Legal and Methodological Analysis of the Fatwās

The Dār al-Iftā’ issued a fatwā that directly engages in women’s political leadership. The fatwā was promulgated by a commission led by Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn Bāz as chairman. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Razzāq ‘Afīfī was deputy chairman, and Shaykh ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ghudayyān was a participant member.Footnote ⁴³ The Dār al-Iftā”s fatwā that directly addresses the issue of women’s political leadership declares that it is not permitted, under any circumstances, for women to lead their communities or to assume judicial power. After this prohibition is stated, the authoritative sources are cited as evidence for the prohibition of women’s assuming leadership roles in both politics and judiciary. According to the uncompromising position of the Dār al-Iftā’, the prohibition against women’s political leadership and judicial power leadership has its basis in the āḥād ḥadīth (solitary report)Footnote ⁴⁴ narrated by an earlier transmitter, Abū Bakra, and the ijmā‘ (consensus of scholars), and it is supported further by historical reality.Footnote ⁴⁵

On its part, the Diyanet engaged with the issue of women’s political leadership under the heading “The Participation of Women in Business and Political Life,” and the discussion culminated in a report of the same title, published by the Diyanet in 2002.Footnote ⁴⁶ Unlike the Dār al-Iftā’, the Diyanet seeks to promote the model of the active and energetic Muslim woman of the Prophet’s time and acknowledges the participation of women in civil service, politics, and society. The report begins with a statement explaining the reasons for its publication, outlines the question, and then sets out the response with legal and religious precision. It is then stated that there is no difference between men and women as human beings and servants of God, so fundamental freedoms and rights apply to both men and women.Footnote ⁴⁷ In issuing this assertion, the Diyanet is guided by the insight that men and women are equally accountable to God, irrespective of their gender. The conclusion that men and women share an innate spiritual equality enables the Diyanet to extend this initial premise to a series of basic rights and liberties. Whereas the Dār al-Iftā’ assumes the inferiority of women, the Diyanet is concerned primarily with anchoring its egalitarian interpretation of gender in an ethical Islamic understanding.

The Dār al-Iftā’ maintains that the prohibition against women’s political leadership originates within the āḥād ḥadīth narrated by Abū Bakra (“Never will succeed such a people who place a woman in charge of their affairs.”).Footnote ⁴⁸ Many Muslim jurists and scholars apply, directly or indirectly, the Abū Bakra ḥadīth as the main legal authoritative source prohibiting women from holding any position of authority, whether political or judicial.Footnote ⁴⁹ The Dār al-Iftā’ justifies its reluctance to accept women as political leaders by referring to this āḥād ḥadīth’s general meaning and then elaborates the legal significance of “general term” (al-lafẓ al-‘āmm) and its precise function as a legal maxim. It observes: “The two words ‘people’ and ‘woman’ are mentioned as indefinite nouns that fall under negation, so they have general meanings according to the Shari‘ah rule. [T]he general meaning of text supersedes the specific reason for which it was said.”Footnote ⁵⁰

The prohibition against female political leadership is clearly established by the general meaning of the āḥād ḥadīth. In interpreting the āḥād ḥadīth, the Dār al-Iftā’ applies the legal maxim of al-‘ibra fī ‘umūm al-lafẓ lā khuṣūṣ al-sabab (the superiority of the general rule over the specific reason). Using this legal maxim enables the institution to extend the general rule, extracted from the āḥād ḥadīth narrated by Abū Bakra, to all instances of the relevant concept.

While the legal influence of the āḥād ḥadīth continues to be debated by scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and within the various schools, it continues to function as an authoritative and predominant source for the Dār al-Iftā’ that principally espouses the legal methodology of the Ḥanbalī school. Al-Atawneh, when explaining the approach of Dār al-Iftā’ to the Sunna, observe: “[The Dār al-Iftā’] … follows the traditional [Salafī] trend by holding the Sunna to be an extension of the authority of the Qur’ān, as based on divine witness … Jurists tend to consider ḥadīths as authorized and valid; so long as the ‘chain of transmitters’ (isnād) is authentic, the ḥadīth must be accepted, whether its isnād is: (1) transmitted along multiple paths (mutawātir); (2) solitary (āḥād); (3) widespread (mashhūr or mustafīḍ); or (4) strange/rare (gharīb).”Footnote ⁵¹

In initially engaging with the āḥād ḥadīth as legal evidence to warrant its position against women leading in politics, the institution demonstrates its adherence to the doctrine of the Ḥanbalī school, which places great emphasis on the authority of the ḥadīth and of the precedents that were set by the early generations of Muslims as a source of law. In his analysis of the epistemological and historical value of ḥadīths for the ahl al-ḥadīth (partisans of hadith), Jonathan Brown notes that Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the eponym of the Ḥanbalī school, famously said: “A weak ḥadīth is dearer to me than the use of independent reason (ra’y).”Footnote ⁵² Over time, this approach of Ibn Hanbal to ḥadīths (either sound or weak) turned into an entrenched legal methodology that prioritizes the derivation of legal rulings from the authoritative texts over consistency in legal analogy. However, the use of āḥād ḥadīth should be underpinned by other sources. The scholars of the Dār al-Iftā’, in responding to a question relating to the application of āḥād ḥadīth, have further clarified this point. They state: “The Hadith-ul-Ahad that are Sahih (a Hadith that has been transmitted by people known for their uprightness and exactitude; free from eccentricity and blemish) can be used with certitude if they are supported by other evidence, otherwise they will indicate probability. In either case, this type of Hadith must be referred to in establishing creedal issues and all other Islamic legal rulings.”Footnote ⁵³

It is established that the āḥād ḥadīth has legal value in matters of ‘aqīda (belief) and law while the Dār al-Iftā’ evaluates any issue that was directed to the institution.Footnote ⁵⁴ In examining the issue of female leadership in politics, the Dār al-Iftā’ therefore grants precedence to the Abū Bakra ḥadīth over the use of ra’y (independent legal reasoning) and qiyās (analogy) while rejecting their use to override this ḥadīth’s general legal ruling.

