrectly in Karatani's estimation, “regards it as synonymous with Athenian democracy” (17). The evidence in Herodotus is thus summarily dismissed since it (supposedly) does not fit with the distinction Arendt draws between isonomia and demokratia, a distinction which Karatani is willing to adopt uncritically. This lack of attention to the actual use of the term results in an account of isonomia that is so amorphous that it can be used to encompass almost any idea. Thus, as with Heraclitus, once Karatani judges that “Socrates … aimed at the abolition of rule itself, that is to say, isonomia” (131), he can then go on to claim that the Socratic rejection of the distinction between public and private is also central to the concept of isonomia (118).
In sum, Karatani's Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy fails to offer a coherent and plausible account of isonomia based on the historical and textual evidence that we possess. Does that matter? I think it ought to matter a great deal, given the title of the book and its focus on Greek philosophy and political thought. Perhaps one might object that the purpose of a book like this is not to contribute to debates in the history of philosophy, but to debates about contemporary politics, and its contribution thus lies in recovering the concept of isonomia as an alternative to current conceptions of democracy. That may well be, but then it is not clear what we gain through such an anachronistic account of isonomia in the first place.
