In this book, Graeme B. Robertson's stated aim is “to develop an original theory of protest politics in hybrid regimes” (p. 3). He achieves this, and he also contributes to our understanding of activism in contemporary Russia. This mix of theoretical and empirical contributions will make the book of interest to a wide range of readers.
Robertson theorizes that the quantity and nature of protest in hybrid regimes—governments that contain elements of both authoritarianism and democracy—depend on three factors: organizational ecology, state mobilization strategies, and patterns of elite political competition. In brief, protest will be frequent and largely peaceful when the climate for organizing, or the organizational ecology, enables a strong, cohesive, autonomous opposition to exist. Otherwise, protest will tend to be rare and involve force or be hidden. The more the political elite mobilizes people and the greater the divisions within it, the higher the level of protest. Which elites engage in mobilization also illuminates who protests and in which locales they protest.
This theory is useful to our understanding of hybrid regimes in numerous ways. The theory emphasizes that the quantity and character of protest is more variable under hybrid regimes than it is in democracies and under authoritarian regimes. Of course, a likely reason is that “hybrid regime” remains a catch-all category. Robertson's book does not overcome this problem, but it does helpfully identify factors that shape protest in hybrid regimes. Identifying factors that explain different phenomena in hybrid regimes may ultimately be the path to a better definition. Additionally, the author's theory offers an alternative view of the reason hybrid regimes develop. His concept of state mobilization strategies emphasizes that hybrid regimes may be “deliberately designed to extract the benefits of competition while minimizing the likelihood of loss of control” (p. 12). In other words, leaders may create hybrid regimes as a way to maintain power. By contrast, others have argued that they are the failures of unsuccessful authoritarians or façades created for consumption by the international community.
Of the components of Robertson's theory, the concept of state mobilization strategies is the most valuable but also the most problematic. The concept is important because it moves theorizing about contentious politics forward. Specifically, it clarifies the idea of political opportunities. The idea of political opportunities, along with mobilizing structures and framing, are central to theories of contentious politics. However, as the author rightly points out, political opportunities have been conceptualized in a limited fashion, namely, as a regime opening or closing to societal influences. In contrast, his idea of state mobilization strategies highlights that the state may not simply provide an opportunity for activism but may intentionally mobilize people. This is an important elaboration of the leading theory of contentious politics.
The problem with the concept of state mobilization strategies is that it needs to be better defined. Theoretically, Robertson treats it as having a single dimension: Political elites either mobilize or do not. Empirically, however, we see that it has a second dimension: the identity of the political elites. In Russia, who protests, where they protest, and how much they protest depend on whether the regional or national political elites are leading the mobilization efforts (Table 1.2, p. 37). “State mobilization strategies” should be two separate variables. This is only a minor problem, and other scholars can apply the remedy, as Robertson's theory should be used to understand contentious politics outside of Russia as well.
Within Russia, the theory illuminates the evolution of protest. Robertson examines three periods, stretching from 1997 to 2008: the final years of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, Vladimir Putin's first presidential term, and his second. His theory accounts for the relatively high level of protest in the Yeltsin era, its decline under Putin initially, and slight rise during Putin's second presidential term. The extent of economic hardship can account for some of the change across time, too; however, the theory bests the economic explanation by also explaining who protests and where.
In the later years of the Yeltsin era, the relatively high level of protest was not consistent across regions of the country, the author shows. This finding is a nice addition to previous studies of activism that characterized Russians as passive in the face of economic challenges. He demonstrates that protest was, in fact, relatively frequent where citizens' and leaders' interests coincided. Specifically, protest was common in regions with leaders who were politically isolated from the national government. To improve their bargaining positions with Moscow, these leaders used their influence over unions to encourage citizens to strike. Regional leaders who already enjoyed a good relationship with Moscow discouraged strikes, and so protest in their territories was rare. Robertson illustrates this geographic variation using a novel data source—daily text reports from the Interior Ministry in each locality. (Otherwise he uses data from the Russian State Statistical Agency, Goskomstat, as other scholars have.) In terms of his theory, elite competition and state mobilization both resulted in high levels of protest during this period, and the latter accounted for variation across the country.
Under Putin, elite competition has decreased and state mobilization has shifted, and so the extent and nature of protest has changed, as Robertson's theory would predict. During his first presidential term, Putin reduced regional autonomy through a series of institutional measures and established an effective “party of power.” These efforts reduced competition among elites. Regional leaders began to demonstrate their loyalty to the president instead of using coercive bargaining tactics. They encouraged demobilization instead of mobilization, so protest levels fell.
During his second presidential term, Putin and his staff mobilized potential supporters, particularly youths, in response to the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and a demonstration by pensioners in Russia in 2005. Activism increased; however, it differed in character from activism in the Yeltsin era: Now, demonstrations were in favor of the regime. It is this description of state mobilization during Putin's second term that provides the best evidence in the book for the intentionality behind hybrid regimes or Robertson's claim that hybrid regimes are “deliberately designed” (p. 12). While interviews with national political elites would have clinched this argument, the correlation between events threatening to Putin's regime and the regime's new political tactics is compelling.
Ironically, state mobilization strategies under Putin have also resulted in a rejuvenation of the opposition, according to Robertson. The opposition has become more cohesive and active, and the author identifies this as a potential catalyst for regime change. It is also worth asking whether the regime's techniques to manage protest, created during a period of relatively high oil prices and economic prosperity, would be sustainable during a domestic economic crisis. The reduction in elite competition has relied on a system of patronage funded by oil revenue and has honed the target for potential protesters' complaints. So, a decline in oil revenue, and thus patronage funds, may revive elite competition and enable the opposition to more effectively frame their grievances.
In sum, this book provides a theory of protest in hybrid regimes, which clarifies the impact and raison d'être of hybrid regimes, elaborates on explanations for contentious politics, and illuminates activism in contemporary Russia. It is a thought-provoking book that is worth reading.
