Amity Shlaes's new history of the Great Depression tells the stories of “the progressives of the 1920s whose good intentions inspired the country” and even more importantly the story of the “Forgotten Man,” the fellow who was “trying to get along without public relief and has been attempting the same thing since the depression that cracked down on him” (p. 13). Her forgotten men are the businessmen and workers who were paying the sales taxes and property taxes that were funding the government programs. They were the ones in the private sector struggling to survive and thrive during hard times and the uncertainties about the continuously changing rules of competition associated with the New Deal's expansion of government influence in the economy.
Shlaes's forgotten men differ from the ones whom Franklin Roosevelt talked of helping with federal emergency relief programs in his speeches. Roosevelt's forgotten men were the poor, elderly, and the large number of people who suddenly found themselves unemployed, often for the first time in their lives.
The Great Depression and the New Deal are extraordinarily complex. Economists and economic historians still passionately debate the macroeconomic causes of the Depression. Meanwhile, the New Deal changed government microeconomic policies in so many parts of the economy that scholars have just now begun to start the process of untangling their effects using statistics. The vast majority of writings about the 1930s by historians without an economics bent and by “journalistic” writers have focused on the policymaking process and on the policy makers, with contemporary accounts of their impact on the poor and some rudimentary statistics thrown in.
Shlaes offers her own accounts of policy makers and their policies. She has a libertarian bent and argues that many of the problems of the 1930s were exacerbated by too many attempts by policy makers to interfere with the operations of markets. She praises Calvin Coolidge for maintaining a limited federal government and Secretary of the Treasury Mellon for his wisdom in cutting the exorbitant income tax rates that had been established in World War I. Herbert Hoover, the progressive leader who had successfully engineered so many bureaucratic responses to emergencies before becoming president, discovered that his activist policies failed to prevent the economy from lurching downward. The jockeying between Roosevelt and Hoover over banking and international loan policies between the November 1932 election and the March 1933 inauguration likely exacerbated the problems with bank failures. She strongly subscribes to Robert Higgs's view in Depression, War, and Cold War: Studies of Political Economy (Oakland, CA: Independent Institute, 2006) that the uncertainties associated with constantly changing New Deal economic and tax policies retarded the recovery. No matter how good the intentions, the meddling made things worse, not better.
A good deal of what she describes about the economic policies is supported by scholarship by economic historians. Economic historians and many traditional historians have long recognized the problems arising from the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, the semi-cartel policies of the National Recovery Administration, the Federal Reserve's mistaken policies, the problems with the gold standard, the uncertainties of changing federal policies, and other issues. The debates have been over how much weight to give to each factor. Empirical work on the microeconomics of the New Deal by John Wallis, Robert Fleck, Robert Margo, Charles Calomiris, Joe Mason, Shawn Kantor, Lee Ohanian, Price Fishback, Robert Higgs, and their various co-authors over the past decade has shown for several major programs that the microeconomic impact of the New Deal was a mixed bag. For an overview of this work, see the New Deal chapter in Price Fishback et al., Government and the American Economy: A New History (University of Chicago Press, 2007).
Shlaes, like many other New Deal writers, makes the mistake of describing Roosevelt's spending policies as Keynesian. William Barber's Designs Within Disorder: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933–1945 (Cambridge University Press 1996) shows how little Keynesian thought influenced Roosevelt's advisors. E. Cary Brown (“Fiscal Policy in the 'Thirties: A Reappraisal,” American Economic Review 46 [December 1956]: 857–79) and Larry Peppers (“Full Employment Surplus Analysis and Structural Change: The 1930s,” Explorations in Economic History 10 [Winter 1973]: 197–210) show that a Keynesian policy was never tried. Their work is summarized well in the leading economic history textbooks. New Deal spending was nowhere near the level needed to counteract the extreme depth of the Depression. Further, nearly all of the New Deal spending was financed by tax revenues, so that the budget deficits in the 1930s were small. Keynes's view of the proper policy is summarized succinctly in his 31 December 1933 open letter to Roosevelt published in the Los Angeles Times (and other newspapers throughout the country): “I lay overwhelming emphasis on the increase of national purchasing power resulting from governmental expenditure, which is financed by loans and is not merely a transfer through taxation from existing incomes (my italics).” What I find worrying is that the absence of a true Keynesian response to the Depression is standard stuff in economic history textbooks, yet Shlaes and many others sadly perpetuate this incorrect myth.
Shlaes also spends very little time talking about the programs that Roosevelt designed for his “Forgotten Men,” the unemployed and the poor. Over the past couple of years, Shawn Kantor, Bill Horrace, Michael Haines, Ryan Johnson, and I have been examining the impact of public works and relief programs (as well as farm programs) at the county and city level. The results of this work, (summarized in the New Deal chapter in Fishback et al. 2007) suggests that a dollar at the margin spent on New Deal public works and relief programs in a county between 1933 and 1939 raised incomes in 1939 in that county by about 84 cents. Increases in such spending in an area also increased in-migration and reduced infant mortality rates, suicide rates, death rates from several diseases, and crime rates. Although these findings came out while Shlaes's book was likely in galley proofs, they suggest that there were some New Deal programs, which accounted for the lion's share of New Deal spending, that counterbalance her strongly negative assessment of the federal policies.
I have another complaint that is a common one associated with “journalistic” histories, the lack of adequate references. Over the past couple of decades, such books generally have improved by including endnotes that give sources by phrase so that readers will not scared off by numbered footnotes in the text. Shlaes's phrase notes, however, are inadequate. There are far too many places where the sources for information that I would not consider to be common knowledge are unavailable.
Despite these flaws, the book shines in its narratives about Shlaes's forgotten men. She is a marvelous storyteller and her stories bring to life the difficulties faced by the many people with businesses and jobs who were navigating a depressed economy where the federal government was expanding its activities. The NRA's impact is brought to life in the story of the Schecter Brothers, who brought the case against the NRA that led the Supreme Court to declare it unconstitutional. Her description of the tribulations faced by former Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon and the government's tactics when the Treasury unsuccessfully sought criminal charges against him for tax evasion serve as a painful antecedent to many recent attempts by prosecutors to try their defendants in the court of public opinion when it turns out that they have no winning case at law. Wendell Wilkie's struggles in the electric utility industry as he competed with, partnered with, and eventually sold his business to the Tennessee Valley Authority illustrates the problems faced by many businessmen when dealing with ambitious government officials. How various people and groups sought help through nongovernmental organizations are illustrated by the tales of black cult leader Father Divine and Alcoholics Anonymous founder Bill Wilson.
By shifting the emphasis towards a set of people often given short shrift in histories of the 1930s, Amity Shlaes provides a welcome addition to Great Depression scholarship. As an analysis of Roosevelt's New Deal economic policy during the 1930s, the book is less successful. However, the market-oriented underpinnings of her analysis will spark continued and much needed debate about the pluses and minuses of the wide range of policies with which Roosevelt experimented during a decade of extraordinary unemployment.
