Secretary Condoleezza Rice was interviewed by the Washington Post Editorial Board in Washington, DC

Q. Given the stance till now of North Korea, is it fair to say that we would have been better off to have retained the Agreed Framework with all the plutonium under lock and key, rather than having to now be in the position of trying to offer concessions to see what they did with that plutonium?

Secretary Rice. First of all, no one is offering concessions to see what they did with that plutonium. We have a framework that is a Six-Party framework, which I think is the only way that you're ever going to have a resolution of the North Korean issue is if China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States are all at the table, all with a mix of incentives and disincentives that they can bring to bear on the North to come clean about its nuclear programs. If you look back at the time of the Agreed Framework, it was very heavily loaded toward benefits for North Korea up front and, in fact, just froze the North Korean program. And when we learned—and I'll return to the HEU issue. But when we learned that the North was pursuing another road to nuclear weapons, the development, I think it was only fair you were obliged then to not continue in a framework that was going to permit that.

Now, the Six-Party framework has indeed arrested the North Korean production of plutonium. It has brought about significant, though not complete, disabling of the reactor itself and the facilities associated with it. It has, for the first time, begun the process of getting an accounting for what the North produced through the 18,000 or so production documents that we have. And we have agreement with the North on a verification protocol, but there is still work to do to make sure that that verification protocol covers all North Korean nuclear programs and that it will have the scientific procedures that are needed to really, fully account for what is going on there. I would say we've concluded 70-80 percent of it, but that other 20-30 percent is essential.

Now, what we've been able to do through the diplomacy of the Six-Party Talks, I think, is to begin to understand a little bit better what is happening there. And frankly, it's heightened our concerns about the HEU portion of the program. I think the intelligence community now believes that there is an undisclosed either imported or manufactured weapons-grade HEU in North Korea. That's a problem.

Q. These are the particles that were found on the—

Secretary Rice. Yeah, but that suggested something more is there, either manufactured or imported. We can't tell. We would never have known that without the Six-Party engagement on the North's programs. But it is why the verification protocol becomes even more important then to establishing what the nature and status of the HEU program is and what they've done with it and what they might do in the future.

So I think the framework that we have, the Six Parties, to recap: it's arrested the plutonium program and had significant disablement; it has begun a verification process that is really beginning to give us a clearer picture of what was going on there and is going on. But it's a picture that gets, if anything, more concerning and therefore pushes us to have a verification protocol that can really get at those issues. The North needs to come clean. But until they do, to speak to the last question about concessions—until they do, they have gotten fuel oil shipments up to a certain point; they're not going to get them further. We have the South Koreans, who after all in some ways are the most important in this, refusing to—or tying aid to denuclearization. And we have, going forward, the fact that this is still by far the most heavily sanctioned country in the world. And taking them off the terrorism list, we did in order to try to let the process on the verification protocol go forward. But they get no benefit in terms of the lifting of sanctions from the delisting in terms (inaudible).

Q. I mean, just to follow it up, all things being equal, isn't—wouldn't it have been better if that plutonium was not reprocessed? I mean, aren't we in the position of now having to negotiate with them to get what they've turned into bomb material?

Secretary Rice. Well, eventually you had to not just shut down the plutonium piece but start to disable and then get at the other elements of this program. And that's what the Six-Party framework has allowed me to do.

Yes, it's unfortunate that they reprocessed in that period of time, creating some stockpile of plutonium. But frankly, given the attention that is now there on their program in terms of proliferation, in terms of manufacture, in terms of disabling, and the fact that it's everybody who really has capacity—other countries that really have capacity to do something about it, I think is a very good development. So I think the Six-Party process has put us in a much better place to ending their nuclear weapons programs, and I mean all of them, where we were in a position at one point to simply freeze plutonium production but, as we found, they could open and do plutonium anytime they wished. That's not where you want to be, and this process has moved them closer to being unable to do that.

Q. Before we leave North Korea, do we have an accounting here directly from them or from other indirect sources of their dealings with Syria and how that reactor-like facility came to be built in Syria?

Secretary Rice. It is another set of issues and questions (inaudible) I think will have to be resolved within the process of verification. Now, the Chinese agreed shortly after the events surrounding the Syrian reactor that there should be a proliferation working group within the Six-Party Talks. Proliferation had not been a part of the—explicitly a part of the original Six-Party framework. I think everybody understood you would probably try to deal with proliferation when you talk about all nuclear programs, but it was not an explicit part of the program—part of the framework.

The Chinese, obviously recognizing the import of what was transpiring, then agreed not just to form one but to chair it. And I think it's in that context that you've got to ask hard questions about North Korean proliferation and whether it—you know, to how many states and under what circumstances.

Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed by Asahi Shimbun in Tokyo, Japan

Q. Secretary Clinton, thank you very much. We really appreciate your sharing your precious time with us. Our first question is about North Korea. What would you say the biggest difference between your Administration's policy towards North Korea, particularly North Korean nuclear issue, and the previous administration's policy towards North Korea.

Secretary Clinton. Well, the previous administration's policy changed, as you know, over time. And I think the ending policy—that we had to engage in the Six-Party Talks and even bilaterally with North Korea—is where they should have started, because I think that is exactly what we must do, and that we have to work closely with the other partners, particularly Japan and South Korea, and engage with China and Russia to bring influence to bear on North Korea to convince them that their pursuit of nuclear weapons is not acceptable and carries costs that are going to be quite high.

So we start from the premise that the Six-Party Talks are a good forum, and we will be appointing a successor envoy to Secretary Hill and engaging as broadly as we possibly can while trying to speak directly to the North Korean people and to the others in the government who are jockeying for position that there are benefits that they would obtain if they began to cooperate.

Q. How do you put that—the human rights issues in this context, in this approach, then?

Secretary Clinton. I believe that the agenda for the Six-Party Talks is a comprehensive one, denuclearizing in a verifiable and complete way, dealing with their missiles, and the human rights agenda, which includes the abductees.

Q. I see. On China, there have been various concerns about China's military buildup in the region, and particularly the nuclear buildup. Since you have started to talk about, you know, the initiation—re-initiation of START and also desired ratification CTBT, how do you put that—China's nuclear buildup in this context?

Secretary Clinton. That's an excellent question, and it is one of the issues I intend to discuss with the Chinese about the possibility of their becoming more involved in nonproliferation and arms control, as the Russians historically have been. China has a role that is important for them to play, and I hope that there will be an opportunity for us to begin negotiating on some of those issues.

Q. I see. So you are trying to initiate a bilateral negotiation? Is the process to discuss about this issue between the U.S. and China in the coming months and years?

Secretary Clinton. Yes. It will be a discussion that can very well lead to some process.

Q. I see. The U.S.-China-Japan— there have—some voices arguing for starting that new process among those three countries because, particularly on the global issues, there have emerged so much overlapping interests and concerns. And perhaps it is the right time for those three countries to get together to at least consult each other with those mutual interests and concerns. Do you agree to that?

Secretary Clinton. I think that's an idea worth exploring. Certainly, Japan and China and the United States have a lot of concerns in common. As you know, China and Japan both have historically exported a lot of goods to the United States. In this economic crisis, they're both confronting some difficult decisions. The United States has a great desire in creating a cooperative relationship among China, Japan, and ourselves. So we will be asking both countries if there are such opportunities for a trilateral dialogue that we could perhaps look forward to.

Q. Would it possibly include trilateral summits?

Secretary Clinton. Well, this is one of these ideas that is just being born, so I think we have to see whether we can create a format that is acceptable to all three countries.

Q. Specifically, in what way do you think that those three countries really should promote mutual understanding and explore the common approach with regard to the global warming, climate change issue?

Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that's a perfect example. Japan is further advanced than the United States and China in energy efficiency and clean energy technology. So creating a partnership among the three of us would benefit China and the United States, and economically benefit Japan. I think that helping China understand ways that it can lower emissions without undermining their economic growth, which is their big fear—you know, they look at Japan, how advanced Japan is. They look at the United States and they say, well, you know, we have a right to develop and give our people a higher standard of living. Well, they do. But it would be far better if they did so in a way that limited emissions and led to clean energy uses. Japan has so much to offer to China on that front. And we have partnerships that we can offer as well. So I think that's a perfect example for the kind of trilateral discussion that you referred to.

Mr. Wood. We have time for two more questions.

Q. Two more questions. Thank you very much. Your predecessor, Secretary Rice, skipped twice in attending the ARF, ASEAN Regional Forum, due to, perhaps, some good reasons. But the East Asian—Southeast Asian country, the officials—politicians were a bit disappointed with the lack of presence on the part of the United States. What is your view of the United States presence and commitment to Southeast Asian countries, particularly regional (inaudible) there?

Secretary Clinton. I think it's an important part of our global strategy to be involved with organizations like ASEAN. I certainly intend, whenever possible, to be at the regional meetings where the United States is invited to participate. And I hope that we can create even closer cooperation between the United States and the ASEAN countries.

Q. Are you planning to also participate in East Asian summit for United States?

Secretary Clinton. That I'm not as familiar with, so I will have to look at that. I know the timing on the ASEAN summit. I don't know the timing on the East Asian summit.

