[A]n act that would amend the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act [represents] important efforts to eliminate the use of chemical weapons globally…. On the eve of the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare, … the bill [will] modernize the very act that would help those victims…. It also includes novichok, a deadly nerve agent implicated in multiple poisonings likely conducted by Russia….

More than a century ago, during the second battle of Ypres, Canadian soldiers were among the very first in human history to fall victim to the horrors of chemical warfare when 160 tonnes of chlorine gas were released toward Canadian lines. By the end of the battle, 6,035 young Canadians, more than one in three, were killed or wounded by the new and terrifying weapon. By the end of the conflict, more than a million people suffered the effects of this new kind of warfare: chemical warfare.

Today, as we see the devastating images of the victims of war and conflict like never before from Khartoum to Kyiv to Khan Younis, it is incumbent on all of us to do what we can to promote peace and to work vigorously toward a world free of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The use of chemical weapons to injure or kill is a vile act of barbarism and regrettably one that, despite our best efforts, has not yet been confined to the annals of history.

While the use of chemicals in war has a long history dating back to ancient times, advances in science and technology, with the possibility of creating so much good for so many people, have also been harnessed on an industrial scale to cause death and destruction. Thankfully, at the conclusion of the conflict, the Geneva Protocol was launched, which prohibited the use in war of either of these categories of weapons of mass destruction.

The way in which the consequences of chemical weapons on the battlefield left no one untouched demonstrated the sheer inhumanity of these types of weapons. However, the protocol did not prohibit their development or production. Consequently, for decades to follow, countries continued to develop massive chemical weapons stockpiles.

After more than two decades of effort, on September 3, 1992, the text of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was sent to the General Assembly of the United Nations by the UN Conference on Disarmament.

Canada signed it on the very first day, January 13, 1993, and proceeded to fully ratify it. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on April 29, 1997. That same year, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW, was formed to oversee the convention’s implementation, supervise destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and inspect the world’s chemical industries to help ensure chemical weapons would never return.

Thirty years later, the Chemical Weapons Convention remains a key pillar of the rules-based international system. More than 190 states are party to it, making it the most widely adopted treaty on non-proliferation and disarmament. The convention’s prohibitions are clear and comprehensive. No country party to the convention may develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or use chemical weapons. They may not transfer chemical weapons to another party or otherwise enable another country or non-state actor to develop them. It affirms the right for all parties to engage in the free trade of chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and that the prohibition on chemical weapons should not hamper unnecessarily the growth of the chemical industry and progress in chemical research. We need that as human beings. On that latter point, the OPCW employs numerous programs to promote chemical science and chemical industry, all for peaceful purposes, around the globe.

As of July 2023, the OPCW supervised and verified the destruction of 100% of the world’s declared chemical weapons.

Unfortunately, the legal prohibition has not yet fully eliminated the risk of chemical weapon use. Since the CWC entered into force, chemical weapons have been used in multiple instances, even by countries that are party to the convention.

Competent international bodies, including the OPCW-UN joint investigation mechanism and the OPCW investigation and identification team have concluded that the Syrian Arab Republic used both the chemical warfare agent sarin and the toxic industrial chemical chlorine as weapons against opposition forces on no fewer than nine occasions and likely more.

The terrorist group Daesh used mustard gas in both Syria and Iraq. Kim Jong-nam, half-brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, was assassinated with the nerve agent venomous agent X, or VX, in the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in February 2017, an act widely believed to have been orchestrated by the North Korean state.

In March 2018, a more complicated development occurred. Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military intelligence officer living in the United Kingdom, and his daughter, were found to have been poisoned by novichok, an extremely toxic nerve agent developed by the Soviet Union. The attempt at assassination left both Skripals and police detective Nick Bailey in the hospital for several months.

The novichok was believed to have been administered to the front door of Mr. Skripal’s house using a perfume bottle, subsequently discarded in a public bin, which, when discovered by a local, believing it to be perfume, resulted in two further hospitalizations and the death of Dawn Sturgess. When the police recovered the bottle from Ms. Sturgess’s home in nearby Amesbury, they assessed it to contain sufficient novichok to kill thousands of people. Eight locations had to be decontaminated to remove any trace of novichok, taking several months and costing millions of pounds.

