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THE CYNICS AS PERSONS OF LEISURE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 September 2026

Masaki Nagao
Masaki Nagao*
Affiliation:
University of Tokyo, Japan
*
masaki.nagao98@gmail.com
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Abstract

The Cynics, especially Diogenes of Sinope, reportedly enjoyed ‘leisure’ (σχολή) even as they recommended toilsome ‘training’ (ἄσκησις). This paper aims to show that these seemingly opposite motifs are, in fact, closely interrelated, and that ‘leisure’ has implications for the whole scheme of Cynicism that have previously been overlooked. We can understand the connection between these motifs in two ways: first, what drives one to engage in unceasing labour is excessive desire, from which Cynic training frees one, bringing about leisure; second, Cynic leisure is always open to the outside world; it functions as a provocative performance that can, albeit occasionally, urge potential Cynics towards training.

Keywords

CynicismDiogenes of Sinopeleisuretraininghappinessperformance

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Type
Research Article
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Greece & Rome , Volume 73 , Issue 2 , October 2026 , pp. 345 - 363
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
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© The Author(s), 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

1. Introduction

‘It is said that when Alexander was far from enjoying any leisure, he met Diogenes, who had a great deal of leisure’.Footnote 1 Thus opens the Fourth Oration of Dio Chrysostom, a leading writer of the so-called Second Sophistic (SSR 5b.582).Footnote 2 It describes Diogenes the Cynic (late fifth century bc–c. 323 bc) as someone with a ‘great deal of leisure’ (πολλὴν ἄγοντι σχολήν), in contrast to the extremely busy Alexander the Great. In other classical sources, too, the Cynics are often associated with leisure or idleness.Footnote 3

On the other hand, we also know that the Cynics enthusiastically encouraged ἄσκησις (‘training’) and πόνος (‘toil’). This would appear to be at odds with Diogenes’ image as a man of leisure. Indeed, the concepts of ‘training’ and ‘toil’ could even be said to be the opposite of ‘leisure’.Footnote 4

In this paper, I will show that in fact the ‘discrepancy’ between the two is nothing of the sort; they have a close connection, intermediated by a broad orientation towards ‘happiness’. Clarifying this connection will offer a vital clue to help us understand the elusive essence of Cynicism.

To the best of my knowledge, very few studies have previously thematized Cynic ‘leisure’.Footnote 5 This is likely because ‘leisure’ is both static and unostentatious. Among the extant literature relating to the Cynics, which tends to focus on concrete words and actions, descriptions of ‘leisure’ are naturally prone to omission; when we do find references, they are usually quite brief. However, I believe that this overlooked (or, more precisely, taken-for-granted) motif occupies a central position within the overall scheme of Cynicism. Another aim of this paper is to provide some support for this belief.

The discussion proceeds as follows: in the first two sections, I will outline the Cynics’ conceptions of ‘leisure’ or ‘idleness’, on the one hand, and ‘training’ or ‘toil’ on the other. The following two sections will show how these two seemingly opposing motifs are united under a broad concern for ‘happiness’: toilsome training can be understood as a decisive precondition for the Cynics’ leisured happiness, while their leisure also provokes potential comrades to go into training.

Before the main discussion, I should note my general treatment of sources. First, this paper aims to look at all the materials relating to the Cynics, including later documents; it will clarify the implications of prominent motifs in this corpus and the relationships between them. Olimar Flores-Júnior has recently shown that the later texts – such as Dio Chrysostom’s orations, pseudo-Lucian’s The Cynic, and the epistles attributed to particular Cynics – consistently express the core spirit of Cynicism.Footnote 6 Of course, our sources vary in their tone, motive, and exactitude. However, despite such diversity, ‘a line of continuity’ undeniably permeates the whole corpus, enabling us to discuss the Cynic tradition as an organic unity.Footnote 7 An arbitrary selection of testimonies would obscure this point, and might lead to hasty generalizations from individual cases, or the omission of important motifs. Therefore, I will not exclude any specific document because of its period or genre.

Second, when they are available, I will also make an effort to cite materials that can be dated to the third century bc or earlier. These earliest sources, substantially contemporaneous with the early Cynics, either come from works written by the Cynics themselves or record direct reactions to their words and deeds.Footnote 8 Although we should avoid overestimating their historicity, there is little doubt that these reactions reflect a certain ‘objective truth’ about Cynicism.Footnote 9 My aim is thus to show that the seemingly ‘unreliable’ documents of later generations are, in many cases, legitimate heirs to such immediate responses, or to the writings of the Cynics themselves.

Of course, I will prioritize the first principle and use the second only as an auxiliary, since reconstructing historical Cynicism is not my primary concern. As is often noted, we cannot separate Cynicism from its reception.Footnote 10 However, there is still room to consider the history of this reception, which is precisely the field of the second principle.

2. Leisure and idleness

Cynic philosophers are often associated with ‘leisure’ or ‘idleness’. Xenophon’s Symposium portrays Antisthenes of Athens, the doxographical master of Diogenes,Footnote 11 as someone proud of his ‘leisure’ (σχολή), which was linked to a simple yet contented lifestyle (4.44 = SSR 5a.82). Crates of Thebes, Diogenes’ most celebrated disciple, reportedly threw away his own wealth to acquire ‘leisure’ (Plut. Mor. 87a = SSR 5b.14; cf. SSR 5h.4–13).

However, the most illustrious ‘person of leisure’ in the Cynic tradition was undoubtedly Diogenes of Sinope. The Vienna Papyrus Gr. 29946, which is estimated to have been written between the third century bc and the middle of the second century bc, Footnote 12 uses the striking phrase ‘freedom from work’ (αἱ ἀπαλ[λ]αγ[αὶ] ἔ[ρ]γου) in an anecdote about Diogenes (col. V 8a = SSR 5b.143). According to an apophthegm recounted by Plutarch, Diogenes asked a host who was busy preparing for a feast: ‘Is it not the case that an excellent man holds a feast [ἑορτή] every day?’ (Mor. 477c = SSR 5b.464). This motif of ‘life as a feast’ is also attributed to Crates: Plutarch says that he ‘spent his life as if it were a feast, laughing and playing around’ (Mor. 466e = SSR 5h.46). For both men, life was but an eternal festival that was always and already being held, without the need for any special preparation.Footnote 13 Maximus of Tyre, an eminent rhetorician of the second century ad, wrote of Diogenes:

He never feared the tyrant, nor submitted to the force of laws, nor was swamped by state affairs, nor was stifled by child-rearing, nor was confined by marriage, nor was bound by farming, nor was troubled by military service, nor was dragged around by trade, but instead he made fun of all such people and their occupations. (36.5 = SSR 5b.299)

In this passage, Maximus portrays Cynic freedom through accumulating negatives: by refusing to perform the duties that society conventionally imposes on its members, Diogenes becomes a man of leisure.Footnote 14