Contrary to the Dār al-Iftā”s text-based approach, the Diyanet initially seeks to identify the general Qur’anic principle regarding the issue. After the Prophet emigrated to Medina, Muslim women were empowered to participate actively in the process of enacting their obedience to the leader of their community. Presenting bay‘a (oath of allegiance) alludes to a political process “through which the leader of an Islamic state is confirmed by the people.”Footnote ⁵⁵ The Diyanet refers to the Qur’an 60:12, which relates the participation of women in the political agreement between the Prophet and his people.Footnote ⁵⁶ In recounting the necessity of presenting and accepting bay‘a for the legitimacy of a political leader, Rahman and Memon state: “[bay‘a] can be considered the election of the leader as without it the supposed leader has no legitimacy and cannot perform as the head of the state.”Footnote ⁵⁷ The Diyanet uses the Qur’an 60:12 as the main authoritative text that attests implicitly to the independent free will of women in presenting their bay‘a to the Prophet during his lifetime.Footnote ⁵⁸ In referencing the Qur’an 60:12, the general Qur’anic principle is established that women, like their male counterparts, have the same free will and right to participate in political life. The Diyanet scholars complement their initial allusion to women’s free will with an emphasis upon juridical capacity (capacity to act). In grounding itself within qiyās, the report claims that the Prophet’s acceptance of women’s bay‘a precisely establishes an ‘illa (discernible effective cause) for acknowledging women’s independent free will in their political participation. The Diyanet’s application to qiyās in adapting women’s bay‘a to their possession of free will most probably demotes the possibility of the use of āḥād ḥadīth as a legal evidence, while the preference for the relevant āḥād ḥadīth by the Dār al-Iftā’ results in the use of qiyās as a legal basis being restricted to a minimum. Rather than applying wordings within their general meaning, the Diyanet instead adopts the legal maxim that holds that particular circumstances do not establish generality, or takhṣīṣ al-‘āmm (specification of the general term) when interpreting the legal consequences of the Abū Bakra ḥadīth. In suggesting that the significance of the āḥād ḥadīth is restricted to the leadership of the Sassanid Empire during the time of the Prophet, the Diyanet scholars strongly imply that it does not provide a sufficiently strong legal basis for a general rule that operates within Islamic law. This explains why the Diyanet does not regard the āḥād ḥadīth as a legal foundation.

In contrast to the Dār al-Iftā’, the Diyanet primarily uses qiyās and recognizes its value as an Islamic legal source when evaluating the issue of freedom and its specific relation to women’s will. The application of qiyās to justify and substantiate the independent free will of women within the sphere of politics clearly derives from the Diyanet’s debt to the legal methodology of the Ḥanafī school, which places greater emphasis on rational system, human logic, as a subsidiary foundational basis for legal discussion. Emir Kaya clarifies: “[Diyanet members’] bureau also houses a religious inquiries room (fetva odası). My experimentation in the room proved that, unless otherwise stated, a Hanafi approach is taken for granted. Shafii catechisms are availed of secondarily.”Footnote ⁵⁹

As Kaya observes, the influence of the legal methodology and tradition of the Ḥanafī school are clearly evidenced within the Diyanet’s fatwās. In addition to this clear debt to the Ḥanafī school, it is noticeable that the Diyanet practices, to a substantial extent, a variation of collective ijtihād when addressing itself to the subject of women’s leadership. With regard to the issue, ijtihād by means of takhrīj (extraction) is presumably carried out by Diyanet members; as such, previously established legal views are evaluated in order to construct a new and practicable legal opinion compatible with contemporary Turkey’s political, social, and legal values. In this regard, the Diyanet states that while the majority of jurists argued that a woman cannot assume a judgeship, there were exceptions to this rule. It is stated that many Ḥanafī scholars and Abu Muḥammad Ibn Ḥazm al-Zahirī (d. 1064) approved that women could act as judges in a limited capacity that excluded criminal cases. The Diyanet then cites Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī (d. 923) and Ḥasan al-Basrī (d. 728), who deviated from the predominant position of the Ḥanafī school and permitted women to hold judgeships without restriction in the type of cases they could hear.Footnote ⁶⁰ The reference to the variety of legal opinions regarding female judges not only illustrates the diverse positions within Islamic jurisprudence but also underscores the possibility of legal change in the sphere of mu‘āmalāt (social transactions). By doing so, the Diyanet implies the possibility of legal changes in Muslim scholars’ perceptions about the status and roles of women, thus echoing the sociocultural and legal factors of their times and contexts.Footnote ⁶¹ In underlining the division between ‘ibādat and mu‘āmalāt, the issue of women’s political leadership is placed within the legal sphere in which change is possible in accordance with time and place. By considering the possibility of legal change, the Diyanet therefore primarily engages with the issue of female political leadership within the boundary of mu‘āmalāt.

In addition, both institutions present ijmā‘ as legal evidence in their evaluation of the legitimacy of female political leadership, but their application to ijmā‘ demonstrates variation toward two opposite ends. The Dār al-Iftā’ uses ijmā‘ as legal evidence to consolidate its position against women assuming political leadership while the Diyanet refers implicitly to the absence of ijmā‘ on the illegitimacy of female political leadership. The resort to ijmā‘ renders the Dār al-Iftā”s fatwā as a well-established and unchangeable rule that has been embraced by the umma (Muslim community). The term umma had been equated with “the people” during the time of the first four caliphs (Abū Bakr, ‘Umar b. al-Kaṭṭāb, ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān, and ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, respectively) and the imāms of the first three centuries. In the fatwā, it is stated: “The Ummah in the time of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the Imams of the early best three centuries practically agreed upon not assigning any power or judicial authority to women, despite the fact that they had well-educated women in various disciplines of religion.”Footnote ⁶²

The extension of the literal meaning of the āḥād ḥadīth to the contemporary issue is strictly underpinned by means of ijmā‘. The Dār al-Iftā’ accepts ijmā‘ to be the third fundamental source of law that determines or restricts legal regulations and rules. It states: “Ijmā‘ is one of the three fundamental uṣūl that must be obeyed: Qur’ān, authentic Sunna (sunna ṣaḥīḥa), and ijmā‘ of the salaf from among the Prophet’s ṣaḥāba, since disputes became widespread after them (amongst the later generations).”Footnote ⁶³

The legal position within Islamic law on female political leadership is presented as having reached consensus: women can neither lead in politics nor assume judicial authority. This raises the question of how the Dār al-Iftā’ precisely manages to claim that the illegitimacy of female leadership depends on the ijmā‘. A wealth of evidence is ignored or nullified when ijmā‘ is adduced as unequivocal evidence. For instance, Umm Salama Hint b. Abī Umayya and ‘Ā’isha bint Abī Bakr, the Prophet’s wives, are reported as having actively taken on leadership roles in the Battle of the Camel (656).Footnote ⁶⁴ In this battle, ‘Ā’isha is reported as having actively assumed a leadership role and allied with Talha and Zubayr against ‘Alī, while Umm Salama is portrayed as being a dissident to ‘Ā’isha’s action in taking on a political public role exemplified by her participation in that battle.Footnote ⁶⁵ These eventuated occurrences in the time of the fourth caliph refer to the absence of the ijmā‘ on the illegitimacy of female political and judicial leadership. Hence, the use of the ijmā‘ as an authoritative source by the Dār al-Iftā’ is problematized by these occurrences because they bring its very application to the specific problem (female political leadership) into clear question.