Q. Madame Secretary, this is my last question. As you know, the Japanese politics has been disarray and this sort of political immobility in Japan actually has already hampered the Japanese Government from pursuing otherwise more perhaps dynamic, more forthcoming approaches and postures. Do you think that this problem already has actually given you some troubles, at least some constraints for you to explore that, you know, common approach with Japan?

Secretary Clinton. I don't believe so. Of course, it is up to the Japanese people to determine their own political leadership. But I think that our alliance and partnership is durable, and it continues no matter who's in the White House in Washington, and it continues no matter who is in charge here in Tokyo. And I want to underscore that, because as important as my ministerial meetings are, and I had excellent meetings today with the foreign minister and the defense minister, and I'm looking forward to my dinner with the prime minister, the people of Japan and the people of the United States have a close relationship. We have so many values in common. We have a view about how, you know, it's possible to improve life for everyone by working together and having economic growth and prosperity. So I see our relationship as being very fundamental, and we look forward to working with whomever the people of Japan choose as their leaders.

Secretary Hillary Clinton was interviewed by Fox News in Seoul, South Korea

Q. Okay. Let's talk about Afghanistan to begin with. At the NATO defense ministers' conference, our allies only agreed to contribute an additional 1,400 troops. That's got to be a disappointingly low figure.

Secretary Clinton. Well, we are only at the beginning of that process. Secretary Gates knew that there were some who were ready to commit now, and obviously made the ask. But we are in the midst of our policy review, and I think that a number of countries are waiting to see more specifically what our plan is, why we think that their contribution of troops would be helpful. But also, it's important, James, to point out that we want their civilian help as well. We want their help training the Afghan army. We want their help training the Afghan police. So there's going to be a number of ways people can contribute.

Q. I want to ask about North Korea. And in doing so, I would like, because you're an attorney, to use a legal term of art. I wish to stipulate in advance that it is the plutonium reprocessing operations in North Korea that are of paramount concern.

Secretary Clinton. Yes.

Q. However, to the extent that highly enriched uranium programs are of intrinsic concern to American policymakers, I hope that we can discuss it solely on its own merits.

Secretary Clinton. Mm-hmm.

Q. I've been following your statements closely and, without parsing words or splitting hairs, taking them quite literally. Your statements on this issue have progressed just in the last few days. At the Senate confirmation hearing, you said it was never quite verified that that program exists. En route to Elmendorf Air Force Base, you said there was a debate within the intelligence community as to the extent of the program. And then yesterday, en route to Seoul, you said that one day you look forward to inspectors being able to determine what, if anything, existed.

Now, it's one thing to say we don't know if it presently exists. It's another thing to say we don't know the extent of it or how far it's progressed. But you're not in any doubt as to whether, quote, “if anything existed” at any time? You do believe that there was a program at some time?

Secretary Clinton. James, I am going to be as clear as I can be about this. I think that there is a sense, among many who have studied this, that there may be some program somewhere, but no one can point to any specific location nor can they point to any specific outcome of whatever might have gone on, if anything did.

And I hate to be so parsing, but I think it's important to underscore this point again. Do I believe that the North Koreans, if they could engage in producing highly enriched uranium, would attempt to do so? I mean, that seems to be their nuclear ambition. I don't have any doubt that they would try whatever they possibly could. Have they? I don't know that and nobody else does either. And I think what's important is to remember why this debate is still going on.

Clearly, there was some reason to believe that something having to do with highly enriched uranium—whether it was happening in North Korea, whether it had been imported into North Korea—was part of the information derived once we got inspectors into North Korea.

But I do believe it was an error to tear up the controls we had on the plutonium. Because what we do know for sure is that they went and reprocessed the plutonium. So we do have to work hard to figure out what, if anything, there is about highly enriched uranium, but that should not— that debate should not detract from our continuing emphasis about disabling their capacity to reprocess more plutonium. And sometimes those get—it's like, well, if we can't figure out one and do them both, we shouldn't do the other, and I just don't agree with that.

Q. You've led me to my next question. You have been fairly explicit at various points along the way in this trip in stating that it was a mistake for the Bush administration to jettison the Agreed Framework. And to a Japanese interviewer on this trip, you stated that the Bush administration changed its policy over time, and that you believe that the ending policy was where they should have started out.

Yet, when one of my colleagues in the traveling press corps at the Japanese foreign ministry the other day asked you if it was a mistake for the Bush administration to de-list North Korea in the absence of any more tangible concessions from the North, you said, I'm not going to get into an analysis of the past. Now, you're clearly content to analyze the past on some occasions, so I think it's fair to put the question to you again: Was that a mistake?