Canada and its allies concluded that the state agencies of the Russian Federation were highly likely responsible for that attack. The British government identified and indicted, in absentia, three Russian intelligence agents.

Canada condemned the attack. The Prime Minister and then-foreign affairs minister issued statements. Four Russian diplomats were expelled from the Russian embassy in Ottawa and the consulate general in Montreal as part of an unprecedented collective response.

In total, 153 Russian diplomats were expelled from 29 countries, including some accredited to the NATO headquarters in Brussels.

The Chemical Weapons Convention contains an annex on chemicals, a list covering most chemical warfare agents and their precursors across three schedules.

Schedule 1 chemicals have only one use: to injure, to kill. They cannot be used in industry and so are prohibited from all purposes except for research and training for protection and defence against themselves, against chemical weapons.

Schedules 2 and 3 chemicals have increasing use in industry and so are subject to fewer controls, with the goal of preventing chemical weapons proliferation while avoiding unnecessarily hampering industry and trade and the benefit of humanity.

At the time of the Salisbury attack, novichoks were not on the annex on chemicals, thus not subject to declaration and verification requirements. It must be made clear that a novichok, as a weapon, indeed, any toxic chemical as a weapon, has always been a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in accordance with the broad definition of a chemical weapon in article II.

Still, Canada and our close allies quickly took the position that the world would be much safer if novichoks were subject to OPCW monitoring like any other chemical warfare agent.

On November 29, 2019, as the result of tremendous leadership by Canada, the United States and the Netherlands, the Twenty-Fourth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took the unprecedented decision to add four new categories of toxic chemicals to schedule 1.

This included the novichok used in the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal. As a result of this amendment, states handling novichoks for defensive purposes such as research, development and testing of new protective gear or medical countermeasures or training police or armed forces in responding to their use must declare their activities to the OPCW and be subject to verification.

This amendment is also symbolic. The toxic chemical used as a weapon in Salisbury is now included in the same list of chemical weapons as sarin, mustard and VX.

The additions to the CWC’s “Annex on Chemicals” came into force on June 7, 2020. The Chemical Weapons Convention requires that all states parties put in place domestic legislation to apply the convention’s prohibitions to their citizens and all people on their territory. That is what Bill S-9 is about.

In Canada, this is done through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which makes it illegal for anyone in Canada, as well as Canadian citizens abroad, to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, transfer, use, prepare to use or assist in the use of chemical weapons.

It also prohibits Canadians from producing, possessing or using schedule 1 chemicals without explicit government authorization. Since June 7, 2020, this has included the four recently added categories. The CWCIA still contains a copy of the convention’s original annex on chemicals, which has been out of date since 2020.

While subsection 2(3) states unambiguously that the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention take precedence should there be disagreement with the act, it is important for us to fix this discrepancy and show leadership on this important issue in this place. To this end, Bill S-9 seeks to repeal the schedule from the act, and repeal or amend two subsections that reference it. These changes would not just realign Canadian legislation with our international obligations but also future-proof it in case of further amendments in the future….

This legislation alone does not eliminate the risk of foreign states, such as Russia; non-signatories; or non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, using chemical weapons for nefarious purposes. It does, however, underscore Canada’s steadfast support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and for other key agreements that form an essential part of the rules-based system that keep Canada, all Canadians and our allies safe….

Canada can be proud of our leadership on these important issues, which also includes former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy’s landmark work on the Ottawa treaty to ban land mines; the launch of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which occurred when former prime minister Chrétien hosted the world leaders in Kananaskis in 2002; and work to spearhead the international convention prohibiting cluster munitions. These are all important, critical parts of keeping our world safe.

Another critical tool is diplomacy, which cannot help but strengthen our ability to maintain the safety and security of Canada and Canadians. We must work with allies and our partners to keep our world safe through a world security infrastructure. That is why we increased our footprint in the world. Diplomacy leads to better activity, which leads to a lesser degree of peace in our world being threatened. That is why we continue to do all that work.

We have missions around the world; our diplomats regularly coordinate with our allies and partners, as well as engaging host governments on the importance of buttressing our work on this convention. It was through concerted advocacy around the world that we were able to adapt the convention to the modern realities of today’s world. It is through diplomacy that we continue to build peace. It is a trying challenge. It is something that we need to commit to every day in this place. It means we continue to monitor the situation, adapt and take legislation we have in this House, this place and this government, and adapt it to modern realities.

