The bicentenary of the abolition of the British slave trade has provoked renewed public and scholarly interest in the significance of parliament's decision to outlaw British slave trafficking in 1807 as well as in the mix of factors that induced it to do so.Footnote 1 Scholarly debate over the causes of that event has come almost full circle as religious explanations first identified by Sir Reginald Coupland in the 1930s and subsequently challenged by more economically deterministic ones have recently returned to centre-stage as part of broader, culturally based arguments.Footnote 2 The extent to which cultural forces influenced the rise of British anti-slavery will doubtless remain a source of discussion. But, insofar as such forces were involved, they reveal how non-economic factors have helped to shape market activity and even economic growth and performance. When parliament proscribed slave carrying by British subjects, it denied them involvement in a commercial activity in which in 1807 they remained major stakeholders and from which they could have continued to profit. Moreover, by funding naval and other slave trade suppression policies after 1815, parliament sought to impose its own reformed values on other nations and their slave traffickers. Its campaign to do so met with resistance and evasion internationally.Footnote 3 Ultimately, however, it contributed to a more generalised revulsion against and outlawing of slave trading and even slavery itself among European and American powers by the end of the nineteenth century. Given the antiquity and robustness of slavery as an institution, this was a remarkable transformation.Footnote 4 Organised anti-slavery provides a dramatic example of how shifts in social values helped historically to change economic behaviour.
In this paper, we shall argue that, if cultural factors were instrumental in outlawing the Atlantic slave trade, they were also central to facilitating its growth and structure through to 1807. Constituents of culture – human perceptions of the world, values, institutions, political and other behaviour – have become integral to what today is commonly known as new institutional economics. Proponents of institutional economic theory recognise that factor endowments are important to economic performance. But they also tend to argue that inter-country differences in economic performance as well as in rates of economic change are linked to the mix of cultural and institutional factors that have increasingly shaped the human environment within which economic activity increasingly takes place. In particular, according to Douglass North, a key architect of this branch of economics, order and disorder need to be placed ‘at the center of inquiry’ into understanding the process of economic change. As North insists, ‘order is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for long-run economic growth’.Footnote 5
The historical performance of economies has provided an important testing ground for theories of institutional economics. Some of the most revealing findings centre on issues relating to trade, notably long-distance trade or cross-cultural exchange. Both involved high levels of risk, and understanding how risk was managed or mitigated is believed to have been crucial to understanding how such activities grew. In one of his earliest studies, North argued that growth in transatlantic trade in the two centuries after 1650 was linked to sizeable improvements in shipping productivity (or reductions in oceanic freight rates). These, in turn, were related to declines in piracy – and concomitant increases in security and order – throughout the Atlantic Basin.Footnote 6 Studies by other scholars have linked historical expansion of long-distance trade to improvements in credit security based, among other things, on family and ethnically rooted networking as well as other forms of social capital. Such developments are seen to have been crucial in underpinning the thirteenth-century commercial revolution in the Mediterranean as well as long-distance trade in Africa.Footnote 7 They are also seen to have reinforced gains in shipping efficiency to foster growth in transatlantic trades from the seventeenth century onwards.Footnote 8
There has been some acknowledgement of the influence of cultural factors in shaping the Atlantic slave trade after 1500. The reluctance of Christians to enslave fellow believers is seen to have been a critical factor in determining that Africans, not Europeans, would be taken from the Old World as slaves to the Americas.Footnote 9 The fact that African slave dealers had no scruples, religious or otherwise, when it came to enslaving members of other sub-Saharan ethnic groups reinforced the pattern.Footnote 10 But, while cultural factors were evidently important in explaining the racial character of the Atlantic slave trade, their role in helping to explain how that trade became so large still remains largely understudied. This paper seeks to redress that issue. In it, I propose to explore some of the processes that underpinned transactions in slaves at the African coast. As we shall see, the evolution of these processes involved inter-cultural dialogue, negotiation and creative institutional adaptation. Together, these strengthened the capacity of African coastal trading communities to respond, with varying degrees of effectiveness, to external shifts in demand for captive labour. Whether such developments should be seen as creating a ‘middle ground’ of Euro-African dealings similar to that suggested for Euro-Indian relations in mainland North America is open to question, not least because Europeans never seriously threatened to settle and thus to claim land in Africa before the nineteenth century.Footnote 11 But insofar as institutional change in Atlantic Africa fostered expansion of cross-cultural exchange in captive Africans, it contributed, on the one hand, to wealth accumulation in the Americas and, on the other, to inflicting damage and disorder on those African societies whence captives came. The cultures of exchange in Atlantic Africa that evolved during the era of the export slave trade had, therefore, far-reaching ramifications. These ramifications cannot be explored in detail in this paper, but when considered as by-products of the evolving human environment within which the slave trade was conducted, they shed light on how economic change occurred more generally in the Atlantic world in the early modern period.Footnote 12
I
Slavery is commonly identified with severe exploitation of the labour of the enslaved; the absence of human rights; and the threat of violence, actual or perceived.Footnote 13 The relative weight of these identifiers of slavery has varied through history, but all three were prevalent in transatlantic slavery. The severity of exploitation of enslaved Africans in the Americas has sometimes been seen as a vital source of capitalist accumulation in Europe.Footnote 14 In Europe, transatlantic slavery came to be justified by the denial of human rights to people of African descent, a situation that some, though not all, abolitionists sought to rectify from the 1780s.Footnote 15 In all its facets, from Africa through to the Americas, transatlantic slavery was firmly rooted in violence. Violence was the instrument for enslaving people in Africa; it was instrumental in efforts by their captors to turn Africans into commodities; and it was intrinsic to plantation life in the Americas. Moreover, violence was an element in the resistance of the enslaved to their situation, wherever that resistance occurred and it became an important vehicle by which slavery in the Americas was dismantled in the century after the Saint-Domingue uprising in 1791.Footnote 16 From beginning to end, violence was the bedfellow of transatlantic slavery.
