Over the past several years, ‘historical epistemology’ has come to be a term assigned to a methodological approach within the philosophy of science, and the label given to a school of thought within the history of ideas. In this commendably concise and sophisticated book, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger – director of the Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Berlin – argues for a more conceptually nuanced and historically informed understanding of historical epistemology than those that have taken up residence at the end of the twentieth century. By now Rheinberger's work on the history and epistemology of experimentation in the life sciences is well known among English-language scholars. Rheinberger's ability to move between the historical and the contemporary, drawing upon a vast literature from philosophy, history and anthropology to deal with problems of knowledge – past and present – is deeply impressive. On Historicizing Epistemology offers readers a different, if not singular, polemic. The book surveys the various conceptual ‘turns’ in the past century, resulting from what Rheinberger calls a fundamental ‘crisis of reflection on scientific knowledge’ (p. 1) at the end of the nineteenth century. But in tracing these turns Rheinberger avoids simply providing a short history or ‘primer’ on historical epistemology. Instead he offers critical reflection on where the history and philosophy of scientific thought has been, and where it is going.
The book is divided into six chapters, each representing a historical period when the conditions of scientific thought were either challenged or transformed in relation to practices and objects of knowledge. Throughout the book Rheinberger makes it clear that national traditions play a significant role in shaping the concept of historical epistemology within different temporal frames. Rheinberger begins at the fin de siècle, which represents a ‘pivotal point’ in the experimental sciences. Through the work of Emil du Bois-Reymond, Ernst Mach, Emile Boutroux and Henri Poincaré, he shows the beginnings of the epistemologization of science and a conception of the ‘historicization of epistemology’. In Chapter 2, Rheinberger examines major shifts in thought that occurred during the interwar period, with special attention to Gaston Bachelard's coupure épistémologique and Ludwik Fleck's critical studies of immunology, most famously outlined in his Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935). Chapter 3 examines rationalism, the constitution of a scientific present, and the cultural history of the sciences found in the works of Karl Popper, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in the period around the Second World War. In Chapter 4, Rheinberger looks after 1945 to find what has been called the ‘new image of science’. Here it is important to mention that the book does not just move between intellectual biographies, but rather uses thinkers as signposts to draw connections between the projects each figure undertakes. In this chapter Rheinberger is able to draw a surprisingly direct line between the work of Alexandre Koyré, Thomas Kuhn, Stephen Toulmin and Paul Feyerabend, principally around the replacement of ‘gradual’ with radical gestalt shifts in the temporality of scientific change. In Chapter 5, Rheinberger turns his attention to France in the 1960s and to the forces underpinning post-structuralism, particularly in the writings of Georges Canguilhem, who, in the tradition of Bachelard, worked to ‘form a conceptual history that can also be understood as a history of the displacement of problems which must be reconstructed in their historical context’ (p. 66). Finally, in Chapter 6, Rheinberger describes ‘recent developments’ as a ‘practical turn’ in the philosophy and history of the sciences, and towards an anthropological register of a history of thought found in the work of Bruno Latour and Ian Hacking.
Any book under five hundred pages that surveys historical epistemology over the past century invites scepticism – or at the very least runs the risk of being too narrow in its focus. Certainly at times Rheinberger's examples are idiosyncratic (something he readily admits in his introduction) and may strike readers as appropriate in the form of a lecture, though less so in a text. Yet this observation is double-edged. One of the book's strengths is the way Rheinberger is able to cultivate an argument that is clear, tightly focused, approachable and analytically unwavering. But parsimony at times sacrifices an array of domains of inquiry and disparate factors that may be part of the historical transformations he is attempting to trace (private life, social change, political affiliations and so on). Nevertheless, in the end, the lesson On Historicizing Epistemology conveys is to avoid a transhistorical approach to understanding theories of knowledge within and about science, and it serves as a reminder that history is the connective tissue binding ideas and practices – even, or perhaps especially, in the places where this tissue begins to erode and regenerate.
