In engaging with an array of scholars, along with Kierkegaard’s two series of deliberations in Works of Love, John Lippitt undertakes to show that love for others is inextricably linked to love for oneself. He states that the “primary purpose” of his book is “to utilize Kierkegaardian resources [above all, Works of Love] in order to think about proper self-love.” (13) That is, in and through his examination of Kierkegaard’s dismissal of erotic love and friendship as deceptive (improper) self-love, he aims to show that Kierkegaard also defends the work involved in love for oneself and so to advocate for true (or proper) self-love. He therefore defends Kierkegaard from his detractors who fail to see the paradox of love that he sets out and that is invoked in the focus of Lippitt’s title: the ‘Problem of Self-Love.’ For, though Lippitt agrees with Kierkegaard that self-love is evil (problematic) when it is selfish (and so subordinates others to its own eros), he also sees what Kierkegaard sees: that there is no escape from oneself. Love is reflexive, he observes in his engagement with Harry Frankfurt’s work in Chapter 5. How we love others reveals, as it is revealed by, how we love ourselves. He observes further that Kierkegaard holds that what he calls the second love commandment—love your neighbour as yourself—says, therefore, “‘You shall love yourself in the right way’, [so that] in the absence of such proper self-loving, one cannot love the neighbour either.” (46) As Lippitt repeatedly notes, “I too am a neighbour.” (122) The claim, then, that Lippitt advances (as, moreover, the argument that Kierkegaard advances) is that “proper self-love is a kind of self-relation that involves the cultivation of certain qualities and capacities that it makes sense to describe as virtues:” e.g., trust, hope, forgiveness and, paradoxically, self-denial, when these are understood to be gifts of the spirit and not merits of one’s rank, status, occupation, race, etc. (6) It is the exploration of these virtues, along with pride, that is the focus of the second series of chapters (6-9).
To love, we see, involves both ourselves and others in a relationship that eschews the subordination of oneself to others and of others to oneself. For to love the other ‘more’ than our selves is to demand (expect) that the other loves us ‘more’ than him- or herself. Yet, it is therefore demanded (expected) that the other annihilate him- or herself for us, as we annihilate ourselves in our enslavement to others. It is evident, then, why Kierkegaard dismisses the “intoxicated expression—to love another person more than oneself” as self-love.Footnote 1 In turn, to love myself ‘more’ than the other, to love the other insofar as it is expedient for me and my fortunes, i.e., to love the other spontaneously or preferentially, is to expect (demand) that the other love himself ‘more’ than he loves me and so to expect (demand) that he loves me insofar as it is expedient. It is evident, therefore, why Kierkegaard also launches an unrelenting attack on spontaneous or preferential love and its expressions in erotic love and friendship.
In the first series of chapters (1-5) of his study, Lippitt focuses on the ‘problem’ of special relationships, including our relationship to ourselves. In defense of Kierkegaard’s notion of love of neighbour as command, Lippitt draws our attention, in Chapter 2, to the contradictions involved in treating the other as an ‘other I,’ instead of an independent other with individual interests, desires, needs, etc. and so in founding our relationships on the ‘good fortune’ that our friendship with the other entails: what he understands to be the mirror view of friendship. Indeed, Lippitt repeatedly points out that, for Kierkegaard, God, understood through (and as) conscience, is the middle term between ourselves and others. As Lippitt puts it, God is the ‘filter’ that sieves out the impurities—that cracks the mirror involved in our relations with others, in whom I see none but myself—and rehabilitates, by representing, the love in our relationships. (The title of the third part of Chapter 4 is “The God filter.”) It is, however, in and through God as the middle term, interchangeable with the neighbour (and, we remember, I too am a neighbour), that we account for the individuality of others and so reconstitute our special relations: what he understands by the drawing view of friendship wherein I am drawn in, through, with, to, and by you, as an individual. Lippitt eschews, then, the view that “the ‘purified’ versions of any two manifestations or works of love must be identical.” (191) For he points out a further paradox involved in what Kierkegaard understands by the work of love: that involved in “making distinctions having made no distinctions!” (87) It is not on the grounds of finite differences—e.g., race, sex, class, sexual orientation, gender orientation…—that we judge our relations; rather, it is in and through our infinite relationships what we embrace, celebrate, and accommodate for our differences. It is not our preferences that act as the standard (index) for what we love, it is, instead, the love that recognizes the equal (because infinite) worth and dignity of every human person that acts as the standard (index) for our preferences. Thus, it is in and through the existence of the neighbour, as every one of us, that “love celebrates differences and acts accordingly.” (87) It is this notion of love that he associates, therefore, with Christianity and with the proper self-love of his own study.