Probably the most crucial point when thinking about Cynics’ leisure is that they consider their life ‘easy’ (ῥᾴδιος) and ‘simple’ (λιτός, ϵὐτϵλής). These adjectives are used surprisingly often in the sources on the Cynics. For example, Metrodorus of Lampsacus, an Epicurean philosopher active in the early third century bc, writes that the Cynics allegedly chose the ‘lightest and easiest’ (κουφοτάτην καὶ ῥά[ι]σ̣[τη]ν) ‘way of life’ (PHerc. 1424 col. 12.30–2 = SSR 5b.509). Similarly, according to Teles, a pro-Cynic writer of the third century bc, Diogenes and his disciple Crates ‘lived an easy life’ (ῥᾳδίως διϵξήγαγον) because each ‘became a beggar who had renounced vanity, and was able to live a simple and frugal [ϵὐτϵλϵῖ καὶ λιτῇ] life’ (fr. 2.14 = SSR 5b.245).Footnote 15 The following poem, attributed to Crates himself, substantiates these testimonies:

Muses of Pieria, listen to me, a supplicant.
Give me constant food for my belly, which is always free from servitude
And has made my life simple [λιτὸν ἔθηκϵ βίον].
…
I do not desire to gather glorious goods,
Nor do I seek the wealth of dung beetles or the rich store of ants.
Rather, I desire to share in justice and to gather that wealth
Which is manageable, easy to acquire [ϵὔφορον, ϵὔκτητον], and honourable in terms of virtue.Footnote 16 (fr. 359 = SSR 5h.84)Footnote 17

Here, Crates explicitly describes his life and possessions as ‘simple’ or ‘easy’. He even composed a hymn dedicated to Euteleia, the goddess of frugality (fr. 361 = SSR 5h.77).

We can understand the ease or simplicity of the Cynic way of life as a direct reflection of the natural ease or simplicity of human life in general.Footnote 18 According to a widely-quoted apophthegm, Diogenes repeatedly insistedFootnote 19 that ‘human life is given to us by the gods as something easy [ῥᾴδιον]’ (Diog. Laert. 6.44 = SSR 5b.322).Footnote 20 According to the pseudo-Diogenes, ‘the earth produces many things, and they nourish us against hunger and cold’ ([Ep.] 36.6 = SSR 5b.566).Footnote 21 In his own poem, Crates advocates: ‘Gather shells and beans together […]; then you could easily [ῥηϊδίως] wear the crown of victory over poverty’ (fr. 354 = SSR 5h.73).

By contrast, the lives of ordinary people – then and now – are beset by various hardships, first and foremost because they have lost sight of the blessings nature has bestowed upon them. However, their situation can be even more miserable because they make their own lives unnecessarily burdensome by endlessly creating new and useless tasks for themselves, such as war, trade, accumulating wealth, marriage, child-rearing, politics, and scientific study.Footnote 22 This is the second cause of their distress. The direct motive that drives people to unnecessary toil is often their bloated desires and passions.Footnote 23 However, strictly speaking, its roots are in the false belief that something futile is worthwhile, along with the customs that reinforce (and are reinforced by) such beliefs.Footnote 24

This reconstruction enables us to clarify the ideas surrounding Cynic leisure. For the Cynics, human life is always given to us as something easy. However, most people forget this and pursue their desires to excess, making their lives pointlessly harsh and difficult to manage. As a result, whereas ordinary people must busy themselves with vast workloads day after day, the Cynic ‘sages’ can enjoy the leisurely life that is natural for human beings.

3. Training and toil

Let us now examine the Cynic concept of ἄσκησις (‘training’), which connects quite intuitively with πόνος (‘toil’) but rather less so with σχολή (‘leisure’).

According to a doxographical testimony, the Cynics encouraged ‘double training’ (διττὴ ἄσκησις); its basis was a collaboration between the body and the mind (Diog. Laert. 6.70 = SSR 5b.291).Footnote 25 This implies criticism of athletes who are only concerned with physical exercise; of sophists (or their disciples), preoccupied with developing their intellectual techniques; and of non-Cynic philosophers, devoted to mental work and to polishing their theories.Footnote 26 In the eyes of the Cynics, the ‘training’ such people engage in lacks proper guidance by reason, practical efficacy in life, or both, so they fail to reach their ultimate goal of happiness or a good life. The Cynics therefore emphasized collaboration between the body and mind in training or, from another angle, the complementary roles of practice and the will. Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé summarizes the Cynic concept of ‘training’ as follows:

Knowing that one must be indifferent to the blows of Fortune or Destiny is absolutely not enough to be really so. If such knowledge is not supported by voluntary and rigorous training to confront the toil, it remains a dead letter, incapable of producing a moral act on its own… In this way, training plays the role of an indispensable auxiliary of reason, ensuring its practical effectiveness; it also appears to be the very condition of virtue in action.Footnote 27

This passage accurately identifies the essence of Cynic training and also invokes another concept: toil. Although some have misunderstood their intention,Footnote 28 the Cynics tended to consider toil itself as a foe to battle and an evil to avoid.Footnote 29 In training, however, a Cynic willingly engages in toil precisely in order to become inured and acquire immunity to it. Pseudo-Crates expresses this point most vividly: ‘Whether toil is something to be chosen or to be avoided, you should toil lest you toil’ ([Ep.] 6 = SSR 5h.91). In this paradoxical instruction, we can glimpse the Cynic idea that training is a preventative practice of voluntarily taking on toil to resist toil itself.

Let us briefly examine the details of Cynic training. First, to align the body with the demands of the mind, the Cynics would acclimatize themselves to extreme heat and coldFootnote 30 or subsist on the bare minimum of food, clothing, and shelter.Footnote 31 Their training was not merely a passive practice of enduring toil; it was also an active practice of re-training their own desires, and their opinions about what they truly desired, so that they ceased to experience ‘toil’ as toilsome – and occasionally even received it as gratifying. According to the startling report of Diogenes Laertius, ‘even contempt for pleasure itself, if one is trained in advance, becomes extremely pleasant’ (6.71 = SSR 5b.291). For Diogenes, according to Dio Chrysostom, even hunger and thirst were transformed into sources of pleasure:

He used hunger and thirst before every meal and thought that this was the most complete and stimulating accompaniment. For this reason, when he was given [cheap] barley bread, he ate it more happily than others did when they were given the most luxurious meals, and when he drank flowing water, he did so more happily than others did when they drank [expensive] wine made in Thasos.Footnote 32 (Or. 6.12 = SSR 5b.583)

As another form of training, the Cynics also exposed themselves to shame and rejection to actualize their ideals of ἀπάθϵια (‘freedom from passions’) and ἀτυφία (‘freedom from delusions’)Footnote 33 in a lived reality.Footnote 34 How can we reconcile these harsh practices with the Cynic leisure observed in the previous section?

