Introduction
Famously captured as a youth by the victorious army of Temür (Tamerlane) following the conquest of Damascus in 803/1401, the Syrian poet and biographer Aḥmad ibn ʿArabshāh (791–854/1389–1450) lived as a captive in Timurid Samarqand until the conqueror’s death and the conquest of the city by his son Shāhrukh in AH 812/AD 1409.Footnote 1 Ibn ʿArabshāh later travelled to different courts in Central Asia, including Khita (Cathay), Saray, and Crimea. After the Ottomans restored their lands in Asia Minor following Temür’s conquest and the subsequent ‘Ottoman interregnum’, a new sultanic court in Edirne formed around the Ottoman prince Meḥmed Çelebī (r. 816–824/1413–1421). Travelling to Edirne and securing a position as a translator and chancery stylist, Ibn ʿArabshāh—fluent in Persian, Turkic dialects, as well as the Uyghur script—stayed in Ottoman service for a decade before returning home to Syria in 824/1421 where he spent the duration of the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy (825–841/1422–1438). After seeking work as a notary and participating in local Sufi circles between 1421 and 1438, Ibn ʿArabshāh began making frequent trips to Cairo following the death of his local shaykh and benefactor ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Bukhārī in 841/1438. This moment also marked the death of Sultan Barsbāy and the ultimate consolidation of power by his successor, al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq (r. 841–857/1438–1453). As a new political order and social circles took shape in Cairo, Ibn ʿArabshāh ventured to publicise his recently completed literary biography of Temür (ʿAjāʾib al-maqdūr fī nawāʾib Tīmūr) while also beginning a new panegyric for Jaqmaq, the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir fī shiyam al-Malik al-Ẓāhir, to find a position in the court of the new sultan.Footnote 2
Late medieval historians and littérateurs were interested in the wider world, which involved looking not only at local social organisations among scholars and elites but also at regional power relations. Like all authors, Ibn ʿArabshāh was thoroughly entangled within the context of his texts. This article aims to arrive at a nuanced and multilayered assessment of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s didactic presentation of one particular group in his panegyrical text—the Türkmen (al-Tarākimah) tribal configurations that inhabited the loose fifteenth-century borderlands between the Syro-Egyptian ‘Mamluk’ Sultanate of Cairo and the lands of the Ottomans and Timurids.Footnote 3 In the text of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir, Ibn ʿArabshāh engages with the Türkmen not just as a peripheral tribal group but as a critical vehicle through which he explores the intricacies of power, sovereignty, and his relationship with Sultan Jaqmaq. The author’s treatment of the Türkmen is more than a narrative choice—it is a strategic element within the broader presentation of the sultan’s legitimacy and authority. This article thus also explores the instances within the text in which Ibn ʿArabshāh engages with the sultanate’s past and present connections to landscapes of power in the microregion of south-east Anatolia.
We can further contextualise the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir as part of a broader tradition of late medieval Arabic royal biography and panegyric. Such cultural productions of the court (referred to as so-called ‘literary offerings’ and sometimes dismissed as pseudo-historical) often blend historical material with geopolitical commentary. These works are believed to stem from an author’s desire to bolster sultanic legitimacy while also signalling chancery or literary expertise. From the earliest period of the Cairo Sultanate in the thirteenth century, the royal biographies of the chancery chief Ibn ʿAbd al-Ẓāhir (d. 692/1292) and his nephew Shāfiʿ ibn ʿAlī (d. 730/1330) blended historical narrative with poetry and literary praise.Footnote 4 The trend picked up again in the fifteenth century with the compositions of Ibn ʿArabshāh and perhaps more so of his contemporary Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-ʿAynī. Many of these texts included significant historical portions that were used to make political points by their authors. While a close comparison of these texts is beyond the scope of the current article, the analysis of other panegyrics of the period, particularly those by al-ʿAynī, might help situate Ibn ʿArabshāh’s interventions more clearly.
Al-ʿAynī’s al-Sayf al-muhannad fī taʾrīkh al-Malik al-Muʾayyad, a panegyric composed for Sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh (r. 815–824/1412–1421) reflects a familiarity with the Türkmen tribes, presenting Shaykh’s own understanding of the Türkmen of Aleppo and Anatolia as a means of reinforcing his claim to legitimacy.Footnote 5 Al-ʿAynī’s subsequent al-Rawḍ al-ẓāhir fī sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Ṭaṭar for the short-reigning sultan al-Ẓāhir Ṭaṭar (r. 824/1421) makes a similar claim of that sultan’s broad ethnographic knowledge of Arabs and non-Arabs (especially Turks and Türkmen) as a justification for his appointment to the sultanate.Footnote 6
However, it is the last of al-ʿAynī’s literary panegyrics, the Sīrat al-Sulṭān al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq, written in roughly the same political moment as the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir, that similarly employs narrative episodes (including revolts and the submission of the Türkmen) to elevate its subject.Footnote 7 That both al-ʿAynī and Ibn ʿArabshāh emphasise the revolt of Taghrī Birmish and connect it with broader questions of tribal politics and sultanic authority underscores the extent to which fifteenth-century Arabic royal biography served as a dynamic genre of political thought.
The text of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir, extant for our purposes as a presentation copy in the British Museum collection, is divided into two parts: the longer first part (83 manuscript folios) is a literary section divided into 13 unnumbered chapters devoted to the kingly qualities of the new sultan, such as knowledge, forbearance, generosity, and gratitude.Footnote 8 The unnumbered eighth and ninth chapters in particular serve the author as a platform to illustrate clearly the place of the new sultan in regional and historical hierarchies of the time: the [eighth] chapter on ‘On generosity, altruism, giving, bounty, and abundance’ (Faṣl fī al-Karam wa-l-īthār wa-l-badhl wa-l-jūd wa-l- sakhāʾ) (42a–54b) and the [ninth] chapter ‘On prudence, contemplation of consequences, and sound management’ (Faṣl fī al-Ḥazm wa-fikr al-ʿawāqib wa ḥusn al-tadbīr) (54b–61b). In these two chapters, interspersed between historical anecdotes and stories, the author offers political commentary on Syria, Egypt, and south-eastern Anatolia within a timeframe of nearly 60 lunar-years (786–844/1385–1440). He thereby discusses contemporary interregional players including the Ottomans, the Timurid ruler Shāhrukh, as well as the Aqquyunlu and Dulgadirid Türkmen vis-à-vis the sultan in Cairo. The second section of the text (36 manuscript folios) is a much shorter history of the first troubled year of Jaqmaq’s sultanate in 841–842/1438–1439, which included revolts led by amirs of the late Sultan Barsbāy in Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo. The latter Aleppan revolt contained a considerable Türkmen element under the amir Taghrī Birmish (himself of Türkmen stock), which will be contextualised below.Footnote 9
Framing his messages on kingship and Realpolitik within discourses of generosity and strategic considerations, Ibn ʿArabshāh presented a rhetorised historical account reconstructing difficult moments between regional powers such as the Dulgadirid and Aqquyunlu Türkmen dwelling on the northern Syrian–Anatolian frontier and the Syrian territories of the Sultanate of Cairo. Ibn ʿArabshāh evaluates the relationships and strategic behaviours of earlier sultans by going back a generation to the late eighth/fourteenth century to address constellations of power in the time of the sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq (r. 784–801/1382–1399, with interruption) that included the Jalayrid ruler Sulṭān Aḥmad in Iraq (784–813/1382–1410), the penultimate Artuqid ruler Sultan ʿĪsā of Mardin (778–809/1376–1407), the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (791–804/1389–1402), and Temür.Footnote 10 The presentation advises Jaqmaq in the present (circa 843/1440) to learn from Barqūq’s past mistakes vis-à-vis the Dulgadirids. Later the text revisits similar and more recent examples of the sultan Barsbāy’s failures against the Dulgadirids and Aqquyunlu Türkmen in 833/1436 when he confronted the latter at their regional capital of Āmid.