Secretary Clinton. I'm not going to comment on that, because that is part of the process we're engaged in right now. So this is still an open effort on our part, to get the North Koreans back to the Six-Party Talks. The role that that decision did play and might play in trying to engage them once again is of paramount concern to me right now. So I guess we could slightly amend what I said. And the immediate past—I think, we should, you know, look on going forward.

But I do think that we could have gone after the North Koreans based on whatever evidence we had about highly enriched uranium without giving up the control that we had established over the plutonium.

Secretary Hillary Clinton and Ambassador Stephen Bosworth delivered these remarks in Washington, DC

Secretary Clinton. Good afternoon. I am very pleased to be here today with Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, our Special Representative for North Korea Policy. He will be our senior official handling North Korea issues, and he will report to President Obama and me.

Ambassador Bosworth is wasting no time in undertaking his new assignment. Early next week, he will be departing for Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing and Moscow to consult on next steps to move the Six-Party process forward. Ambassador Bosworth, as some of you who have been around here a while know, is an experienced diplomat who will lead our efforts to address the full range of concerns with respect to North Korea, including its nuclear ambitions and its proliferation of sensitive weapons technology, as well as its human rights and humanitarian problems. He will work closely with our allies and partners to convince North Korea to become a constructive part of the international community.

Ambassador Bosworth will serve as our senior emissary for U.S. engagement with North Korea. Ambassador Sung Kim will be our Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks. He will closely work with Ambassador Bosworth and continue to lead our day-to-day efforts, including heading our Six-Party delegation and maintaining constant contact with our allies and our Six-Party partners.

Assistant Secretary Christopher Hill, our outgoing head of delegation for the Six-Party Talks, has invested great energy and skill in the years that he has served in this position. I am pleased that Secretary Hill has graciously agreed to continue serving our country by moving on to another challenging assignment.

Ambassador Bosworth has had a distinguished career that has prepared him well for this assignment. He is currently the dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. A three-time ambassador including to the Republic of Korea, he is an experienced envoy poised to interact with officials at the highest levels of foreign governments. We believe his involvement will facilitate high-level engagement with North Korea and our other partners, and enhance our efforts to move forward in the Six-Party process and to realize our goal of the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.

Ambassador Bosworth.

Ambassador Bosworth. Thank you very much, Madame Secretary. Let me say just very briefly I consider public service to be a privilege, and I am honored by the confidence that you and the President have shown in me in asking me to take on what is obviously a very important set of responsibilities, and I look forward to it.

I'm leaving with Ambassador Sung Kim early next week for the region. As the Secretary indicated, we will be having extensive conversations there. I look forward to seeing old friends and meeting new friends. Obviously, this is an enterprise in which the United States has a major role, but it is an enterprise which will not succeed unless we have the strong support of all of our allies and friends in the region. And I am going to dedicate myself, as I know Ambassador Hill has, to making sure that we move forward, but that we also move forward together. It's important to operate from a basis of consensus.

So thank you again. I am truly delighted to have another opportunity to serve my country. Thank you for the privilege.

Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much.

Mr. Wood. We have time for two—just two questions. The first one's Elise Labott, CNN.

Q. Okay. Thank you. Congratulations, Ambassador Bosworth. You were recently in North Korea. Can you talk to us about any conclusions you have from meeting North Korean officials about the willingness to engage with Washington, as Secretary Clinton has expressed on her trip, and—or whether you think they may be consumed with their own issues, like the succession that Secretary Clinton also talked about? And do you plan to meet any North Korean officials on your trip? Have you reached out to them, since you've been (inaudible)? Tell us about how you plan to engage with North Korea. Thank you.

Ambassador Bosworth. Well, obviously, we plan to engage with North Korea. The question as to whether we're going to engage with them on this particular trip remains to be decided. That will depend upon our consultations in the region, and it will depend upon what we hear back from the North Koreans.

I was there earlier this month as a member of a private delegation. At that point, I had no idea I was going to be returning so soon, nor indeed in this particular role. I found the North Koreans, I thought, quite inclined toward continued dialogue with the United States and a continued commitment with the people of the region and the Six-Party process. Now obviously, I was not there speaking for the United States. I was not there as an official representative. But in my judgment, they see the benefits to them of engagement with the outside world and are prepared to move ahead.

Now, as we all know, this is a very complex issue, and a lot depends upon their internal assessment of our intentions, the intentions of their neighbors. So I would stop by saying, yes, I think they are inclined to continue the process of dialogue that Ambassador Hill and his colleagues have begun.