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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2005
Roxanne Euben agrees with Edward Said on the point that a close connection between exteriority and power resides at the core of Western rationalist discourse. Far from being non-normative, ahistorical, and unbiased toward its subject of inquiry, Western rationalist discourse constructs and controls the images of political phenomena through the filter of Western categories of knowledge. This discourse is not attentive to its contingency on specific “historical a priories,” to use Foucault's language, and accordingly stays oblivious of the socio-political functions of its “truth”-producing activities.
According to Euben, the current scholarship on Islamic fundamentalism is an exercise in disciplinary power, which dictates the parameters of enframing the identity, meaning, and function of Islamic fundamentalist movements without reference to the adherents' own understanding of their political behavior. In other words, within Western rationalist discourse, Islamic fundamentalism serves as the irrational Other to the intelligible Western Self. Hence, it is no wonder that modern rationalist scholarship focuses exclusively on the function or on the socio-economic and political “causes” of Islamic fundamentalism and dispenses with the “reasons” those Islamic fundamentalists uphold.
The author, however, finds hermeneutics less susceptible to the distortions of power than the social-scientific models parasitic on rational discourse. She therefore applies the hermeneutic/dialogic method of understanding to give voice to a set of subjugated truth claims. To achieve such an understanding, Euben emphasizes the moral/epistemological necessity of Gadamerian “openness” and, at the same time, reminds us of “the finitude of our capacity to understand complex matrixes of meaning in part constituted by systemic inequalities of power” (p. 42). The first two chapters of the book set this agenda and establish the methodological basis for a thick description of Islamic fundamentalism in subsequent chapters.
Euben's concept of fundamentalism reflects “contemporary religio-political movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundation of the community, excavating and re-interpreting these foundations for application to the contemporary social and political world” (p. 17). This attempt, according to the participants, is guided and informed by divine truths that are unknowable by purely human means. They maintain that divine truths are not matters of hermeneutic and contextual re-interpretation of religious sources. As a result, Islamic fundamentalism is believed to initiate a rediscovery of eternal, non-negotiable divine truths and values that are abandoned in the pagan epoch of jahiliyya. The author rightly locates this anti-hermeneutic epistemology among the background assumptions of all varieties of fundamentalism. Indeed, one might take her observation one step further and analyze the political function and social outcomes of hermeneutic epistemologies in societies that are currently prone to fundamentalism.
In Chapter 3, Euben analyzes the ideas of Sayyid Qutb on such issues as philosophy, the natural and social sciences, morality, politics, and the Islamic state. She concludes that Qutb managed to alter “the very terms of Islamic political debate concerning the legitimacy of authority, the nature and necessity of political activism and the characteristics of just community” (p. 55). Chapter 4 is devoted to the 19th-century Islamic “reformist” arguments of the likes of al-Afghani and Abduh on the compatibility of Islam and reason. Euben maintains that the issue of compatibility between Mu

tazila reason and revelation is the main point that differentiates the reformist al-Afghani from the fundamentalist Qutb.
In the fifth chapter, Euben studies the similarities between Qutb's critique of rationalism and contemporary Western voices on the problems endemic to the modern condition. According to her, this comparison between two apparently different sets of political theories reveals a correspondence between the Other's and the Self's critiques of modern rationality and thus facilitates the overcoming of the reified Self–Other dichotomy. As she specifies, Qutb's fundamentalist program is to re-enchant the world through implementing a metaphysical account of truth, which justifies absolutist authority. In contrast to Qutb, internal Western criticisms stay loyal to a viable conception of democratic freedom, which—as a shared democratic end—is to be realized through participatory social engagements.
We might expect to know Euben's opinion of why—at least, in Egypt—the revolutionary voice of Qutb overshadowed the rationalist reformist program of al-Afghani and Abduh. Why was reason not as attractive to Qutb as it was to al-Afghani or Abduh? The answer may lie partly in the point that these thinkers have different historical experiences of modernity. Qutb, as the author briefly observes (p. 166), seems to regard colonialism, the world wars, and the present torment in the Third World and their associated human disasters as the direct—and historically accidental—outcomes of Enlightenment rationality. As a consequence, he would share the post-modernist idea that there is something rotten in modern rationality itself, though, as Euben mentions in Chapter 5, Qutb's prescription is radically different from the ones advanced by post-modernists. What I want to highlight here is a suggestion that we might need to revise the hermeneutic method of understanding by expanding the domain of meaning-formative context to historical and socio-political interactions. Euben approvingly quotes Taylor that “meaning is derived from the practices that constitute everyday social existence” (p. 153). However, it seems that the meaning-formative frame of reference in her work is mainly restricted to the written (not lived) texts. The suggested expansion of context takes place within the meaning-oriented hermeneutic methodology. Thus, it is different from the familiar idea of complementary combination of hermeneutics and the sociology of knowledge.
In all, Enemy in the Mirror offers an astute interdisciplinary study that calls on Western scholarship to take a short (irrational?) break from its instrumental rationality. This might help it to see that the scary face of Enemy/Other is depicted in a mirror that the modern rationality, for centuries, has held in front of its own face.
Euben relies on original sources and demonstrates sound scholarship. Her book makes a positive contribution to the present knowledge of Islamic fundamentalism and introduces a good case for what she calls “comparative political theory.” Students of political science, postcolonial studies, and Middle East studies will definitely benefit from this important book.