Ibn ʿArabshāh, invited to the Cairo citadel for a month as a scholar-in-residence at the request of Jaqmaq (or members of his entourage), addressed these issues anecdotally in his new panegyric composed in Rajab-Shaʿbān 843/December 1439–January 1440. In that time, Ibn ʿArabshāh participated in courtly activities in the citadel, built up a network of contacts in the city, and finalised his famous biography of Temür to enhance both his social prestige and cultural capital. As a free agent in need of a fixed salaried position (manṣib, pl. manāṣib), Ibn ʿArabshāh textually represented himself in these later works as a multilingual expert on most of the foreign rulers Jaqmaq and his entourage were communicating with as well as an experienced chancery scribe.Footnote 11
Ibn ʿArabshāh had penned much of his biography of Temür in Syria during the reign of Barsbāy who ruled from Cairo. In that period the bey of the Aqquyunlu Türkmen, Qara Yülük ʿUsmān (Qarā Yūluk ʿUthmān) (r. 805–839/1403–1435), had emerged as an important regional rival for Temür’s successor Shāhrukh against his Qaraqoyunlu Türkmen foes in eastern Iran and Azerbaijan. Because Barsbāy was engaged in a bitter rivalry of his own with Shāhrukh and his Aqquyunlu vassals, Ibn ʿArabshāh’s biography of Temür (mostly complete by 840/1437) thus focused heavily on the activities of Qara Yülük (who Barsbāy had gone to Āmid to confront in 833/1436) during the earlier time of Temür.Footnote 12 In the wake of Barsbāy’s death in 841/1438, Ibn ʿArabshāh’s interests turned instead to the emerging context of Jaqmaq’s new political order in Cairo, including the eastern Anatolian theatre in which Türkmen tribal configurations remained active.
Navigating tribal politics and strategy
By virtue of his early career experiences, Ibn ʿArabshāh proved familiar with the inner workings of Timurid rule and Ottoman state practices. In addition to his proficiency in Turkic dialects, he was well-equipped to offer strategic and cultural advice about the region. To complete his extended stays in Cairo, it was necessary for Ibn ʿArabshāh to commute from Damascus while his family remained in Syria. He thus had personal interests in the lands of Bilād al-Shām and likely desired stability for the region. His premodern biographers also claim he harboured dreams of returning to take up a position as a religious scholar in Syria, suggesting that he hoped for steadiness in Aleppo, Hims, and Ḥamā, all of which had large Türkmen contingents and local pastoral and sedentary communities with their own liaisons to the Türkmen (amir al-Turkuman). Ibn ʿArabshāh had often journeyed through Anatolia, on his way between Edirne and Damascus, and had contacts who lived among the citied populations. He journeyed extensively through the area and in the 830s/1430s travelled to interview resident scholars, veterans, and survivors of Temür’s rule for his biography.Footnote 13 From the text of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir, Ibn ʿArabshāh articulates a discernible and perilous trend of retaliatory campaigns launched by Cairo against the Türkmen, which invariably culminated in ambush and plunder. He aimed to safeguard Jaqmaq from repeating these destructive patterns in the future.Footnote 14
The historiographical part of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s text portrays Aleppo as highly unstable because of the wandering Türkmen nearby, implying that the sultan needed loyal friends in the area.Footnote 15 Ibn ʿArabshāh’s text also polishes the more recent image of the Dulgadirids as saviours of Aleppo after having supported Jaqmaq’s authority locally, perhaps to strengthen relational ties between them. The following discussion argues that Ibn ʿArabshāh’s presentation proves aware of the complex landscape and goings on of Türkmen tribal configurations in both the late fourteenth century as well as his own contemporary mid fifteenth century, and that he strategically employs the depiction of Türkmen actors to navigate and influence the political dynamics of Jaqmaq’s reign. Through a careful analysis of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s historical accounts, this article then demonstrates how the author mobilised his extensive knowledge of east Anatolia and his personal experiences within Timurid, Ottoman, and other courts to position himself as a valuable adviser on matters of regional strategy and diplomacy to serve in Cairo.
The Türkmen question and interregional geopolitical contexts
‘Türkmen’ (sometimes corrupted as ‘Turcoman’ in English or French) is likely an Iranian name for those ‘resembling the Turks’, though it also denotes a name given to Turkic tribal contingents of the Oghuz branch.Footnote 16 To accurately discuss the relations of Türkmen with the later fourteenth- and fifteenth-century sultanates of Islamic West Asia, it is necessary to first assess their role. Türkmen, for centuries, nomadised between the Caspian and Aral Seas to Lake Baikal. They were historically concerned with securing pastureland and exchanging livestock products for essentials that were difficult to produce such as pottery and weapons. They also frequently conducted raids and changed alliances. Various ruling powers recognised their strategic importance and often integrated them into their armies as auxiliary troops. In the Saljuq era, Türkmen and other Turkic tribes—with their military prowess—formed the backbone of the army. They were organised under tribal leaders and proved crucial in maintaining Saljuq military dominance. They were equipped and financially supported by the sultanate through tax assignments, allowing them to collect taxes from specific regions, a practice that later became normative. Despite recommendations for a multi-ethnic military to prevent any single group from dominating, the Turkic (particularly Türkmen) elements often held substantial influence within the army.Footnote 17
In the early fifteenth century, Temür’s campaigns through Anatolia and Syria devastated the Ottoman and Syro-Egyptian polities, which only began to reassert themselves as major powers in the mid 1410s. From the perspective of the fifteenth-century Cairo Sultanate, the eastern frontier was vulnerable to invasion and therefore in need of friendly allies.Footnote 18 The emergence of clans and tribes such as the Aqquyunlu, Qaraqoyunlu, and Dulgadirids was often spurred by continual conflicts between neighbouring groups.Footnote 19 Military capabilities, land usage, and interactions with surrounding powers had an impact on Türkmen engagements with the Ottomans and the sultans of Cairo. These can be viewed through a prism of historical precedents in which Türkmen military strategies and social dynamics figured into regional engagements.Footnote 20
Modern research has identified the successive reigns of the Cairo sultans Barsbāy (825–841/1422–1438) and Jaqmaq (841–857/1438–1453) as an extended period in which the institutional relationships between the court at Cairo and different local communities in Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, the Hijaz, and Cyprus were dramatically reconfigured.Footnote 21 One concern of the interrelated political orders established by these two rulers of the Syro-Egyptian Sultanate and their supporters in the second quarter of the fifteenth century was the tribal networks and configurations of nomadic and semi-nomadic Türkmen active in northern Syria and south-eastern Anatolia.Footnote 22 The ‘Türkmen question’ in south-eastern Anatolia was thus a preoccupation that confronted any new Cairo-based ruler between the late fourteenth to the early sixteenth centuries. It was necessary for political elites to consider which groups to maintain as allies. Because tribal networks and grazing lands may extend into their own spheres of influence, it was important to consider how best they might be incentivised to keep more powerful regional rivals such as the Ottomans or Timurids at bay. The question of who may serve as a trustworthy ally among the competing Türkmen clans remained a vital issue that several Egyptian and Syrian historians of the period shared their opinions on.
