The books reviewed here shed light, from different angles, on the evolution of Iraqi Kurdistan toward statehood since the establishment of a safe haven in 1991. There are a Kurdish regional government, a Kurdish parliament (for some time in fact two such autonomous institutions), and a Kurdish judiciary that function independently of the center in Baghdad; the Kurdish language has replaced Arabic in official publications and in education at all levels; and the Kurdish peshmerga forces are integrated in the Iraqi National Army but are in sole control of the Kurdish autonomous region and its boundaries. Although political leaders still speak of federalism and autonomy within Iraq, the population appears to be massively in favor of independence. The American invasion and occupation of Iraq and the ensuing civil war have greatly strengthened the hands of the Kurds, to the dismay of their Turkish and Iranian neighbors.
Robert Olson's latest book, The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq Since the Iraqi War, is a chronicle of developments in Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkish–Kurdish relations during a two-year period roughly beginning with the American attack in March 2003. His focus is—in his own words—on the consequences of the American invasion on “consolidation of Kurdish nationalism” and on state-formation processes in the Kurdish-administered part of Iraq (p. 18). His contention is that the invasion and occupation of Iraq “greatly facilitated” these state formation processes, although there were also developments that appeared to economically integrate the Kurdish region in a larger “capitalist” economy (p. 233). The goat and butcher in his title are meant to be metaphors for “the lower intelligentsia and bureaucratic classes supported by popular nationalism” and “the emergent bourgeois class that is always looking for a market” (p. 1) or, elsewhere in the book, simply “nationalists” and “capitalists.” Olson does not hide his sympathy for goats attempting to escape the butcher's knife, but the metaphor does not help much to understand the actual dynamics of social and economic developments in the region; rather, it obscures them.
Unlike the authors of the other books discussed here, Olson did not visit the Kurdish region or speak to any of the actors involved—Kurdish, Arab, Turkish, or American. His main sources for this study are the Turkish newspapers Hürriyet and the Turkish Daily News and the (U.K.-based, English-language) Kurdish website Kurdmedia.com. The limitations inherent in this dependence on few and biased primary sources are too obvious to be mentioned, but Olson's long-standing involvement with the history of Kurdish nationalism should enable him to contextualize the news reporting. Hürriyet is a notoriously unreliable newspaper, but it is also the mouthpiece of certain sections of Turkey's state apparatus and the Kemalist elite. Its commentaries often reflect the concerns of vested interests that feel threatened by the rise of Kurdish nationalism, the liberal democratic Islamism of the current government party, AKP, and the prospect of Turkey's accession to the European Union.
The chief merit of Olson's book is, in fact, its coverage of Turkish perceptions and Turkish responses to developments in Iraq. The reader gets an idea of the humiliation felt by the Turkish military when in July 2003 American troops arrested eleven Turkish soldiers (who allegedly were preparing, together with local Turcoman politicians, to assassinate the Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk) and placed bags over their heads, treating them like ordinary terrorist suspects. This “bag affair,” which Olson repeatedly refers to in the book (pp. 27–28, 242), was quite important in the emergence of a wave of xenophobic Turkish nationalism. It inspired the enormously popular film Valley of the Wolves—Iraq, in which a few good men travel to Iraq to mete out bloody revenge for this insult to national honor, and a spate of popular writing in which the incident proves that the Turks have no friends but the Turks. None of this, however, is discussed by Olson.
Olson shows how, in spite of visceral opposition to the very idea of Kurdish nationality and Kurdish institution building, and in contrast to their numerous threats of military intervention in northern Iraq, the Turkish authorities have acquiesced in the consolidation of the Kurdish regional government and how diplomatic and economic relations between Turkey and the Kurdish region expanded. The Turkish journalist and businessman Ilnur Çevik established, with permission if not encouragement from the Turkish Armed Forces, a Kurdish satellite-television station for Barzani's KDP, in an effort to draw viewers away from the PKK's satellite broadcasts. Çevik has been one of a handful of well-connected advocates of closer political and economic relations between Turkey and the Kurdish autonomous region. Although Turkey's official ideology stands in the way of acceptance of any Kurdish political entity, geopolitical considerations, such as the wish to join the European Union, and the need to maintain the strategic alliance with the United States and Israel, Olson suggests, have made the government more accommodating in deeds than in words.