Disorder and violence are commonly regarded as enemies of sustained economic growth or commercial performance.Footnote 17 At the heart of transatlantic slavery, therefore, lay an apparent paradox: how, given the brutality associated with the capture and transport of enslaved Africans to the Americas, did the trafficking in captive Africans come to assume the scale and durability that it did. Part of the answer may lie within African belief systems. According to some historians, wealth accumulation through trade in some parts of Africa was seen to take place in a zero-sum cosmology within which accumulation through commerce by some groups involved trade-offs against personal or familial health and even social tranquillity. Ironically, slave trading moderated the trade-off between `wealth’ and ‘sorrow’ by allowing traders to retain some captives as part of their kinship group and thus compensate for any anticipated loss of kin that would flow from commercial success.Footnote 18 Others have suggested a different, though not necessarily incompatible, answer to the apparent paradox by pointing to a separation of the internal initial enslavement process, with all its attendant violence and disorder, from the later stages of moving captives to the African coast for sale. In short, a geographical division of labour between enslavement and marketing of captives is said to have emerged, with African societies absorbing the collateral damage associated with the Atlantic slave trade and slave shippers claiming the benefits from it.Footnote 19 Even if we accept that such a geographical separation of processes occurred, it was never wholly complete. Slave narratives and other evidence remind us that those involved in enslaving others by violence might fall victim to the same themselves, even quite close to the coast, and end up on slave ships.Footnote 20 There were instances also of European traders raiding African coastal communities for slaves and though such practices may have diminished in relative importance in time, it is evident that violence – or at least the threat of it – remained a powerful weapon in the armoury of coastal sellers and buyers of captive Africans. In this respect, violence was always implicit, as well as being often explicit, in slave trafficking.Footnote 21
Nonetheless, from the earliest stages of European oceanic contact – and in most cases before slaves became the dominant item of exchange – trade quickly became the primary and increasingly predominant mechanism of interaction between African and European along the Atlantic African littoral. Although Africans are often depicted as the weaker of the partners in such engagements, the fact that commercial exchange became the modus operandi of interaction reflects, it may be argued, more the strength of African communities in their dealings with Europeans rather than their weakness.Footnote 22 Those dealings, of course, involved parties from very different cultural backgrounds and economic worlds, but as the scale of European trade with Africa grew, Afro-European dealings in slaves emerged as probably the major international arena of cross-cultural exchange from the mid-seventeenth to the early nineteenth century. The security and efficiency within which that exchange occurred – and the controlled or managed violence on both sides that underpinned it – had important consequences for the growth of transatlantic slavery and the wider Atlantic economy. Moreover, as a form of cross-cultural activity, its development anticipated what was to be a growing and arguably transformative feature of an emergent global economy from the seventeenth century onwards.
As in other exchange relationships, the scale and pattern of slaving activities at the African coast was largely shaped by negotiation or ‘dialogue’ between the parties concerned. On the European side, those involved included resident traders and their mulatto offspring, many of the former being employees or ex-employees of the corporate trading companies established by most western European nations to represent their interests in the African trade in the seventeenth century.Footnote 23 Accordingly, resident traders were more numerous on the ground in regions such as Senegambia, the Gold Coast and West-Central Africa south of the Congo, where Europeans established forts or settlements than at the Windward Coast, the Bight of Biafra and the Loango Coast north of the Congo, where, on the European side, bargaining for slaves was more commonly done by ships’ captains. On the African side, slave transactions were usually conducted by merchant communities that were typically subject to political oversight and regulation by local states, which also often served as intermediaries or middlemen between inland suppliers of slaves and European buyers.Footnote 24 Buffers to some extent between the violence of the slave procurement zone and the more orderly transactions in slaves of the coast, the trading communities along the Atlantic littoral were the frontline of the cultural interface between Africans and Europeans in the slave trafficking business. It was their strategic position between African supplier and European buyer of slaves as well as their skill in handling dialogue and transactions with Europeans that allowed them to accumulate wealth from the slave export trade.Footnote 25 Such wealth sometimes became the envy of inland slave suppliers, encouraging in some instances a military and political ‘push to the sea’ by inland states. A form of vertical integration in slave supply chains in Africa, such action could destabilise more than improve the efficiency of the Afro-European interface.Footnote 26
The nature of the Afro-European commercial dialogue and the ensuing patterns of economic exchange were shaped by various factors, the importance of which could vary from one trading venue to another or, depending on changes in the ‘actors’ involved, even at the same venue through time.Footnote 27 Three key features of slave trafficking in Atlantic Africa have been highlighted by recent quantitative assessments of the export slave trade.Footnote 28 The first was the incorporation of increasing numbers of venues in Atlantic Africa into the slave supply network as the scale of embarkations for the Americas rose from a few thousand captives a year before 1600 to between 40,000 and 60,000 a year by the second half of the eighteenth century. Most of the earliest captives boarded ship at Senegambia and at West-Central Africa south of the Congo, but from the mid-seventeenth century the Gold Coast, the Bight of Benin (or Slave Coast) and the Bight of Biafra became important embarkation centres. They were later joined by the Loango Coast from the early eighteenth century, Sierra Leone and the Windward Coast from the 1740s and South-East Africa from the 1780s. Expansion in slave exports from Africa thus depended on deepening activities in some regions, notably West-Central Africa, and extending their reach to others, notably in the Gulf of Guinea. Each type of activity involved widening the boundaries of Euro-African cross-cultural commerce and thus dialogue or negotiation between slave buyer and slave supplier. In the long run, slave shipments depended heavily on just four regions – West-Central Africa, the Bight of Benin, the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast – where four out of five of the 12.5 million captives taken from Africa to the Americas boarded ship.Footnote 29 Other regions, nevertheless, became significant participants in the Atlantic slave trade at certain times, further broadening the commercial dialogue between African and European trader.