4. How happiness connects leisure and training

In this section, I will show that we can understand the two seemingly incompatible concepts considered above – on the one hand, toilsome training, and on the other, effortless leisure – consistently within the broader scheme of seeking happiness (ϵὐδαιμονία, τὸ ϵὖ ζῆν).Footnote 35

The key is the motif of a ‘shortcut’ (σύντομος ὁδός). The Cynics called their own philosophy a ‘shortcut’, in contrast to the ‘long road’ followed by other schools or ordinary people.Footnote 36 Depending on the sources, the Cynics’ destinationFootnote 37 is either ‘virtue’ (ἀρϵτή)Footnote 38 or ‘happiness’,Footnote 39 but in any case, the ultimate goal is the latter.Footnote 40 The Cynic shortcut does not imply ease; it must be understood as a steep and arduous path, despite being short and direct. For example, pseudo-Diogenes contrasts the ‘steep and burdensome’ ‘shortcut’ with the ‘gentle and easy’ ‘long road’, explicitly linking the former to Cynic ‘training’ (Diog. [Ep.] 30.1–3 = SSR 5b.560). Other testimonies, too, often present training as a means to cultivate virtueFootnote 41 and ultimately to seek happiness,Footnote 42 not as an end in itself.Footnote 43 Therefore, it seems natural to regard the steepness of the Cynics’ shortcut as a reference primarily to their toilsome training.

Once one has reached the end of the strenuous shortcut, however, the scenery changes drastically. For example, Themistius, an orator active in the fourth century ad, vividly depicts the ‘road’ the Cynics trod:

The beginning of this road is difficult and rugged, but, after a little while, its travellers come upon a bare and broad plain. Calm weather, clear sky and tranquillity dwell in it, and the land puts forth by itself the provisions that are necessary for those who go on it.Footnote 44 (On Virtue 9)

The last point is worth noting: ‘the land puts forth by itself the provisions that are necessary’ for the Cynics, without any need for hard work. This presentation reflects an idea noted in Section 2: the natural ease of human life that forms a background for happiness, which can be found at the end of the shortcut. Thus Cynic training is joined seamlessly with leisure. The practice of Cynic training remakes the subject’s desires, often involving the removal of superfluities that were once fused with our everyday lives. People who are not Cynics usually have boundless and insatiable desires, which they expend a great deal of effort to gratify. Under such conditions, it is virtually impossible to maintain stable contentment, and it is almost inevitable that one will suffer from a sense of deprivation. Cynic training, then, dissolves this predicament through the forceful transformation of desire. Of course, when extricating oneself from that relentless pursuit of one’s desires to which one has long been accustomed, one must endure the intense pain of withdrawal symptoms, in addition to the toil of training. However, beyond that agony a happy life of leisure awaits, free of endless exertion for the sake of indulging desire. In other words, because the Cynics pursued happiness through the painful training that slims down desire, being happy in a Cynic sense generally entails having plenty of leisure; therefore, even if non-Cynics’ ‘long road’ ultimately led to happiness, it would not involve as much leisure as the Cynic shortcut does.

This last point is important. In my view, Cynic leisure is an immediate consequence of Cynic training, the Cynics’ way to pursue happiness. Of course, the Cynics also required a certain amount of leisure as a precondition for training.Footnote 45 However, this is distinct and different from the leisure a Cynic acquired at the end of the shortcut; the latter kind is far more secure and lasting, because training radically transforms one’s demanding desires.

In this way, Cynic training is a means of achieving happiness and is consistent with Cynic leisure.Footnote 46 Yet there is more to it: Cynics often continue training even after realizing happiness (and therefore leisure), because they cannot immediately sweep away the superfluity that has seeped into every corner of their lives. The continuation of training gradually reduces one’s needs, making it easier to maintain happiness.Footnote 47 Cynic training thus remains a beneficial practice even for the wise, who already enjoy leisure. That is why Diogenes constantly ‘trained himself in every way’ (Diog. Laert. 6.23 = SSR 5b.174);Footnote 48 such a custom does not mean renouncing leisure but reinforcing it.Footnote 49

For further clarity, it will be helpful to compare the Cynics’ idea of leisure with that of other philosophers.

First, let us compare Cynic leisure with the ‘philosophical’ concept of leisure that Plato formulated and Aristotle established. Both understand ‘leisure’ (or theoretical activities occurring in leisure) within the context of what actualizes the highest in humanity and constitutes a happy life. Aristotle deepened Plato’s insight into the political implications of this conception of leisure, elevating it to a universal end for citizens.Footnote 50

Cynic leisure does not share these aspects. It is not an end in itself, a means to an end, or a condition in which an end is achieved; it is an outgrowth of the Cynics’ unusual way of pursuing happiness as an end. Cynic leisure is therefore so free as to embrace idleness or inaction, without prescriptive implications such as those we find in Platonic or Aristotelian leisure. It does not serve theory and primarilyFootnote 51 belongs to the personal dimension, not the political. Plato and Aristotle would probably condemn this type of leisure as shallow and simple-minded. However, the Cynics would reply that these philosophers’ leisure is both insecure and misspent, as time-consuming activities like theorizing often lead them to vexing aporias. According to tradition, Diogenes called Plato’s school a ‘waste of time’ (Diog. Laert. 6.24 = SSR 5b.487).

Second, the relationship between the Cynics and the Xenophontean Socrates is more nuanced. At first glance, their mutual resemblance is remarkable. Like the Cynics, the Xenophontean Socrates recognizes the importance of training,Footnote 52 controls his desires,Footnote 53 and thus enjoys leisure.Footnote 54 We can safely regard Antisthenes, both a disciple of Socrates and a forerunner of Cynicism, as a link between the two. Xenophon portrays him as a man of leisure, and Socrates as the one who taught him leisure (Symp. 4.43 = SSR 5a.82). Therefore, the Cynic idea of leisure can be traced back to Socrates via Antisthenes, at least in part.

Nevertheless, we cannot equate their conceptions of leisure, for at least three reasons. First, the Xenophontean Socrates generally treats leisure as a precondition for doing better work.Footnote 55 We should distinguish this type of leisure from Cynic leisure proper (although it was not alien to the Cynics).

Second, the kind of training which makes leisure possible differs between the Cynics and the Xenophontean Socrates. The latter’s training consists of moderate physical exercisesFootnote 56 and mental practices;Footnote 57 that of the Cynics involves inflicting pain on their bodies, exposing themselves to insults, and a more radical reduction of desire (see Section 3). From the Cynic perspective, Socrates’ training and leisure are respectively inadequate and unstable.Footnote 58

The difference is indicated by the tale of the Choice of Heracles, which the Xenophontean Socrates tells in its entirety, and which he allegedlyFootnote 59 owes to Prodicus (Mem. 2.1.21–34). In this story, the personification of Virtue preaches to the young hero that to attain happiness, ‘labour and diligence’ (πόνου καὶ ἐπιμϵλϵίας) are necessary (2.1.28); so far, the Cynics would agree. However, divergence appears immediately after this (2.1.29), as Socrates describes the path of Virtue as ‘steep and long’ (χαλϵπὴν καὶ μακρὰν). Socrates cannot follow the Cynic shortcut; his training necessarily takes time because it lacks Cynic intensity.Footnote 60 We can apply a parallel criticism to Antisthenes, at least with some modifications: like his master, he was associated with the wealthy, intellectual circles of Athens,Footnote 61 had a house in Piraeus,Footnote 62 and had undertaken his civic duties of military service.Footnote 63 According to Dio Chrysostom, Diogenes compared Antisthenes to a ‘trumpet’, alleging that he spoke respectably but never listened to his own words or put them into practice (Or. 8.2 = SSR 5b.584).Footnote 64