The area between the Anti-Taurus Mountains and the eastern Euphrates was composed largely of fortress cities, and territorial rights were often (re)negotiated by the sultans of Cairo and several Türkmen clans, tribes, and dynasties: the Aqquyunlu (based at their stronghold of Āmid as well as Mardin and Erzerum in Armenia and Diyarbakr), the Dulgadir (based in Elbistan), and the Ramadanid Türkmen (based in Adana). The contested fortress cities often included Tarsus, Adana, Marʿash, Derende, Elbistan, Malatya, Harput, and Urfa, many of which were crucial for upholding the protracted peace between the Cairo Sultanate and the Ottoman Sultanate. These influential tribal principalities preserved a measure of autonomy by skilfully navigating the political landscape and leveraging the competition between these two fifteenth-century sultanates. The precarious balance of power was maintained in part because neither sultanate invested the considerable resources necessary for direct control over these territories. Any attempts to impose such control risked inciting conflict. Shai Har-El has primarily framed the Cairo Sultanate’s relationship with the Türkmen as an imbalanced and pragmatic patron–client dynamic, while Malika Dekkiche has emphasised the necessity of viewing the Türkmen as an independent force, which was especially problematic for the Cairo Sultanate in the fifteenth century.Footnote 23 Barbara Kellner-Heinkele has argued that processes of sedentarisation allowed Türkmen groups to become better integrated into the Sultanate of Cairo.Footnote 24 Despite the mutual advantages of the relationship between the sultanate and Türkmen rulers (since the mid fourteenth century), however, as noted by Patrick Wing, this dynamic complicated the territorial cohesion of the sultanate by creating various types of simultaneously existing ‘frontier’ regions which caused the authority, influence, and reach of the sultan of Cairo to become multivalent.Footnote 25
The late historian David Morgan contended that Türkmen tribal groupings were depicted in Arabic historiographical sources in a manner that reflected a limited understanding by fifteenth-century historians. He argued that these groups evolved concurrently and in competition with one another, rather than in a simplistic or harmonious manner.Footnote 26 Like many of his fifteenth-century historian peers in Cairo, Ibn ʿArabshāh understood the Türkmen as potential agents of sultanic authority (those having entered ‘hearing and obedience’) as Türkmen al-ṭāʿa; the ‘obedient’ Türkmen who lived as semi-nomadic tribal formations in Syria and eastern Anatolia as a tax base and irregular auxiliary force for the sultan with whom their leaders occasionally enjoyed patronage ties.Footnote 27
This grouping was then juxtaposed against the plundering, marauding Türkmen troublemakers, or Türkmen al-baghā. This simplistic dichotomy fits neatly into Ibn ʿArabshāh’s larger discussions of good and evil that run through the text and are complemented by his vision of Jaqmaq as the symbol of all that was good and Temür as all that was bad. As a set of signifiers, al-ṭāʿa and al-baghā demonstrate a semantic field through which we can construct relations, map alliances, or configurations between different groups to understand internal and external balances of power in the context of the existing tensions between the Cairo Sultanate and the borderlands separating it from Ottoman territory often interpreted by modern scholars as a frontier or buffer zone. Directly ruling the region would have imposed significant costs on the Cairo Sultanate, and so it was more advantageous to install loyal Türkmen clients to govern the towns, subsequently seeking formal acknowledgement from Cairo after the fact. Many leading Türkmen beys might be recognised as amirs of ten or ṭablkhāna or receive an iqṭāʿ allotment or cash payment in return for sending sheep to Cairo. These were the characteristics of the Türkmen described by historical sources of the period, as loyal or obedient (al-ṭāʿa) to the sultan.Footnote 28
The role of Türkmen in the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir
To gauge the meaning attached to the Türkmen in Ibn ʿArabshāh’s work, it is important to consider the contexts in which they arise and to note that they do not appear in other chapters of the first part of the text. Kingly conduct with the Türkmen serves the text as prime examples, though the Türkmen appear alongside other stories of generosity and good planning, and only in those chapters. In other chapters of the text, exempla are drawn from the more distant past as Ibn ʿArabshāh builds his arguments on anecdotes concerning prophets, Iranian kings, caliphs, and medieval rulers such as Nūr al-Dīn Zenkī and Saladin. These examples are often selected from earlier works, including ʿAwfī’s Jawāmiʿ al-ḥikāyāt (Compendium of tales), al-Ṭurṭūshī’s Sirāj al-mulūk (Lamp of kings), and al-Qushayrī’s Risālah (Epistle [on Sufism]).
The author’s abrupt expositions about Türkmen suggest that Ibn ʿArabshāh had a clear message about these actors, and their appearance in the text links to ongoing discourses on generosity and strategic organisation. The Türkmen feature significantly in the author’s discussion of the avarice of earlier Cairo sultans and represent missed opportunities for cooperation. The mention of earlier incidents involving the Dulgadirids is linked to their contemporary role as heroes in the early reign of Jaqmaq described in the second historiographical portion of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir. In recommending generous behaviours to Jaqmaq, the sultan could thus increase the number of loyal Türkmen (al-ṭāʿa) to substantially reduce or eliminate the evil-doing Türkmen (al-baghā or al-bughā). Ibn ʿArabshāh’s capacity and readiness to delineate obedient collaborators and rebellious conspirators among Türkmen (and others) during the initial year of Jaqmaq’s sultanate reflects his self-perceived expertise on these events and the allegiances and strategies of political actors. This positioning underscores the significance he believes he and his text have, and the role he might play within the political order of Jaqmaq’s ‘state’ (dawla).
Meanings attached to Ibn ʿArabshāh’s portrayal of the Türkmen in relation to kingly virtues warrant further examination. The text singles out the Türkmen as long-standing adversaries of the sultanate with a contentious history dating back to the reign of Sultan Barqūq. This turbulent relationship persisted for nearly 50 years until the temporary relief achieved under Sultan Jaqmaq at the author’s time of writing. Although the Türkmen are discussed in conjunction with other actors and polities, they are given particular emphasis due to recent upheavals in Aleppo associated with the rebellion led by the Türkmen amir Taghrī Birmish and his followers against Jaqmaq in 841–842/1438–1439.Footnote 29 For Ibn ʿArabshāh, this focus underscores a critical issue: the appropriate level of political engagement that the sultan and his court in Cairo should maintain with Türkmen groups like the Dulgadirids.
