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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 March 2004
The significance of European integration as a process and an intellectual focus is undeniable. The economic importance of the European auto sector and its worldwide dimensions are also self-evident. Roland Stephen's effort to deepen our analytical understanding of the former through a detailed examination of the latter thus promises to be of interest to readers from a variety of fields, ranging from economics and politics to the analysis of corporate strategy.
Stephen acknowledges that no single, parsimonious theory is adequate to explain the complex trajectory of the development of the European Union (EU). Indeed, he gives short shrift to many of the traditional theoretical approaches to European integration, particularly the neofunctionalist or spill-over theory long identified with Ernst Haas. Stephen offers instead an analytical framework based on an eclectic set of insights and propositions taken from well-known theories of regulation, policy formation, and institutional analysis. Its key elements are the perceived distribution of the costs and benefits of integration across auto firms and member states as well as the institutional arena in which policy initiatives are debated and decided. The meat of the book is the application of the framework to four key issue areas: setting common standards for permissible levels of auto emissions, reducing national government subsidies to auto firms, antitrust policy toward the auto sector, and developing an EU-wide voluntary export restraint (VER) system with Japan to replace the hodge-podge of national restraints.
Stephen's framework can produce very plausible explanations of policy outcomes. For example, in the case of auto emissions, different firms specialized in different propulsion technologies and were divided because the costs of potential regulations would fall more heavily on some firms than others. National governments were also divided, because some felt more environmental political pressure than others. Policymaking shifted to the European Parliament and eventually resulted in higher common emissions standards than most auto companies would have preferred. In the case of Japanese imports and transplants, the auto companies were united in their reluctance to accept complete openness to what they perceived as unbeatable (and perhaps unfair) competition. Some national governments were more liberal in theory than others, but none was willing or able to put together an open auto trade coalition in the face of determined industry opposition. Policymaking remained very informal, and the result was a variant of the European tradition of managed trade in the form of a complex Europe-wide VER with Japan, which was “an antiliberal outcome … imposed on consumers and importers” (p. 19).
In his cases the author makes good use of interviews with European auto industry officials, lobbyists, and Brussels Eurocrats. He also draws on appropriate official documents from various EU institutions, some national documents, and a wide range of secondary literature about auto industry economics, politics, and corporate strategies. He displays an impressive knowledge of the kind of policymaking by informal understandings and insider deals among auto firms, national governments, and European officials on issues such as Japanese imports, which he labels as “typical of Brussels at its most opaque” (p. 134).
Occasionally, familiarity with the interests and positions of the various stakeholders and the desire to cast light on murky behind-closed-doors politics leads Stephen to the very edge of what his evidence will support. He resorts to assertions that might well be true but cannot be documented. His language then takes on a slippery, conditional air. For example: “Spain no doubt expected to be a beneficiary from an open investment regime…. The Japanese may even have quietly indicated as much, and EU structural funds were perhaps promised by the president of the Commission, Delors” (p. 133). Or: “Also, VW's preferences for high emissions standards must have been somewhat moderated after the acquisition of small-car producer SEAT (in Spain) in 1986” (p. 89). This can be annoying, in that it requires the reader to parse his sentences very carefully. But it is hardly a fatal flaw, given the less than full disclosure of much of the politics surrounding the European auto industry in these years.
Stephen acknowledges that he has traded breadth of scope for depth of analysis. He notes that he makes little mention of potentially significant actors, such as labor unions, local and regional governments, consumer groups, and components manufacturers (p. 83). Except for a few brief references, the detailed coverage ends in the early 1990s. And there is no mention of the efforts, which were being discussed at both the national and European levels even in the 1980s, to limit the automobile's effect on cities, to promote alternative modes of mobility such as urban transit and high-speed trains, and to increase fuel taxes and levy other kinds of fees and eco-charges on automobiles.
Within these self-imposed limits, most readers will not be disappointed by what Stephen has to tell us about how the integration pulse provided by the Single European Act affected European auto markets, auto producers, and both national and EU policymakers. Readers interested primarily in the European auto industry will find a wealth of detail and some fascinating interpretations of events. Those interested primarily in the process of cooperation, integration, and institution building will also be rewarded by some very interesting and important insights into how to think about the interaction of business and politics at the national and European levels in the late 1980s and early 1900s
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