In 2002, Louis Menand's Pulitzer-winning The Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America appeared.Footnote 1 It provided a riveting discussion of the lives of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey alongside some of their ideas. Each shaped what we call pragmatism. Philosophical pragmatists differ quite a bit, but there are common themes in their writings. First, they reject the dualisms of early modern philosophy including appearance/reality, cognition/emotion, mind/body, self/others, and so on. Second, fallibilism—the notion that there is no final or absolute knowledge—is also pervasive. The “quest for certainty” is a fool's errand. Third, there is also a commitment to “pluralism,” which involves skepticism about grand metaphysical theories. Fourth, there is an empiricism that manifests itself in a deep respect for the sciences and experimentation. Last, there is a thoroughgoing emphasis on community and respect for democracy. It is an analogue of scientific experimentation in the social realm.
Menand hypothesized that pragmatism was due to the American Civil War and the Metaphysical Club. The former created radical uncertainty in American life, and the latter was a place where intellectuals like Holmes Jr., James, and Peirce thought through this insecurity, arriving at their pragmatism. For all of its brilliance, Menand's hypothesis was weakly supported. First, though the American Civil War was tremendously important for Holmes Jr. personally and intellectually, given that he served, it didn't seem to be as important for the others. James's brother Wilky was seriously wounded convalescing in the family's hallway, but it does not occupy him as it does Holmes Jr. Second, the Metaphysical Club mattered to James and Peirce (and many others), but less so for others like Dewey who never attended it. The club was simply more complicated than Menand lets on.
In this very welcome volume, the editors Brian Butler, James Good, and Frank Ryan have expanded our sense of who the Metaphysical Club was and what debates animated it. First, the editors include many more members of the “real Metaphysical Club.” The original members in 1872 were Chauncey Wright, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Nicholas St. John Green, John Fiske, and Joseph Bangs Warner (Francis Ellingwood Abbot joined them in 1873). A second group joined that included Thomas Davidson, James Eliot Cabot, Charles Carroll Everett, George Holmes Howison, Ernest Francisco Fenollosa, Francis Bowen, George Hebert Palmer, and Granville Stanley Hall. We learn that the club had two “phases”—a pragmatist one (1872–75) and an “idealist” one (1876–79). The included readings thus provide a much more comprehensive and complicated accounting of the club. Second, contrary to Menand's volume, we do not see some grand explanation for their views, such as the American Civil War. Rather, we see them through three meso-level “clusters”—science, law, and idealism. This locates the activities of the club in ways that fit their own identities and arguments. Third, contrary to Menand's volume, the individual thinkers are not as isolated by biography; we see their conversation occurring through their writings. This provides the sinew of argument and influence connecting the participants. It is impossible to adequately summarize the collection, but take, as an example, Part One: Science and Pragmatism.
We begin with Chauncey Wright who was the backbone of the early Metaphysical Club. Wright was an empiricist (or “positivist”) who was especially skeptical of metaphysics. His own methodological views were due to Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin demonstrated an allegiance to multiple lines of observation and evidence. Wright's skepticism of metaphysics is also found in his discussion of cause and effect and inductive inference. We “select” the phenomena and find patterns, and this does not require metaphysical foundations. He likens this sequence of events to “weather,” which exhibits no real progress or purpose. Darwin himself asked for Wright's help in dealing with one of the challenges to his theory—could it account for human consciousness? Darwin thought yes, but others, like Alfred Russell Wallace, thought no. Wright offers his own account of how humans achieve the self-consciousness that nonhuman animals lack. We come to recognize the difference between representations and what is represented. Thereafter, we can recognize ourselves as representors. Charles Sanders Peirce picks up the skepticism of metaphysics found in Wright (his “intellectual boxing master”) and articulates his own theory of truth. First, he articulates his “pragmatic maxim” through the famous Popular Science Monthly essays:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (XX)
The meaning or significance of a concept consists in the practical effects it implies. When we turn to the topic of truth, Peirce suggests that it is what the community of inquirers’ “drift” to over time; it is what they are “fated” to agree upon if inquiry continued indefinitely. Peirce's own revolution is to realize that our categories are not Kantian “ready-mades,” but organically occur in and change through experience. William James was deeply influenced by both Wright and Peirce, and the editors choose a selection of James's book reviews to show the directions he would travel. One important difference between Wright and James is over meaning and purpose. Wright tended to a kind of “nihilism,” but James was strongly inclined to think that life could be meaningful. We have freedom of the will, and there is even a God of sorts. James coupled these views with his voluntarist tendencies. If empirical evidence could not settle a dispute and the dispute matters to the decision-maker, then we must believe what we want (James would later weaken the claim to we are permitted to believe). Thus, given that observation could not settle the existence of free will or God's existence, he believed. We see James's later views coming into focus with his “The Sentiment of Rationality.” The section closes with psychologist Granville Stanley Hall's argument that the universities and colleges in the United States would do well to turn to the likes of Wright, Peirce, and James for a distinctively American philosophy that is “philanthropic, full of human faith in human nature and in the future” (221).
Overall, The Real Metaphysical Club is quite an achievement. It collects together vital documents that tell a story of how a group of scientists, philosophers, and lawyers got together in 1872 and began an American philosophical tradition.
