The book is a most welcome contribution on the state of the Maghrib at the start of the new century. The starting point of the volume is that expectations for democratic political development in the region have not materialized. Quite the opposite in fact is true, despite the attempts of the various regimes in the Maghrib to give the impression that they are on the way to democracy. The changeover from Hassan II to Mohammed VI did not lead to a restraining of the executive powers of the king, who remains the ultimate unelected and unaccountable decision maker. The same applies to Algeria, where the introduction of formal political pluralism following the “black” decade of the 1990s did not coincide with substantive democratic changes, because significant power remained in the hands of a behind the scenes Pouvoir. Finally, the analysis of Tunisia correctly claims that Bin Ali was able to strengthen his hold on the country following his medical coup and that the presence of a political opposition together with an emerging middle class does not threaten the survival of his oppressive regime.
A superficial reading of the previous contribution would lead one to conclude that not much has therefore changed in the politics and government of the three Maghribian states. Such a conclusion, however, would be highly misleading, and one of the strengths of this book is to highlight precisely that much has indeed changed in the Maghrib. All the chapters in this volume, despite dealing with radically different issues ranging from the revival of Amazigh identity politics to political Islam and from economic reforms to international relations, directly or indirectly shed light on how Maghrib regimes have been able to survive by transforming the nature of governance, shifting their support basis, and adapting to new international circumstances. The main contribution to the literature on the region is that it details how the current regimes have been able to survive despite changing domestic and international circumstances. Strategies of survival of the Maghrib regimes rest on a combination of co-optation and repression. In Morocco, the monarchy has been able to play secular Amazigh revivalism off against Islamist Arab nationalism in an attempt to defuse the challenge of both to the institutional primacy of the monarch. In addition, both Hassan II and Mohammed VI have been able to co-opt sectors of political Islam. A similar trend has occurred in Algeria, where the regime is able to play the secular Francophone sectors of society off against the Islamists and vice versa according to the political issue of the moment.
In Tunisia, political Islam has been repressed, and the Bin Ali regime survives partly because it has been able to make the secular middle class its ally in the struggle against the potentially regressive policies of the Islamists. The liberalization of the economy and the progressive integration of the three countries into the global market have also provided them with sufficient material resources to create an indigenous business class beholden to the state and therefore unlikely to challenge its authoritarianism. Thus, the social constituencies supporting the three regimes are very different from the ones that supported them in the 1970s and 1980s. Although the secular left used to be the main opposition challenger, it is now a reluctant supporter for fear of Islamism. Although workers and peasants used to be among the main supporting constituencies, it is today the turn of a globalized merchant class to be the bulwark of the regime.
However, the success of these survival strategies is precarious, and the book satisfactorily deals with the challenges facing these polities. In particular, despite co-optation and repression, the appeal of opposition to political Islam is still strong. The absence of improvement of the socioeconomic conditions for the masses and the volatile international situation that the “war on terror” provoked still constitute powerful motivators for Islamist opposition. The worst socioeconomic situation is found in Morocco, and it is no coincidence that the disenchantment with the political system has been very profound in the kingdom, as the very low turnout in the 2007 legislative elections confirmed. Although all political actors and the king underscored the significance of the electoral competition and the importance of turning out to give substance to the process of democratization, only one-third of the electorate went to the polls. The stance of Shaykh Yassine's movement, which refuses to participate in electoral competitions because they simply legitimize an unjust political system, was thus vindicated.
Tunisia does not have the same dramatic socioeconomic indicators as Morocco, but its model of development is also bound to stall if democratic institutional reforms are not undertaken. An economic crisis would undermine the social contract between Bin Ali and his supporting constituencies, reviving the popularity of political Islam. Algeria should be theoretically better equipped for addressing its socioeconomic situation due to its hydrocarbons wealth, but progress has been very slow, and the oil wealth does not really trickle down, leaving an Islamist alternative still open.
Limited political pluralism, inequitable economic reforms, and controversial international alliances are all ingredients that make the Maghreb a potential powder keg. The rise of terrorist incidents in Algeria after some years of calm and the arrival of jihadi violence in both Tunisia and Morocco are but one indicator of the difficulties facing these regimes. Intense and polarizing debates about national identity and collective memory sap domestic solidarity, while emigration deprives all of these countries of valuable resources. It is the great merit of this volume that all these issues are analyzed in considerable detail, giving both scholars and policymakers the opportunity to be better informed of the challenges emerging from such an important but often underexamined region of the world.
