Stephen Macedo aims to defend marriage as a monogamous relationship between two and only two persons as a distinctive good that liberal states should recognize and support. He aims both to decisively demonstrate the failure of arguments that conclude marriage should be restricted to heterosexuals and to show that it is perfectly defensible to include gays and lesbians in the institution while excluding various forms of nonmonogamous unions or plural marriages.
Macedo claims that a defense of same-sex marriage is necessary, especially within the United States, because the cultural power of the arguments against recognition of marriage equality remains strong. Moreover, many have thought—wrongly, according to Macedo—that the recognition and inclusion of same-sex marriages sparks an unstoppable slippery slope to the legal recognition of polygamy. Even more, the institution of marriage has received increased philosophical attention in recent years from those arguing that the state's recognition of only monogamous (heterosexual) marriage, or in some cases any form of state-sanctioned marriage, is inconsistent with basic liberal principles. These critics claim that liberalism requires state neutrality with respect to various reasonable comprehensive views of the good life and thus the state either must expand its definition of marriage or abandon state recognition of marriage altogether. Macedo aims to show that liberal values of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity support restricting state recognition and support to monogamous marriages. His book will be of great interest to liberal theorists broadly, and those working specifically on marriage reform.
The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 examines conservative arguments against same-sex marriage and skillfully exposes their weaknesses, especially their unfitness for public justification. Part 2 examines the arguments of some libertarian, feminist, and liberal critics of state recognition of marriage. Macedo argues, contrary to some recent critics (such as Elizabeth Brake, Cass Sunstein, Richard Thaler, and Tamara Metz), that it does not violate liberal principles for the state to accord marriage a special status and undertake policies to promote it. Part 3 defends monogamous marriage and gives grounds for excluding state recognition and support for various forms of plural marriage.
Central to Macedo's argument that state recognition and support of marriage is essential to the liberal values of equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity is the claim that the goods of marriage promote these values. Married persons tend to be happier and healthier, have better sex and social lives, live longer, are more financially secure, report higher levels of subjective well-being, experience less depression, use fewer controlled substances, experience less chronic disease, suffer less violence inside and outside the home, and have better-adjusted children and less economic stress (108–12). Macedo notes that these benefits, on average, are greater for men than for women. Moreover, a class divide has emerged in the United States, in which marriage is more common and stable among the upper socioeconomic classes than among the lower. Given the great goods associated with marriage, the state's interest in promoting the institution is significant. Further, given the great goods associated with marriage and the liberal state's commitment to equal recognition and respect of all persons, arguments for excluding some persons from the institution have a high bar to pass. As Macedo strengthens the arguments for the value of marriage, he at the same time raises the bar for the reasons that could permit excluding some from the institution (e.g., those wishing to have plural marriage in some form).
Macedo gives four arguments that aim to differentiate same-sex marriages (of only two persons) from polygamous marriages. These help justify differential treatment. First, he claims that unlike same-sex attraction, polygamy is not an orientation but a preference. Macedo may be right about same-sex attraction being akin to an immutable trait and thus having more depth than a desire for plural marriage, but this argument is insufficient for establishing the justifiability of differential treatment. In general, I think the LGBT movement's willingness to embrace the so-called immutability of traits as a basis for arguments for justice is a mistake. Whether the trait in question is immutable is difficult to know, but, more importantly, it is irrelevant from the perspective of justice. Consider the analogy with interracial marriage: while race might be an immutable trait, from a legal perspective, the desire to marry someone of a different race is surely a preference. But it is a preference that cannot be justly restricted. Whether the desire to practice polygamy is an orientation or a preference is immaterial to whether justice demands that we recognize polygamy (assuming the state recognizes marital relations). The question is whether refusal to recognize plural marriages is consistent with the equal citizenship of persons who wish to enter such arrangements, against a background of recognition of monogamous marriages.
Second, Macedo claims the depth and kind of commitment that marriage offers is only realizable in dyads, for only in dyads are persons reciprocally dependent in exactly the same way. The upshot seems to be that two-person marriage is more egalitarian than other forms. The first part of the claim that reciprocal dependence is only possible in dyads is not argued for explicitly, though the author does cite empirical evidence. Moreover, it is not clear why we should think that even persons in dyadic relationships are reciprocally dependent in exactly the same way. But more importantly, one might question whether such reciprocal dependence, if it exists, is necessary for the function of marriage that is central to the state's interest in recognizing it. The ideal of marriage offered here, with its emphasis on necessary reciprocal dependence, is a fairly strong moral ideal that goes beyond the state's interest in securing equal basic liberties for all.
Third, Macedo argues that recognition of polygamy undermines distributive justice, for some will be unfairly excluded from the opportunity for marriage given that in polygamy, as traditionally practiced, wealthy men are able to secure more wives, thus reducing the pool for less wealthy men. This argument seems to rest on the shaky premise that marital, love, or romantic relationships are a matter of distributive justice. What would a commitment to this premise entail regarding those who are shut out of the “romance market” because no one wants to date or marry them? Do they have a claim of justice? No doubt Macedo will reply: all he requires is that we secure conditions of fair equality of opportunity to seek spouses. But it isn't clear how permitting plural marriage undermines such fair opportunity, for all have equal opportunity to seek multiple spouses. However, there is a stronger equality objection to be made regarding this form of traditional polygamy, but it has to do with sex equality for women, not the males locked out of the marriage pool.
Finally, Macedo argues polygamy is less stable than monogamy. Polygamous marriages will involve more conflict and degraded trust (164–66). His evidence is focused exclusively on traditional polygamy, where one man marries many women. Macedo argues that such traditional polygamy is at odds with a real concern for sex equality. I have no quarrel with his critique of traditional polygamy; however, I wish he would have engaged more deeply with alternative forms of plural marriage that are not structurally inegalitarian. He briefly discusses this (197–201), but effectively dismisses the concerns on the grounds that such egalitarian plural marriages are rarely if ever practiced, and there is simply no substantive data on such arrangements. Absent such evidence “we have no basis for concluding anything” (200). But why do we have to wait to see empirical data about how such egalitarian plural marriages function to determine the principled liberal position as to whether equality demands their recognition?
This well-argued book will serve a wide audience. Anyone interested in getting into the marriage debates would do well to start with Just Married and can expect to gain a full understanding of the landscape. Macedo makes a strong argument for inclusion of same-sex marriages into the legal institution of marriage, and a strong case for retaining the legal institution. While spot on regarding the arguments against traditional polygamy, given its threat to sex equality, he fails to fully appreciate the challenge of egalitarian plural marriages.