Third, the two sides also disagree on the sufficiency of training. The Xenophontean Socrates and Antisthenes share an intellectualist view, at least in part: for them, virtue is knowledge.Footnote 65 This idea does not immediately contradict their emphasis on training,Footnote 66 but definitely limits its scope;Footnote 67 besides training, the good life requires intellectual and theoretical inquiry. The Xenophontean Socrates, though less striking than Plato’s portrayal, engages in definitional inquiryFootnote 68 and believes learning is important.Footnote 69 Antisthenes also wrote a vast number of theoretical works,Footnote 70 and devoted his leisure time to dialogue with Socrates and other intellectuals.Footnote 71 The Cynics do not support this type of intellectualism.Footnote 72 For them, ‘nothing at all in life is done successfully without training, and this training has the power to overcome all things’ (Diog. Laert. 6.71 = SSR 5b.291).

In sum, it is highly likely that Socrates significantly influenced the Cynic conception of leisure via Antisthenes, but we can nonetheless speak of the originality of Cynic leisure.

One might ask: ‘After eliminating all excesses in life, do the Cynics not arrive at a life of boredom rather than one of leisure – and is boredom not a kind of pain?’ We can envisage at least two answers. First, leisure means that ‘one does nothing’, not that ‘one must not do anything’. If one feels like doing something, one is free to do so. Of course, in a narrow sense, leisure will temporarily cease, but as long as one maintains one’s status as a Cynic sage,Footnote 73 one can freely resume the suspended leisure at any time. Second, boredom is, in a sense, a feeling peculiar to ordinary people. We tend to feel that time spent doing nothing is unbearable because we are bound by the desire to do something, or by the (often misguided) assumption that something should be done. Therefore, Cynic leisure can be enjoyed only by those who do not find such inactivity painful.Footnote 74

5. Performing leisure

In the previous section, I argued that training enabled the Cynics to achieve and maintain their leisure. This section will explore another relationship: leisure as a motivation to do training.

This argument is supported by the performative aspect that often accompanies Cynic leisure. We can find the most impressive example of this in the following anecdote:

When it was reported that Philip [sc. the King of Macedonia] had already sent his army forth, the Corinthians all panicked and were set to work [on defence]. Some procured weapons, some brought in stones, some strengthened the walls, some reinforced the battlements, and so each person engaged in useful work. Diogenes saw this and, as he had nothing else to do, he himself […] rolled the jar (which he used as a temporary abode) up and down Craneion. When one of his acquaintances asked him, ‘What are you doing, Diogenes?’ he replied, ‘I’m rolling the jar as well, so that no one will regard me as the only idler while the citizens work so hard’ (Luc. Hist. conscr. 3 = SSR 5b.25).Footnote 75

The ironical message behind Diogenes’ reply is that, for him, busily running around to defend the homeland is tantamount to aimlessly rolling a jar around: both are equally pointless. By engaging in unnecessary work himself, Diogenes implies that the civic duties binding ordinary people are just as unnecessary and have the same relative utility, while he obliquely draws attention to his own leisure, which is free from such duties. In a sense, this is a paradoxical demonstration of doing nothing by doing something.

Although this anecdote may seem a rather elaborate example, there are many other cases in which Cynic leisure functions as a type of performance, open to the gaze of any onlookers who happen to be nearby. For example, let us consider the famous tale about how Alexander the Great visited Diogenes:Footnote 76

When many politicians and philosophers came to see him [sc. Alexander] and congratulated him [on being elected leader of a military expedition to Persia], he expected Diogenes of Sinope, who was staying in Corinth [at that time], to do the same. However, Diogenes was spending his time leisurely [σχολὴν ἦγϵν] in Craneion with little concern for Alexander; consequently, the king himself took the trouble to visit him there, and found him lying in the sun. (Plut. Vit. Alex. 14.2–3 = SSR 5b.32)

Despite his busy schedule, Alexander went out of his way to visit Diogenes because the Cynic enjoyed leisure. If Diogenes had been busy with some work, it would have been reasonable for the king to wait until the Cynic had finished it. However, Diogenes was literally doing nothing; this fact made Alexander ill at ease because it shows that Diogenes could have visited Alexander whenever he wished, yet he opted to continue doing nothing. Here, Cynic leisure functions as a conspicuous, provocative performance. By doing nothing, Diogenes suggests the superfluousness of what he could have done, had he so wished. He chooses to bask alone in the sun rather than rush to the king’s side. Alternatively, by avoiding the unnecessary act of rushing to the king’s side, he has been able to gain sufficient leisure to bask in the sun.

In any case, the Cynics’ leisure – and their performative practices in general, which were constantly demonstrated in public – evoked various responses among passers-by.Footnote 77 The first (and probably most common) reaction consisted of embarrassment, ridicule, and rejection (these three often intermingle). The second was superficial envy or sympathy without action. As many have noted since ancient times, most people find the Cynic way of life (especially the training) a hopelessly intolerable prospect.Footnote 78 Even among those onlookers who were sympathetic, few would dream of actually joining the Cynics; having been momentarily entertained, they would quickly return to their vulgar, non-Cynic lives.Footnote 79 The third (and naturally rarest) reaction was just the opposite: actual practice, accompanying a serious reception. A sympathetic spectator might, albeit only occasionally, be excited enough by the Cynics’ practices to wish to follow them. Although the ‘conversion’ to Cynicism in the reported instances was often guided by a discourse (λόγος),Footnote 80 a Cynic speech is supposed to be validated by, and subordinate to, the deed embodying it in reality.Footnote 81 In this sense, Cynic performances, including leisure, can serve as a motivating force that inspires potential comrades to undertake training; the possibility of this function is grounded in Cynics’ scandalous self-exposure to the outside world.

Of course, other reactions are conceivable. As a borderline case, the audience might subsequently have felt some hesitation in continuing their conventional civic lives. Such feelings would echo the first reaction, in that they involve a sense of embarrassment; the second, in that they are partly sympathetic to the Cynic criticism of convention but do not stimulate action; and the third, in that they nevertheless effect some change in real-life practice. We can interpret the following in light of this:

He [sc. Diogenes] laudedFootnote 82 people who were on the verge of getting married but hesitated,Footnote 83 people who were on the verge of going on a voyage but hesitated, people who were on the verge of getting involved in politics but hesitated, people who were on the verge of rearing children but hesitated, and people who made preparations to spend time with those in power but never approached them. (Diog. Laert. 6.29 = SSR 5b.297)

It is at least possible to interpret these hesitations as a transitional state before one recognizes the necessity of training so that one can eventually realize happiness and enjoy leisure. Negative emotions, such as guilt, often arise when we fail to do what we think we should have done. However, Cynics enjoy their inaction with impressive serenity. That is the hallmark of Cynic leisure, and what makes it possible is training. In that sense, the pain of hesitation can also function as a motivating force that impels people towards Cynic training, regardless of whether they act on it.