A second major feature of commercial exchange in Africa was the varying intensity of concentration of activity among different exporters at different regions of slave supply. It is well known that throughout the history of the Atlantic slave trade Portuguese-speakers almost totally dominated shipments of African captives from south of the Congo.Footnote 30 This reflected Portugal's investment in Luanda and later Benguela, but was underpinned by the fact that, in the age of sail, the southern Atlantic wind and current systems largely favoured traders departing on their slave voyages from Brazil and returning to the same. Brazilian ports under Portuguese control, notably Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, thus dominated the Angolan slave trade south of the Congo. This did not mean that ships from these ports traded only to Angola. On the contrary, after 1650, they took a large share of the captives leaving from the Bight of Benin. At the same time, ships departing Lisbon developed at various times an active trade with places in Upper Guinea between Senegambia and Sierra Leone. In these parts of Atlantic Africa, therefore, as Afro-European commercial dialogue developed, it became essentially (or at least largely, in the case of the Bight of Benin) one conducted in Portuguese or some pidgin variant thereof.Footnote 31
Few other carriers achieved the level of dominance in slaving or other commercial activities with a particular region or sub-region that Portuguese-speakers did at Angola. But it is now clear that other carriers – almost all of them entrants into the slave trade from the mid-seventeenth century – took disproportionately large shares of their slaves from just a few regions. To give just some examples, largely from the eighteenth century when the slave trade of most carriers reached its peak: the Dutch in the form of the Middelburg Company after 1730 took most of their slaves from Guinea (meaning, in this case, the Windward Coast and Gold Coast) and the Loango Coast; the French largely focused in the same period on the Loango Coast, the Bight of Benin and Senegal; and the British, who rivalled the Portuguese as the principal carriers of slaves in the eighteenth century, largely concentrated on the Gambia and Gold Coast, where London-registered ships centred much of their trade, and at the Bight of Biafra, Sierra Leone and the Windward Coast, from where Liverpool ships embarked over half of all the slaves they carried from Africa in 1720–1807.Footnote 32 In short, therefore, while cross-cultural trade in Africa commonly involved more than one European trading nation in dialogue with local African slave suppliers, it was not uncommon for traders from one nation – or even one or two ports from within one nation – to dominate local commercial conversations with indigenous traders. Such concentrations of activity by European slave carriers at particular venues in Africa have yet to be fully explained. In the absence of the natural environmental factors that helped to explain Portuguese dominance south of the Congo, they point towards the importance of networking and social capital as well as local knowledge and coastal ‘creole’ languages as key factors in promoting cross-cultural exchange in Atlantic Africa. The persistence of such patterns through time also points towards the impact of the human environment in fostering potential barriers to entry among established carriers against new entrants seeking to encroach on trade at particular venues. However one interprets such patterns, commercial dialogue across cultural boundaries involved shifting combinations of African and European parties to such activity at different places. Given that most slave carriers disembarked their human cargoes in American colonies that lay under their own national jurisdiction, the factors helping to shape commercial dialogue in Atlantic Africa were instrumental, too, in promoting connections between specific slave supply regions in Africa and markets for slaves in the Americas. Put another way, understanding the patterns of cross-cultural dialogue in Africa helps to explain the different mix of ethnicities of enslaved Africans arriving in different parts of the Americas.Footnote 33
Accompanying these concentrations of activity by different European carriers at particular regions of Africa was an equally powerful tendency for the export slave trade to become concentrated not just in a few slave supply regions but also at a relatively small number of ports along the Atlantic coast of Africa. This is a third key finding of the recent quantitative literature on the trade. That literature shows that, especially after the entry of north European nations into the slave trade, scores of places between the Senegal River in the north and the Orange River in the south were embarkation places for African captives at any point in time.Footnote 34 But a critical finding of the recently published on-line slave voyages database is that among the numerous embarkation places, ten ‘ports’ accounted for the dispatch from their home continent of up to two-thirds (or 8 million) of all the enslaved Africans bound for the Americas. Importantly, all were located south-east of the Windward Coast. They comprised Cape Coast and Anomabu (at the Gold Coast); Ouidah (Bight of Benin); Bonny and Old Calabar (Bight of Biafra); and Loango, Malembo, Cabinda, Luanda and Benguela (West-Central Africa). Some, like Ouidah and Luanda, numbered their departing captives in millions, in Luanda's case close to 3 million. The others typically accounted for up to half a million or more.Footnote 35 Such places were African equivalents of well-known European slaving ports such as Bristol, Liverpool, London and Nantes or American ones such as Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco. Like their European and American counterparts that are often considered critical to the integration of the Atlantic economy from the sixteenth century onward, Luanda, Ouidah, Cabenda, Bonny and the other leading centres of slave trafficking in Atlantic Africa were equally pivotal to the integration of sub-Saharan Africa into the same. They were the epicentres of the most intensive promotion of cross-cultural dialogue and exchange activity involving oceanic commerce in the Atlantic world. What happened in these African ports helped to shape the scale and pattern of slave exports to the Americas as much as Liverpool, Rio de Janeiro and the other infamous slave ports of the Atlantic world did. Two – Luanda and Benguela – were closely tied to the Portuguese and Brazilian worlds. Cape Coast, Anomabu, Bonny and Old Calabar became vital to British traders, at least until 1807. Of the rest, Ouidah, Loango, Malembo and Cabinda were focal points of competition between different national groups of slave carriers through time. In each of these respects, what transpired in each of these African slaving emporia was a microcosm of much larger processes of cultural interchange throughout the Atlantic seaboard of Africa.