Our words need to be backed by meaningful actions, notably through funding the weapons threat reduction program housed within Global Affairs Canada. It represents Canada’s flagship contribution to the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, hosted by former prime minister Jean Chrétien in Kananaskis, Alberta, in 2002.

Canada has contributed more than $1.6 billion towards threat reduction activities worldwide, including destroying chemical weapons and combatting their spread. This includes supporting the destruction of declared chemical weapons in Russia, Syria, Iraq and Libya.

Through the weapons threat reduction program, Canada is the single largest donor country to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which was set up to implement the CWC. It was honoured with the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize for its effort to supervise the destruction of more than 98% of declared global stocks of chemical weapons. With our $10 million commitment, Canada is the top individual donor to the OPCW’s new Centre for Chemistry and Technology in The Hague, which opened this past May. The centre will strengthen and bolster the organization’s investigative capacities and capabilities and support innovative efforts to keep pace with the ever-evolving chemical weapons landscape.

Canada has also provided defensive equipment, including masks and filters, to the Ukrainian military, given the threat of chemical weapons use by Russian forces. Let us be very clear: This bill is also about the defence of Ukraine against the illegal invasion of Russia into its territory. To counter Russian efforts to undermine the global norm against chemical weapons use, Canada has worked in close concert with allies to demand that Russia fully declare its novichok program.

Our government will continue to be a leader on the global stage and ensure that Russia is held accountable for its aggressions against Ukraine. This may be through providing defensive equipment or through Bill C-57, the Canada-Ukraine free trade agreement, which Conservatives have voted against multiple times, to support the rebuilding of Ukraine when we win….

In August 2020, when Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny was poisoned by a novichok agent, one that was sufficiently different from the novichok agent used against Sergei Skripal that it is not covered by the amended “Annex on Chemicals,” Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned the assassination attempt. Moreover, Canada joined our G7 partners and NATO allies, which made similar statements.

We have continued the close coordination of advocacy and, as recently as August, announced sanctions against senior officials of the Russian government, judiciary and investigative committee, as well as federally funded courts. This includes the notorious Basmanny District Court, which has been directly involved in human rights abuses against Russian opposition leaders, including Alexei Navalny, Vladimir Kara-Murza and other Russian citizens.

Even now, as President Putin continues his war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine, Canada is working hand in hand with allies to counter blatant disinformation on chemical weapons by Russia. Moreover, it is preparing to hold Russia to account should it choose to use chemical weapons in Ukraine. This would be a bad decision on Russia’s part.

Canada has joined its G7 partners in demanding information from Russia regarding allegations, supported by reports from Russian state-controlled media, that the Russian military has dropped grenades filled with a riot-control agent from drones in occupied Ukrainian territory. This would be another blatant violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The threat of a resurgence in chemical weapons use is real. Canada will play a key role in upholding the tools of the rules-based international order that keep us safe, including the Chemical Weapons Convention. We will also continue in our fight against flagrant violations of international law and global norms. This legislation will bring us in line. It will signal to the world that we are serious about keeping up with the convention and that we will continue to move in pace as industry changes, as technologies emerge and as people continue to be unsafe.

Canada will stand on the right side.

[La] LIC est un atout important pour notre économie, car elle contribue à faire du Canada une destination de choix pour l’investissement étranger en assurant l’existence d’un régime stable et prévisible.

Ensuring that Canada remains attractive to businesses and investors through a clear and predictable regulatory regime is ever more important as we continue to attract significant new investment…. No matter which country I visit, it is understood that Canada is a great investment destination, particularly when it comes to clean technologies, critical minerals, and automotive and battery supply chains. In fact, Bloomberg ranked Canada second in the world for its battery ecosystem, ahead of the United States and just behind China. This is a great thing that we have achieved in a couple of months, I would say, and we should all be proud as Canadians.

I will continue to work tirelessly to attract more investments to Canada that will create well-paying jobs and spur economic growth, and I look forward to more big announcements in 2023….

Au fil des dernières années, nous avons noté trois grandes thématiques, qui ont été abordées lors de la révision de la Loi. Il s’agit des préoccupations stratégiques et géopolitiques, de la nécessité d’améliorer la certitude et la transparence pour les investisseurs et de la nécessité de protéger l’économie et l’innovation au Canada.