6. Conclusion

The discussions above have demonstrated that we can reconcile the leisure enjoyed by Cynics with their training. First, training is a means to attain happiness, and thus yields leisure. Second, Cynic leisure has some psychological effects on passers-by who observe it; in a few cases, it may provide the impetus for them to move towards Cynic training.

As criticism of our mass consumer society grows stronger by the day, the Cynics’ leisure-filled ‘sustainable living’Footnote 84 offers valuable insights. In addition, their happiness in doing nothing may be comparable with the ‘slacker’ culture in the United States,Footnote 85 the tang ping (‘lying flat’) movement in modern China,Footnote 86 and other such tendencies. However, we must bear in mind that Cynic leisure was the product of harsh training that was not practicable for all. Thus, Cynicism pours cold water even on the various ‘anti-growth’ and ‘anti-work’ trends that are flourishing today.

Footnotes

*

I would like to thank the anonymous referee for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this article. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP23KJ0717.

References

1 In this paper, I follow the convention of rendering σχολή as ‘leisure’. K. Kalimtzis, An Inquiry into the Philosophical Concept of Scholê: Leisure as a Political End (London, 2017), 148–9, points out a complication: with its etymological nuance of ‘permission’, this English term does not correspond precisely to the connotation of ‘freedom’ that σχολή has. Therefore, we must bear in mind that this translation is merely a convenience.

2 When citing materials related to the Cynics, I refer to G. Giannantoni (ed.), Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae (Napoli, 1990), i–iv, using the abbreviation SSR.

3 Whereas ‘idleness’ implies ‘doing nothing’ or ‘inactivity’, ‘leisure’ (σχολή) originally meant a certain kind of activity, if Kalimtzis (n. 1), 9, is correct. However, this paper treats them as closely interconnected concepts, for two reasons. First, the majority of our sources are third-person accounts of the Cynics; in this case, just as Aristophanes could allege that Socrates was ‘lazy’ (Nub. 316; Ran. 1498), the distinction between ‘leisure’ and ‘doing nothing’ is often blurred. Second, even Kalimtzis acknowledges the popular meanings of ‘leisure’ that involve inactivity ([n. 1], 1–2); in the classical period, these were already adjacent to such negative connotations as ‘idleness’ or ‘laziness’ (cf. F. Montanari [ed.], The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek [Leiden, 2015], s.v. σχολή, D; P. Demont, La cité grecque archaïque et classique et l’idéal de tranquillité [Paris, 2009], 28–9, 279–80).

4 Cf. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity (Baltimore, 1935), 122.

5 W. D. Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty: Origins of Ancient Cynicism (Notre Dame, 2006), 66–97, discusses the Cynics’ ‘leisure’ and ‘idleness’. However, on the one hand, he ends up comparing the leisure of the poor with the busyness of the rich; on the other, he thinks the laziness of the wise is equivalent to another form of labour (‘philosophical work’; cf. Demont [n. 3], 387). In any case, he does not go so far as to tackle Cynic ‘leisure’ head-on. Other scholars who do not directly examine Cynic leisure, even though their discussions are closely related to my concern, include M. Chapuis, Figures de la marginalité dans la pensée grecque: Autour de la tradition cynique (Paris, 2021), 210–25, who analyses the relationship between the Cynics’ rejection of work and their view of nature, and O. Flores-Júnior, La vie facile: Une lecture du cynisme ancien (Paris, 2021), who focuses on the Cynics’ simple life.

6 Flores-Júnior (n. 5).

7 Ibid., 23–48; cf. D. Izzo, Studi sulle intersezioni tra Cinismo antico e commedia greca e latina (Trento, 2019), 476. J. I. Porter, ‘The Cynics with and without Foucault’, Arethusa 56 (2023), 363–89, repudiates this consistency, but I think he exaggerates the problem. First, he pays little attention to the fact that we have access to dozens of contemporary testimonies of the early Cynics; instead he simply emphasizes our sources’ lack of any historical foundation (366–8). Second, contrary to his implication (366), the attempts to uncover the Cynic tradition’s consistency on the assumption that it exists are neither circular nor reproachable in themselves; otherwise, we would have to renounce almost all studies of the history of philosophy. Third, although it is true that ‘[t]easing out what is authentically Cynic from later contaminations is a challenging proposition’ (ibid.), defending the coherence of the Cynic tradition does not necessarily require such strict selection. Several studies have convincingly argued that most ‘contradictions’ within the corpus are merely apparent or peripheral: see, for example, M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, L’ascèse cynique: Un commentaire de Diogène Laërce VI 70–71 (Paris, 1986), 77–84, on the ‘contradiction’ between the Cynics’ rigorism and hedonism; O. Flores-Júnior, ‘Paradoxes cyniques: l’activité littéraire d’Antisthène et de Diogène de Sinope’, Nuntius Antiquus 13 (2017), 117–36, on the ‘contradiction’ between Cynics’ criticism of traditional arts and their frequent use of them.

8 Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 40–4; Porter (n. 7), 367–9.

9 I borrow this phrase from Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 44.

10 E.g. H. Niehues-Pröbsting, Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus, second edition (Berlin, 2016), 18–19; Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 44–5; Porter (n. 7), 366–9.

11 In the twentieth century, there was a marked tendency to discuss Antisthenes separately from the Cynics: cf. e.g. E. Schwartz, ‘Diogenes der Hund und Krates der Kyniker’, in his Charakterköpfe aus der antiken Literatur (Leipzig, 1910), ii.1–26; D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D. (London, 1937), 1–16; F. Sayre, The Greek Cynics (Baltimore, 1948); Giannantoni (n. 2), iv.222–6. However, few recent scholars have doubted his crucial influence on the formation of Cynicism: see e.g. M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, Le cynisme, une philosophie antique (Paris, 2017), 607–30. P. Zaccaria, ‘Antisthenes the Ἁπλοκύων: A Critical and Exegetical Note on Diogenes Laertios 6,13’, WJA 40 (2016), 141–67, argues that ‘…Antisthenes was already given a role in the invention of Cynicism while Diogenes of Sinope was still alive, or at least soon after his death’ (157).

12 Giannantoni (n. 2), iv.494, n. 13.

13 Cf. Chapuis (n. 5), 350–2.

14 See below for further testimonies.

15 For Teles’ fragments, I follow the edition of P. P. Fuentes Gonzáles, Les Diatribes de Télès (Paris, 1998).

16 For the connection between poverty and virtue, or wealth and vice, see Desmond (n. 5), 40–55; O. Flores-Júnior, ‘Khortos gasteri ou le bonheur est dans le pré: éthique et politique cyniques selon un poème de Cratès de Thèbes’, Dialogue 45 (2006), 647–77.

17 For Crates’ fragments, I follow the edition of H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons, Suppl. Hell.