In other respects, too, commercial life in the leading African slave ports was symptomatic of wider patterns. At some, notably Cape Coast, Anomabu, Ouidah and Luanda, there emerged European and mulatto resident populations, who played an active part in dealing with local traders. At Bonny, Old Calabar, Loango, Malembo and Cabinda, by contrast, exchange depended more on ship-to-shore interaction, though temporary factories might be erected on shore at some places. Everywhere, some form of creole or pidgin language developed as the language of exchange. Whatever format existed, as in other areas of Atlantic trade, transactions in slaves at the key trading emporia in Africa were typically underpinned by investment by Europeans not only in factories and castles (where allowed) but also in networking activities and in other forms of trust-building social capital. Such activities, reinforced by regularities and continuities in commercial dealings and the personnel involved, have been the subject of recent studies of Ouidah, Bonny, Old Calabar, Luanda and Benguela.Footnote 36 Investment in social capital in these places took various forms and, commonly involving participation in local cultural activities, was economically important in several ways. It facilitated in particular the growth of credit in coastal slaving transactions, about which there is evidence from as early as the seventeenth century.Footnote 37 Advancement of credit by Europeans to Africans became a vital factor in supporting increased commercial interaction between the coast and inland sources of slaves. It is, however, also evident that ‘trust’ alone was often insufficient to sustain credit-based transactions between European and African traders. In such circumstances, local political and institutional practices – and the values they embodied – were commonly appropriated and adapted by both European and African parties to safeguard such transactions. Among the practices so adapted was human pawnship, where people, including kin, might be pledged as pawns to creditors in return for loans, and local secret societies such as Ekpe, which, among other things, served as local debt enforcement agencies.Footnote 38 The adaptation of such institutions to the needs of international exchange was the outcome of a truly cross-cultural dialogue in which Europeans appropriated and, in negotiation with their African trading partners, adjusted local institutions to new use. Without such cross-cultural agreement, and the credit transfers that it facilitated, the scale of the Atlantic slave trade would have been much smaller than it was.
II
A fuller appreciation of the role of cross-cultural dialogue in underpinning the development of the Atlantic slave trade requires that we look at other elements in the processes that facilitated the linking of African supply of captives with American demand for slaves. Though a variety of elements were involved, I propose here to concentrate on two, not least because they concern the cultural context of exchange. The first relates to the ‘rules of the game’ within which negotiation of slave purchases occurred at the African seaboard; the second to the pattern and trends of slave prices at the African coast. Both sets of issues involved buyers and sellers of slaves in cultural and institutional dialogue. How they resolved them throws light on the respective bargaining positions of buyers and sellers of slaves at the African coast and ultimately, I shall argue, the extent to which the export slave trade shaped African economic life between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.
For international trade to prosper and grow the parties involved in exchange need to recognise and accept mutually agreed rules of engagement. These comprise part of the ‘order’ necessary for exchange to prosper. Such ‘rules’ complement other desirable elements within which commercial interaction takes place, but in important ways provide a framework within which social capital developed. One critical element was mutual respect for the security of the person and property of each of the parties involved and mechanisms for redress if that security was impaired.Footnote 39 Another is the establishment of mutually acceptable procedures for conducting trade negotiations and of mechanisms for resolving disputes over their interpretation. Underpinning both is the assumption that each party to any negotiation will benefit from the exchange process by satisfying its own demand for goods or items at competitive prices. As a form of international activity, the trafficking in slaves at the Atlantic coast was naturally subject to such constraints. Indeed, its long-run growth depended on their acknowledgement and acceptance, as recent evidence showing a link between the potential for market breakdown and instability in trade activity in Senegambia, Sierra Leone and Gabon underlines.Footnote 40 This contrasts with the high and often sustained levels of slave exports from other parts of Atlantic Africa, notably at the leading slave ports mentioned earlier. The evidence suggests, therefore, that the capacity of buyers and sellers to establish the ‘rules’ under which transactions in slaves could be pursued to mutual benefit varied from one part of Atlantic Africa to another. It could vary, too, at the same place through time, as the political leaders at Old Calabar acknowledged in 1780. In response to the murder locally of two Liverpool shipmasters by one disaffected faction in the community and a subsequent falling away in trade, they sought to reassure Liverpool traders by noting that that they had made ‘Great Law about whitemen not hurt’ and suggesting that ‘Suppose one family Stop any whitemen[,] We Will Brock [i.e. Break] that family because all Country Stand by that Law this time.’ The leadership of Old Calabar certainly appreciated the value of safeguarding the personal security of traders at least if slaving activities were to prosper.Footnote 41
Space constraints prevent a full discussion of the evolution of the rules of commercial engagement throughout Atlantic Africa, but three points may be noted. First, trade in Africa rarely occurred in a political vacuum; on the contrary, in most regions and places, the export slave trade became tightly interwoven with local political structures, with competition for the rents accruing from trade providing an important ingredient for political rivalry within states and sometimes even conflict between them.Footnote 42 With few exceptions, therefore, trade became surrounded by local political protocols, to which exporters of slaves had to pay appropriate regard. The actual form of protocols varied from place to place, and might involve acknowledging local political authority, following standard bargaining practices and paying bribes. Understanding and respecting local practice was, therefore, an important precondition for successful initiation and conduct of trade. Fractures within local political structures sometimes created short-term opportunities for gain by buyers of slaves, but the instabilities generated by political division within coastal communities or between them and internal suppliers of slaves were rarely beneficial to buyers of slaves in the longer term.Footnote 43 Significantly, the export slave trade tended to prosper most in the presence, not the absence, of political order at African coastal venues. Paying due regard to the local political or ceremonial protocols, therefore, was a relatively small price to pay for Europeans as part of the cost of achieving security and expansion in trade relations.