The fifteenth-century Anatolian frontier
To better situate the text of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir alongside the author’s explanations and interventions, some analysis of the regional players is in order. The late fourteenth- and fifteenth-century situation in Anatolia often appears convoluted though reflective of a delicate power balance among Türkmen tribal groups caught between an array of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s former and current patrons: the Timurids, the Ottomans, and the sultans of Cairo. Ibn ʿArabshāh’s understanding of boundaries, polities, and regions as integrated spaces was closely linked to the moral and didactic purposes of his writing.Footnote 30
Azerbaijan and Anatolia, as key frontier zones of West Asia, exemplified a region characterised by fluidity and mobility, contrasting with the more static nature of settled societies. Türkmen groups such as the Dulgadirids and the Ramadanids, enjoying considerable autonomy on the peripheries, were likely reluctant to become formal vassals of Cairo. Their rulers were designated as nāʾibs or governors rather than as direct vassals—reflecting semi-independent status.
Unlike formal vassalage which involved an explicit oath of fealty and rigid obligations, being a nāʾib in this context allowed regional actors to retain de facto independence while acknowledging Cairo’s sovereignty in principle. This ambiguity seemed to suit the political needs of all parties while also suggesting broader patterns of negotiated sovereignty in the borderlands. The power vacuum in the Anti-Taurus Mountains and Cilicia, resulting from the decline of Saljuq and Armenian authority, meant that these regions were often controlled by tribal factions led by powerful leaders. The relationship between these Türkmen tribes and Cairo involved a combination of rewards and coercion.Footnote 31
Through much of the fifteenth century, these border areas were marked by political instability with shifting allegiances facilitated by a favourable geography and extensive networks of towns and routes. Instability in Anatolia, exacerbated by the earlier Mongol invasions, undermined Saljuq rule and contributed to volatility in the region. In response to unrest among the Türkmen, Cairo often employed strategies such as grooming alternative Dulgadir beys or offering asylum to rebels for expedient purposes. Loyalties and power structures were continually in flux, reflecting a landscape in which social and cultural boundaries were dynamically constructed through various power relations across Islamic West Asia.Footnote 32
The Aqquyunlu Türkmen
Amidst this shifting political landscape, one of the most prominent Türkmen groups to emerge was the Aqquyunlu, whose fortunes were shaped by the same fluid loyalties and strategic alliances that defined much of fifteenth-century Anatolia and beyond. Ibn ʿArabshāh composed the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir in Cairo during a period for the Aqquyunlu described by John Woods as a ‘time of troubles’ in which numerous claimants were engaged in civil war following the death of Qara Yülük, who himself had come to power after a succession struggle roiled his clan in 805/1403.Footnote 33 Early on, Qara Yülük had submitted to Temür and helped Timurid forces attack the Syrian territories of the Cairo Sultanate.
During his reign as sultan, al-Ashraf Barsbāy wrestled with the Aqquyunlu over territorial rights and made at least three campaigns against them before his death in 841/June 1438, including a disastrous campaign against Āmid in 833/1436. Barsbāy’s lack of success on the frontier between the Sultanate of Cairo and the Euphrates emboldened other Türkmen actors such as the Ramadan and Dulgadir. Indeed, Barsbāy’s successors were able to benefit from internal strife between the Aqquyunlu. In the wake of Qara Yülük’s death, no fewer than 11 claimants sought to reunite the greater tribe with support from various backers among the Timurids, Ottomans, the Sultanate of Cairo, and the Qaraqoyunlu Türkmen. According to Woods, the tensions began to die down in late 841/1438,Footnote 34 shortly before Jaqmaq came to power in Cairo. Ibn ʿArabshāh praises the Aqquyunlu amir ʿAlī Beg (‘the noblest son of Qara Yülük and the one closest to good’) for his swift appearance before Jaqmaq to pay homage with his sons and family members.Footnote 35 Ibn ʿArabshāh alludes to Barsbāy’s past difficulties with the Aqquyunlu but argues that new claimants of the family, by virtue of their decision to ally with Jaqmaq, had chosen the side of righteousness. To underscore Jaqmaq’s generosity, Ibn ʿArabshāh points out that he honoured visiting Türkmen with copious wealthFootnote 36 and provided ʿAlī Beg with money and supplies to perform the Hajj in late 842/early 843.Footnote 37
ʿAlī Beg was not the only potential Aqquyunlu client seeking patronage from Jaqmaq. The amir Jahangir, elder brother of the future ruler Uzun Ḥasan (r. 861–882/1457–1478), approached the Cairo Sultanate for support. Uninterested in repeating Barsbāy’s failures against the Türkmen, Jaqmaq proved reluctant to intervene. Although he acknowledged Jahangir as the governor of Ruha in 1439, he declined to support his military conflicts against his uncle Ḥamza, then the Aqquyunlu leader of Diyar Bakr. Aleppo felt economic disturbances immediately when the city fell to the Qaraqoyunlu. Aleppans feared their city would be overrun by Türkmen refugees and their pursuers, which also drove up the prices of animals in the city’s markets. With Jaqmaq’s refusal to provide substantial backing, Jahangir turned his attention to supporting Ḥamā’s rebel governor, prompting Jaqmaq to contemplate a punitive campaign against the Aqquyunlu. Ultimately, Jaqmaq directed Jahangir to confront his uncle in 842/1439 and instructed his Dulgadirid border guards to prevent Jahangir’s return should he flee from the Qaraqoyunlu. To demonstrate good faith, Jahangir tried to send his mother and son to Jaqmaq’s court, whom the sultan welcomed and honoured after an initial refusal.Footnote 38 During his brief citadel residency, Ibn ʿArabshāh was privy to a number of these Aqquyunlu and Dulgadirid embassies to Cairo to seek Jaqmaq’s favour as new sultan.
The Dulgadirid Türkmen
From the time of the establishment of their principality in 1337, the Dulgadirid Türkmen remained a factor in Syrian politics, through a delicate power balance with the nearby nā’ib of Aleppo. Dulgadirid forces often joined campaigns sent by the Cairo Sultanate against the Armenians and Mongols in Anatolia.Footnote 39 The sultanate and the Dulgadirids thus enjoyed symbiosis of a fragile nature. The sultans valued the buffer provided by Dulgadirid territory against regional rivals like the Ottomans and Timurids, while the Dulgadir beys benefited from the protection, legitimisation, and support offered by the sultan in Cairo.Footnote 40
Ibn ʿArabshāh’s text describes the south-eastern Anatolian terrain of the Dulgadirids and Aqquyunlu as logistically difficult for invading armies. At the start of his sultanate in 784/1382, Barqūq found himself at odds with the Dulgadirids after becoming embroiled in rivalries between competing branches of the family. Barqūq involved himself in several proxy assassinations which preceded a punitive expedition against the Dulgadir bey Sūlī (r. 788–800/1386–1398) in 787/1385–1386 as described by Ibn ʿArabshāh. Barqūq dispatched an army into the rugged terrain of the Anti-Taurus Mountains. The campaign encountered formidable resistance from entrenched and well-fortified Dulgadirid forces, leading to a devastating ambush where the sultan’s troops faced a barrage of arrows and catapult fire from mountainous heights. Barqūq’s army was plundered, stripped, and sent back to Syria in shame, making it impossible for the sultan to take revenge against the Türkmen.Footnote 41 Military engagements with Barqūq’s detachments eventually exhausted the Dulgadirid rulers, already weakened by ongoing regional conflicts.