18 Besides the quotations below, see also the materials and interpretations presented by Chapuis (n. 5), 214–22. A similar, early idea can be recognized in Xenophon’s Antisthenes (Xen. Symp. 4.34–44 = SSR 5a.82).

19 In this testimony, the unusually emphatic phrase ἐβόα πολλάκις λέγων (‘often said loudly’) is used; this is distinct from how other testimonies are introduced with banal expressions, such as ἔλϵγϵ or ἔφη (‘he said’). Cf. Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 61.

20 Cf. Satyrus the Peripatetic ap. Jer. Adv. Iovinian. 2.14 = SSR 5b.175: natura haberet poculum (‘nature furnished a bowl’).

21 For pseudo-epistles of the Cynics, see A. J. Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition (Atlanta, 1977), 10–21.

22 For the busyness (ἀσχολία) of non-Cynics, see e.g. Plut. Mor. 782a = SSR 5b.31; Diog. Laert. 6.51 = SSR 5b.198; Dio. Chrys. Or. 6 = SSR 5b.583; 10.9 = SSR 5b.586; Plut. Mor. 69d = SSR 5h.34; Teles fr. 5.49–51 = SSR 5h.45; Crates [Ep.] 7 = SSR 5h.94; Luc. [Cynicus] 6–11.

23 E.g. Stob. Flor. 3.10.45 = SSR 5b.229; Maximus of Tyre 36.6 = SSR 5b.299; Diog. [Ep.] 12 = SSR 5b.542; 33.2–4 = SSR 5b.563; Dio Chrys. Or. 4.83–138 = SSR 5b.582; 8.25–26 = SSR 5b.584; 10.15 = SSR 5b.586; Luc. [Cynicus] 8–10.

24 E.g. Xen. Symp. 4.35 = SSR 5a.82 Teles fr. 2.12–13 = SSR 5b.222; Dio Chrys. Or. 4.56–8 = SSR 5b.582; 8.7–9 = SSR 5b.584; 10.21–32 = SSR 5b.586; Strabo 15.1.65 = SSR 5c.3; Crates [Ep.] 35 = SSR 5h.122.

25 See also Stob. Flor. 2.31.68 = SSR 5a.163; Diog. [Ep.] 15 = SSR 5b.545; Teles fr. 4b.46 = SSR 5h.42; Crates [Ep.] 10.3 = SSR 5h.97. It is possible that ‘double training’ was treated as a theme in Diogenes’ work Heracles (J. L. López Cruces, ‘Une tragédie perdue: L’Héraclès de Diogène le Cynique’, LEC 78 [2010], 3–24; but M. J. Cropp, Minor Greek Tragedians: Fragments from the Tragedies with Selected Testimonia. Volume 2: Fourth-Century and Hellenistic Poets [Liverpool, 2023], 209–11, disagrees with his conjecture).

26 Goulet-Cazé (n. 7), 53–7, 93–100. Cf. Plut. Vit. Per. 152f = SSR 5a.102; Diog. Laert. 6.48 = SSR 5b.118; Diog. Laert. 6.70 = SSR 5b.291; Stob. Flor. 3.7.17 = SSR 5b.292; Diog. [Ep.] 27 = SSR 5b.557; 50 = SSR 5b.580.

27 Goulet-Cazé (n. 7), 151, my translation from French.

28 E.g. Lovejoy and Boas (n. 4), 131: ‘Gospel of Work’; H. Schulz-Falkenthal, ‘Zum Arbeitsethos der Kyniker’, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle, Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe 29 (1980), 91–101; R. F. Dobbin, Epictetus: Discourses Book 1 (Oxford, 1998), 112: ‘Cynics glorified ponos [labour, trouble] as an end in itself’.

29 E.g. Diog. [Ep.] 12 = SSR 5b.542; Dio Chrys. Or. 8.11 = SSR 5b.584.

30 E.g. Diog. Laert. 6.23 = SSR 5b.174; 34 = SSR 5b.176; Plut. Mor. 233a = SSR 5b.177; Diog. [Ep.] 30.3 = SSR 5b.560; Dio Chrys. Or. 6.8–11 = SSR 5b.583; Philemon fr. 146 CAF ap. Diog. Laert. 6.87 = SSR 5h.4.

31 E.g. Diog. [Ep.] 27 = SSR 5b.557; 30.3–4 = SSR 5b.560; Dio Chrys. Or. 6.8–15 = SSR 5b.583; Crates [Ep.] 11 = SSR 5h.11.

32 One might associate this practice with the Xenophontean Socrates and Antisthenes (Mem. 2.1.33; 4.5.9; Symp. 4.41 = SSR 5a.82). However, if Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 75–83, is correct, there is a subtle but important difference: while these two ‘wait’ until they feel hunger or thirst, Diogenes ‘uses’ such deficiencies to gain pleasure.

33 For Cynic ideals of ἀπάθϵια and ἀτυφία, see e.g. Aristocles fr. 1.4, in M. L. Chiesara (ed.), Aristocles of Messene: Testimonia and Fragments (Oxford, 2001) = SSR 1h.4; Diog. Laert. 6.2 = SSR 5a.12; 15 = SSR 5a.22; Julian. Or. 9.192a = SSR 5b.95; Teles fr. 2.14 = SSR 5b.245; PHerc. 336/1150 col. 21 = SSR 5b.511.

34 E.g. Diog. Laert. 6.49 = SSR 5b.247; Plut. Mor. 531f = SSR 5b.247; Diog. [Ep.] 11 = SSR 5b.541; Diog. Laert. 6.90 = SSR 5h.27.

35 The only extant sources concerning the Cynics’ definition of happiness are the unreliable gnomologic testimonies (= SSR 5b.300–1) that focus on ‘tranquillity’ (ἡσυχία), ‘enjoyment’ (τὸ ϵὐφραίνϵσθαι / ἱλαρότης), and ‘absence of suffering’ (τὸ μηδέποτϵ λυπϵῖσθαι). In addition to such pleasure-based definitions, those concerning desire are also promising, such as the ‘satisfaction of all needs’ and the ‘absence of dissatisfaction’. Many testimonies seem to suggest this latter option, without excluding the former: examples include Xen. Symp. 4.34–44 = SSR 5a.82; Dio Chrys. Or. 6 = SSR 5b.583; 10 = SSR 5b.586; Luc. [Cynicus].

36 Cf. V. Emeljanow, ‘A Note on the Cynic Short Cut to Happiness’, Mnemosyne 18 (1965), 182–4; S. Prince, ‘Antisthenes and the Short Route to Happiness’, in P. Bosman (ed.), Ancient Routes to Happiness (Cape Town, 2017), 74–97. Prince argues that the prototype of the Cynic shortcut can be found as early as Antisthenes’ time.

37 As for the non-Cynics’ destination at the end of their ‘long road’, there are two possibilities: first, that the ‘long road’ does not lead to happiness at all; second, that it certainly leads to happiness but only after a long time. Apollodorus of Seleucia, a pro-Cynic Stoic of the second century bc, probably contended that Stoicism fell into the second category; see M.-O. Goulet-Cazé, Les Kynika du stoïcisme (Stuttgart, 2003), 109–11.