Thus, Lippitt involves us in the test of working out a slew of relationships: between the divine and the human, between the Jewish and the Christian (for, as Lippitt acknowledges, the first and second love commandment central to Kierkegaard’s work, and so central to Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity, are taken from the Hebrew Bible), between the religious and the secular, and between the Bible and modernity. Lippitt involves us, i.e., in working out the history of true love. However, although he holds, and aims to show us, that the concept of the neighbour is central to true love, he also holds that Kierkegaard undervalues pagan (classical) friendship; for conscience is, he writes, “a significant feature of many such [i.e., pagan] accounts.” (70) Thus, “the category of the neighbour is not strictly necessary to explain what is objectionable about such advantage-taking” in untrue relations. (70) Yet, he therefore introduces a contradiction in his account of true (self-)love. It is this contradiction that I shall address in the remainder of my review. I shall show, consequently, that in not accounting truly for the history of love that he espouses, Lippitt contradicts himself and so risks the value (significance) of his own argument.
In Chapter 2, Lippitt discusses a number of key passages on friendship in Aristotle’s Ethics and he finds—lo!—Aristotle’s view does not introduce the neighbour as the middle term in and through which one recognizes that all relationships, universally, are special. Indeed, in a note on his discussion of pride as a virtue, Lippitt candidly and accurately describes Aristotle’s view: that a virtuous man is, and acts, superior to his inferiors. (n11, 182-3) However, Lippitt also indicates that Kierkegaard is unfair to the virtues of pagan (ancient) peoples, for there are, he writes, “nobler varieties of friendship that, even if not permeated by Christian neighbour love, can still reach greater heights than Kierkegaard tends to allow.” (33) Yet, Lippitt is thus caught in the snares of irremediable contradiction. For, if it is, as his argument aims to show, the love of neighbour that introduces, in the Hebrew Bible, the standard for our relationships, how is it that—without the neighbour—we are able to assess the ‘heights’ of the views of friendship in ancient (here, ancient Greek) works? With what does Lippitt measure the ‘greater heights’ of friendship in extra-biblical culture—if not the neighbour? Yet, he indicates to us that paganism is to be located outside of (without) Christian ‘neighbour-love.’ He then puts the contradiction in astonishing terms: “even if Christian neighbour-love does introduce as a new idea that we have a duty to love everyone, the idea that outside Christianity friendship contained ‘no moral task,’ and was not a matter of conscience, is certainly false.” (36) But he therefore obfuscates how he understands—and how his readers are to understand—the ideas of neighbour-love, morality, and conscience that he advances. For what is ‘conscience’ outside of the command, the duty, to love all people? What is neighbour-love outside of the moral command of conscience?
Lippitt argues that even if the pagan poet, whom Kierkegaard excludes from the vocation to love the neighbour as oneself, is set aside, surely, the “pagan thinker” recognizes this moral task in his relationships. (34) But who is the “pagan thinker”? It is not Aristotle, as he’s shown. It is not Seneca, for, as he then argues, the duty to love all bears no relation to the Stoic duty to do without friends: indeed, “The contrast [of Christian duty] with the likes of Seneca could hardly be starker.” (42) Is it Socrates? But, if so, Lippitt ignores Kierkegaard’s unfailing demonstration, from 1841 onward, that Socrates “did not know that the neighbor existed and that one should love him.”Footnote 2 (Lippitt does not address in his study, in comprehensive or systematic terms, the stark contrast that Kierkegaard draws between Christ, the god-man, and Socrates.) Lippitt claims to find the moral task of love in a conversation between Pythagorean friends and in Euripides’ reverence for adversity in friendship, as is evinced by a friends’ sacrifice of himself for another. Yet, to whom does he turn? He does not turn to the tragedies of Euripides or to the statements attributed, by ancient Greek philosophers, to Pythagoras. In defense of his claims, instead, he turns to the work of other scholars on ancient friendship who agree that pagan friendship is, at least, of ‘greater heights’ than Kierkegaard allows: i.e., he provides no evidence (from ancient texts) for his claims.Footnote 3 Also, Lippitt does not here address the self-sacrifice of ancient friends in and through the critical distinction that he sets out in later chapters between (improper) self-sacrifice and (proper) self-sacrifice.
In attending to the contradiction inherent in Lippitt’s argument, we see that, in an examination of love, there is no escape from history. In not raising the key questions of how we are to understand the relationship between the Bible and modernity, faith and reason, or the religious and the secular in and through Kierkegaard’s polemic, in defense of Christianity, against Christendom (as the rationalization of pagan virtues in Christian terms), Lippitt falls into contradiction in his treatment of pagan friendship and so threatens his insight into the love of neighbour as the account of proper self-love. As there is no self outside of (its) relationships, so too is there no relationship (no love) outside of history. There is no self outside of its history of relationships and, thus, its relationship to history. As the religious, truly, is not the otherworldly (or supernatural), so too is the secular not the worldly. Rather, the worldly describes the idolatry of Christendom. What counts, finally, as Lippitt acknowledges, is love as the recognition of the neighbour in, through, and as each and every person. What counts, finally, is not the distinction between the religious and the secular but the act of love that respects, and engages with, the history of others and so works to repeal the false self-love involved in our relations and therefore to rehabilitate the historical, and historically biblical, love of our lives.