For all his favourable qualities as a good ruler acknowledged by Ibn ʿArabshāh, Barqūq nevertheless experienced tactical difficulty exerting influence over the Dulgadir Türkmen and getting them to yield to directives from Cairo.Footnote 42 Having evoked the Dulgadirids, Ibn ʿArabshāh aligns their appearance closely with the chapter’s theme of generosity and altruism. Ibn ʿArabshāh’s narration of Barqūq’s struggles with Sūlī Bey aims to advise Jaqmaq in his own Dulgadirid policy.Footnote 43
Just as the moment in Jaqmaq’s early sultanate came on the heels of regional tension with the Aqquyunlu, the relationship with the Dulgadir beys had likewise been delicate ever since the late fourteenth-century Ottoman ruler Bayezid had complicated matters by offering patronage to Türkmen tribes in the region during his competition with Barqūq. With Bayezid’s help, Sūlī’s son Sadaqa was eliminated after a brief turn in power as Dulgadir bey and replaced with his cousin Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed (800–846/1398–1442), inaugurating a new chapter of Ottoman patronage for Dulgadir.Footnote 44
In the troubled reign of Barqūq’s son, al-Nāṣir Faraj (r. 801–815/1399–1412, with interruptions), Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed supported that sultan against Türkmen rebels and helped restore Aleppo to Cairo’s control. When Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed later rebelled against the Cairo Sultanate, Dulgadir territory in Marʿash and Elbistan were instead assigned to his brother ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn and his son Ḥamza.Footnote 45 At the outset of al-Muʾayyad Shaykh’s sultanate (r. 815–824/1412–1421), between 815–819/1412–1416, continuous warfare against neighbouring Türkmen polities further strained their resources. The Ottomans struggled with the Sultanate of Cairo over influence in the Qaraman principality, with its capital in Konya, which greatly upset the local equilibrium.Footnote 46 At this time, Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed grew ever closer to the Ottomans, supporting the new sultan Meḥmed I (r. 816–824/1413–1421) and sealing their alliance through marriage to his daughter Emine Hātūn. As a courtier and chief of the chancery in Ottoman Edirne at the time, Ibn ʿArabshāh may well have been aware of the relationship between the Ottoman sultan and the Dulgadir bey.Footnote 47 Feeling emboldened by the situation, the Türkmen began moving into the territory of the Cairo Sultanate and took Bihisni and Derende, which provoked an expedition led by Shaykh in 820/1417.
The turmoil that began in Muʾayyad Shaykh’s era appears to have culminated in 839/1435, when the Dulgadirids were entangled as adversaries in Sultan Barsbāy’s desperate hunt for his arch-rival the Circassian amir Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, who had fled Egypt and sought aid and assistance from the Aqquyunlu and Dulgadirid Türkmen tribal configurations and subsequently undermined the sultan’s rule throughout much of his later career.Footnote 48 Barsbāy had been initially favourable towards Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed, granting him control of Derende and Ayntāb. Barsbāy’s later troubles with the Aqquyunlu, however, put the Dulgadir bey in a difficult spot in between them. Hoping to retake Malatya from the Aqquyunlu, Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed joined the sultan’s campaign against the Aqquyunlu at Āmid to take Diyar Bakr in 833/1436. They became estranged, however, when Barsbāy instead favoured Nāṣir al-Dīn’s family rival Ḥamza, driving him to seek protection from the Ottoman sultan Murad II.Footnote 49 Alienated by Barsbāy, Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed harboured Jānibak al-Ṣūfī for a time and even married him to his daughter Nafīsa Hātūn. Later dangling his captive son-in-law before Barsbāy as a ruse, Nāṣir al-Dīn successfully made demands and collected payment from the Sultan of Cairo, only to ultimately renege and set Jānibak al-Ṣūfī free.Footnote 50 Later that year, Jānibak and Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed sought refuge and assistance from the Ottomans.Footnote 51
Barsbāy subsequently sent an army to punish the Dulgadir bey for his treachery which included Jaqmaq in the capacity of senior amir. As had been the case with the earlier army dispatched by Barqūq in the 780s/1380s, Barsbāy’s forces were lured into a dangerous mountain pass to risk their lives against well-prepared Dulgadir forces. According to the laudatory tones of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s panegyric, however, several rulers beyond the gravitational pull of the Sultanate (such as the Timurid ruler Shāhrukh) had already heard rumours about Jaqmaq’s excellence and chivalry and were excited by the prospects of his reign as an auspicious moment of prosperity. For Ibn ʿArabshāh, it had been the presence of Jaqmaq and the amir Arikmās in Barsbāy’s army that helped stay the hand of Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed Dulgadir despite encouragement from eager family members urging him to carry out a repeat of Sūlī Bey’s successful strategy against Barqūq.Footnote 52 Nāṣir al-Dīn vowed to spare the army only because of the presence of Jaqmaq (and the amir Arikmās), who according to Ibn ʿArabshāh, had risked his own reputation to protect the Dulgadir bey’s honour by speaking favourably of him at Barsbāy’s court. Word of the noble deed reached Nāṣir al-Dīn and according to the author, he sat in wait, hoping Jaqmaq would one day become sultan so that he could rush to Cairo and pay homage to the new sultan. For his part, Barsbāy abandoned his campaign without achieving its objective, and following Ibn ʿArabshāh’s presentation, ‘died whilst eating his hands in remorse’.Footnote 53
Mobilising vast resources and manpower, Barsbāy continued towards Aqquyunlu territory in Āmid on an ill-fated campaign against Qara Yülük ʿUsmān. The sultan had already wasted money and demoralised his fighters in trying to subdue Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed Dulgadir and arrived at Āmid in a bad state.Footnote 54 Although nominally forcing Qara Yülük to accept the sultan’s sovereignty, Barsbāy’s forces returned to Syria to hollow fanfare in abject failure. Echoing the perceptions and historical commentary of al-Maqrīzī’s Sulūk which he read in that author’s home,Footnote 55 Ibn ʿArabshāh alleges that Qara Yülük later said of Barsbāy that he was bad at administering affairs, narrow-minded, and foolishly sought to fight him as an enemy rather than purchasing his cooperation through gifts as an ally.Footnote 56 It is thus that for the author ‘everything that was planted by Jaqmaq ripened, blossomed, and bore fruit’ with the Türkmen in his own reign.Footnote 57
By all accounts, Barsbāy’s death improved relations between the Dulgadirids and the Cairo Sultanate.Footnote 58 During his stay in the Cairo citadel, Ibn ʿArabshāh alludes to a grand embassy of the Dulgadir Türkmen including Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed, who as reigning Dulgadir bey, ruled as ‘amir of the Türkmen and ruler of Elbistan, Kayseri (Qayṣariyya), and other cities and citadels’. Joined by his daughter Nafīsa (d. 853/1449), the widow of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī, the Dulgadir chief planned to seal an alliance with Jaqmaq by marrying his daughter to the sultan. By doing so, he may have been ‘hoping for an audience […] to don the necklace of hearing and obeying’, thereby becoming a formal vassal of CairoFootnote 59 and participating in the performance of an important act of reconciliation between Dulgadirid and Cairo Sultanate leadership badly damaged in the era of Barsbāy’s rule.Footnote 60 In the large wedding that followed on 25 Shawwāl 843/1440 shortly after Ibn ʿArabshāh’s departure, Jaqmaq paid a million dinars as dowry and handed over Harput, a former Dulgadir territory that had been in Aqquyunlu hands for nearly a decade.Footnote 61