The Diyanet approaches ijmā‘ from a different perspective and underlines extant diverse opinions of scholars related to the legality of female judges. These legal opinions are the product of a given context that, in most cases, is formulated through a predominant hierarchical perception of gender. This is exemplified by the above-mentioned scholars’ legal views relating to women serving as judges, which range from legal to illegal.Footnote ⁶⁶ In building on the contributions of these early Muslim scholars, the Diyanet takes the political and social circumstances of Turkey into account and then formulates its own Islamic legal view regarding female political leadership. The Diyanet examines different legal opinions within the area of Islamic law and occasionally uses this diversity to sketch alternative solutions for contemporary issues.Footnote ⁶⁷ Şamil Dağcı observes: “As far as possible, [the Diyanet] draws advantage from the alternative solution suggestions that exist in the Islamic legal legacy. [The Diyanet] therefore does pronounce its own views instead of presenting a legal opinion that belongs to any particular legal school.”Footnote ⁶⁸

The Islamic legal heritage can be said to be an important reference point for the Diyanet’s practice of iftā’. In this regard, it may be argued, the Diyanet gives the appearance of having liberated itself from the shackles of the strict adherence to only one legal school. Evidently accepting the possibility of divergent views within the sphere of mu‘āmalāt, the Diyanet asserts that like the legal views regarding female judicial leadership, legal discussions on female political leadership can reflect the social, political, legal, and cultural structure in which they were produced. In implicitly alluding to the existence of different legal opinions, the Diyanet opens an area in which it enjoys a greater degree of flexibility and freedom in interpreting the authoritative texts related to female political leadership. Referencing the existence of different opinions means the absence of ijmā‘ on this specific issue because ijmā‘ is frequently defined as the unanimous agreement of all qualified Muslim scholars in a given period on a particular ruling. David Jalajel states that legal theorists often define ijmā‘ as unanimous agreement of all competent legal scholars upon a particular ruling that relates to Islamic legal issues.Footnote ⁶⁹ Whenever ijmā‘ occurs on a specific issue, the ruling becomes a matter of binding legal authority, and any disagreement on that issue is henceforth prohibited.Footnote ⁷⁰ The Diyanet seeks to corroborate its argument relating to the absence of ijmā‘ upon women’s political leadership by adducing the fact that Umar b. al-Kaṭṭāb appointed al-Shifaa’ b. ‘Abd Allāh as an ombudsman within Medina’s marketplace.Footnote ⁷¹ With the intent of further strengthening its argument, the Diyanet states that during the time of the Prophet and his Companions, women were employed in private and public service jobs and were also entitled to assert their legal opinions.Footnote ⁷² The assertion of the absence of ijmā‘ therefore provides the Diyanet an opportunity to endorse the permissibility of female political leadership.

Rather than following the Dār al-Iftā”s methodology, which adopts a decontextualized and literal reading of the relevant legal textual sources, the Diyanet offers a contextual reading that depicts the circumstances, conditions, environment, and historical context of the time of the Prophet and the Companions—a more temperate and flexible legal opinion that is compatible with Turkey’s political and social context. The Diyanet adopts the view that historical events that occurred during the time of the Prophet and the Companions do not, contra the position of the Dār al-Iftā’, justify the imposition of the supposed ijmā‘, which prohibited women’s political leadership. Two forms of argument regarding ijmā‘ therefore collide. Of the two, the Diyanet’s position seems more sustainable because the Companions and the Successors do not appear to have commented extensively upon the ruling relating to women in political leadership position. In addressing women’s political leadership, Jalajel challenges the assertion of ijmā‘ on this specific issue. He observes:

In particular, the supposed ijmā‘ with regard to the prohibition of appointing of women to judicial posts by the Dār al-Iftā’ cannot be presumed to be a powerful argument: although their appointments were restricted to non-capital cases by some scholars, women were permitted to act as judges in unlimited capacity by some scholars during the first three centuries of Islam.

Lastly, both institutions present the Qur’anic verses specifically relevant to the parable (qiṣṣa) of the Queen Bilqīs (known to Jews and Christians as the Queen of Sheba) and the Prophet Sulaymān as legal evidence with the intent of further underpinning their positions in the fatwās. Although reference to the parable by both institutions conceivably provides an authoritative legal basis that strengthens their legal opinions by rooting them within the Qur’anic text, their interpretations of these verses demonstrate variation towards two antipodal ends. The Dār al-Iftā’ does focus on verifying the argument against women’s political leadership by employing an antifemale, hermeneutical approach in interpreting the verses regarding the dialogue between Queen Bilqīs and the Prophet Sulaymān, both of whom were leaders of their communities. Rather than showing interest in Queen Bilqīs’s political leadership competence, the Dār al-Iftā’ draws attention her acceptance of Islam. Her submission to God is interestingly linked by the Dār al-Iftā’ to her passion and weak character that originates in being female. In the fatwā, it is stated: “Given that kings and queens are often characterized by pride, exaltedness and a tendency to protect and keep their reign, she [Queen Bilqīs] resorted to trickery by means of money, acting like weak people, hoping to protect herself and her reign in this way. Apart from this, there was also astonishment that led her to be uncertain about her throne, and her full admiration for the reign of Sulayman (peace be upon him), which captured her hearth like all other women who tend to be influenced by external appearances because of their strong passion.”Footnote ⁷⁴

The relevant verses regarding Queen Bilqīs are interpreted within Saudi society in which women have been segregated and excluded through the hand of state and religious establishment. In the process of constructing a homogeneous nation, women, Madawi al-Raheed states, have been used as an emblem that embodies the religious character of the Saudi nation.Footnote ⁷⁵ Over time, the Saudi patriarchal, tribal, and cultural values that ostracized women from public and social life have been transformed into entrenched legal and social norms through the policy of religious nationalism adopted by the Saudi state—consequently minimizing women’s appearance in the public sphere and restricting their citizenship rights and political participation. The predominant patriarchal and antifemale perception in Saudi society resonates in the qualities of Queen Bilqīs as portrayed in the fatwā. For the Dār al-Iftā’, Queen Bilqīs’s character flaws (emotional inclination, intellectual deficiency, lack of perspicacity, and propensity to forget) result in her surrendering to the Prophet Sulaymān, deferring to his da‘wa, and submitting to Allāh.Footnote ⁷⁶ Being a woman is therefore acknowledged as a disqualifying condition for political leadership. However, the fatwā includes a theoretical disconnect: the fact that women possess diminished mental capacity and emotional tendencies may exclude them from judicial and political administration, but it is not denied the possibility that they may be well informed in the sciences of religion.Footnote ⁷⁷ The Dār al-Iftā’ asserts that though knowledgeable and pious Muslim women were consulted in the past, they never aspired to a political position.Footnote ⁷⁸ The acknowledgment that women may possess authority within the sciences of religion admits the possibility of their participation in religious education, but it does not admit their political participation.