38 Diog. Laert. 6.104 = SSR 5a.135; Suda kappa 2712 = SSR 5a.135; Diog. Laert. 7.121 = SSR 5a.136; Plut. Mor. 759d = SSR 5a.136; Suda kappa 2711 = SSR 5a.136.

39 Diog. [Ep.] 12 = SSR 5b.542; 30.1–2 = SSR 5b.560; 37.4 = SSR 5b.567; 44 = SSR 5b.574; Crates [Ep.] 6 = SSR 5h.93; 13 = SSR 5h.100; 21 = SSR 5h.108.

40 Gal. De animi cuiuslibet peccatorum dignatione et curatione 3.12 = SSR 5a.136: δι’ ἀρϵτῆς ἐπ’ ϵὐδαιμονίαν ὁδὸν (‘the route to happiness via virtue’). I. Gugliermina, Diogène Laërce et le cynisme (Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2006), 129, and M. Chapuis, ‘Diogène, “Socrate devenu fou”?’, Philosophie Antique 20 (2020), 115, have both argued that the Cynics’ original term was simply ‘shortcut’ or ‘shortcut to happiness’, while ‘shortcut to virtue’ seems to be a Stoic adaptation (see also Goulet-Cazé [n. 7], 36–8). Indeed, the view that ‘virtue’ or the ‘life in accordance with virtue’ is the end (τέλος) has a highly Stoic tone (Goulet-Cazé [n. 7], 32–4; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.87 = SVF 1.179; Clem. Al. Strom. 2.21.129 = SVF 1.180; Stob. Flor. 2.7.6e = SVF 3.16); while several testimonies (e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.104 = SSR 5a.135) attribute it to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes, this should not be taken literally.

41 E.g. Muson. 9.38 = SSR 5b.13; Diog. Laert. 6.70 = SSR 5b.291; Crates [Ep.] 12 = SSR 5h.99; 19 = SSR 5h.106.

42 Diog. Laert. 6.71 = SSR 5b.291; Diog. [Ep.] 12 = SSR 5b.542; 30 = SSR 5b.560; 37.4–6 = SSR 5b.567.

43 This also appears to have been the case with Antisthenes, to whom the categorical doctrine that ‘toil is good’ is attributed (Diog. Laert. 6.2 = SSR 5a.85). See e.g. Stob. Flor. 3.29.65 = SSR 5a.126: ἡδονὰς τὰς μϵτὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων (‘one must pursue pleasures after toil, but not those before toil’).

44 Translation by A. Rigolio, which appears in J. Wilberding, J. Trompeter, and A. Rigolio, Michael of Ephesus: On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 10 with Themistius: On Virtue (London, 2018). We can find a similar motif in Hes. Op. 289–92; Diog. [Ep.] 37.4–6 = SSR 5b.567.

45 Cf. e.g. Diog. [Ep.] 44 = SSR 5b.574; Plut. Mor. 87a = SSR 5b.14.

46 To put it another way, those accustomed to the licentious life must undergo training if they are to enjoy leisure anew. In that sense, the Cynics sometimes criticized the ‘laziness’ of worldlings. Cf. e.g. Dio Chrys. Or. 6.11 = SSR 5b.583; 10.7 = SSR 5b.586; Stob. Flor. 3.29.40 = SSR 5d.3; Diog. Laert. 6.92 = SSR 5h.40.

47 A. Brancacci, ‘Aristotele e Diogene il Cinico’, Peitho / Examina Antiqua 11 (2020), 72, terms it ‘progressiva sottrazione’ (progressive subtraction).

48 In this testimony, an imperfect-tense verb (ἐκυλινδϵῖτο, πϵριϵλάμβανϵ), which indicates a past habit, is used together with the present participle (συνασκῶν), which indicates a continuous action. Similar tenses or aspects often appear in testimonies concerning Cynic training.

49 This reconstruction may seem to contradict the previous paragraph by making Cynic leisure a precondition for new training. However, it does not; it merely means that the elimination of surplus desires is a gradual process. Since new training will also bring about Cynic leisure more securely than before, the overall picture has not changed.

50 Kalimtzis (n. 1), 17–120.

51 This qualification, ‘primarily’, is significant. As Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 119–24, argues, the Cynic way of life implies a kind of altruism; requiring only the bare minimum, it need not encroach on others’ resources. As a result of seeking happiness, the Cynics can contribute to collective welfare. For the relevant issue concerning Cynicism’s performative aspect, see Section 5.

52 Mem. 1.2.23; 1.6.7; 2.1; 2.6.39; 3.5.14; 3.9.2–3; 3.9.14; 3.13.6; 4.2.6–7; 4.8.6.

53 Ap. 16; Mem. 1.2.1; 1.2.14; 1.3.5–15; 1.5.6; 1.6; 2.6.1; 4.5; 4.8.11; Oec. 2.8.

54 Mem. 1.3.5; 1.6.9; 3.11.16; Oec. 2.5–8.

55 E.g. Mem. 1.6.9; 3.9.9; Oec. 4.3. Cf. Demont (n. 3), 291–3; L.-A. Dorion and M. Bandini, Xénophon: Mémorables. Tome II, 1re partie: Livres II et III (Paris, 2011), 357–9.

56 Mem. 1.2.4; 1.6.7; 2.1.28; 3.12.5–7; 4.7.9; Oec. 5.4; Symp. 2.17–20.

57 Ap. 16; Mem. 1.2.4; 3.1.1; 3.7.9; 4.5.12; 4.8.4; Symp. 8.39.

58 Ael. VH 4.11 = SSR 5b.256; Maximus of Tyre 36.6 = SSR 5b.299; cf. Diog. Laert. 4.49.

59 This qualification seems necessary. According to R. Mayhew, Prodicus the Sophist: Texts, Translations, and Commentary (Oxford, 2011), xx, ‘Prodicus believed that the fundamental choice between a virtuous life and a vicious one is morally optional’.

60 Contrary to the traditional hypothesis proposed by Joël, a Cynic influence on Xenophon’s presentation of the Choice of Heracles seems difficult to attest (Dorion and Bandini [n. 55], 150–1).

61 Xen. Symp. 4.61–4 = SSR 5a.13.

62 Xen. Symp. 4.38 = SSR 5a.82; Diog. Laert. 6.2 = SSR 5a.12.

63 Diog. Laert. 6.1 = SSR 5a.3.

64 A fragment of Neanthes (Diog. Laert. 6.13 = SSR 5a.22) attributes the custom of wearing an ‘unfolded’ mantle to Antisthenes. Zaccaria (n. 11), 150, 154, believes that this suggests he could endure the cold better than Diogenes, who needed a ‘double’ mantle. However, if Zaccaria is correct, Neanthes’ estimation seems rash. According to tradition, Antisthenes was protected by the roof and walls of his own house (Xen. Symp. 4.38 = SSR 5a.82), while the Cynics slept in a jar, on the ground, or in front of others’ houses (e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.23 = SSR 5b.174; Satyrus ap. Jer. Adv. Iovinian. 2.14 = SSR 5b.175; Antipater ap. Anth. Pal. 7.413 = SSR 5i.3; Sen. Ep. 14.2.14 = SSR 5b.159; Plut. Mor. 77e = SSR 5b.172; Arr. Epict. diss. 3.22.47 = SSR 5b.263; 1.24.7–8 = SSR 5b.265; Juv. 14.308–12 = SSR 5b.42; Luc. Vit. auct. 9 = SSR 5b.80; Diog. [Ep.] 36.5 = SSR 5b.566; Themistius On Virtue 52 = SSR 5b.149). Antisthenes may have foregone a double mantle not because he could endure more than Diogenes, but because he lived so comfortably that he did not need one.