Let me talk about modernizing the law in the current geopolitical context. Canada’s interactions with the rest of the world are changing. Hostile state and non-state actors pursue deliberate strategies to acquire goods, technologies and intellectual property. They do so in ways that are incompatible with Canada’s interests and principles. We also know that foreign investments can be used as a conduit for foreign influence activities that seek to weaken our norms and institutions.

The nexus between technology and national security is now clear, and I think we have recent examples of that. It is here to stay for the long run. Rapid technological innovation has provided Canada with new opportunities for economic growth, but it has also given rise to new and difficult policy challenges.

I will talk about modernizing the law and supporting investment in Canada. At the same time, we need to support a welcoming investment climate for beneficial investment. This means that the ICA’s operations must be clear, transparent and, I am sure we would all agree, efficient. We know that regulatory certainty and the speed of reviews are important factors in attracting investments to Canada. It is all about predictability and having a very stable regime.

I will now mention trends in innovation that we are seeing now. Canada’s foreign investment regime also needs to adapt to the speed of innovation. Intangible assets, such as intellectual property and data, have grown in importance in defining Canada’s economic strength, and at the same time they pose new challenges in terms of how these are to be managed.

A good example of this challenge is quantum technology. Our government recognizes the value of the intangible economy, its growth and the relevant opportunities for Canadians across our nation. That is why, in January, I announced the launch of Canada’s national quantum strategy, which will shape the future of quantum technologies in Canada and will help create thousands of jobs across our nation.

Quantum science and technologies are at the leading edge of research and innovation, with enormous potential for commercialization and game-changing advances, including more effective drug design, better climate change forecasting, improved navigation and innovations in clean technologies.

The Government of Canada is committed to supporting the continued growth of this emerging sector as it helps drive Canada’s economy and supports highly skilled jobs and, I would say, well-paying jobs as well. To ensure we protect it, quantum science is already listed as a sensitive technology area under the ICA’s national security guidelines.

Les modifications que nous proposons aujourd’hui sont basées sur ces thèmes. Notre gouvernement a déjà entrepris des efforts de modernisation de la LIC en mettant à jour nos politiques afin d’améliorer la transparence et d’offrir de la certitude aux investisseurs.

Je me permets d’énumérer quelques-uns des développements de ces dernières années. En 2021, nous avons mis à jour des lignes directrices sur l’examen relatif à la sécurité nationale des investissements étrangers. En 2022, devant l’invasion non provoquée et injustifiable de l’Ukraine, nous avons énoncé une nouvelle politique sur l’examen des investissements étrangers provenant de la Russie. Nous avons aussi introduit un mécanisme de dépôt volontaire pour les investisseurs souhaitant obtenir une certitude réglementaire, déclenchant les mêmes délais légaux qu’un dépôt obligatoire. Les investisseurs gagnent ainsi une certitude quant à leurs plans, tandis que le gouvernement se prévaut d’une plus grande visibilité et aura jusqu’à cinq ans pour revoir et prendre des mesures à l’égard d’un investissement à défaut d’une déclaration volontaire. Finalement, une politique concernant les investissements étrangers par des entreprises d’État dans les minéraux critiques dans le cadre de la LIC était annoncée à l’automne. Il s’agit d’une mesure des plus importantes….

The time is right to pursue modernization of the Investment Canada Act…. Now more than ever, we need to make sure we are doing everything we can to foster an innovative and healthy economy. The global environment has evolved significantly in recent years, including in global competition, investment and technology….

The guidance and decisions issued over the past several years make it clear that some transactions, particularly those by state-owned or state-influenced investors, may be motivated by non-commercial imperatives that could harm Canada’s national security….

Canada’s well-known excellence in emerging and sensitive technologies and critical minerals is an attractive target for hostile states. Through these amendments, we are making sure we have the right tools to protect those sectors along with our IP, personal data and critical infrastructure. The volume and complexity of foreign investment reviews are increasing, and this significant change provides a strong rationale for supporting ICA modernization….

Fundamentally, we believe that an effective regime must be robust, transparent and flexible to adapt to a changing world, and now is the time to make these changes. This new bill represents the most significant update of the ICA since 2009. Think of where the world is today and what it looked like in 2009. I put it to all members that we would all agree that it needs an update. We are making important moves now to review and modernize key aspects of the act, while ensuring that the overarching framework to support needed foreign investment to grow our economy remains strong and open.