In contrast with the Dār al-Iftā”s androcentric and patriarchal interpretation, the Diyanet places its focus upon the absence of any negativity in the Qur’an regarding the leadership of Queen Bilqīs and then identifies the general principles of Islamic law on this issue. Within the report, it is stated: “Alternatively, the Qur’an expresses no negativity in its mention of the Queen of Sheba, Bilqīs, and the countries whose leaders are women have been sustaining their powerful existence at the present time. These two realities then evidently demonstrate that this saying of the Prophet does not include the general ruling (ḥukm). In this regard, it is possible to assert that there is no unequivocal and binding premises (naṣṣ) in Islam which prohibits women from undertaking civil service.”Footnote ⁷⁹

The verses relating to Queen Bilqīs, read through the lenses of social and gender justice, are put forward by the Diyanet to support its argument in favor of female political leadership. Queen Bilqīs is referred to as a female ruler who exercises power and authority in her community. In grounding its argument within the authoritative source, the Diyanet interprets this paradigmatic figure as validating the understanding that nowhere in the Qur’an is there any prohibition of women’s political leadership. Operating within the democratic and secular context of contemporary Turkey induces Diyanet members to apply a contextual and holistic reading of the authoritative sources in order to determine the general legal principles that related to political leadership. The identification of general legal principles possibly emerges as another legal consideration that can be explicitly drawn upon by the Diyanet during the process of the practice of iftā’. For the Diyanet, it is not class, race, or gender that is deemed to be the essential criterion; instead, capacity and qualifications are the essential attributes of a leader.Footnote ⁸⁰ Both are identified as the fundamental principle of Islamic law for assuming political leadership. In invoking this general principle, the Diyanet explicitly states that these characteristics and qualifications are not restricted to men—accordingly, anybody who possesses these required attributes can be tasked with the duty of state leadership.Footnote ⁸¹ The report therefore not only gives consent to the legitimacy of female political leadership but also reflects discourses of social justice, human rights, and gender equality that have pervasively percolated into the political, legal, and social values of Turkish society. Additionally, the presence of women politicians governing their countries is further used as a newly forged precedent for the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of female political authority. The Diyanet employs the recent past as legal evidence to assent to female political leadership. This introduces another legal basis that can be used as a resort. The survival of the states that are governed by women is presented as an implicit indication that ijmā‘ has not been achieved on the illegitimacy of female political leadership. The Diyanet’s approach opens the way for evaluating women’s political leadership in accordance with the needs and demands of contemporary societies and provides a legal perspective for the promotion of an inclusive vision toward gender issues.

Contextual Analysis of the Fatwās

The two fatwās upon women’s political leadership are replete with references to socially and culturally accepted gender roles for women, their legal capacity, and their status within Saudi and Turkish societies. In referring to the imprints of contextual factors on the issue of female leadership, Simonetta Calderini observes: “Because leadership, unlike enforced power, is reciprocal in the sense that it needs to be recognised as legitimate by the individuals and the community, it is woven into the social, legal and political structure in a given time and place. Hence, as far as female leadership is concerned, its expression, meanings and understanding are the product of a given context which, in most cases, is formulated through an explicitly and predominantly hierarchical gender discourse.”Footnote ⁸²

The application of different legal methodologies is not sufficient to explain the discrepancy between the two fatwas issued by the Dār al-Iftā’ and the Diyanet unless they are seen through the lenses of contexts in broader social, political, legal, and cultural attitudes toward female status. A contextual analysis may therefore provide an important insight because it brings to light the interaction between Islamic legal methodologies applied in the fatwās and the social contexts from which the fatwās emerge.

Contextual factors that influence Islamic legal methodologies demonstrate a wide range of variety. In Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the predominant madhhab (school of Islamic law) affiliation, national policies relevant to women, legal regulations of women’s rights, and social perceptions regarding gender roles are the most prominent contextual factors that can be identified in the fatwās regarding women’s political leadership. For example, both the Dār al-Iftā’ and the Diyanet primarily pursue the legal methodologies of the madhhab that are followed by the majority in their countries. The Dār al-Iftā’ espouses the legal methodology of the Ḥanbalī madhhab, which is predominant in Saudi Arabia, while the Diyanet follows the legal methodology of the Ḥanafī madhhab, which is followed by the majority of Turkish people. In contrast to the use of ra’y within the Ḥanafī madhhab, the Ḥanbalī madhhab generally relies on the transmitted texts (naql) as the basis for arriving at legal opinions.Footnote ⁸³ Both the Dār al-Iftā’ and the Diyanet can be considered representatives of the predominant madhhab in their countries in terms of the application of legal methodologies when examining the issue of women’s political leadership. The Dār al-Iftā’ gives privilege to the use of transmitted texts and relies mainly on the first two sources of law (the Qur’an and Sunna) while the Diyanet prioritizes the use of independent legal reasoning, especially in evaluating the first two sources. This is particularly observable in the evaluation of the āḥād ḥadīth narrated by Abū Bakra as a legal authoritative source by both institutions. In a similar way to the legal methodology of the Ḥanbalī madhhab, the Dār al-Iftā’, notwithstanding issues of authenticity, reliability, and historicity, acknowledges the āḥād ḥadīth as legal evidence.Footnote ⁸⁴ The Diyanet cautiously approaches the use of the āḥād ḥadīth as legal evidence as it is in the legal methodology of the Ḥanafī madhhab. Footnote ⁸⁵ After distinguishing between the historical accuracy and legal efficacy of the ḥadīth, the Diyanet accepts the ḥadīth to be historically accurate but still does not recognize it as an effective legal source. The evaluation of the probative value of the āḥād ḥadīth is therefore not fixed but fluctuates in accordance with the legal methodologies espoused by the Dār al-Iftā’ and the Diyanet.

In the second instance, national policies relevant to women within the two countries also emerge as pivotal contextual factors that implicitly influence legal methodologies applied by both institutions. The exclusion of women from decision making is common across Saudi Arabia, and it occurs within the family, community, and wider society. The persistent marginalization of Saudi women derives from the religious nationalism policy, a historical process through which the Saudi state, since its establishment, has sought to transform Salafī understanding of Islam into a nationalist ideology. Al-Rasheed observes: “The invented ‘Saudi’ nation articulated an identity by claiming to apply the sharia (Islamic law) in all aspect of life and submitting to a universal Islamic ethos. [Salafiyya] under state patronage was turned into a quasi-nationalist project, the purpose of which was to provide a universal discourse about unity, authenticity, and tradition, deriving its legitimacy from divine sources rather than man-made modern constructions of national identity. However, as in secular nationalist and anti-colonial nationalist projects, women were singled out as fundamental pillars of this imagined community.”Footnote ⁸⁶

Saudi women have been incorporated into the political project pursued by the Saudi state as a symbol of its religious nationalism since its establishment, so there is an interconnection between gender, politics, and religion in Saudi Arabia. This interconnection explains existent gender inequality and women’s marginalization in Saudi Arabia because the state has applied the restrictive and strict legal interpretations of Salafīsm, which have so far prevented women from actively participating in political life and placed them under the guardianship of their male relatives who control their mobility, marriage, work, and education.Footnote ⁸⁷ The Dār al-Iftā’, al-Rasheed observes, emerges at this point as an embodiment of religious nationalism that helps to safeguard the piety of the nation.Footnote ⁸⁸

Under the auspices of the state, religious nationalism provides an area in which religion and politics converge on creating a pious community. In this pious state, women have become symbols of Saudi national identity. Their appearance within the public sphere, their roles in society and their visibility in politics have been specified within the boundaries of religious nationalism that have been drawn by the state in accordance with the Dār al-Iftā”s fatwās. Footnote ⁸⁹ In referring to how the Saudi state has gauged its piety by making women a yardstick, al-Rasheed states: “The Saudi state claims to be an Islamic state different from other post-colonial Arab states in the way it upholds the piety of nation, which became increasingly defined in terms of excluding women, minimising their appearance in the public sphere, and restricting their citizenship rights and participation.”Footnote ⁹⁰

