In the 1980s, Susan Moller Okin energized feminist theory by an act equivalent to pulling back the curtain on the Wizard of Oz. She challenged John Rawls' Theory of Justice (1971) by questioning how the family could remain opaque to notions of justice and suggesting that the well-being of supposedly autonomous citizens in a democracy in fact depended on the subordination of women that made the two-parent family close to universal. Thirty years later, the two-parent family has ceased to be universal and the decline of marriage has exacerbated class-based inequality. Yet we are no closer to a full examination of the relationship of the state, the family, and the idea of justice.
In The Supportive State, Maxine Eichner attempts to fill that gap. Her central claim is that the state has “a responsibility to support caretaking and human development” (p. 52). She situates the importance of caretaking—for the young, for the elderly, and for mutual support among adults—among the goods upon which a liberal state depends. By “liberal” she means classic liberalism, which argues for a limited state that respects individual autonomy and the equality of all citizens in a democracy. Liberal theory, dating back to John Stuart Mill, has recognized that dependent children become good citizens only through appropriate rearing. Yet Mill's argument for liberty assumed the existence of nonstate institutions, the family principally among them, providing the appropriate nurturance. Okin's analysis asked, what if these institutions themselves are unjust? Eichner adds, what if they fail? If the family no longer supports the dependent and if it cannot do so without subordinating women, the results may marginalize a large segment of society and hinder democratic self-governance. Moreover, she maintains that the strength of the family reflects not just individual virtue but also economic conditions, which in turn reflect public policy.
Eichner recalls Frederick Engels' critique of factory conditions in nineteenth-century England and how the “grueling demands of the workplace drained families of their nurturing function … suffocated feelings of love and affection, eviscerated caretaking and led to the breakdown of the family” (p. 56). She observes that the breakdown of the family today similarly reflects the absence of jobs for blue-collar men, workplace conditions that fail to take family needs into account, and the demonstrated relationship between economic stress and domestic violence. In short, she concludes that the state has an obligation to promote caretaking and that the health of family life serves as a scorecard on the effectiveness of its efforts.
The author is at her best in explaining how the state can support caretaking without either placing the burden so disproportionately on women that it denies them equal citizenship or intruding so directly in the conduct of the family that the state becomes oppressive. She argues, for example, that the state should play a greater role in structuring institutions that provide care, rather than in directly providing or subsidizing the care itself. She rejects both Martha Fineman's claim that children are “public goods” whose care should be seen as a state responsibility and Mary Ann Case's claim that subsidized support unfairly requires the childless to pay for others' personal satisfaction. Instead, she crafts an intermediate position that places the primary responsibility for children on their families, with a secondary role for the state as cop (enforcing a floor for adequate care) and cheerleader (mandating, for example, paid family leave as a way to encourage caretaking).
Progressives will find Eichner to be most provocative in arguing that the state can and should privilege two-parent families, but she almost immediately eschews any measures that disadvantage other families. If that leaves the reader wondering what “privilege” entails, as a practical matter, it means continuing to recognize marriage and adopting policies such as job-training programs that foster the likelihood of multiparent families, but not marriage-dependent tax or welfare benefits that would further skew existing inequality.
Eichner's analysis is almost always reasonable, indeed maddeningly so, as she systematically favors nudges toward the right outcomes rather than coercive or punitive state policies, without asking what happens when the nudges fail to produce the desired results. Lurking just below the surface, however, are potentially radical conclusions. If the liberal state has an obligation to promote caretaking, what happens when the policies favored by Eichner fail? The elephant in the room on the issue of family health is growing societal inequality. Greater inequality, particularly greater male income inequality, skews family form. At the top, as Eichner acknowledges, the gendered income gap remains and the traditional two-parent family is alive and well. Farther down the socioeconomic ladder, the two-parent family is under siege, in large part because of the disappearance of the stable blue-collar jobs she discusses. Further aggravating the class gap are reproductive practices she does not mention. The middle class channels greater investment into children through careful control of timing and number. Yet the United States as a whole has a larger percentage of unplanned births than other developed nations. That is so because of the combination of the debilitating effects of greater inequality (a promising future is the best contraceptive) and the political refusal to systematize access to contraception and abortion. The debate between Fineman and Case was not just about state subsidization of child care; it was also about the state interest in the trade-off between the quality and quantity of children who would be born. In a privatized world, it is hard to support caretaking without promoting the birth of more children into marginal circumstances.
The Supportive State carefully argues that the liberal order must respect family autonomy, but the observation that state policies influence family form has profound implications. Eichner makes a persuasive case that the liberal state has an obligation to support caretaking. The converse of the argument is that family health serves not just as one of many goods the state should promote but as a critical barometer of societal justice. This suggests that a theory of the state that makes caretaking a first-order good also makes it fundamental in the evaluation of the acceptable trade-offs that underlie public policy more generally. If we assume, for example, as a growing body of evidence indicates, that greater inequality itself harms family stability, would liberal theory compel adoption of more egalitarian policies even at the expense of greater economic “inefficiency”? Does the state have an obligation to address class-based differences in fertility in order to compel greater equality? Must it champion stronger families even if higher taxes or greater regulation limit the autonomy of the wealthy? If greater inequality is inevitably a threat to the family, does that make it intrinsically incompatible with justice for that reason alone?
Making the family not just a visible component of justice but central to it requires a fundamental reconception of political theory. The very idea of dependence—that is, the inevitable dependence of the young, the elderly, and the infirm—is a challenge to liberal notions of autonomy. The liberal state rests on principles of equal respect for all citizens and the identification of minimum conditions necessary to realize that respect. The emergence of the two-parent family as a marker of class—while it continues to function as an important correlate of children's well-being—operates as a fundamental indictment of the possibility of either true autonomy or justice in such a society. Eichner's book thus throws down a gauntlet for those who would integrate the changing modern family into principles for the good society.
