This book is a scholar's page-turner. A poignant reminiscence about political activism and incarceration in the aftermath of Iran's 1979 revolution opens the book. It is immediately followed by an adumbration of the theoretical scaffolding behind this fact-filled sprawling work. The author acknowledges that his erstwhile Marxist–Leninist “foundationalism” and its ideological nemesis, the Islamic Republic of Iran's religious “fundamentalism,” originate in the same cluster of monistic and deterministic “totalizing ideologies.” But, the author asks, what are the “stakes of the relativist approach” as an alternative to such false certainties? The loss of a “universal referent” and the fading of an “emancipatory politics” seems an exorbitant price to pay for the escape from religious or secular determinism (pp. 4–5). Is there another alternative? Thus starts a theoretically ambitious and historically specific project on the odyssey of non-Western nations from tyranny to freedom. The first chapter of this book is a tour de force, adroitly situating this innately Iranian dilemma in the context of the global debates over modernism, postmodernism, orientalism, and postcolonialism. Ghamari-Tabrizi seeks a safe passageway between Scylla of “fundamentalist absolutism” (old or new) and Charybdis of “liberal universalism.” As a warning of the dangers involved, he recounts the cautionary tale of the iconic Salman Rushdie, who wildly zigzagged between the two extremes and eventually shipwrecked his project of “cultural translation” (p. 12).
In preparation for the discussion of the Iranian revolution, the second chapter describes four distinct Muslim responses to European modernity: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani's acceptance of modernization and rejection of Westernization, Hasan al-Banna's advocacy of the “Islamization” of Muslim lives in place of political revolution, Abul ʿAla Maududi's call for an authoritarian Islamic state, and Sayyid Qutb's plan for a radical Islamic revolution that, in turn, influenced Ali Shariʾati and the Iranian revolution.
Chapter 3, the longest and most detailed chapter of the book, is devoted to a discussion of various drafts of Iran's new constitution and its final ratification through a coup de théâtre in the assembly of experts in August 1979 (p. 41). Throughout, the author scrutinizes the relative merits of two rival theories: one reminiscent of the monistic and deterministic theories he embraced as a young ideologue, and the other influenced by the contingent and reflexive theories that he has embraced as a seasoned sociologist. The “determinist-conspiratorial theory” argues that Khomeini orchestrated the entire chorus of events to enshrine his own principle of “mandate of jurisprudence” (velāyat-i faqīh) in Iran's new constitution. The “social-constructionist” theory proposes that the ratification of the constitution was the result of widely divergent factors including the weakness of the liberals and leftists, the power of fundamentalists and clerics, and the “uncertainties and insecurities” of the revolutionary leadership over the potential commandeering of the theocratic principle of velāyat-i faqīh by the traditional seminarians of Qom. The complex interplay of these forces can explain the evidence that determinist theories are incapable of explaining away, namely, Khomeini's nod of approval to the first version of the constitution that did not include the theocratic clause of velāyat-i faqīh and his notorious neutrality throughout the deliberation process.
The author maintains that the unintended and unforeseen consequence of the implementation of the principle of velāyat-i faqīh was the transformation of Islam from a corpus of “accepted dogma” to a body of “contested knowledge” (p. 88), making expediency (maslaḥ at) salient over orthodoxy and facilitating the secularization of the revolutionary regime from within. This metamorphosis was completed in 1989, when a revision of the constitution institutionalized an “Expediency Council” with the authority to overrule the religiously mandated “Guardian Council.”
Against this historical backdrop, Ghamari-Tabrizi charts the rise of Abdolkarim Soroush along with the need of the newfangled Islamic Republic to legitimize itself in the face of the secular and leftist challenges. While sympathetic with Soroush's critique of vulgar Marxism expressed in televised debates that made him famous, Ghamari-Tabrizi faults the philosopher for neglecting the humanistic interpretations of Marxism. In defense of Soroush (and Max Weber before him), one can argue that the Marxism they faced was the formulaic Marxism of Bernstein, Kautsky, and Plekhanov, not the cerebral Marxism of Gramsci, Luxemburg, or Lukacs. Marxism in Iran has always tended toward power and realpolitik, from the Soviet Marxism of the Tudeh party to the Maoism and leftist elitism of Iran's guerilla organizations.