The author implies that Jaqmaq, unlike many of his recent predecessors, was prolific in charity to local petitioners but also makes clear that ‘the world rejoiced in the east and west when Jaqmaq became sultan and every day he increased his generosity and goodness [and …] hemmed in the kings of the world with alms and gratitude’. For Ibn ʿArabshāh, many administrators and neighbouring kings who had chafed under mismanagement linked to Barsbāy’s political order, such as the Aqquyunlu, Dulgadirids, and Timurids, were now free to celebrate the accession of Jaqmaq, pay homage, and ‘kiss the ground before him and realise his just dawla’.Footnote 62
The Türkmen revolt of Aleppo (842/1439)
A key aspect of Ibn ʿArabshāh’s composition of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir is its emergence during a period in which Jaqmaq’s agents had recently quelled two major revolts in the key Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo. In Aleppo, a significant period of rebellion was presided over by the Türkmen amir Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad al-Bahasnī, known as Taghrī Birmish in late 842/1439.Footnote 63 Ibn ʿArabshāh’s discussion of the revolt maintains an important connection to previous examples of Türkmen relations mentioned in the earlier chapters of the text, though in many ways it was a unique case. Taghrī Birmish, rather than being a Türkmen bey or amīr al-tarākimah, had been a simple amir and nāʾib under Barsbāy. Having been appointed and ensconcing himself in Aleppo, Taghrī Birmish, on Barsbāy’s death, was able to organise resources and contact neighbouring Türkmen tribes willing to participate in his insurrection (ʿiṣyān). As these tribes continued to operate in and around the Syrian cities now under Jaqmaq’s authority, they represented a dangerous alliance of manpower willing to stand against the new sultan in Cairo.
Ibn ʿArabshāh imbued his discussion of Taghrī Birmish with significant meaning, framing him as one of several rebels against the early reign of Sultan Jaqmaq. This portrayal mirrors Barsbāy’s earlier struggle with the rebel amir Jānibak al-Ṣūfī. The legacy of this regional conflict, particularly the role of the Dulgadirid Türkmen, remained a crucial backdrop in Ibn ʿArabshāh’s writings in Cairo in late 843/1440, shortly before Jaqmaq’s marriage to the Dulgadirid princess—who was also the widow and umm walad of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī—en route to the citadel.Footnote 64
Ibn ʿArabshāh’s narrative of the Aleppo revolt is largely straightforward. Upon learning of Barsbāy’s death, despite a summons to forsake his position and report to Cairo, Taghrī Birmish had lingered with his mamlūks and supporters in Aleppo and tried to conquer the local citadel. To bolster his forces, he summoned nearby Türkmen, including his cousins, brothers, and other companions.Footnote 65 Taghrī Birmish’s Türkmen identity was of concern to contemporary historians and allegedly to Jaqmaq himself, who feared his kinsmen would pose a substantial threat to the sultan’s authority in northern Syria. Ibn ʿArabshāh interprets Taghrī Birmish’s rebellion as a uniquely ‘Türkmen’ insurrection, different and therefore perhaps more formidable than simultaneous revolts Jaqmaq faced also in Cairo and Damascus. He notes that while Taghrī Birmish had been an important amir under Barsbāy—having even played a part in hunting Jānibak al-Ṣūfī—he was nevertheless unpredictable, impious, and committed to his Türkmen style of rule.Footnote 66 Thus Jaqmaq ignored Taghrī Birmish’s letters promising loyalty and dispatched forces from Cairo under the amir Aqubughā al-Timrāzī to bring him to justice.Footnote 67
A substantial Türkmen following indeed threw in with Taghrī Birmish in Aleppo including the Türkmen leader Ibn Saqlsīz, who Ibn ʿArabshāh claims had been disastrously ignored by Barsbāy and Jaqmaq—affording him freedom to ‘leave obedience’ and ally with Taghrī Birmish.Footnote 68 After organising local Türkmen around Aleppo into a ‘group of troublemakers’, Taghrī Birmish travelled to Tripoli to secure booty to advance his schemes and was there joined by the beleaguered deputy of Tripoli who helped the Türkmen plunder the Levantine coast.Footnote 69 Relying on tropes of Türkmen evil-doers (al-baghā) as only knowing how to pillage, Ibn ʿArabshāh demonstrates a perception of Türkmen as wild, marauding pests.Footnote 70 The author’s narrative then returns with the swelled ranks of Taghrī Birmish’s Türkmen to Aleppo where they again laid siege and ‘spread havoc in the lands’.Footnote 71
To attract more Türkmen followers, Taghrī Birmish sent messengers, horses, and robes of honour to the Qaramanids and to Mūsā ibn Qarā, summoning their presence. According to our author, Mūsā’s agreement and participation threw the lands further into disarray, ending with even the coasts and mountains ravaged in what Ibn ʿArabshāh describes as ‘one of the ugliest fitnas ever’.Footnote 72
Aleppans rioted when they learned that Taghrī Birmish had invited Türkmen to pillage their city and attacked the leader and his men. Taghrī Birmish fled outside the city as the people of Aleppo seized his property and weapons, and robbed his followers and mamlūks. By the end of 842/1439, Taghrī Birmish returned to battle the city dwellers, capturing and mutilating many of them in revenge. The historian Ibn Taghrībirdī claims Taghrī Birmish outdid even Temür in his barbarity due to his ‘lack of religion, tyranny, and rage at the Aleppans’. Jaqmaq’s forces arrived shortly after and forced him to flee.Footnote 73
Ultimately, in Ibn ʿArabshāh’s account, a contingent of Dulgadir Türkmen came to the aid of Jaqmaq’s forces. The amir (and future bey) Sulaymān ibn Dulgadir (r. 846–858/1442–1454) (Jaqmaq’s new brother-in-law and heir apparent of the incumbent Dulgadir bey Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed), having learned about the events, through ‘guidance and good fortune from God’ elected to aid Jaqmaq, who had shown respect to his family.Footnote 74 There was an inherited enmity between the Dulgadirids and these so-called ‘Türkmen evil-doers’. Although the Dulgadirids—despite cooperating with the Ottomans—had never been rebellious, they were cautious towards the sultans of Cairo and were occasionally hesitant to visit them in Egypt, preferring to stay in their fortified mountainous hold-outs.Footnote 75
According to Ibn ʿArabshāh, Sulaymān Dulgadir wanted to repay the earlier gifts of the sultan and wished to do his part in helping to stabilise his authority. He prepared a Dulgadir contingent and summoned allies such as Shalmās ibn Kubal, Aḥmad ibn Būzjāh, ʿUthmān ibn Kunduz, and Yülük (Aylūk) ibn Ramaḍān and marched on Taghrī Birmish and his rebellious Türkmen and stood with the sultan’s army and deputies. Taghrī Birmish fled and headed for Ḥamā, wanting to join forces with another rebel amir, Īnāl al-Jakamī in Damascus, but the latter (perhaps himself weary of Türkmen) told him not to bother since they had nothing in common beyond opposition to Jaqmaq’s leadership in Cairo.Footnote 76
To evade capture, Taghrī Birmish attempted to hide among a group of Türkmen identified by the author as the Sāwajiyya clan. At that time, Sūdūn al-Nawrūzī was the leader of the Türkmen of Aleppo, alongside Birdībak al-ʿAjamī and Quṭuj al-Ẓāhirī. As al-Nawrūzī’s forces closed in on Ḥamā, Taghrī Birmish, pursued by the army, abandoned the fight in an effort to save himself. Ultimately, he was forced to surrender, taken back to Aleppo and executed shortly thereafter.Footnote 77