Parlons des modifications prévues dans le projet de loi C‑34. Nous proposons d’apporter sept modifications à la Loi sur Investissement Canada.

Premièrement, une nouvelle exigence de dépôt préalable sera instaurée pour certains investissements. Cela permettra au Canada de disposer d’une meilleure vue sur les investissements dans certains secteurs d’activité désignés, surtout où les investisseurs auraient accès à des actifs ou des renseignements techniques importants qui ne sont pas accessibles au public, comme de la propriété intellectuelle de fine pointe ou des secrets commerciaux, à la clôture de l’investissement.

Je dirais même à mes collègues que c’est une mesure nécessaire dans un monde où les actifs intangibles sont de plus en plus importants.

Le gouvernement peut donc veiller à prévenir de tels dommages qui seraient irréparables. Les investisseurs devront déposer un avis d’investissement dans les délais inscrits dans la réglementation.

I want to stress that we are taking a targeted approach here. An across-the-board pre-implementation filing requirement without regard to nuance of business sector, type of transaction or other relevant facts would have an unnecessarily burdensome impact on needed and beneficial investment into Canada without providing improvements to national security analysis. Our targeted approach will support transparency and certainty for investors, which is something we all want.

Second, the bill would make the national security review process more efficient by providing me, as Minister of Industry, in consultation with my colleague, the Minister of Public Safety, the authority to extend the national security review of investments, whereas previously a Governor in Council order was required at that stage. This is about being efficient. This is about going at the speed of business, and this is about agility in light of different types of transactions.

Removing the additional step of getting an order by the Governor in Council would give more time to our interdepartmental experts in security and intelligence to complete their vital work, including the intelligence analysis assessing the national security risks of a transaction.

Troisièmement, les modifications touchent aux pénalités pour les cas de non-conformité aux dispositions de la Loi sur Investissement Canada. Celles-ci ont été fixées il y a déjà plusieurs décennies et ne correspondent plus aux évaluations courantes des transactions ni à l’inflation.

Par exemple, pour les dispositions actuelles de la Loi sur Investissement Canada, la pénalité maximale de 10 000 $ par jour qui a été établie en 1985 sera augmentée à 25 000 $ par jour par infraction, et ce, sans limite. De plus, une toute nouvelle pénalité pour les investisseurs qui manquent d’effectuer le dépôt d’avis préalable, dont j’ai parlé plus tôt, écoperont d’une amende de 500 000 $ ou le montant prévu par règlement, selon le montant supérieur.

Cette mise à jour assurera que les pénalités auront un plus grand effet de dissuasion.

Fourth, the bill introduces the authority for me, as Minister of Industry, after consultation with my colleague, the Minister of Public Safety, to impose interim conditions on an investment. This would reduce the risk of national security injury taking place during the course of the review itself, such as through the possible transfer of assets, intellectual property or trade secrets before the review is complete.

Cinquièmement, la Loi offre plus de souplesse dans l’atténuation des risques à la sécurité nationale en me permettant, toujours en ma qualité de ministre de l’Industrie et encore en collaboration avec mon collègue le ministre de la Sécurité publique, d’imposer des engagements contraignants de la part des investisseurs. Ces engagements devront démontrer qu’ils réduisent adéquatement les risques à la sécurité nationale qui découleraient de l’investissement en question.

J’ajouterai que c’est une mesure assez utilisée dans les autres pays, notamment chez nos voisins américains.

Auparavant, l’imposition des engagements visant à atténuer les risques en matière de sécurité nationale d’une transaction ne pouvait qu’être imposée par un décret du gouverneur en conseil. Avec des engagements contraignants qui peuvent être discutés et acceptés à l’échelle ministérielle, ceux-ci peuvent aussi être éventuellement modifiés ou même résiliés au besoin.

Sixth, the bill would allow Canada to share case-specific information with international counterparts to help protect common security interests. This type of co-operation is so important when considering an investor who may be active in several jurisdictions seeking the same technology, for example. We would have more discretion to share such information, and of course it would be based on the evaluation of confidentiality and other concerns in doing so.

