In Cause for Thought: An Essay in Metaphysics, John Burbidge offers a compelling alternative account of causality, one that is in contrast with classical forward-moving causal determinacy. The traditional understanding of causality paints a picture of linear movement of causes to effects ad infinitum. Burbidge concisely and convincingly shows that this linear picture is a deep oversimplification of what causality, when thought through, really is. By appealing to the idea of dynamic reciprocal interaction, Burbidge argues that a more accurate understanding of the world can be gleaned by what he calls “complex cause” (34). To demonstrate this more complex understanding of cause, Burbidge appeals to the metaphysics of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel (among others), and borrows from quantum uncertainty and chaos theory (29). According to Burbidge, the idea of mechanistic forward-moving causality cannot account for the dynamic interaction of causes, conditions, contingencies, and effects that can be observed empirically (for example: the unpredictability of weather patterns, quantum swerving). Burbidge claims that a dynamic kind of metaphysical framework centered on reciprocal interaction can account for the emergences of complex organic processes, rational agency, and even the divine in a way that a linear metaphysics of forward-moving causality cannot.
Burbidge’s book is concise at just over 100 pages, and is split into six chapters. The first of these chapters, “Introduction to Metaphysics,” helps situate the practice of metaphysics and is especially helpful to those unfamiliar with the relevant debates and history of metaphysics. It also sets the stage nicely for the ensuing engagement Burbidge undertakes with the concept of cause.
In Chapter Two, “The Ontology of Cause,” Burbidge offers a dialectical account of some of the traditional assumptions about causality. He compellingly traces the reasons for defining cause as it traditionally is, then proceeds to demonstrate certain inconsistencies with the concept. Burbidge outlines the way most causal effects in the world result from the intersection of several mutually reinforcing conditions (24). Events are rarely, if ever, the result of an isolated cause that moves in a neat forward direction (28).
One of the most compelling parts of the book is in the second chapter when Burbidge offers real-world observations to support his claims about causality. Weather patterns, for example, can only be predicted with any measure of accuracy for about two weeks (29). Moreover, such predictions are always limited to a certain margin of error that grows with the length of such a prediction (30). Burbidge anticipates that the determinist would likely respond by claiming that this inaccuracy is only so due to the unavailability of empirical data (31). Burbidge convincingly points out how this response amounts to question-begging. “It assumes causal determinism and fits its explanation of the way the world functions to that prior belief. Yet most of the evidence does not support such an exclusive claim. Too many of our causal inferences are based on statistical probabilities, not deductive certainties” (31).
In Chapter Three, “Cosmology of Complex Cause,” Burbidge takes the inconsistencies (or oversimplifications) in the idea of forward-moving causality from Chapter Two and develops them into a more complex picture of causality. The chapter is an effort to demonstrate the ways in which thinking about causality in terms of reciprocity allows for the emergence of more complex self-perpetuating structures. According to Burbidge, thinking about causality in this way sheds intriguing metaphysical light on complex structures such as organic life. Indeed, for Burbidge, dynamic reciprocal interactions develop functions of their own that develop a new kind of life (39). This in turn leads to a new kind of causal entity. Burbidge’s crucial metaphysical claim is that the world is largely composed of emergent properties. That is, structures are not simply the sum of their parts, but rather the result of complex reciprocal interactions that lead to the emergence of new entities (43). Such entities develop a kind of purposiveness, a drive to self-reproduce and interact casually with the world in a new way (47).
In Chapter Four, “The Psychology of Conscious and Rational Agents,” Burbidge’s central goal is to show how consciousness can emerge from the metaphysical structure he developed up to this point in the book. The move Burbidge makes is to show how a purposive self-reproducing entity develops into something that distinguishes itself from its surroundings. That is, it becomes the kind of “negative unity” that can consider other possibilities by negating the direct reactions and innate initiatives that normally drive a less developed purposive unity (55). This new entity moves beyond simply a drive to self-reproduce.
Burbidge’s fifth chapter, “The Theology of Comprehensive Agency,” focuses on the potential theological implications of his metaphysical picture. According to Burbidge, “the theological goal is to find an explanation for the way the world is as a whole” (75). The point he wants to drive home here is that it is actually a feature of rationality to look beyond itself and its world. Because rational agents necessarily consider possibilities beyond what is given, the question of god will necessarily emerge (92).
Overall Burbidge provides a persuasive rethinking of the concept of causality. Although his later chapters on human rationality and the theological realm seem less convincing than earlier chapters, they offer worthwhile insights. The book is clear and easy to understand and I find myself thinking about the topic of causal determinism in a new and more enriched way. Thus, I would recommend this book to anyone interested in the topic of causal determinism as I think Burbidge does a nice job of engaging with the question in a unique way.