Second, in addition to adjusting to local politics, buyers of captives had, as in other markets, to accommodate local, often culturally or politically determined, preferences for imported trade goods among sellers of slaves. It is sometimes argued that Europeans duped African sellers of slaves by offering shoddy or inferior goods in exchange for human captives. This argument had its roots, among other things, in the late eighteenth-century abolitionist discourse. The allegedly poor quality of firearms, which commonly formed part of the ‘bundles’ of commodities exchanged for slaves, has been particularly emphasised.Footnote 44 Without seeking to deny that attempts at duplicity occurred, it appears, nevertheless, that, as consumers, Africans for the most part called the tune when it came to deciding the composition of the bundles of goods that Europeans had to supply if they wanted to compete in buying slaves in Africa.Footnote 45 The evidence suggests, too, that trade at the African coast was not a trade between unequal parties. On the contrary, it was one in which Europeans had constantly to be aware of changing consumer preferences in African markets, to make appropriate adjustments to the mix of goods shipped to the coast, and to accept that exchange values of different goods against slaves might vary across time and in some cases prove to be extremely poor. Changes in European industry, notably textiles, may have allowed buyers of captives to introduce new items into the bundles of goods exchanged for slaves, but such innovations did not apply uniformly across Atlantic Africa. They were always subject to acceptance by African traders. In short, each series of transactions relating to slaves involved local negotiation over the composition and exchange rate of goods against slaves and in such negotiation a primary, if not dominant, factor was always local African consumer preferences. Thus, for example, in the second half of the eighteenth century, at Cabinda, Luanda and Benguela, East Indian textiles commonly constituted up to two-thirds of the goods exchanged for slaves, whereas at Ouidah, cowrie shells constituted the largest single item bartered for slaves.Footnote 46 Similar variations in patterns of demand for trade goods were evident at other leading ports. The explanations for such variations lie within Africa and were largely driven by local African political and social conditions. Together with developments in European industry, such conditions largely shaped the ongoing dialogue or bartering between buyer and seller of slaves at the African coast over the price of slaves and how it should be paid.
Some exchanges of goods for slaves in Africa were based on pure barter between buyer and seller, but such were the complexities of trade negotiations and the varieties of commodities included in the bundles of goods exchanged for slaves that currencies of trade evolved in time.Footnote 47 Ultimately, the vast majority of transactions came to be negotiated in coastal currencies. Prices of slaves were commonly recorded in them as were the values of commodities bartered in exchange. Many Europeans even recorded their own coastal accounts in the local currency alongside those of their homeland. Local units of account became, therefore, a third central element in the ‘rules’ or mentalities of Afro-European exchange. Moreover, just as the demand of goods exchanged for slaves varied from place to place, so, too, did the currencies in which trade was conducted. At Gambia, the Windward Coast and Bonny, the unit of account was the ‘bar’; its exchange rate against European currencies differed from one place to the other. At the Gold Coast and at Ouidah, transactions were conducted in ‘trade ounces’; at Old Calabar, in ‘coppers’; and at Angola, in ‘pieces’ or ‘cloths’.Footnote 48 The provenance of such units of value is sometimes obscure but in most cases was clearly linked to items of trade such as bar iron, gold, copperwares or textiles which were or had been important at the locality in question. Whatever their source, local units of account became interwoven into trade negotiation at the African coast, accepted by Europeans and Africans alike. Put another way, like the pidgin languages through which the terms of trade were negotiated, they became central components of the culture of coastal commercial exchange. Enabling profit and loss on exchanges to be calculated, however crudely, they, in turn, enabled such exchange to function more efficiently and thus to grow.
Central, too, of course, to the growth of the transatlantic slave trade was the expansion in demand for African captive labour in the Americas. That labour was largely deployed to expand production of precious metals, notably in Spanish America and after 1700 in Brazil and even more importantly through time in the cultivation of agricultural crops for sale in Europe. Among the crops most dependent on slave labour was sugar, first grown in Brazil from the 1530s and spreading just over a century later to Barbados and in the succeeding two centuries to the whole Caribbean.Footnote 49 Other crops also became identified in time with slave labour, notably tobacco, rice, cotton and coffee, but the production of sugar and its derivatives remained critical, accounting perhaps for up to four-fifths of all enslaved Africans taken to the Americas.Footnote 50 As sugar cultivation wore out labour, the high concentration of newly arriving captives at sugar colonies also helps to explain the extraordinary ‘consumption’ of enslaved Africans in production processes in the Americas.Footnote 51 That, in turn, dictated that in addition to the growing need for captives to increase output of commodities for European markets, a replacement demand for enslaved labour increasingly reinforced the flow of captives across the Atlantic. At the height of the Atlantic slave trade in the late eighteenth century, that demand accounted for a substantial proportion of all the African captives bound for the Americas.