Canada’s investment review regime is world-leading and we share information and collaborate closely with our allies, several of whom, including among the Five Eyes, have either updated or introduced new screening mechanisms responding to geopolitical threats.

Finalement, la loi instaure de nouvelles dispositions pour la protection des renseignements dans le cadre du contrôle judiciaire des décisions. Cette modification va permettre au gouvernement de s’appuyer sur des renseignements sensibles pour défendre ses décisions relatives à la sécurité nationale, tout en protégeant ces renseignements contre la divulgation. Ces nouvelles dispositions vont permettre aussi aux demandeurs de participer pleinement à la procédure.

Our record as government makes it clear that where national security is concerned, we do not hesitate to take decisive action. Our assessment of risk keeps pace with evolving economic and geopolitical circumstances.

While the ICA provides broad authorities to intercede and address national security risk that can arise in foreign investment, these amendments build on that strong foundation and improve on the mechanics of the process around national security…. We want to remain an attractive destination for investment, and this law would achieve that.

[T]his trade agreement is special. I rise today to enter into the record the story behind this agreement, because all members in the House, all Canadians and, especially, the 1.3 million members of the Ukrainian Canadian community, should know how it came about.

The story of this agreement begins with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s first visit to Canada back in 2019. During that visit, President Zelenskyy and the Prime Minister announced a mutual intention to modernize the existing Canada-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement. Following that announcement, public servants in both countries went about doing their respective homework to prepare for renewed negotiations.

That homework often takes many months. It is just part of the routine for our respective civil servants and trade negotiators. However, there was nothing routine about the way these negotiations unfolded.

First came the pandemic, which stalled progress for over a year. Then, when we were finally ready to launch negotiations, Russian troops were massing along the Ukrainian border.

On January 27, 2022, I held a virtual event with Yulia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s deputy prime minister and minister of economy, to announce the start of negotiations on this agreement. Russia had not yet invaded Ukraine at that time, but it was already clear that the situation was reaching a precipice. The world was seeing that an invasion was imminent, and there was a lot of uncertainty.

A short time before that announcement, I asked my Ukrainian counterpart if she and her government were still willing and able to move forward with negotiations. Her answer was candid and unequivocal: She told me that her government was determined to move ahead, and she told me how much it mattered that Canada was showing confidence in Ukraine at a time when many were beginning to question its resolve.

Ukraine knew then which path it wanted to take for its future. Ukraine had chosen the values of democracy, openness and transparency, as well as a rules-based international order. A sovereign Ukraine was seeking to modernize its infrastructure, its economy and its laws. A comprehensive and progressive free trade agreement would be an important step toward modernization for Ukraine, and Canada would be its gateway.

One month after that announcement, on February 24, 2022, Russia moved in with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and it invaded for all the reasons I just listed: Ukrainian territorial and economic sovereignty, values of openness and democracy, and a rules-based international order. Vladimir Putin despises all these things, and he could not stand to see Ukraine embrace them, uphold them and blossom into a great modern nation. That is why he invaded Ukraine.

On that day, I knew, the Prime Minister knew and the government knew what we had to do. As long as the government of Ukraine stood, we would stand with it. Since the war began, Canada has committed $9 billion in military, humanitarian, financial and development assistance to Ukraine. We also understood that standing with Ukraine meant that we would see these trade negotiations through to the end.

At the outset, it was not easy. The war made travel dangerous and even routine calls impossible for our Ukrainian counterparts. Negotiations had barely begun; suddenly, they came to a standstill. They stayed at a standstill for four months, until I travelled for meetings at the OECD in Paris. That is where I met Ukraine’s chief negotiator, Taras Kachka.

It is important to understand that we did not plan a formal meeting that day. He and I, along with Canada’s chief negotiator, simply sat in the cafeteria of the OECD building and talked. Mr. Kachka recounted the first 120 days of the war and the challenges he had to overcome just to make that one trip to the OECD. I again asked if Ukraine was able and willing to begin negotiations. Mr. Kachka said yes and I said yes, and negotiations began in earnest.

A few weeks later, at the G7 summit in Germany, I finally met Deputy Prime Minister Svyrydenko face to face. We revisited our earlier conversations and talked of how our earlier hope of avoiding the conflict had been so savagely dispelled. We reiterated our mutual intention to reach an agreement, and then we hugged.