However, Saudi women are invited to participate in society and politics to the extent to which they serve the reification of the nation’s image as Muslim and pious. Although their participation in politics as being appointed members of the Consultative Council was recently permitted, their very scant number in the council refers to the reluctance of both the Dār al-Iftā’ as the “ideologues of religious nationalism” and the state as the “commander of religious nationalism.” Within the Saudi state that has internalized religious nationalism, the Dār al-Iftā’ continues, in rejecting female eligibility for the administration of justice and the offices of political leadership, to adhere to an androcentric and literal interpretation of the Qur’anic verses and the ḥadīth. This brings out the state’s masculine dimension in a fuller detail and roots the political leadership within the authoritative texts by excluding women from political and judicial positions. The fatwā upon women’s political leadership therefore is not only the product of the Dār al-Iftā”s pure Islamic legal thought but also a reflection of its obsessive efforts to maintain religious nationalism to the extent permitted by the state.

Contrary to religious nationalism, the secular nationalist project has been applied by the Turkish state to create a homogenized and unified society. Similar to the religious nationalist project, women have been used by the Turkish state as a symbol of the imagined secular community.Footnote ⁹¹ After the demise of the Ottoman Sultanate, every sphere of life underwent a secularization process to homogenize the society and to form Turkish national consciousness.Footnote ⁹² Despite the fact that many clear indications of social conservatism can be found in the society, the newly established Turkish state has chosen to enforce a nationalist model that requires the total privatization of religion and the full secularization of social life. On November 27, 1923, for instance, the first draft of a family law that included the endorsement of polygyny and the reduction of the legal marriage age to nine for girls was presented to the Turkish National Assembly. This proposal, which was subsequently rejected, alludes to the then existent contestation between religious and nationalist oppositions. The religious opposition was silenced through the abolition of the Caliphate and the abrogation of Islamic law in favor of secular codes and laws.Footnote ⁹³ The issues relevant to women’s roles and status have been turned into a political tool by the Turkish state to obliterate the cultural and religious remnants of the Ottoman Sultanate. Kandiyoti observes: “The decisive actions of [the early Republican government] with respect to women’s emancipation were the evacuation of Islam from legislative and broader institutional sphere, and the inclusion of women into a new notion of ‘citizenship’ dictated by the transition from a monarchy to a populist republic.”Footnote ⁹⁴

Legislative reforms regarding women’s rights and conditions have also been acknowledged as an influential platform to display the modernization and Westernization of the Turkish state. The secularization of the family code and the enfranchisement of women are part of a broader effort to sever all ties with the Ottoman past and to create a new legitimizing state ideology.Footnote ⁹⁵ In particular, the enactment of the participation of women in politics has provided the newly established Turkish state an opportunity to present itself as a democratic nation. The inclusion of women into public and political affairs has brought an increase in their status and public visibility as it has been planned by the Turkish state. Within the state that was built upon the elements of secular nationalism, the Diyanet has generally acted in accordance with the political policies that have been imposed by the administrative governments, so the image of Muslim women has been identified by this institution within the triangle of the state’s nationalist policies, religion, and society.

The Turkish state has imagined a new identity for Turkish women while continuously drawing an opposition between the past and the present. While the Ottoman past has been allegedly described as the center of obscurantism, passivity, and indolence, the Republican Turkey has been directly linked to development, rationalism, and modernism.Footnote ⁹⁶ In referring to the stereotyped image of women in the Ottoman period, the modern Turkish women have been strategically portrayed as patriot, energetic, active, and intellectual.Footnote ⁹⁷ The dichotomy that was produced during the early years of the Turkish Republic has marginalized religious women within the society. Through the progressive nationalist policies, religious women have been inadvertently “labelled as outdated, backward and traditional”; “forced to live their religious lives in private”; and “turned into ‘the other’ for republican modern women.”Footnote ⁹⁸ Even during the years when the multiparty system was adopted by the state, religious women have remained invisible and passive in both social and political lives. After the 1980s, conservatism as an Islamic ideology has been revivified and gained some strength within cultural, political, and social areas.Footnote ⁹⁹ With the reawakening of conservativism, the imposition of secular nationalist reforms has been strictly criticized, and a more fair and just system has been demanded by religious citizens. In conjunction with the increasing social and political influence of conservatism, religious women have begun to break the boundaries of their imposed invisibility and to express their political, social, and economic demands.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ In this regard, it is possible to state that the Diyanet implicitly intends to consolidate the visibility of religious women in social and political areas by adopting a reconciliatory approach that conflates Islamic and nationalist values. References to the active participation of Muslim women in social, political, and public affairs during the time of the Prophet are made to corroborate the image of active, energetic, and intellectual women—this alludes to the Diyanet’s effort in harmonizing the image of women in both Islam and the secular nationalist project of the state.Footnote ¹⁰¹ In putting emphasis on the link between context and Islamic legal opinion within the sphere of mu‘āmalāt, the Diyanet connects the existent exclusion of women from politics with the time and place in which these legal opinions were produced. The emphasis on the contextual influence on previous Islamic legal opinions enables the Diyanet to reconcile modernization and Islam.

Furthermore, the legal regulations relating to women emerge as another contextual influence that directs the two institutions toward antipodal ends regarding women’s political leadership. While the Turkish legal system constitutionally guarantees equal rights for all citizens, the Saudi legal system extends privileges to men in both personal (in the areas of marriage, divorce, and child custody) and political regulations. Saudi women remain as a semi-independent personality in the legal system. Their movement, educational choices, employment, marriage, divorce, and even health are subject to decisions made by their male guardians. The appearance and mobility of women have also been regulated by the royal decrees that have been issued in accordance with the Dār al-Iftā”s fatwās. For instance, the amount of dowry (mahr) was evaluated by the Dār al-Iftā’ because of its excessiveness that emerged as an obstacle against legitimate marriages within the society. Although in Islamic law, the determination of the amount of dowry has been left to the parties that will make the marriage contract, the fatwā limits “the size of dowries, claiming that the prerequisites in a marriage contract should not be so daunting that they hinder marriage.”Footnote ¹⁰² This fatwā was later transformed into law by the Saudi Ministry of Justice under Regulation 12/133.Footnote ¹⁰³ Official fatwās related to women therefore emerge as a legal source that defines the boundaries of what is permissible and forbidden for women.