Whether captives were intended to expand production or replace those dying prematurely, the process mediating between American demand for slaves and African supply was the price mechanism. Unfortunately, evidence relating to prices of slaves on both sides of the Atlantic is thin and uneven before 1650, but from the limited data that are available the trend in prices through much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries appears to have been relatively flat.Footnote 52 This is perhaps to be expected given the modest scale of the Atlantic slave trade before 1650 and, according to Manning, Africans’ ‘positive supply response to the higher demand for slaves’.Footnote 53 Thereafter, the picture changed as the scale of the trade grew. Firmer price evidence from the late seventeenth century onwards shows that in the century or so through 1807 coastal prices of slaves tended to rise in nominal as well as in real terms.Footnote 54 The latter is measured by the quantity of trade goods bartered per slave. This upward trend in coastal prices of captives was more marked after 1750 than earlier in the century, and as such tended to mirror the index of real prices of newly arrived enslaved Africans in the Americas.Footnote 55 The transatlantic shadowing of American slave prices by African ones was not to be unexpected given the rising tide of captives crossing the Atlantic before 1807 and improvements in flows of market information within the Atlantic world. Increased volumes of activity encouraged greater integration of markets.
There are also signs, however, that rising demand for captives to unprecedented heights in the middle years of the eighteenth century placed strains on existing African capacity to supply captives for export. The mean time taken by ships to complete their purchases of captives in Atlantic Africa doubled between 1730 and 1775 from three to six months, extending the overall length of slaving voyages from Europe.Footnote 56 In the same years, the real price of captives at the coast moved upwards, while European traders earnestly began more intensive exploitation of previously largely neglected potential sources of captives at Sierra Leone, the Windward Coast and the Bight of Biafra.Footnote 57 Although the evidence is not conclusive, it seems likely that in this period, too, Europeans were tempted to expand supplies of credit to their African counterparts, with a view perhaps to improving the flow of slaves from inland sources to coastal trading venues and thereby accelerating turnaround times of ships at the African coast. If this was the case, the strategy evidently had some success, for the indications are the loading times of ships in African ports fell back from the 1770s onward.Footnote 58 In all these respects, market forces, largely operating through the price mechanism but underscored by Afro-European social capital building that supported innovation in credit arrangements, appear to have determined changes in the intensity and geographical distribution of slaving activity in Africa as American demand for captives reached new heights in the half century before 1807. In doing so, they also extended the geographical reach of the Afro-European commercial dialogue both coastwise and inland.
Vital though they are in shedding light on shifts in both the geography and balance of power of commercial exchange, time-trends in mean coastal prices of slaves tell only one part of the story of patterns of cross-cultural trade in Atlantic Africa. If we switch focus from time trends of prices to patterns of prices by categories of captives, other cultural adjustments that facilitated growth in commercial exchange are revealed. At the heart of the issue here were American buyers’ preferences for slaves and African slave dealers’ responses to them. Particularly important was the fact that for cultural as much as other reasons American preferences for enslaved Africans varied in important respects from those of long-established buyers in Africa and other parts of the world. Satisfying Americans’ preferences for captive Africans involved, therefore, shifts in African slave dealers’ commercial perceptions and, as we shall see, adjustments in cultural practices within Africa from the sixteenth century onwards.
From an early stage in the history of the Atlantic slave trade, relatively clear age and gender preferences among American buyers of African captives were apparent. During the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century, the prime slave or ‘pieza de Indias’, as it was defined for tax purposes in Spanish America, was considered as a young, healthy, adult aged fifteen to thirty or as a person having a height of least seven palmos. Throughout Spanish America, this became the standard against which all other categories of enslaved Africans – superannuated, juvenile, very young or simply of shorter stature – tended to be evaluated.Footnote 59 It became in time increasingly refined, focusing more on adult males than males and females and as slave use in other places expanded spread more or less uniformly across every European political jurisdiction in the Americas. At times, too, and especially when the geographical sourcing of captives became wider, gender- and age-based preferences for slaves were underscored by ones based on ethnicity, real or imputed. Indeed, ethnically based stereotypes of captives emerged in time, with some groups being viewed by potential buyers more favourably than others.Footnote 60 In this respect, Igbo slaves from the Bight of Biafra were commonly viewed with less favour among American buyers than others.