65 Xen. Mem. 1.1.16; 3.6.17–18; 3.9.1–5; 4.2.20; Symp. 2.12; Diog. Laert. 6.10, 12 = SSR 5b.134; Antisthenes Heracles ap. Diog. Laert. 6.105 = SSR 5a.135; Suda kappa 2712 = SSR 5a.135.

66 Goulet-Cazé (n. 7), 141–50.

67 L.-A. Dorion and M. Bandini, Xénophon: Mémorables. Tome I: Introduction générale, Livre I (Paris, 2000), 93–4.

68 Mem. 1.1.16; 3.9; 4.6; Oec. 1.1–15.

69 Ap. 21; Mem. 1.1.9; 1.6.14; 2.6.39; 3.1.2–3; 3.5.23; 3.9.2; 3.8.14; 4.1.2–5; 4.2.1–5; 4.7.3–5; 4.7.8; Symp. 6.6; 7.4.

70 Diog. Laert. 6.15–18 = SSR 5a.41.

71 Xen. Symp. 4.44 = SSR 5a.82; Mem. 3.11.17 = SSR 5a.14.

72 Goulet-Cazé (n. 7), 150–5.

73 Of course, the ‘Cynic sage’ differs from the perfect and infallible sage of Stoicism. I am using the word ‘sage’ to mean ‘someone who has achieved happiness as a result of training’; this ‘happiness’ is not perfect, since it leaves room for improvement that results in something more secure.

74 However, ordinary people may feel a kind of longing for Cynic leisure through a simple comparison with their own busyness. The ‘superficial envy’ that I will mention at the end of the next section is related to this type of ambivalent reaction to ‘doing nothing’. For the general idealization of ‘leisure’ or ‘tranquillity’ in ancient Greece, see Demont (n. 3).

75 See also Diog. Laert. 6.69 = SSR 5b.26.

76 The celebrated motif of Alexander’s encounter with Diogenes makes its earliest known appearances in writings by Varro (Sat. Men. 53.8 = SSR 5b.41) and Cicero (Tusc. 5.32.92 = SSR 5b.33), both active in the first century bc; their testimony had to rely on much older sources. Onesicritus, who was a disciple of Diogenes and accompanied Alexander on his campaigns, may have been the oldest of these (see Giannantoni [n. 2], iv.446–50). In any case, the motif seems to have been established at a relatively early stage of Cynic tradition.

77 Cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 9.8 = SSR 5b.585: ‘Some admired him [sc. Diogenes] as the wisest of all, but others thought him mad’. For the Cynic performance in general, see e.g. I. Sluiter, ‘Communicating Cynicism: Diogenes’ Gangsta Rap’, in D. Frede and B. Inwood (eds.), Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge, 2005), 139–63; P. Bosman, ‘Selling Cynicism: The Pragmatics of Diogenes’ Comic Performance’, CQ 56 (2006), 93–104.

78 E.g. Diog. [Ep.] 14 = SSR 5b.544; 30 = SSR 5b.560; 41 = SSR 5b.571; Luc. Dial. mort. 21.4 = SSR 5b.588; Crates [Ep.] 21 = SSR 5h.108; 29 = SSR 5h.116.

79 E.g. Dio Chrys. Or. 8.10 = SSR 5b.584; 9.5–7 = SSR 5b.585. This is equivalent to a version of cynicism in the modern sense, i.e. ‘das aufgeklärte falsche Bewußtsein’ (the enlightened false consciousness), as P. Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft (Frankfurt am Main, 1983), i.37, defines it.

80 E.g. Diog. Laert. 6.75–6 = SSR 5c.2; 6.82 = SSR 5g.1; 6.96 = SSR 5i.1; 6.94 = SSR 5l.1.

81 E.g. Antisthenes Ajax = SSR 5a.53; Stob. Flor. 2.15.43 = SSR 5b.283; Diog. Laert. 6.71 = SSR 5b.291; 6.64 = SSR 5b.320; 6.38–9 = SSR 5b.479; 6.28 = SSR 5b.504; Diog. [Ep.] 15 = SSR 5b.545; 17 = SSR 5b.547; 51 = SSR 5b.581; Dio Chrys. Or. 8.1–2 = SSR 5b.584; Crates [Ep.] 20 = SSR 5h.107; 21 = SSR 5h.108.

82 This verb ἐπῄνϵι (‘he lauded’) does not necessarily mean conclusive approval; Diogenes can ‘laud’ not only those who do a virtuous thing but also those who do not do a vicious thing. Cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 6.47 = SSR 5b.453.

83 I read τοὺς μέλλοντας γαμϵῖν καὶ μὴ γαμϵῖν, etc., following all manuscripts. Traditional emendation into τοὺς μέλλοντας γαμϵῖν καὶ μὴ γαμοῦντας, etc. was first suggested by A. Turnebus, Adversariorum libri XXX (Aureliopolis, 1604), 599, and then followed by J. Kühn, ‘Observationes et emendationes in Diogenem Laertium’, in M. Meibomius (ed.), Diogenis Laertii De vitis, dogmatibus et apophthegmatibus clarorum philosophorum libri X (Amsterdam, 1692), 525; K. von Fritz, Quellenuntersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope (Leipzig, 1926), 114–15; D. A. Russell, ‘A New Text of Diogenes Laertius’, CR 15 (1965), 175. This emendation is unacceptable. We should understand the targets of Diogenes’ laudation not as those who resolutely reject or refrain from something, but instead as those who indecisively hesitate or dither. According to Montanari (n. 3), s.v. μέλλω, the phrase ‘μέλλω with μή and inf.’ can be translated as ‘to delay, put off, hesitate, procrastinate’; this rendition does not conflict at all with the context of our testimony. Therefore, there is no positive reason to revise the unanimous reading of extant manuscripts. See also Flores-Júnior (n. 5), 247–61.

84 I borrow this expression from M. D. Usher, Plato’s Pigs and Other Ruminations: Ancient Guides to Living with Nature (Cambridge, 2020), 131.

85 See e.g. T. Lutz, Doing Nothing: A History of Loafers, Loungers, Slackers, and Bums in America (New York, 2006).

86 See e.g. Z. Jingyi, ‘“Tang Ping” of Chinese Youth: Origin Tracing and Social Identity Survey’, Academic Journal of Humanities & Social Sciences 5 (2022), 5–12.