The private conversations I had with my Ukrainian counterparts moved me in ways that are hard to describe. If they had told me that they were not yet ready to begin trade talks, of course we would have waited. Canada would have given Ukraine as much time as it needed.

Ukraine’s quiet resolve to move forward was unmistakable and unbreakable. These negotiations were driven by the very values of openness and self-determination that Ukrainian soldiers were and are fighting and dying for. I can tell the House today that, even in the midst of an all-consuming war effort, Ukraine’s commitment to those values never wavered and neither did Canada’s.

Je suis fière de dire que cet accord a été conclu en un temps record, c’est-à-dire en à peine 12 mois. Voilà qui illustre la détermination du Canada et de l’Ukraine dans ce dossier crucial. Le processus a pris fin il y a quelques semaines à peine, quand le premier ministre et le président Zelenski ont signé l’accord à l’occasion de la seconde visite du président Zelenski au Canada. C’est un véritable honneur pour moi d’en parler à la Chambre.

Outre le fait que les négociations n’ont pris que 12 mois, force est de reconnaître qu’il s’agit d’un accord exceptionnel. Dans les milieux commerciaux, c’est ce qu’on appelle un accord de grande qualité. Il comprend des dispositions sur le commerce des services et les investissements, un mécanisme obligatoire de règlement des différends pour assurer un traitement équitable, ainsi que des mesures de protection des travailleurs. Par surcroît, il reconnaît l’importance des PME, notamment celles appartenant à des femmes et à des Autochtones. Enfin, il prévoit des mesures de protection environnementale qui sont plus exigeantes que toutes celles qui figurent dans les autres accords de libre-échange conclus par le Canada à ce jour.

Bref, en termes de contenu et de pratiques exemplaires, cet accord est équivalent à l’Accord Canada-États-Unis-Mexique, au Partenariat transpacifique global et progressiste et à l’Accord économique et commercial global. Le Canada est le premier pays à signer un accord commercial global avec l’Ukraine.

L’Ukraine nous a dit qu’elle utiliserait cet accord commercial comme modèle dans ses négociations avec d’autres partenaires potentiels. C’est entre autres pourquoi j’affirme que cet accord est spécial.

Par-dessus tout, cet accord est spécial parce que les Canadiens appuient la lutte de l’Ukraine contre l’invasion barbare de Poutine. Ils manifestent leur appui par l’entremise de leur gouvernement en fournissant de l’aide militaire, humanitaire et financière. Le soutien à l’Ukraine ne se limite toutefois pas aux mesures du gouvernement. Ici, au Canada, bon nombre de personnes et d’organismes apportent leur aide en accueillant des familles ukrainiennes qui fuient la guerre. De nombreuses autres organisations et entreprises canadiennes veulent se joindre à cet effort, tant au pays qu’au cœur de l’Ukraine.

Cet accord offre aux Canadiens de nouvelles façons de soutenir l’Ukraine. Il établit les règles régissant la manière dont les entreprises canadiennes peuvent investir dans la reconstruction de l’Ukraine, dans la modernisation de ses infrastructures et dans la création d’emplois en Ukraine et au Canada. Des entreprises canadiennes sont déjà actives en Ukraine, et d’autres se joignent à elles en ce moment même. L’entreprise canadienne de construction Aecon est en train de former des partenariats en Ukraine conformément à un protocole de collaboration pour la construction d’une centrale hydroélectrique dans ce pays.

La présence d’entreprises canadiennes aidera l’Ukraine à persévérer malgré la guerre. Grâce à cette entente, d’autres pourront se joindre à elles et le feront. Grâce à toutes ces activités, le Canada et une Ukraine victorieuse pourront renforcer nos valeurs communes dans notre quête de la paix, du succès mutuel et de la prospérité. Au bout du compte, le commerce ne repose pas uniquement sur les affaires, mais aussi sur des valeurs communes.

Les Ukrainiens et les Canadiens souhaitent tous une Ukraine libre, moderne et démocratique. Cet accord commercial est la manifestation de ces valeurs communes. Je suis vraiment fière d’y avoir joué un rôle.

Aujourd’hui, j’exhorte la Chambre à réaffirmer son engagement à l’égard de ces valeurs ainsi que son soutien à l’égard de l’Ukraine en adoptant ce projet de loi le plus rapidement possible. Slava Ukraini.