Explaining American preferences for some categories of enslaved Africans over others is complex. As one might anticipate, however, preferences seem to have been heavily influenced by the perceived labour qualities of the enslaved. Some ethnic groups acquired a reputation for hard work, durability and the possession of particular skills, whereas others came to be seen variously as rebellious, lazy or even suicidal. Such stereotypes were attributed to a range of factors, including acquired or inherited African skills or, in some cases, to perceptions of the natural abundance or harshness of the environment from which captives were taken.Footnote 61 In terms of age, American buyers obviously sought captives who could immediately be put to work, avoiding the costs of child-rearing, while in the case of gender they obviously seem to have had relatively little regard for the reproductive value of females, even though in most colonial regimes children born to females assumed the legal condition of their mother. Females entering the Atlantic slave trade were destined, in fact, primarily to live and die producing sugar and other crops rather than children. In this respect, like males, they were classified essentially as field or other labourers, with the males commanding a price premium presumably because they were perceived as being better suited physically to withstand the rigours of plantation and mining work.Footnote 62
There is little evidence that stereotypes of captives based on ethnicity translated regularly or consistently into price differentials within American slave markets. When they did, this seems to have been attributable as much to differentials in the purchase cost in Africa of captives and their transport to America as to actual buyer preferences in the Americas.Footnote 63 By contrast, when allowance is made for such factors, age- and gender-based preferences were more or less consistently reflected in patterns of slave prices in America.Footnote 64 Young and healthy adult males were normally among the first captives sold at auction from recently arrived ships from Africa. Males typically fetched premiums of up to 15 per cent or more over those for females, with young adult males achieving premiums of 20 per cent or more over the mean price for whole shiploads of captives. Equally, children under the age of fifteen years usually fetched lower prices than adults, whether male or female, though where sellers distinguished ‘men-boys’ from other males the differential between women and men-boys might be very small or even non-existent. Overall, nonetheless, price patterns for newly arrived enslaved Africans reflected buyer preferences: adults typically sold for markedly higher prices than children and men for more than women. This was the case regardless of political jurisdiction in the Americas.
Because of oceanic transport costs, prices of slaves at the African coast were naturally lower than those in the Americas.Footnote 65 They were commonly recorded, as we have seen, in local units of account, the exchange rate of which with European currencies varied. In whatever currency prices were reported, prices of slaves at the African coast evidently varied by age and gender. Such variations were, moreover, fairly robust and consistent through time and across regional markets. In their general direction, too, they tended to mirror those found at American slave markets. Insofar as one can establish coastal prices, mark ups on adult males were typically 20 per cent and sometimes as high as 40 per cent above the norm for whole purchases of shiploads of slaves.Footnote 66 Adults in general usually cost significantly more than children. Such patterns clearly reflect the market power of American buyers of slaves at the African coast. Other things being equal, they also provided strong price signals to African traders regarding the composition of captives to supply. Their responses did not always accord with the declared preferences of American buyers, perhaps because at times slave procurement and other cost factors in Africa offset some of the gains from supplying captives with a coast price premium. Whatever the cause, we know that the proportion of females entering the slave trade before 1700 and of juveniles entering the slave trade after 1800 was, in each case, higher than the long-run norm.Footnote 67 So, too, was the proportion of females dispatched from the Bight of Biafra relative to other regions. Such variations indicate that the coastal dialogue between buyer and seller of captives could be subject to factors outside their own immediate control. Nevertheless, it remains the case that across all the major African slave embarkation venues and throughout most years of the Atlantic slave trade, male slaves entering the trade typically outnumbered females by significant proportions. In most cases, males outnumbered females by two to one; in some cases the ratio was even higher. Furthermore, even in the Bight of Biafra, where the ratio of males to females was usually lowest, males commonly comprised around six out of ten of captives embarking ship for the Americas. In most cases, too, adults considerably outnumbered children across all supply regions, at least before the nineteenth century. In short, despite some temporal and regional variations, the gender and age composition of slaves supplied by African dealers was consistent with the preferences for slaves expressed by American purchasers.
At one level, such patterns of slave exports from Africa to the Americas may be seen as an understandable and predictable market response by African slave suppliers to overseas demand stimuli. At another level, however, patterns of slave supply embodied a significant cultural adjustment on the part of African traders to an emerging and growing export market opportunity that, in terms of its demand for captives, differed in major ways from other markets with which they may have been familiar. Price data relating to other African-based slave trades are thinner than for the Atlantic slave trade, but they still paint a very different picture of patterns of demand for captives in those markets. In the far older trans-Saharan slave trade, for instance, it was not males but females, especially pre-pubescent ones, who typically commanded the highest prices.Footnote 68 Among older age groups, prices were broadly similar for males and females of the same age. The only exception was eunuchs, who commanded exceptionally high prices. Premiums for young girls and eunuchs in trans-Saharan markets largely reflected the fact that most would end up in the harems and other institutions identified with rich and powerful Muslim households. Elsewhere, in the African internal slave markets, a price premium on females was also commonly found.Footnote 69 In this case, it applied to females in their prime working and reproductive years, but in African areas under Islamic influence, pre-pubescent girls again brought a premium price. On this evidence, then, the demand for enslaved females within Africa typically matched or even outpaced that for males. This suggests that enslaved females within Africa may have been valued for both their productive and reproductive capacities, with perhaps high proportions being absorbed into the household and kinship groups of their captors.Footnote 70
Enslaved Africans sold in internal markets or into the trans-Saharan trade were typically victims of wars, raids or kidnappings by other ethnic groups or ‘nations’. A variety of factors may have been instrumental in triggering violence between communities or states in Africa, but the internal slave price data suggest that an important motivation behind wars and raids was the expected ‘crop’ of female and juvenile captives that such wars might be expected to yield. Such captives might be retained by their captors or sold on. Wars did not only yield female or juvenile victims, however. They also produced a wide range of captives, prominent among them being adult males. Some would be defeated warriors. Vanquished and doubtless dishonoured and humiliated, such men could easily pose, as long as they lived and remained in captivity locally, a continuing threat to their former enemy. In the absence of alternative outlets for their profitable removal to or disposal at some distance from their homeland or place of capture, the safest option for their captors was to slaughter them on the battlefield.Footnote 71 When placed together with the retention and absorption of female captives, such action might be interpreted as an example of socio-biology in which ‘[i]n human raids and wars . . . another man is a rival to be killed, but a woman can represent a valuable opportunity to transmit the victor's genes’.Footnote 72 Whatever the underlying explanation, the execution of defeated adult males and enslavement of their female brethren probably emerged as important traditional ‘rules’ of war in much of Africa. In all likelihood, this remained the case in many parts of the continent long after Europeans arrived at the Atlantic littoral of Africa.Footnote 73 American demand for African captives, however, with its specific – and by traditional African standards, unusual – preference for adult males arguably radically changed this scenario, placing, in regions accessible to the Atlantic seaboard at least, potentially significant value or ‘rents’ on groups of wartime captives previously considered as much a threat as an asset to their captors.
