For too much of its history, Iraq has been an unwilling host to the whims and ambitions of foreign forces, the brutalities of sectarian loyalties and murderous self-promotion. With some notable exceptions, the recent literature on the conflict there has tended to be equally self-serving, frequently reflecting the poorly informed pronouncements from afar. Into this field comes Allawi's recent book.
Ali A. Allawi is particularly well qualified to write about the continuing experiment that is the invasion and occupation of Iraq. A prominent Shi'a whose father was a minister of health, his cousin is Ayad Allawi and his uncle Ahmad Chalabi, he returned to the post-Saddam Iraq where he served as minister of defence and minister of finance. The success of The Occupation of Iraq lies in Allawi's ability to combine the rare insight of an insider in the world of recent Iraqi politics with as close to a dispassionate analysis as is possible.
Spanning almost 500 pages and covering a multitude of topics, any summary of this work must omit more than it includes. The following are three areas I felt merited honorable mentions. It is to the immense credit of this work that others may have chosen quite differently.
The first topic is the ideological underpinnings of the invasion. The reasons for the invasion of Iraq remain elusive—not helped by the altering claims of its advocates and architects. Alllawi focuses on its ideological underpinnings, particularly the arguments of Bernard Lewis and Leo Strauss that intertwined to inform an influential range of people that, in the post-September 11 world, the foreign policy of the United States should have the alteration of the politics of Iraq at its core. He is, of course, not the first to point to the importance of such thinkers on the decision makers and their advisors in the White House, although he notes their appeal beyond the much cited neoconservatives. What he adds to the analysis are two scholars whose views, if afforded the prominence due to them, might have avoided the catastrophic consequences of the invasion.
The first, the sociologist Robert Merton, articulated five unintended consequences that frequently accompany the actions taken by people and governments, thereby producing unforeseen results. The invasion of Iraq realized all five. The second is the Iraqi historian Ali al-Wardi, whose work, Allawi argues, is unsurpassed in understanding the politics and people of the country. The debacle of Iraq only strengthens the sense that much of the current debacle might have been avoided had the knowledge of those who actually knew about Iraq permeated the consciousness of those who chose to invade it. Allawi's argues that it might have been derived from al-Wardi.
The second topic is that of post-invasion mismanagement. What emerges in Allawi's book is that, though ill-advised though it may have been, the invasion was not destined to fail. That it did owes much to the dire mismanagement of almost all aspects of political governance after the fall of Saddam. The catalogue is extensive, but one example serves as an illustration. The process of de-Ba'athification purged all those who had held any positions of power in Saddam's Iraq, people who necessarily had to express loyalty to the regime. It was understood, and not only by Sunnis, as a process of de-Sunnification. This robbed the country of desperately needed expertise and experience and created a wellspring of profound dissatisfaction, a pool of hundreds of thousands of people from whom the insurgents could and did draw. Economic failures; corruption; an unwillingness to cede anything other than the appearance of power to Iraqis, thereby undermining claims to be promoting democracy; a misreading of the holders of political power; and undue personalization of politics also marked the occupying authority's era of control.
The third topic to consider is Iraq and the region. There is a tendency in writing on Iraq to focus on the intentions and actions of the United States. While acknowledging its importance, Allawi deepens the scope, detailing the invasion's effect on the development of alternative political consciousnesses within Iraq and the role played by regional powers in response to and in promotion of those changes. The war and its removal of the vicious Ba'ath regime, the liberation and empowerment of previously subjugated powers, and an increased involvement of neighbouring states have created an Iraq, however impermanent its future, that is different both from Iraq before the invasion and from how the invaders imagined it would be. As such, much remains undecided. The future for the country is bleak, but not foreordained, and the forces that will decide its fate are numerous and unclear.
It is to Allawi's credit and the readers' pleasure that this book combines the insight of someone intimately involved in the process he describes, a politician's sense of what is truly significant, the ease and accessibility of a journalist, and the perspective and context of a scholar. This will be the benchmark for all future works on Iraq and the tragedy—albeit with the hint of hope—therein.