Ghamari-Tabrizi's most sustained critique of Abdolkarim Soroush, however, concerns his silence during the repression of the left as well as his short-lived role in the government-sanctioned Committee of Cultural Revolution (pp. 104, 107). The author finds Soroush's explanations for the Committee of Cultural Revolution's limited mandate and his temporary involvement in it unpersuasive (p. 116) and goes on to quote the unadorned apology of a younger intellectual (Sadeq Zibakalam) for his role in the Cultural Revolution as a model worth emulation. Yet Ghamari-Tabrizi's critique of Soroush's sins of omission during the Iranian “reign of terror” sound more filial than adversarial, more in the spirit of lamentation than of argumentation.
In Chapter 6, Ghamari-Tabrizi steps back to consider Ali Shariʾati's Gramscian “counter hegemonic project,” his liberation theology, and his authoritarian notion of “guided democracy” (pp. 167, 176). The author reminds us that twenty years of revolutionary experience separate Ali Shariʾati's emancipatory Islam from Soroush's hermeneutic Islam. He obviously believes Soroush, his lapses notwithstanding, to be the heir to Shariʾati's monumental legacy.
In the meantime, Ghamari-Tabrizi continues to describe Iran's postrevolutionary epochs as the background of these intellectual developments. Rafsanjani's era of “developmentalism” (p. 162), during which poverty decreased but inequality increased and crony capitalism gave rise to muckraking journalism, was followed by Khatami's liberal era that built on the structural and demographic realities that emerged under Rafsanjani. As a result, “the revolutionary modus vivendi was surpassed by the pragmatic modus operandi” (p. 164).
Returning to the book's theoretical objectives in Chapter 7, Ghamari-Tabrizi engages in a brief but brilliant critique of Soroush's “naturalist” perspective (pp. 206–209). The alternative to rationalism, it turns out, is not rudderless relativism, as Soroush seems to imply, but a judicious reflexivity that contextualizes knowledge in its sociopolitical milieu without calling into question the validity of its assertions. To assert, as Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Rorty have, that “scientific knowledge is produced in a web of political, economic, and cultural networks” (p. 209) is not tantamount to relativizing and rejecting the rationality and coherence of scientific logic. The author also takes notice of the new developments in Soroush's thought that were promulgated by the publication of his two seminal books, Straight Paths (Tehran: Moassesseh e farfangi e Sarat, 1999) and Expansion of the Prophetic Experience (Tehran: Moassesseh e farfangi e Sarat, 1999) in the 1990s. This radical turn toward a more thoroughgoing hermeneutic interpretation of the sacred texts and practices came as Soroush was hounded by IRI officials and forced into exile in 1996.
The last chapter of the book returns to the pithy eloquence and grand sweep of the first chapter. Using the marvelously complex and multifarious political and intellectual developments in postrevolutionary Iran as evidence, Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi argues that the West has yet to appreciate “the multi-leveled and politically contested manifestations of public religion” in Iran and the way competing meanings of Islam have been “articulated, appropriated, and contested in the public sphere.” Instead, the West dehistoricizes Islam “as yet another ideology of intolerance” (p. 245). Ghamari-Tabrizi suggests that “Iran's experiment” can usher in a new approach to “understanding public religion.” It may have the potential of democratizing the Muslim world (p. 246). The author believes that “the response to intolerant public religion must come from an inclusive, pluralist, and democratic public religion of justice,” not from a secular dream of privatized religion. The secular position is based on the illusion that religion as an explanatory authority is withering away. A host of thinkers from Alasdair McIntyre to Seyla Benhabib argue otherwise (p. 247). Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi believes that public Islam in Iran has hybrid and democratic sources, both classical and contemporary, which need to be recognized and nurtured, whereas the pronouncements of classic modernity and monistic Islam are at once totalitarian and dogmatic.
This book is a scholarly tightrope walk over an ocean of facts toward a well-conceived theoretical goal: understanding the role of public religion in the journey of non-Western nations toward self-realization in a postcolonial global world. Academically, it is a virtuoso act, but like a tightrope walker, Ghamari Tabrizi makes it look easy to the uninitiated.