The position, status, and rights of women have been identified by the Dār al-Iftā’ as long as the Saudi state provides its consent. For the state, the religious nationalism emerges as the main benchmark in issuing legal regulations regarding women, so the state has recognized a privileged position to the Dār al-Iftā’ in identifying women’s roles, status, appearance, and rights. The natural place of women has been identified by the Dār al-Iftā’ as the home, and their role in the larger society is very restricted.Footnote ¹⁰⁴ They are permitted to work outside the home on three conditions: the occupation is appropriate to women’s nature, women and men are separated, and women’s attire is modest. All three conditions were transformed into law.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Women’s freedom in selecting a profession is thus restricted to its compatibility with their perceived nature and qualifications, as well as the work situation itself. The Dār al-Iftā’ prohibits women from working in public services that require interaction with men. In accordance with the fatwās issued by the Dār al-Iftā’, the state issued many regulations that restrict the intermingling of men and women in many places, including restaurants, hotels, educational institutions, and public transportation. For example, the fatwā that prohibits women’s employment in hotels was transformed into law by Royal Decree 3/27746.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ Women’s appropriate attire is evaluated in many fatwās, so their appearance in public has been identified by the Dār al-Iftā’. The word jilbāb in the Qur’an 33:59 is interpreted as being the “proper” public garment for the Saudi women, and it is described as a loose, plain, and thick apparel that covers the entire body.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ This dress code was later turned into law that requires not only Saudi women but also foreign women in Saudi Arabia to wear appropriate attire in public.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ These strict regulations have limited women’s mobility and involvement in both social and political areas and subordinated them to men—further supporting a male-dominated society.

In transforming many fatwās into legal regulations, the state probably intends to demonstrate its compliance with Islam, but there occasionally exists a contentious tension between the state and the Dār al-Iftā’. For only political reasons, the state sometimes disregards or resists its own religious institution with the intent of promoting itself as a modernizing agent that supports women’s emancipation and rights. After the 2000s, the Saudi state has aspired to efface in the international platform its notoriously oppressive policies related to women and has started to pursue more inclusive policies.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Legal regulations about women’s issues have therefore turned into an arena, with the state oscillating between the Dār al-Iftā’ and the international community. On September 25, 2011, for instance, King Abdullah announced that women would be appointed to the Consultative Council and would be permitted to participate in municipal elections.Footnote ¹¹⁰ The fatwā relating to women’s political leadership, however, refers to the reluctance of the Dār al-Iftā’ in incorporating Saudi women into the political realm. Despite this fatwā, women’s political participation was legalized by the state. The recent inclusion of women as candidates and voters will probably compel the Dār al-Iftā’ to issue a new, more adaptive fatwā on women’s political participation and leadership. However, to date, it has not issued any fatwā that permits women to participate in politics, suggesting that the tension between the state and the Dār al-Iftā’ will probably continue in the near future.

The recent developments do not exert any influence on the fatwā regarding female political leadership that was probably issued before the legalization of women’s rights to suffrage and to stand for election. Until the 2000s, the state espoused a policy of political repression against women within the legal realm—this has turned into a political culture in which women have remained both politically and legally passive, disengaged, and marginalized agents.Footnote ¹¹¹ Within this political culture, the Dār al-Iftā’ states: “Moreover, one of the concerns of power is to inspect the conditions of matters and handle public affairs. This requires travelling throughout the countries, meeting people, commanding the army in times of Jihad (striving in the Cause of Allah), confronting enemies in concluding treaties and agreements, making pledges of allegiance with members and groups of the Ummah (nation based on one creed), men and women, in war and peace, in addition to other acts that neither coincide with a woman’s status nor with the rulings that were prescribed to protect her honor and keep her away from immorality.”Footnote ¹¹²

The legal regulations originated in the fatwās are presented as legal reasons that prohibit women from assuming political and judicial leadership. The state has reinforced an exclusivist political culture against women by way of imposing the fatwās as legally binding regulations.Footnote ¹¹³ Within the Saudi legal system, the Dār al-Iftā’ therefore acts as not only the pre-legislative mechanism but also the ideologue of the Saudi political culture.

In Turkey, the secular nationalism pursued by the state has developed certain aspects regarding women’s lives and their legal status. In comparison to their counterparts in other Muslim countries, Turkish women enjoy considerable civil and political rights, and they have become more visible in the public and social domain. Within the Muslim world, Turkey’s achievements in the field of women’s rights (educational, legal, and political) are widely recognized and acknowledged as being unparalleled.Footnote ¹¹⁴ Key protections are legislatively guaranteed by the Turkish Civil Code (1926), whose features closely resemble the Swiss Civil Code, its direct inspiration.Footnote ¹¹⁵ The adoption of this code severed all judicial and legislative links with Islamic law and thereby transformed the civil, educational, personal, and political status of women. In keeping with the provisions of the Civil Code, marriage partners were provided with equal rights (in matters pertaining to child custody, divorce, and marriage), polygamy was prohibited, and women gained the right to choose their own spouses.Footnote ¹¹⁶ In addition to these regulations, women were enfranchised in two stages: the rights to vote and stand as candidates in municipal elections were granted in 1930, and the same rights were extended to national elections four years later.Footnote ¹¹⁷ Since then, women have been repeatedly supported and encouraged in exercising their right to vote and stand for election. Over time, the active participation of women in political and social life has gradually increased, and their presence has grown in small proportion. In 1993, Turkey elected Tansu Çiller as its first female prime minister, and she served in this role until 1996.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Her political contribution was nonetheless hugely significant, and she succeeded in picturing a leadership style that was simultaneously egalitarian, feminine, and modern. In no small part due to her contribution, seventy-nine female deputies were elected in the 2011 General Election, and three further female deputies were elected in the General Election that followed four years later.Footnote ¹¹⁹ As a result, women’s rights have become established as a constitutive part of contemporary Turkey’s domestic political culture. Although women’s political representation remains low in comparison to the European Union average, there is an ongoing effort to increase women’s participation in economic, political, and social life.Footnote ¹²⁰

Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, women’s parliamentary representation and political participation have increased, and women have occupied senior diplomatic and judicial posts. Regulations support women’s empowerment and their full participation in all spheres of society. Functioning within this inclusivist environment toward women directs the Diyanet to approach the issue of female participation in politics cautiously and from a modern legal perspective. In its initial pages, the report refers to the equality between men and women as servants of God and maintains that Islam recognizes the equal economic, educational, political, and social rights for both men and women:

In many respects, the Islamic rights that the Diyanet recognizes for both men and women overlap with the fundamental rights that the Turkish secular legal system extends to both men and women—this creates an impression that the Diyanet seeks to align women’s Islamic legal rights with the state’s democratic and secular sensitivities. The report is, to a certain extent, the Islamic legal product of Muslim scholars whose mindset has been extensively shaped by the democratic and social values of Turkey and its wider social environment. It can be argued that the report relating to women’s political leadership reflects the Diyanet’s effort to reconcile between Islamic legal principles and secular democratic values. The report therefore brings out the overlap between two legal considerations—Islamic and secular—that are frequently assumed to be diametrically opposed to each other.

