Sara Brill's Aristotle on the Concept of the Shared Life aims to situate Aristotle's thinking about human political community within the broader context of his thought about animal sociality and life as such. One goal is to enrich our understanding of Aristotle by exploring connections between the various perspectives on human life that he develops in his ethical, political, and biological works. Another is to challenge views about the relationships between the political and the biological in recent critical theory, especially the work of Giorgio Agamben. Agamben appeals to a distinction between “bare” biological life and “meaningful, political, discursive life” (3), a contrast he takes to align with an ancient Greek distinction between zōē and bios. He thus joins Arendt and Heidegger in a tradition that associates animality with biological necessity and envisions it as transcended by and in conflict with the distinctively human realm of the rational and the political; the human is separate from and involves a rejection of animality. Brill maintains that the same sort of view also pervades interpretations of Aristotle by scholars from more analytic philosophical traditions. One of her book's central contentions is that for Aristotle, on the contrary, human political life is an expression of animality rather than a rejection of it, an intensification of animal sociality rather than something that separates humans from their animal nature. Even those features that distinguish human beings from other animals are rightly understood only in light of the continuity between humans and all other living things. Language and the capacity for choice help make human shared life more intense and fragile than other forms of animal sociality, but we fully grasp the promises and pathologies of human community only when we see that “the relation between human being and polis is an intensified form of the relation between any animal and its proper habitat” (29). The “ecological character of Aristotle's approach to animal life” (146) enables us to appreciate how political institutions make up part of human beings’ bios, “the manner in which the animal's parts, actions, and character are integrated into a single way of taking up the task of living” (145–46). That task is zōē, “the single complex activity” (8) of living as such shared by all living things.
This understanding of the concepts of zōē and bios differs considerably from Agamben's; for Aristotle, there is no “bare life,” and politics, reason, and meaning are not repudiations of what we share with other living things, but our peculiar way of engaging in the activity that we share with them. In these respects, Aristotle might seem to offer an attractive alternative to Agamben, one less alienated from the body and animality as such. Yet Aristotle's thought by no means emerges from this book as a heroic corrective to the errors of contemporary critical theory. On the contrary, Brill takes aim at the “structural misogyny” (27, 148) of Aristotle's thinking and “the commodification of life” (30, 208) that she finds in his commitment to private ownership of property, his critique of usury, and his eagerness for eugenics legislation. She claims to unearth the roots of these pernicious aspects of his thought in an “alienated stance toward human natality” (3), itself born of a frustrated “natal longing” (6, 230) that in turn generates a vision of politics as fundamentally aimed at “the management of generativity” (6, 204). So there is no simplistic celebration of Aristotle here, but a complex and ambivalent exploration of a way of thinking in some ways radically different from contemporary theorizing.
Readers of Aristotle who take their bearings from Agamben may thus find a provocative and challenging alternative in this book. Others may be more impressed by its shortcomings. I offer just a few examples. First, Brill overstates the extent to which recent analytic philosophical scholarship has found a repudiation or rejection of animality in Aristotle's conception of human nature. Familiar as such readings may be from Heidegger, Arendt, and Agamben, Brill cites few cases among “analytically oriented scholars of ancient philosophy” (7), and those cases are hardly unambiguous. For most scholars, it is uncontroversial that Aristotle regards human beings as a kind of animal; for this reason, much of Brill's argument against the view that humanity involves a rejection of animality has the feel of someone breaking through an open door. Admittedly, debates continue about just how Aristotle thinks human beings differ from other animals (see especially Geert Keil and Nora Kreft, eds., Aristotle's Anthropology [Cambridge University Press, 2019]). On its face, however, Brill's central claim is not in dispute in those debates, which she does not address in detail. It is therefore unclear how, if at all, her contentions contribute to them. Similarly, though Brill herself notes that for Aristotle, “living is said in many ways” (14), she writes as though “living” were a univocal term, the name for a “single complex activity” (8) at work in plants, fish, birds, deer, humans, and gods. Yet Aristotle appears to argue instead that “life” is a homonymous term, such that no single account applies to all these cases (DA II.2 413a20–b4; Top. VI.10 148a26–31). If so, then what, if anything, unifies the various kinds of life and licenses our using the same word for all of them? Does Aristotle have a coherent, plausible account of the homonymy of life? Brill does not raise these questions, and what she says does not point toward a clear answer to them (for a careful treatment, see, e.g., Christopher Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle [Oxford University Press, 1999], 176–93).
Besides underexploring important questions and debates, Brill also engages in a kind of psychologizing hermeneutics that many will find inadequately defended, if not objectionable in principle. She sees many of Aristotle's views as rooted in anxiety, fear, and disgust, especially with regard to human reproduction, and she asserts that fantasies about controlling reproduction are at the core of his political thought (esp. 164–69, 204–5, 222–27, 254). Brill does not claim that Aristotle announces these motives explicitly, but neither does she argue that they are logically implicit in what he says or that they provide the best explanation of why he says what he says. Yet some such argument is necessary if we are to have any reason at all to believe that these psychological descriptions were true of Aristotle in the first place, let alone that they help us to understand his texts more adequately than we otherwise might. Even if we set aside objections to the very idea of textual interpretation as psychology, we simply do not find arguments here sufficient to support these psychological diagnoses. Alternative explanations for Aristotle's claims seem easy enough to construct, and we should require more argument before concluding that his beliefs and arguments were instead the product of the hidden emotions that Brill attributes to him.
For these reasons, specialists in Aristotle will likely not learn a great deal from this book. It may well succeed, however, in its goal of opening up rather than foreclosing engagement with Aristotle's texts among students of contemporary critical theory (11).
