On June 18, 2019, Jürgen Habermas celebrated his ninetieth birthday. Less than six months later, on November 11, Suhrkamp Verlag released Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie (hereafter AGPh). Despite its grandiose title, a glance at the subtitles of the two volumes reveals its narrower focus on the relationship between religion and philosophy. The first thus introduces “the Occidental constellation of faith and knowledge,” while the second develops the concept of “rational freedom” by following “the trail of the discourse of faith and knowledge.”
It is not surprising that Habermas would seek to cap his career with a history, as this is a common trope within the German philosophical tradition. However, his decision to focus on the relationship between faith and knowledge is unexpected given his long-standing commitment to the idea that modernity has no need for religion, but must instead “create its normativity out of itself.”Footnote 1 While metaphysical faith traditions have played an important role in human development, in the 1980s Habermas argued that science had successfully translated the basic insights of religion into a secular vocabulary through a “linguistification of the sacred,” whereby the normative resources of faith had been put into language accessible to all—believers and nonbelievers alike—within a society no longer dependent on a shared religion.Footnote 2 By the mid-2000s, however, he came to accept that “philosophy must be ready to learn from theology” and that faith has “an epistemological status that is not purely and simply irrational.”Footnote 3 He no longer presents religion simply as part of the backward-looking genealogy of reason; it is now also a resource of forward-looking normative inspiration.
The origins of this book date back to the end of the twentieth century. In the aftermath of the Cold War and the victory of neoliberal capitalism, Habermas voiced his concern that “something is missing” in our “ambivalent modern age.”Footnote 4 Additionally, he worried about what would happen if the increasingly unavoidable intercultural dialogue between the secular West and the rest of the world ended in failure or misunderstanding. On September 11, 2001, Habermas's fears were realized as “the tension between secular society and religion exploded in an entirely new way.”Footnote 5
As a result of these developments Habermas turned his attention to the relationship between faith and knowledge. In so doing he sought to understand “fundamentalism [a]s an exclusively modern phenomenon and, therefore, not only a problem of others.”Footnote 6 Rather than blaming the fundamentalist “other,” he used the so-called “war on terror” as a way to reflect on the failures and pathologies of secular modernity. The twenty-year research agenda that culminates in AGPh is thus driven by Habermas's political commitments to open dialogue and self-criticism.Footnote 7 It is guided by the insight that the modern, globalized, multicultural world does not need to choose “faith or knowledge,” but is instead tasked with figuring out how they can coexist while also learning from each other.
AGPh therefore seeks “to depict the process of ‘migration’ of theological content into profane thought as philosophically comprehensible learning process.”Footnote 8 The narrative starts with the origins of philosophical thinking in the Axial Age (800–200 BCE), when metaphysical worldviews first separated themselves from myth. This represents a “cognitive breakthrough” (1:182) because it enabled the “construction of a God's-eye view” that allows “the whole to be brought into view and objectified” (1:183). This opened the door for the fusion of the rationalistic tradition of Athens with the religious heritage of Jerusalem.
After the fall of Rome Habermas traces the disintegration of this “Christian Platonism,” which was brought about by the increasing “differentiation between sacerdotium and regnum” (1:617). This rupture was pushed along by the medieval rediscovery of Aristotle, who was credited with “the differentiation of practical from theoretical reason” (1:689). Via readings of Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam, Habermas argues that this development leads to the “decoupling [of] the knowledge of God from the metaphysical knowledge of Nature” (1:766).
The second volume begins with Martin Luther, who completes the break between faith and knowledge. Habermas highlights the role that the “Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms” plays in differentiating secular from ecclesiastic authority. He also credits Luther's “faith-based” (2:36) conception of religion for opening “the door to an anthropocentric turn in philosophy” (2:13) by allowing secular forms of knowledge to carve out their own space outside of theology.
The rest of volume 2 is devoted to tracing the origins of postmetaphysical thinking, Habermas's shorthand for the paradigm of social cooperation based on the communicatively mediated search for mutual understanding (Verständigung) that he has developed over the course of his long career. Moving through the work of David Hume, Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Søren Kierkegaard, the narrative ends rather abruptly with Charles Sanders Pierce. The argument of the latter volume is organized around the idea of “rational freedom” (vernünftige Freiheit). While this concept is a relatively recent addition to Habermas's lexicon, it sums up his long-standing conviction that philosophy must seek to encourage individuals “to make autonomous use of their reason and to practically shape their social existence” (1:13). Referring to its “enlightening role,” Habermas concludes that the discourse of faith and knowledge reveals that postmetaphysical thinking must continue to “contribute to rationally clarifying our self- and world-understanding” (1:12).
