This book offers the most complete extant critical edition, and the first French separate edition, of Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella. Text and translation are presented on facing pages. The translation, which has also been published by Flammarion (L. Brisson and J.-F. Pradeau, Porphyre. Lettre à Marcella. Vie de Pythagore [2023]), masterfully preserves both the letter and the spirit of the Greek, without compromising on the elegance of the French language. What is new is the edition of the Greek text, which is based on a careful examination of the sole surviving manuscript (Biblioteca Ambrosiana Q13 sup., pp. 215–22; belonging to Bessarion, copied by Georgios Dishypatos Galesiotis in the 1450s) and critically discusses all previous editorial work. The introduction also incorporates some new material. A dozen endnotes have been added (nn. 6, 28, 35, 56, 69, 82, 87, 88, 106, 111, 115, 134), while some existing ones have been enhanced with extra information. The volume is supplemented by an appendix, three indexes and a bibliography usefully subdivided into six thematic sections.
The book’s strongest point is probably the excellent critical apparatus, both exhaustive and clear. For instance, at Marc. 11.8 P., unlike É. des Places, who proposes ἀγάλλοντα <τοῦ θϵοῦ>, follows W. Poetcher, who opts for ἀγάλλοντος θϵοῦ, whereas the manuscript reads ἀγάλλοντα … θϵὸς [lac. ca. 8 litt.]. What if the missing word were ἀγάλματα (8 letters)? Then one would read ἐνϵικονισαμένου ἀγάλλοντα [ἀγάλματα] θϵοῦ. The ἀγάλλοντα [ἀγάλματα] could be understood as referring to the Forms or Individual Intellects considered as living statues within the living statue corresponding to the Hypostasis Intellect. Θϵοῦ ἐνϵικονισαμένου could point either to Intellect as self-hypostasised (Porph. fr. 223.7–9 Smith) or to the One, which Intellect reflects (Marc. 13.11: ἐνοπτριζόμϵνος). As P. observes (n. 50 p. 94), Porphyry echoes Plotinus V.8.5, where the Forms are compared to divine statues within the soul of the wise man (τὸ ἱϵρόν at Marc. 11.7) identified with Intellect (Enn. V.8.5.20–5). Some editorial choices, such as, for example, θϵοῦ (Mai followed by all editions) instead of θϵόν (cod.) in Marc. 13.12, may seem dubious. Here the accusative works well as the object of the participle ἐνοπτριζόμϵνος: Intellect sees God, namely the One, in itself as if in a mirror, and this self-contemplation is what ‘creates’ the duality of Intellect.
The text and critical apparatus should be read together with the endnotes, which form the more extensive section of the book. They offer a wealth of information while also shedding light on uncertain readings, lacunae and text difficulties. For instance, n. 6 (p. 76) discusses the syntax of Marc. 1.12–14. An alternative solution could be to take βαστάσαι (13) to depend on ϵἱλόμην (2). Then the translation would run as follows: ‘Ce n᾽était pas, enfin, en vue d’un quelconque calcul d’intérêt … que j’ai volontiers choisi de me charger d’un tel fardeau par seul envie de bien faire’. The discussion of Marc. 34.1–2 in n. 134 (p. 118) is indicative of P.’s attention to detail. Unlike previous editors, who read ἕνϵκα instead of Mai’s ἔναρα (‘spoils’), he proposes that ἔναρα could be a gloss explaining how a part may be cut off for the preservation of the whole. However, his suggestion does not seem very plausible: there is no reference to military affairs, whereas corpses, which could hardly be considered as spolia, and artilleries are not, strictly speaking, ‘parts’ of an army. It seems more likely that ἕνϵκα is an annotation – not necessarily an addition – by which Galesiotis endeavours to clarify the meaning of Marc. 34.1–2. His point is, I submit, the following: τῆς ψυχῆς is the object of an omitted ἕνϵκα (equivalent to ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ) and not an indirect object of ἀποκόπτϵιν. By analogy, to complement τῆς ψυχῆς <ἕνϵκα> (34.2), we should read ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ <τοῦ σώματος> (34.1). The parts of the body are cut off for the salvation of the body, not for salvation tout court. Porphyry does not refer to the prohibited (D.F. Caner, Vigiliae Christianae 51 [1997]) act of self-mutilation, like, for instance, Origen’s alleged self-castration (Eus. HE VI.8). Origen (ComMt XV.3) interprets Sextus’ corresponding maxims (13 and 273) as encouraging self-castration. Porphyry has in mind medical amputation. At Marc. 34.2 he does not recommend cutting off the body from the soul, but cutting off the body for the sake of the soul. He does not encourage suicide, which is forbidden (Pl. Phd. 61c–62a; Plot. Enn. I.9; Porph. Abst. I.38.2; Antr. 35; VPlot. 11.12–21), but rather the soul’s liberation from the body, so that the soul may rule over (ἄρχϵιν) the body. The syntax ἀποκόπτϵιν τῆς ψυχῆς <ἕνϵκα> points to prioritising the soul by ‘excluding’ the body. If, for the salvation of the body, it may sometimes be necessary to have a limb removed, then, by analogy, for the salvation of the soul, one should be prepared to ‘cut off’ the whole body, that is, to free the soul from the body through philosophy, as described in Plato’s Phaedo. Parallels occur in Porphyry’s Sententiae 8 and 9 (I.-F. Viltanioti, Ancient Philosophy 38 [2018]) and in Sent. 31.7 (on the body’s being ‘in’ the soul albeit not locally; Porph. fr. 253.29–37 and 57–76 Smith; Cat. 78.2–5 Busse).
A few meaningful additions here and there are possible. For instance, mentioning Enn. III.4 would have been welcome in nn. 8, 81, 86; in n. 35 καθηγϵμών (Marc. 8.2) evokes Plato’s designation of Pythagoras as ἡγϵμὼν παιδϵίας (Pl. R. X.600a); n. 130 could have included a reference to Plato’s Gorgias 523e. In n. 14 and in the introduction (pp. 29–30) P. investigates the debated question concerning the meaning of ‘the need of the Greeks’ (Marc. 4.6). He persuasively disconnects this enigmatic allusion from Porphyry’s purported participation in the preparations of the Great Persecution, a hypothesis based on Lactantius (DI V.2). Some additional bibliography would have been useful here.Footnote 1 As P. shows, it is far more likely that Porphyry had to travel to Athens or Rome for the needs of the Platonic Schools.
The introduction consists of fifteen sections covering a range of topics, from Porphyry’s life, works and views to the purpose, sources and content of the Letter to Marcella. It provides the necessary context and background information, while offering some thought-provoking insights, such as the idea that, like Odysseus’ nostos, Porphyry’s and Marcella’s reunion serves as an allegory for the soul’s ascent (pp. 25–7); the ‘platonisation’ of Epicureanism (pp. 33–6, also appendix p . 128); the comparison between three kinds of law (Marc. 25) and the hierarchy of virtues in Porphyry’s Sent. 32 (pp. 30–3), where Plot. Enn. IV.3.15.10–23, III.1.10 and III.4.6.47–60 would also have been relevant. The depiction of Porphyry and his legacy (pp. 1–14) could have been more in line with recent trends, which stress his originality and importance in the Neoplatonic tradition.Footnote 2 Nowadays one could hardly describe Porphyry as an ‘interprète poussif’ of ‘notoriété limitée’ (p. 12). The section on Porphyry’s use of Sextus’ Sententiae and other gnomologia (pp. 18–25) should be read in combination with the critical apparatus’ fontes and parallela, and with the synoptic table in the appendix (pp. 119–27). Similar tables are found in A. Sodano (Porfirio, Vangelo di un Pagano [20062], pp. 127–33) and I.-F. Viltanioti (‘Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella’, in: A.-B. Renger and A. Stavru, Pythagorean Knowledge from the Ancient to the Modern World [2016], pp. 171–83).
P.’s book offers the best available edition of Porphyry’s Letter to Marcella enhanced with rich supplementary material. It is now impossible to study the Letter without consulting this book, which will also be useful to anyone interested in Porphyry and/or late ancient philosophy and literature.