Warfare and other forms of violence were just as important in Africa for recruiting captives for American slave markets as they were for domestic African and other export slave markets. As the Atlantic trade grew in importance, it arguably accentuated existing levels of violence in the interior of West and West-Central Africa, increasing the potential pool of all captives available for internal as well as the transatlantic traffic. Some – possibly even a majority – of the females were likely retained within domestic slavery in Africa but, as the total levels of enslavement activities increased, this would still allow some females, including girls, to enter the Atlantic trade. Arguably, such females might have been considered superfluous to domestic demand in Africa. Joining the females destined for transatlantic markets, however, was an evidently even larger tide of males. Some were probably victims of wars and violence linked directly to the Atlantic slave trade.Footnote 74 Motivated primarily perhaps to secure captives, especially males, to sell into export markets, such conflicts might be considered a direct adjustment in military culture in Africa to the presence of European slave ships at the African coast. Other male captives were probably victims of conflicts arising for other reasons. Historically, many would not have escaped the battlefield alive, but from the sixteenth century onwards the possibility emerged of deporting them profitably through trade networks to remote locations across the Atlantic Ocean. This is not to argue that such captives benefited from the rise of the Atlantic slave trade; on the contrary, sale to Europeans may have heaped added dishonour on them to that arising from military defeat. But whether wars were prompted by the slave trade or by other factors, the ensuing outflow of captives to the Americas seems to have rested on adjustments in the culture or rules – or even the political economy – of warfare in Africa in the face of new slave export opportunities by sea. In tandem with cross-cultural processes of dialogue and institutional change at the Atlantic seaboard, such adjustments were instrumental in allowing African slave suppliers to respond positively to growing demand for enslaved people in the Americas between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.
III
The Atlantic slave trade was the largest oceanic coerced movement of people in history. Lasting over three centuries, it had an enduring, even defining, impact on the modern world. It helped to nurture the growth of the post-Columbian Atlantic economy. It fostered racial division and inequality. It ushered in the global remixing of peoples through migration that has become such an important element of modernity. These effects of transatlantic slavery were only possible, however, because the traffic in captives from Africa to the Americas became as large it did. Understanding how that happened sheds light on what Douglass North has defined as a critical turning point in economic change historically, namely, ‘the transition from a belief system built to deal with the uncertainties of the physical environment to one confronting the opportunities of the human environment’.Footnote 75 The Atlantic slave trade, with its uncertainties as well as its global reach, offers exceptional opportunities to explore how the transition that North describes took place.
The slave trade was often depicted by contemporaries as being unusually hazardous. It is a theme continued by historians. There is little doubt that the physical or ‘natural’ environment within which the activity occurred contributed to that image. Atlantic Ocean currents and wind systems largely dictated voyage patterns.Footnote 76 Harvest seasons in Africa commonly determined the timing of voyages as captives needed to be fed.Footnote 77 Viruses and germs were central determinants of shipboard mortality of captives.Footnote 78 Hurricanes and drought affected harvests of slave-grown crops, especially in the Caribbean, thereby causing fluctuations in demand for labour. These and other factors made slaving voyages risky enterprises. Developments in the human environment, nonetheless, allowed slave traffickers to counter or at least moderate some of these risks and to respond positively to the commercial opportunities created by European colonisation of the Americas. Historians have identified a number of risk-mitigating technical and financial innovations in the slave trade.Footnote 79 Some related to shipboard health and may have contributed to a long-run decline in percentage losses of captives in transit.Footnote 80 Others concerned credit and remittance issues, and facilitated the circulation of finance capital.Footnote 81 Yet others were rooted in iterative exchange, social capital and knowledge accumulation and transfer.Footnote 82 One element in the last was the evolution of the cultures of exchange in Atlantic Africa which have been the focus of this paper and which played a vital factor in shaping African supply responsiveness to external demand for captives. This paper provides an incomplete investigation of that responsiveness. We still have much to learn, for example, not just about how but also why African slave dealers responded in the way they did to American demand for labour. Explanations of such issues are likely to be found in the cosmology or belief systems of African societies, as Harms has reminded us,Footnote 83 and in the local structures of power within which African traders operated. Equally, there is still much room for debate over the distribution within as well as outside Africa of the costs and benefits arising from transatlantic slavery and their long-term legacies. But the fact that some 12.5 million captives entered the Atlantic slave trade in the three centuries or so before 1850 is tragic testament both to the chronic hunger for captives in the Americas and to the organisational skills and incentive regimes that European traders developed in partnership with their African allies in order to satisfy that hunger. The Atlantic slave trade provided more than a bitter legacy for the modern world. It also provided a telling, if tragic, example of how through adjustments in the balance between the physical and human environment – or through ‘the structural change that humans impose on human interaction’Footnote 84 – the modern world may actually have been created.