Ibn ʿArabshāh foreshadows this same story earlier in the text in his chapter on contemplating consequences, when he introduces the army sent by Jaqmaq to deal with Taghrī Birmish. After the defeat of the latter, the army, including the amir Khushkaldī al-Dawādār and other ‘obedient Türkmen’ associated with the amir Yülük ibn Ramaḍān (ruler of Adana and Misis (Mopsuestia)), headed for Aleppo in 843/1440. Despite the defeat of Taghrī Birmish, his erstwhile ally Mūsā ibn Qarā continued resisting Jaqmaq and ravaged the lands until the amir Khushkaldī led forces towards him.Footnote 78 They invited ‘Türkmen evil-doers’ to join them but were ultimately lured into narrow mountain passes and rough terrain and—according to the author—failed to envision an exit strategy. Revisiting once more the ‘wily Türkmen’ trope in the text, Ibn Qarā, prepared, was ready for them when they got to Bāb al-Malik (a notoriously narrow mountain pass of southern Anatolia, close to the Mediterranean), and the Türkmen ambushed them from atop the mountains with stones and slings, killing, plundering, and setting any survivors to flight.Footnote 79
Ibn ʿArabshāh ties this most recent report back as a counterpart to the story of Barqūq’s late fourteenth-century army that suffered the same fate against Sūlī Bey ibn Dulgadir’s ambush in the tight passes some five decades earlier in 785/1384. Barqūq’s men, too, had not considered the consequences of following the Türkmen into dangerous mountain ravines. Ibn ʿArabshāh also points out the similarities of what happened at SarāyāFootnote 80 when Christian fighters in Rūm lured the Ottomans into valleys and tight paths, few of them ultimately surviving the ambush.Footnote 81
In his didactic recreations of regional power relations, Ibn ʿArabshāh underscored past narratives of treachery as well as the potential utility of Türkmen tribes, particularly the Dulgadirids, and used the historical record to enhance presentist concerns about Jaqmaq’s delicate situation in Aleppo during and shortly after the revolt of Taghrī Birmish. In writing from the perspective in which past situations with Türkmen rulers were presented as not handled with kingly aplomb befitting the lofty station of the sultan in Cairo, Ibn ʿArabshāh endeavoured to attach meaning to the past of simultaneous value to the present. Ibn ʿArabshāh’s allusions to the troubled past with Jānibak al-Ṣūfī were also no doubt carefully loaded reminders for Jaqmaq’s entourage. It is significant that Ibn ʿArabshāh’s narrative of the Aleppan revolt of 841–842/1438 casts the Dulgadirids as heroes and allies, at a moment when they were arriving in Cairo as honoured emissaries and wedding guests of Jaqmaq—a belated act of closure meant to foreground their alliance by finally laying to rest the ghosts of Barsbāy’s era, namely Jānibak al-Ṣūfī and the lingering legacy of the disastrous Āmid campaign.Footnote 82 In line with a dichotomy of good and bad that runs through the entire text, Ibn ʿArabshāh takes a decidedly pro-Dulgadirid stance—placing them among the best and most righteous rulers of the region.
Conclusions
The fifteenth-century Anatolian frontier remained a critical zone that set forth two intertwined visions of order: the internal order of the Cairo Sultanate itself alongside the broader geopolitical order it engaged with. Although the Dulgadirids, Aqquyunlu, and Qaraqoyunlu were comparatively minor players, their presence nevertheless had ramifications for geopolitical strategy. This subtle influence resonated with historians of the period such as Ibn ʿArabshāh, who addressed both concepts of order in his texts.
A crucial element of the context remains Ibn ʿArabshāh’s composition of a panegyric for Jaqmaq’s court amidst a flurry of incoming and outgoing embassies to Cairo from the Timurids, Ottomans, Dulgadirids, and Aqquyunlu, as Sultan Jaqmaq wed Ottoman and Dulgadirid princesses intended to forge new alignments.Footnote 83 It is possible to speculate that Ibn ʿArabshāh—by virtue of his brief stay in the citadel—may have been privy to discussions about regional politics and the contents of exchanged letters. The question remains: what lessons about the Türkmen was Ibn ʿArabshāh trying to impart on Jaqmaq and his entourage? Throughout Ibn ʿArabshāh’s text, there are allusions to the difficult state of relations between the Cairo Sultanate and the Türkmen tribal groupings of the south-eastern Anatolian borderlands. In light of Jaqmaq’s reparations to relations damaged by the reign of Barsbāy with the Timurids, Dulgadirids, Ottomans, and Aqquyunlu, Ibn ʿArabshāh, in his fixation on a precise historical moment, sensed the zeitgeist as one ripe with hope for regional stability, especially since he had lived through Temür’s painful assault on Syria, Barsbāy’s disastrous Āmid campaign, and most recently, the revolts against Jaqmaq in Damascus, Aleppo, and Cairo.
Although he gives pride of place to the Cairo Sultanate as the pinnacle of rulership and sovereignty among its peers in the region, Ibn ʿArabshāh nevertheless levels charges of corruption and greed against Jaqmaq’s predecessors vis-à-vis their relations with neighbours. The author of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir claims that Jaqmaq only sought wealth for its practical purposes: reaching settlements with foes, keeping them imprisoned, or overpowering them through coercive violence. Ibn ʿArabshāh juxtaposes Jaqmaq against Barsbāy, whose costly campaign against the Aqquyunlu in 833/1436 had been, according to the author, spurred largely by that sultan’s vain inability to withstand the gloating claims of the Aqquyunlu bey Qara Yülük ʿUsmān. According to Ibn ʿArabshāh—again, closely following the tone of al-Maqrīzī’s Sulūk chronicle—if Barsbāy had invested wisely by courting Qara Yülük, winning his allegiance through gifts and ‘sewing grains of charity […] to bring him into the trap of love and obedience’, he would have more prudently and effectively spent his money.Footnote 84
Ibn ʿArabshāh produced the rhetorised narratives of this text at a teachable moment for Jaqmaq. For the author, Jaqmaq stood as a fresh sultan who had been cultured by the ʿulamāʾ, and who appeared on the cusp of setting right the wrongs of the recent past particularly in his relationships with a slew of regional players. Despite making far-reaching claims for Jaqmaq as the sultan and king of the Turks, Arabs, Persians, and Daylams, Ibn ʿArabshāh favours the local—Cairo and the cities of Bilād al-Shām—but also extends his focus to the wider regional power structures that focus on a West Asian political space, though one with a decidedly limited purview of rulers and territory. This represents his spatial expertise and forms the landscape for what he has to offer. He calls out Anatolia broadly as ‘al-Thaghr al-Rūm’ and the lands under Shāhrukh’s control, thereby providing contemporary context, signalling political and military rivalries, and reinforcing the narrative of Jaqmaq’s authority within the broader geopolitical framework. Ibn ʿArabshāh’s engagement with the past political orders of the Cairo Sultanate and the Türkmen principalities were thus part of a ‘shared imagination of the hierarchies of power’ which contributed to a collective understanding of how the wider Muslim world was organised as well as Ibn ʿArabshāh’s closer surroundings.Footnote 85 The use of ‘frontier’ and the mention of powerful regional figures like Shāhrukh and the Ottomans highlight the contested nature of Jaqmaq’s sovereignty and the larger dynamics at play in mid fifteenth-century western Asia.
