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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
Arguably the most intricate set of overlapping strategic relations in the contemporary Middle East consists of those involving Syria, Israel, and various actors based in Lebanon. It is a brave scholar who sets out to disentangle these connections and to do so in a way that might shed new light on such complicated questions as, “How does Lebanon figure into Syria's domestic and foreign policies, especially with respect to peacemaking with Israel? Where does the United States stand in regard to the peace process and what are its real commitments to both Israel and Syria? What are the conditions and implications of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Palestinian peace accords and treaties with Israel for Israeli–Syrian peace negotiations? [and]…Were there any ‘missed opportunities’ for peace, and why has peace been elusive so far?” (p. 2). Crucial aspects of these variegated problems are almost certainly going to get short shrift in any monograph.
And so they do in Robert Rabil's ambitious book. Chapter 1 offers a competent survey of the historical trajectory of the Syria–Israel conflict from 1948 to 1975, highlighting the contradictory objectives and deep-seated misperceptions that repeatedly pushed the two governments into war with each other. Chapter 2 recounts the tale of Syrian and Israeli military intervention in Lebanon from 1975 to 1991, reaching two conclusions that are so widely held that they have become clichés: by the time of the Taif Accord, President Hafiz al-Asad's “aim of controlling Lebanon had been largely achieved militarily, politically, and legally” and “with Syria controlling Lebanon, Hizbullah has become the most significant instrument at Damascus's disposal to put military pressure on Israel” (p. 80). Chapter 3 shifts gears to explore U.S. policy toward Syria, Israel, and Syrian–Israeli peace from 1991 to early 2002. Each of these three topics merits an entire chapter of its own, so one is not surprised that the treatment remains superficial or to learn that “U.S. foreign policy toward Syria has been ambivalent, for better or for worse.” The reader cannot help but wish, though, that the author had devoted a bit more space to elaborating and justifying the startling claim that “this ambivalence often translated itself into a tacit bias toward the Syrian position on how to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict” (p. 108).
Chapter 4 presents an overview of Syria's domestic politics, with particular attention to the years after 1970; it includes short excursuses on Syria's deepening links to Lebanon (pp. 127–32) and the images and attitudes that constitute “the Syrian regime's psychological barrier to negotiating peace with Israel” (pp. 143–44) but ignores the contributions that have been made by Alasdair Drysdale, Eberhard Kienle, Hans Gunter Lobmeyer, Elisabeth Longuenesse, and Elizabeth Picard, among others. A parallel overview of Israel's domestic affairs is presented in chapter 5. The two countries' divergent positions regarding control of the Golan and the distribution of water make up chapter 6. Chapter 7 traces the course of bilateral negotiations from the summer of 1992 to the spring of 2000, a subject more thoroughly and deftly handled by Helena Cobban in yet another volume missing from Rabil's library.
By chapter 8, it is apparent that none of the questions posed at the outset is going to receive the sustained attention it deserves. The Shabaa Farms are allotted one paragraph in the conclusion (p. 271) and Hizbullah not much more (pp. 272, 276–77). Yet the rambling discussion of “missed opportunities for peace” is by far the most stimulating chapter in the book. Rabil summarizes a wide range of informed opinion regarding the hotly disputed issues of whether Israeli leaders proposed significant concessions during the second half of the 1990s; whether the Syrian leadership recognized such concessions, only to reject them; and whether the United States facilitated or hindered the peace process. His own analysis is uncompelling: Syria's refusal to accept Israel's terms reflects “the premium an Arab, especially an Alawi Arab of peasant origins such as Asad, would put on the issue of ‘dignity,’ the dignity of retrieving in full what was lost in defeat” (p. 259). Yet the range of debate that is captured in the text is impressive and relies on hard-to-find source material. Moreover, the arguments advanced by these writers provide important insights into current Syrian–Israeli relations that are sure to benefit academics and policymakers alike.