When examining attacks in Western countries claimed by or attributed to al-Qaeda and now more recently the Islamic State, many still view the 11 September attacks as a watershed moment between two eras. No doubt, much has been altered. Yet, it is important to remember within the Anglophone world that one of the first jihadi campaigns in the West was launched in the mid-1990s against France by the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA). Since then, dynamics have changed in French society, within the French Muslim community, and in particular the makeup of the French jihadi scene. In the aftermath of the Islamic State–directed November 2015 Paris attacks, where Islamic State operatives killed 130 victims and injured 413 more, Gilles Kepel's recent book Terror in France helps fill that gap.
Many monographs on jihadi-related topics in the West too often focus solely on the jihadis themselves. Kepel's new book goes beyond to explore contextual information, weaving in contemporary French social and political history; contemporary French Muslim social, political, and integrationist history; and the interplay of both with different generations. Moreover, while a number of books have been written about French jihadism in past years, they are primarily in French and for a domestic audience. That Kepel's work is a translation of his original French book into English broadens the potential audience and impact. Kepel is a French political scientist who has worked on issues related to jihadism in France and the Arab world since the early 1980s. Most other French works on jihadism are written by journalists and provide excellent detail and analysis but are less theoretically ambitious in their scope. To untangle the puzzle of how France arrived at its November 2015 attacks, Kepel utilizes multiple methods: he triangulates qualitative historical analysis, field research in the French banlieues, and content analysis of jihadi primary source documents in Arabic and French.
Answers to the recent wave of terrorism in France are situated within France's colonial legacy, the 2003 Iraq war, and the 2005 Paris riots. Regarding the first, Kepel argues that the individuals that began incubating within the jihadi milieu that grew up in France in the mid-2000s can best be described as “retro-colonial” (p. 2). Noting that unlike individuals’ grandparents or parents who immigrated to France to escape war or persecution in their home country and to make a better life for their family, the latest generation was interested in revisiting historical grievances, especially in relation to the Algerian War of Independence and France's general colonial project in Africa given that most jihadis in France are from North and West Africa. The Iraq War helped exacerbate these feelings, creating new local networks amongst a group of French-born Muslims from the 19th arrondissement of Paris who became foreign fighters in the first two years of the war. This network helped lay the seeds for new connections resulting in the unprecedented foreign fighter flow to Syria and the Islamic State a decade later. Lastly, the French riots of 2005 laid bare the lack of relevance the Union of Islamic Organizations of France had over the younger generation. A fatwa declared on 7 November 2005 to stop the riots actually exacerbated the violence, and showed that the role it had played as the leading voice amongst French Muslims since the 1989 “veil affair” had waned (p. 19).
As a consequence, an opening emerged for a more “authentic” and austere form of Islam, Salafism, within some French Muslim youth circles, which did not rely on old cultural practices from previous generations’ home countries or what was perceived as a diluted French or European Islam. Kepel contends that “in groups destabilized by the experience of colonialism and migration, by job insecurity and poverty, by being made to feel inferior culturally and symbolically, the imposition on oneself and one's community of a set of rigorous religious norms can be seen as a way of restoring social stability and control” (p. 138). The 2012 Muhammad Merah attacks in Toulouse and Montauban, which killed seven and injured five, were the first outward signs of this new generation taking action.
Kepel shows that the new trend of violence inaugurated by these events was exacerbated by two factors. The first was the growth of online jihadi forums in the mid- to late-2000s and later social media platforms, which provided greater access for recruitment and planning (p. 24). The second was the Arab uprisings and the collapse of Syria (p. 25), which yielded an avenue for greater mobilization amongst many local French jihadis and to achieve their ultimate goal: the resurrection of a caliphate. Not coincidentally, as Kepel explains, France had the largest cohort of individuals within the West to join up with jihadi groups in Syria. Although less known outside of France, Bubakr al-Hakim, a French Tunisian—one of the first foreign recruits of Abu Musʾab al-Zarqawi's network in Iraq in 2003 and the gunman who assassinated a secular Tunisian politician in 2013—was a key node, helping to recruit, facilitate, and plan the November 2015 Paris attacks, among others.
In response to these developments, a simmering far right movement—that many saw weakened with the victories of the center-right Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007 and socialist Francois Hollande in 2012—returned to popularity, rallying voters around a perceived country under siege (p. 63). Therefore, although the far right would lose in the 2017 presidential election to the centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron, the movement's national presidential electoral vote percentages, led by Marine Le Pen and the Front National party, were higher than anything previously seen in France.
Although Kepel's book helps unravel the growth in French jihadism and how its newest generation led it to the November 2015 Paris attacks, it also provides an important warning about the potential for future conflict within France. When diagnosing this future, Kepel notes that France now contends with
two kinds of protest movements [that] have developed alongside one another: right-wing ethnic nationalism and Islamism as parallel conduits for expressing grievances. They both bear a strong utopian element that restores a mythical dimension to a disastrous social reality by projecting onto it a utopia where those who are left behind today will triumph tomorrow. These two worldviews redefine group memberships, solidarities, and enmities along lines that are not defined in terms of social class, even though they are fed by an obsessive fear of losing social status (p. 3).
Kepel's book would be well suited for an undergraduate course related to terrorism in the West, the aftermath of French colonialism, issues of French and European immigration and integration, and connections between jihadi networks in the West and the Arab world. It also provides concise arguments bereft of excessive academic jargon. Those steeped within jihadi studies might find many background information topics covered in prior studies, but Kepel's book nonetheless threads together French society at large, the French Muslim community, and the French jihadosphere. It no doubt will become an important resource for those wanting to better understand French jihadism.