Nevertheless, Ibn ʿArabshāh oversimplified messy issues into black or white problems. The text of the Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir overlooks other pressing issues driving regional politics such as the intense competition over Kayseri by the Ramadanids, Qaramanids, and Dulgadirids. For the author, prosperity appears attainable on the micro level through the maintenance of good ties with the Dulgadirs as Jaqmaq’s first line of defence in Syria, followed by the Ottomans with the friendly Murad II, and the more unpredictable Aqquyunlu, Qaramanids, Ramadanids, and more distant Timurids under Shāhrukh’s rulership.Footnote 86
In his endeavours to instrumentalise regional expertise, past experiences, and acquired knowledge in Cairo, Ibn ʿArabshāh communicated layers of meaning in his historical narrative which includes strategy and how to deal with Türkmen groups. The text as a whole seeks to disclose wisdom to the new sultan Jaqmaq and his entourage, encouraging the spending of money to establish ties of love with allies and to avoid chasing enemies into narrow mountain passes. The author mobilises the sultanate’s history with the Dulgadirids and Aqquyunlu to give meaning to what happened the previous year (842/1438) and that which he wished to avoid in the future. Ibn ʿArabshāh aims to warn Jaqmaq and his entourage not to fall victim to another Türkmen ambush like Barqūq or get drawn into a regional conflict like Barsbāy, or the more recent amir Khushkaldī, or even the Ottomans, who all—in failing to contemplate consequences or plan suitable exit strategies—were bested by Türkmen contingents aided by terrestrial knowledge and a home-field advantage. Our author also warns Jaqmaq not to succumb to the same greedy practices of his predecessors in Cairo that led to protracted and avoidable wars.
Again drawing on the blameworthy examples of Barqūq and Barsbāy, Ibn ʿArabshāh warns Jaqmaq not to alienate the Dulgadirids. By maintaining good relations with the loyal Türkmen who had now helped him quell revolts to his authority, Jaqmaq could maintain peaceful relations and regional dominance. Given the timing of the writing shortly after Jaqmaq’s marriage to a Dulgadirid princess, Ibn ʿArabshāh may well have been subtly celebrating the reconciliation of the Cairo Sultanate and the Dulgadir Türkmen after the more antagonistic reign of Barsbāy. In some ways, the early years of Jaqmaq’s reign resemble a rapprochement among West Asian Muslim rulers, which, for Ibn ʿArabshāh, were the perfect conditions for the Sultan of Cairo to assume his rightful and proper place as foremost Muslim sovereign and ideal king—a repairer of relations disturbed regionally for decades by Temür and more locally by Barsbāy.
Finally, in light of Jaqmaq’s reparations to damaged relations, Ibn ʿArabshāh’s use of the troubled 60-year relationship with Türkmen, particularly the Dulgadirids, who now stood to be close allies of Jaqmaq, was a way to endow the current situation—which involved resolving uneasiness among Türkmen groups in Syria—with symbolic meaning in the context of his discourses on good and evil, the rulers and the ruled, sultanic generosity, and the ruler’s strategic contemplation of consequential outcomes. In serving as a sophisticated treatise on kingship and strategic governance, Ibn ʿArabshāh’s text transcends mere panegyric. By presenting the Türkmen tribes not just as historical actors but as pivotal elements that required strategic consideration, Ibn ʿArabshāh’s text provides a deeply interconnected view of the Sultanate of Cairo with its surrounding powers.
The author’s depiction of the Türkmen and their interactions with the sultanate underscores that these tribal configurations were central to the political stability of the region. This perspective thus allows us to challenge traditional views of the sultanate as an isolated polity and draws attention instead to connections of significance it had with the Islamic east.
To be sure, Ibn ʿArabshāh’s Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir transcends simple praise for its subject—rather it presents thoughtful advice on frontier governance and how to repair fractured relationships of the past, and reimagines the role of the Sultan of Cairo in managing a volatile West Asian landscape. Ibn ʿArabshāh, by virtue of centring his discussion on the Dulgadirids, the Aqquyunlu, and the borderlands that linked Syria with south-eastern Anatolia, reframes the region as a fluid political space in which Sultan Jaqmaq, as an enlightened ruler, might meaningfully enact his forbearance and informed strategy. The Taʾlīf al-ṭāhir thus participates in discursive efforts to imagine the Sultanate of Cairo and its functionaries as active players in the wider geopolitical context. In this sense, the present study contributes to the momentum of recent scholarship on the interconnected and (trans-)regional context of the ninth/fifteenth-century sultanate.Footnote 87
Ultimately, the period discussed in this article represents a fleeting moment of stability marked by Jaqmaq’s rapprochement with the Dulgadirid Türkmen. This interlude—reinforced as it was through marriage alliances and embassy exchanges—proved short-lived. Later tensions gave way to conflicts involving the Dulgadir bey Shāh Sūwār (Şehsuvar, d. 877/1472) and the Aqquyunlu ruler Uzun Ḥasan (d, 882/1478) in subsequent years. In the long term, these tensions contributed to a political milieu that brought about the ultimate absorption of Dulgadir territory as well as the Cairo Sultanate itself into the lands of the Ottoman empire in the early decades of the sixteenth century.
Acknowledgements
This article began in the context of the project ‘The Mamlukisation of the Mamluk Sultanate II: Historiography, Political Order and State Formation in Fifteenth-Century Egypt and Syria’ (Ghent University, 2017–2021) directed by Jo Van Steenbergen and funded by the European Research Council (Consolidator Grant agreement #681510). An earlier version was presented at the MMS-II workshop ‘Fifteenth-Century Arabic Historiography: Textual Themes, Didactic Purposes and Processes of Meaning Making’ in December 2020. I would like to thank all the participants in the workshop for their comments, with special thanks to Christopher Markiewicz, Daniel Mahoney, Evrim Binbaş, Jo Van Steenbergen, Kenneth Goudie, Rihab Ben Othmen, and Zacharie Mochtari de Pierrepont. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their feedback. The remaining faults are my own.
Conflicts of interest
None.