The organization of the book is not thematic but strictly chronological, so that certain major issues, such as the status and demography of Kirkuk, Turkey's relations with the Iraqi Turcomans, the presence of PKK guerrilla camps in Iraqi Kurdistan, tension between the AKP government and the Turkish Armed Forces, and Turkey's diplomatic relations with the Kurdish regional government, recur in several chapters but are nowhere discussed systematically. There are also surprising gaps in coverage, and Olson disappoints in not providing sufficient context to many of the events he reports. His reporting on the Turcomans is mostly based on press statements in Hürriyet of the Iraqi Turcoman Front—which is a Turkish front in more than one sense—without an indication that this is only one of various Turcoman organizations. The September 2004 American offensive against the largely Turcoman city of Tal Afar, halfway between Mosul and the Syrian border, receives much attention because of angry Turkish reactions, but Olson makes no effort to analyze the background of the conflict. He juxtaposes without further comment statements by American, Iraqi Turcoman Front, and Turkish government spokespersons, as well as the claim by Assyrian scholar Eden Naby that the Kurds were engaged in ethnic cleansing of Christians and Turcomans. Concerning the PKK leadership in Iraq, there is some tantalizing information on a major split in its ranks in June 2004 and the decision of the main faction to resume guerrilla struggle, but we get no idea what the split was about or why the fighting resumed. Foreign trips of the Iraqi Kurdish leaders are duly noted and their public statements summarized, but the internal dynamics of Iraqi Kurdish politics remain largely invisible. Readers looking for an analysis of the political developments in Iraqi Kurdistan will find the reports of the International Crisis Group more useful than this book.
A book that seemed to promise important new insights into recent developments in Kurdistan—the blurb on the dust jacket claims that “this book will supplant a number of standard texts on the Kurds”—is Denise Natali's The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (Syracuse University Press, 2005). Unlike Olson, who wrote in Kentucky (although armed with Turkish newspapers and considerable background knowledge), Natali has lived in Kurdistan for much of the past fifteen years. She was involved with several international relief agencies in Iraqi Kurdistan and spent more time there than any Western author of whom I am aware. Few of her personal observations and interviews shine through in the book, however; most of what she writes is based on her reading of a large but haphazard body of secondary materials.
The main body of the book is a narrative history of what she calls Kurdayetî, “Kurdish national identity,” in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, by which she intends to show how Kurdayetî can manifest itself in different forms depending on political circumstances. Under certain conditions, Natali writes, Kurdayetî becomes “ethnicized and salient,” by which she appears to mean that Kurdish groups start making territorial demands (for autonomy or independence) (pp. xviii, 69, 91, 149). She points out that in many situations Kurds have accommodated themselves with the existing state system and have emphasized other identities—socialist, religious, civic—besides or instead of their Kurdish ethnic identity. She argues that it was usually in cases in which the state elite did not allow free expression of Kurdish ethnic identity that Kurdayetî became “ethnicized” and separatist. The more complex and open the political space is, and the more options the state allows Kurdish actors, the lesser the likelihood that they will radicalize and opt out of the system.
This analysis has policy implications, and Natali concludes the book with recommendations to the Iraqi, Iranian, and Turkish governments, as well as to Kurdish communities. The former are urged to “manage the Kurdish problem” by allowing sufficient space for the expression of ethnic identity and decentralizing the political system. The latter are told to show responsible behavior and channel their political claims not through radical nationalist or Islamist groups but through “human-rights organizations, the European Parliament, and foreign governments” (p. 189). (There are Kurds, of course, who believe that it was precisely the dependence of Iraqi Kurdish leaders on foreign governments that was to blame for some of the worst disasters of the past.)
The book disappoints most where my expectations were highest: Natali has very little to say about the concrete situation on the ground in Iraqi Kurdistan, and her descriptions of developments in Iranian Kurdistan in the 1980s or in Turkey in the 1990s are partial and unbalanced. As a history of the Kurdish movement, it will by no means supplant David McDowall's A Modern History of the Kurds.
For understanding the current situation in Iraqi Kurdistan and the prospects for the near future, two other books, written before the American invasion and occupation, are much more helpful. The beautifully written travel account by Christiane Bird, A Thousand Sighs, A Thousand Revolts (Ballantine, 2004), gives a better insight into Kurdish society and the concerns of ordinary Kurdish men and women than any other recent book I know. Bird spent three months in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2002, complemented by another few months in the neighboring Turkish and Iranian parts, and shows herself to be a keen observer and a sensitive and sympathetic interviewer. Recounting the personal memories of men and women who lived through deportations and torture, the chemical bombing of Halabja and the Anfal offensive, the uprising and mass flight of 1991, the civil war between the KDP and PUK, and the struggle to rebuild their society, she evokes the traumas but also the resilience of this society. Great political events loom large in the background, but Bird's focus is especially on Kurdish individuals—their lives, experiences, concerns, and ambitions. Hardly anyone she meets is colorless and ordinary, and she interviews some really formidable women and men, but she also has an eye for the little things of everyday life, from food and fashion to jokes and popular music. Gender relations, changing dress codes, and restrictions on women's freedom of movement figure prominently in the conversations she reports. The 1991 uprising was a time of greater freedom for women, but with the establishment of Kurdish self-rule, many of the old restrictions reappeared. Gossip and reports of honor killings are powerful mechanisms of social control, and many of the young women Bird interviews appear resigned to giving up their ambitions. This makes the few unmarried women who do pursue public careers even more remarkable.