Despite the outward secular and modern appearance of Turkey, the secular regulations have not been wholly adopted by all women. Because of the secular nationalist view that women who wear the headscarf and who have religious sensitivities are backward and do not reflect the ideal of the female citizen, religious women have been largely isolated from social and political life. In the 2000s, the state noticed the dichotomous segregation among its female citizens and sought to obviate this binary categorization by means of the Diyanet.Footnote ¹²² Many official fatwās sympathetic to women’s rights have been issued to reach religious women and increase their visibility in social and political life.Footnote ¹²³ Indeed, the report related to women’s political leadership was issued in 2002. However, neither before nor after the report, no woman has been appointed to the High Board of Religious Affairs, the highest decision-making body within the Diyanet—this alludes relatively to the androcentric character of the Diyanet.Footnote ¹²⁴

In the last instance, different social perceptions regarding women implicitly exert an influence on the scholars’ legal thought within both the Dār al-Iftā’ and the Diyanet. Social perceptions related to women’s status and roles demonstrate considerable differences in Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In Saudi Arabia, the imposition of religious nationalism has created a society that applies coercive and repressive means to subjugate women and effectively segregate and incarcerate them in the home. Amalkhon Azimova observes: “Today, in Saudi Arabia, women are completely removed from the glares of outsiders, hidden by tall walls built around villas, behind a veil or the black tinted window of a car.”Footnote ¹²⁵ Formal and informal segregation of men and women has implicitly restricted women almost completely to the home except when women are accompanied by their male relatives. Over time, Saudi women have become victims of political, legal, and social oppressions that have been enforced by the state. In underlining the negative influence of oil wealth on women’s status, Azimova observes: “The abundance of oil permitted to the government of Saudi Arabia to suppress both civil and political liberties and enforce [Salafī] ideology. Oil wealth allowed the government to impose strict gender segregation policies that further inhibited women’s access to political, economic and social space.”Footnote ¹²⁶ Under the policies of male guardianship, women have been turned into semi-legal people who must obtain legal permission from their male guardians for almost anything that they want to do in their lives. Before stepping out of her house, opening a bank account, receiving medical treatment, or enrolling in a university, a woman needs her guardian’s notary attested permission.Footnote ¹²⁷ Almost all regulations related to gender segregation and male guardianships originate in fatwās issued by the Dār al-Iftā’.

The praxis of gender segregation and male guardianship has substantial implications for the ways women are perceived in Saudi society. Saudi women have been generally considered pure and chaste beings who need to be protected by the patriarchal actors of either the state or the male family members. This attitude has reinforced the perception of their weakness by socially subordinating them to men. The long-time enforcement of male guardianship norms has resulted in Saudi women being portrayed as less competent than men.Footnote ¹²⁸ Ali Hadi Omair states: “[Saudi] women are likely to be seen as less capable of taking care of themselves because they are observed to require assistance from male relatives to complete activities necessary for their daily lives. Women are also likely to be perceived as less capable of achieving significant goals in comparison to men, as they are observed to occupy lower status roles than their male counterparts.”Footnote ¹²⁹

The engrained perception of women as weak and incompetent beings within Saudi society conceivably exerts an influence on the fatwā because it is likely that the cultural and social environment influences Dār al-Iftā’ scholars’ interpretative activities and legal determinations. The scholars seek to advance the impression that women are hesitant, lacking in control (of both body and mind), and weak. The roots of this interpretation can be traced back to the gender-based perceptions regarding women’s status in Saudi society. In this regard, it is noticeable that the fatwā is selective in its use of evidence. This becomes apparent when the Dār al-Iftā’ applies directly to the Abū Bakra ḥadīth, along with the androcentric interpretative strategy of the Qur’anic verses in relation to Queen Bilqīs. The Dār al-Iftā’ does not clarify whether the expression “deficient in intellect” is extracted from the factual perceptions relating to Saudi women or a selective approach to the textual legal evidence. However, it may be assumed that the Dār al-Iftā’ is likely influenced by the dominant exclusivist perception of women in Saudi Arabia when adopting a selective approach to the androcentric and patriarchal interpretation of the authoritative texts.

Many social perceptions that depict women as either explicitly or implicitly less competent and successful than men with respect to certain qualities may form a gender-based attitude that is exclusivist to women.Footnote ¹³⁰ Addressing the factors that impede Saudi women seeking to assume leadership, Lama Gazzaz underlines the biased perception of women rooted in the Arab culture and states: “The Saudi community though modern in most [of] its approaches still looks at leadership from an ancient perspective, where only men had leadership capacities, and by nature women did not possesses any characteristics or traits that could make them effective leaders.”Footnote ¹³¹ In identifying the factors that prevent women from working in the Saudi judiciary, Samah al-Agha observes that Saudi judges think that the members of Saudi society “may lack the confidence in the ability of female judges due to their emotional and biological status of women and due to their beliefs that men are superior to women.”Footnote ¹³² Women have been considered as vulnerable, emotional, and deficient beings in accordance with the entrenched gender perception within the context of the Saudi society. The fatwā internalizes these dominant attitudes and perceptions related to Saudi women while presenting women as being excessively emotional, incapable of rational thought, with limited intellectual capacity. This is perhaps most clearly signified in the interpretation of the story of Queen Bilqīs, with her excessive emotion and female character used to explain her defeat and surrender to the Prophet Sulaymān.Footnote ¹³³ The fatwā states: “[The prohibition on women’s political leadership] is attributed to their deficient reasoning and rationality, in addition to their passion that prevails over their thinking.”Footnote ¹³⁴ Despite the existence of a much-debated yet widely circulated ḥadīth related to women’s deficiencies in religion and intellect, the legal methodology and sources that are used to reach these conclusions are not cited.Footnote ¹³⁵ This indicates that the perception regarding women’s deficiencies in intellect has been widely accepted within the Saudi society.

Furthermore, the Saudi state sustains its interdependency with kin and tribal solidarity to protect the union of the state.Footnote ¹³⁶ This interdependence protects tribal values, and this in turn perpetuates patriarchal practices. Al-Rasheed observes: “The state endeavoured to keep their tribal ethos, which, among other things, keep women in a patriarchal relationship under the authority of male relatives.”Footnote ¹³⁷ The patriarchal structure not only forms a hierarchical relationship that empowers men to control women but symbolizes women are also a source of honor and shame for both their families and society. Omair states: “Women’s morality, in particular their sexual morality, stands as a major focal point in Saudi culture … Saudi women are strongly perceived as playing the role of safeguarding morality. This is not only a case of being perceived as having an obligation to remain moral themselves but also to prevent others (particularly men) from behaving immorally.”Footnote ¹³⁸

Saudi women have therefore explicitly been considered responsible for safeguarding the honor of family, tribe, and nation. Within the fatwā, the interconnection of androcentric social norms, patriarchal culture, and tribal society is expressed in the sustained ostracism against women. The fatwā includes a list of requirements of leadership (international travel, mixing with men, and the negotiation of treaties with other states) before concluding that each requirement is contrary to the general status of women and the specific rulings intended to protect their chastity, honor, and dignity.Footnote ¹³⁹ While the issue brings to light the persistence of patriarchy within the country, it can also be argued that the Dār al-Iftā’ implicitly makes it possible for patriarchal practices and tribal values to become further embedded within the juristic tradition. The Dār al-Iftā’ can, to this extent, be considered “an institutionalized public patriarchy”Footnote ¹⁴⁰ that implements the religious authority to gain control over women to the extent to which the state permits.Footnote ¹⁴¹