While this narrative is interesting and suggestive, Habermas's approach raises a number of questions. I briefly take up two of the most important. First, outside of brief chapters on “Buddha's theory and practice” (1:361ff.) and “Confucianism and Taoism” (1:383ff.), Habermas's argument is confined to what he admits is a “Eurocentrically limited perspective” (1:126). Even within Europe, Habermas sets Byzantium and orthodox Christianity aside in order to focus on the Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant tradition that emerged from the Reformation. He justifies this approach by noting that it is impossible to “take up an imaginary view from nowhere” (1:172, English in original). Epistemologically speaking, he argues that historians “as knowing subjects cannot shed the ‘skin’ of their own way of life” (2:774). Since we are always limited to our views as participants sitting at the end of a long historical process, Habermas argues that this is where we have to start. While this is an important methodological point, it is not at all clear that it is sufficient to justify Habermas's lack of engagement with the discourse on faith and knowledge outside of the secular West on its own.
Ultimately, this approach is justifiable in light of Habermas's political motivations. Insofar as AGPh is an attempt to understand secularization as a European problem in the aftermath of 9/11, Habermas's decision to reflect on his own intellectual tradition is not Eurocentric, but a form of self-criticism that makes good on his promise to treat fundamentalism as a European issue, “not as a problem of others.” Since it is addressed primarily to Europe, it is perhaps understandable that this argument follows the European path of development.
Second, given that Habermas is presenting an essay on “faith and knowledge,” there is a certain asymmetry in the fact that most of the narrative actually shows knowledge learning from faith, not vice versa. This is a potentially significant oversight, as post-Enlightenment Western Christianity has also benefited significantly from its interaction with science and secular knowledge. This choice is also problematic, as it is not clear how the dogmatic claims of faith can sit alongside and interact with the claims of secular knowledge and philosophy, which according to Habermas must be subjected to the “unforced force of the better argument.”
Habermas sidesteps this objection by focusing not on the truth-content of theological dogma, but on the “internalized faith experience” (2:121) of “the participants” (1:69) in religious ritual. He offers two justifications for this decision. The first, methodological reason is based on Habermas's argument that dogma is inaccessible to him as a “secular nontheologian” (2:701). By contrast, he claims that as a sociologist he is able to study the effects of religion on the behavior of believers by examining “the core of the ecclesiastical cult” (2:698). This defense is rather unconvincing, as one does not need to be a believer in order to engage in theology or in religious argumentation. On the contrary, one only needs to be willing to accept certain assumptions while operating within that sphere, which is something philosophy is well-placed to do.
Habermas's second reason for focusing on religious practice is better that the first. In reflecting on the survival of faith in the postsecular societies of the West, he argues that “religious teaching can only survive in modernity insofar as it is practiced in the ritual of a community's liturgy” (2:699). All dogma must therefore “find its linchpin in the sacramental actions of the community” (2:699) if it is to affect the everyday actions and moral behavior of its adherents. Given his underlying political motivations, he is interested in how continued translations from faith traditions “at the end of the age of worldviews” (2:699)—i.e., after the death of metaphysics—can help to address the loss of meaning and community associated with modernity by “playing a role in the production and stabilization of social solidarity” (2:702).
The reason for the asymmetry of the learning processes presented in this narrative can thus be explained by Habermas's recognition that faith is an important source of solidarity and normative commitment at a time of heightened individualism, loss of meaning, and relativism within modernity. While faith also has much to learn from knowledge, AGPh is addressed primarily to the postsecular West. Far from treating Europe as the logical end-point of modernity, as secularization theory does, Habermas instead points out that “‘Occidental rationalism’ now appears to be the actual deviation.”Footnote 9 Although he expected the disappearance of religion in his earlier writings, he now wants to warn the postsecular societies of the West that they are better off searching for value in religion, rather than acting as the “salespeople of instrumental reason and destructive secularization.”Footnote 10 Instead of a one-sided narrative of secularization, AGPh thus ultimately presents a successful attempt to “reopen and perpetuate the mutual interrogation of philosophy, science, and religion” (1:23).Footnote 11