The Iraqi Kurds interviewed by Bird generally held strong pro-American views and with only one major exception were hoping for direct military intervention in Iraq. In this respect the Kurds of Turkey could hardly differ more—reflecting the fact that U.S. policymakers have always treated Kurdish rights in Iraq and Kurdish rights in Turkey as entirely different matters and have consistently supported Turkey's repression of Kurds. Bird's interviews with Turkish Kurds constitute an interesting counterpoint to the Iraqi Kurdish narratives and help to illuminate, among other things, the mystery of the lasting popularity of the PKK and its imprisoned leader Öcalan among the common Kurdish population.
Another book that covers a lot of new ground is Gareth Stansfield's study of state-formation processes, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy. Although completed before the American invasion and therefore not covering the latest developments, it remains highly relevant to understanding the current situation. Stansfield focuses on the two major political parties, KDP and PUK, and on the regional government of Kurdistan, analyzing formal structures and de facto decision-making processes on the basis not only of interviews with key personalities but also of direct observation. He arrives at conclusions that considerably nuance the general perception of highly personalistic and arbitrary rule by the party leaders, Masud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, and that are optimistic about the stability of the evolving political institutions of the Kurdish region.
In 1992, a year after the creation of a safe haven in northern Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds organized elections for a regional assembly and established a coalition government. Due to a high threshold, only the two major parties were represented in this parliament, miraculously with equal numbers (apart from a few seats reserved for minorities). A regional government was formed on a fifty–fifty basis, all positions of influence equally divided between the two parties, and each minister “assisted” by a deputy of the rival party. Barzani and Talabani did not take up positions in the government and remained the most powerful actors in the background. Rivalry between the two parties, compounded by unequal access to economic resources (the KDP controlled transit and cross-border trade with Turkey, by far the largest source of income), immobilized the government and by 1994 had escalated into open fighting. Militarily, the parties were equally strong, but in 1996 the KDP called in the support of the Iraqi army to expel the PUK from the city of Arbil, the seat of the regional government and parliament. Although severely beaten, the PUK managed to recover with Iranian support and regain control of the southern part of Iraqi Kurdistan. After two more years of intermittent fighting and mediation efforts by the United States, a stable territorial separation between the two parties was finally achieved, with two regional parliaments and governments, based in Arbil and Sulaimaniya respectively.
Stansfield describes these developments in detail. He shows convincingly that the Kurdish parties are neither monolithic nor completely controlled by their leaders, as is widely assumed. He points out the various factions within each party and the bases of their strengths. In his description, the parties are much more similar to one another than has often been stated (the old image of the KDP as dominated by tribes and the PUK by urban middle classes still persists in much writing on the Kurds). He plays down the amount of influence that large tribes are often alleged to have in post-1991 Kurdistan. The anthropologist Andreas Wimmer has described the parties as little more than tribal confederations held together in an elaborate system of clientelism; Stansfield stresses that the formal structure of the parties is quite institutionalized and that, again contrary to widely held views, bureaucratic rationalization is even more developed in the KDP than in the PUK.
He is even more upbeat about the dual administration of the Kurdish region. The territorial separation and institution of two parallel regional governments allowed for consolidation and greater effectiveness of the administrations, which were no longer paralyzed by interparty rivalry and could less easily be destabilized by foreign (i.e., Turkish and Iranian) governments. Both administrations included some of the smaller parties that had previously been excluded. Stansfield found ministries in both governments to be driven by formal decision-making rules rather than character. The major differences between them could be attributed to the available resources: the PUK administration had a poor resource base and was therefore forced to cooperate more closely with (international) nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations, whereas the KDP administration enjoyed greater financial independence. Stansfield concludes that Iraqi Kurds had almost accidentally invented their own model of consociational democracy, with some form of democratic centralism in each of the two subregions, integrated by gradually improving communication between the elites of both.
Stansfield is a benign observer, and he sometimes seems to take his interviewees' words too easily at face value, but his observations of the degree of institutionalization and professionalism of the administrations appear to be borne out by later developments. After the overthrow of the Baءth regime, the two Kurdish administrations reunited, and the parties highly effectively represented common Kurdish interests in negotiations with the other political forces. With Talabani and Barzani complementing one another as presidents of Iraq and of the Kurdish region, the Kurds appear well poised to defend their gains of the past decade.