In contrast to the Dār al-Iftā’, the Diyanet does not attribute female political leadership to biological factors and does not present women as deficient in reason. Instead, the qualifications of the person who will be assigned to the position of leadership is held to be the key consideration. The Diyanet maintains that the person who governs a country or a government has to be the individual best suited to the job.Footnote ¹⁴² Despite the Diyanet’s indulgent approach, it is possible to witness some negative attitudes against female political participation within Turkish society. In referring to the time when Tansu Çiller became the prime minister, Yeşim Arat states: “the role of the prime minister is not considered compatible with being a woman in the Turkish context. The woman prime minister who has succeeded in exercising her right to head the government has to wage a political campaign against those who oppose her because of her sex.”Footnote ¹⁴³

Although patriarchal norms and demeanors continue to exist in the society, changes in women’s status have incrementally occurred through a combination of industrialization, urbanization, education, and social movements. The negative and intolerant gender perceptions have been attenuated over time, with the consequence of women’s increased political, social, and business participation. In particular, since the representation of both religious and secular Turkish women in the national parliament notably increased after the 2000s, the negative perception regarding the status of women has started to change, albeit incrementally.Footnote ¹⁴⁴ Until the 2000s, religious Turkish women’s marginalization reflected an artificial division between religious and secular.Footnote ¹⁴⁵ However, the state’s policies regarding women have been changing, and the state intends to integrate more women into its politics at all levels (local, provincial, and national).Footnote ¹⁴⁶ The common perception relevant to gender has started to change in accordance with the changing policies of the state. Sumeyye Kesgin observes: “The Turkish parliament … is the arena of the expression of imagined, constructed and instituted women. Although the role of women has been imagined and constructed, it can be argued that women’s existence in the public sphere has challenged the male authority and the meaning of the private sphere. As in the case of Turkey and as an example, the public visibility of women in the parliament has created a new image of the private sphere and challenged the patriarchal hegemony in the public sphere.”Footnote ¹⁴⁷

It is possible to notice the repercussions of the changing gender perceptions in the Diyanet’s report. The Diyanet adopted a pragmatic theory in considering changing circumstances and social realities in accordance with the state’s policy to incorporate both secular and religious women into public and political realms.Footnote ¹⁴⁸ In the view of the Diyanet, political or judicial leadership is not a question of gender; rather it is instead a matter of capacity, efficiency, and knowledge. Common social perceptions regarding women therefore provide an important framework of reference when Diyanet members evaluate the possibility of female political leadership.

Furthermore, the Diyanet maintains that the two types of leadership—leadership in civil society and leadership in prayer—originate in different Islamic legal spheres. The report states: “Importantly then, it is not compulsory that the head of state personally commands the army in the war time, delivers the Friday sermon and leads the Friday prayer. It is possible that these duties can be fulfilled by people who are designated by the head of state.”Footnote ¹⁴⁹ This statement may be interpreted as a reflection of the Turkish political structure, in which power (economic, military, political, and religious) is dispersed across separate administrative structures and institutional bodies. The grounding of Turkey’s political system in a separation of powers significantly enhances the likelihood that it will influence the Diyanet’s legal interpretation. In the first instance, it should be noted that the Diyanet retains a close connection with Islamic legal tradition in the area of ‘ibādāt (ritual practices)—this is evidenced within the concept of the partial leaderships whose rulings are distributed among the army, parliament, and religion. The issue of leadership in prayer is placed in the area of ‘ibādāt which is immutable and unchangeable. In the second instance, women’s political leadership is included in the scope of mu‘āmalāt. This may direct an assumption that the Diyanet remains open to alternative readings of the authoritative texts if the issue is evaluated within the scope of mu‘āmalāt. However, if the issue falls into the category of ‘ibādāt, the institution acknowledges the legal ruling as already determined and established.

Unlike the tribal values and patriarchal influences on the Dār al-Iftā”s fatwā, the impacts of democratic values are observable in the Diyanet’s report. The Diyanet’s report on women’s leadership is composed of an eclectic mixture of democratic values and Islamic ethics. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic grounded in democratic and secular values, women have incrementally participated in the public, social, and political spaces. In particular, since the 2000s, religious women have come to the fore to access not only the public sphere but also state politics. The inclusion of highly educated and ambitious religious women in social and political spheres has occasioned both an inversion of traditional gender roles and a change in power relations between men and women within the society.Footnote ¹⁵⁰ The apparent visibility and activity of religious women have resulted in more indulgent and inclusivist changes in the perception of Diyanet members related to gender issues.Footnote ¹⁵¹ The portrait of gender in the report clearly demonstrates how the perspectives of Muslim scholars who work within the Diyanet are extensively influenced and molded by the democratic society in which they live. With the intention of substantiating the permissibility of female political and judicial leadership, the Diyanet adopts a contextual reading of the authoritative texts that provides a solid theoretical foundation for the improvement of women’s rights. Anchoring itself in the idea of full conscious human agency of both men and women before God, the Diyanet underlines that both genders as the caliph of God on earth are responsible in building a society.Footnote ¹⁵² In acknowledging the connection between democracy and women’s rights, Ali Akbar observes: “There is indeed an intimate relationship between the process of democratisation and promoting gender equality, since democracy necessitates equality between men and women.”Footnote ¹⁵³ Akbar’s contribution further reiterates that the functions, roles, and statuses assigned to men and women in a democratic society should be theorized as specific tacit parameters in the process of internalizing gender equality. It is possible to sketch a clear linear connection that conjoins the Diyanet’s Islamic legal methodology and the social perceptions of Turkish women. Dominant social perceptions and values relating to the status of women in the democratic Turkish society should therefore be understood as powerful influences that compel Diyanet members to adopt a contextual reading of the authoritative texts in the process of issuing the report that relates to women’s political participation.

Given the interaction between the social context and Islamic legal methodologies, the fatwā issued by the Dār al-Iftā’ highlights the unique attributes of Salafī-Ḥanbalī Islamic legal thought and also provides considerable insight into how the national, political, legal, social, and tribal values are imperceptibly and synchronically incorporated into its fabric. In the first instance, it can be claimed that the Dār al-Iftā’ played an important role in creating Saudi socio-cultural dynamics and in maintaining Salafī religious nationalism; however, it is also strongly influenced by cultural, patriarchal, social, and tribal parameters when issuing its fatwās. Conversely, the report issued by the Diyanet demonstrates that women’s political empowerment is supported by the textual evidence and the legal rationale of Diyanet members, each of which functions to reflect gender-related attitudes and perceptions that are pervasive in Turkish society. This demonstrates how prevailing perceptions about women and their political, legal, and social status can influence the Diyanet’s report upon women’s political participation. It is therefore likely that the report reflects the increased status of women within men’s regard and Turkish society more generally.