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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2004
Professor Baskerville's second essay on the politics of child support (Baskerville, 2003) attempts to establish the following propositions: (1) Administrative agencies responsible for implementing state child support policies (“the police”) are “effectively writing the laws” with respect to child support guidelines (719). (2) Agency behavior in this regard is governed not by economic research but by incentives of financial gain (720). (3) These factors account for onerous and unrealistic child support guidelines (720). Finally, (4) agency participation in the development of child support guidelines breaches the separation of powers and is constitutionally suspect (719). Unfortunately, the evidence still does not substantiate Professor Baskerville's claims. His essay overstates agency influence while understating the role of research in state child support guidelines reviews. Further, it misconstrues the incentives that govern agency operations; it misrepresents the content of state child support guidelines; and it confounds the constitutionality issues at stake.
Child support guidelines are enacted by the legislature in 25 states, by court rule in 18 states, and by administrative rule pursuant to statute in only eight states (Morgan 2002a, 1-13–14). If agencies are exercising too much power over this issue, it is evidently not by virtue of their authority to promulgate guidelines. Nor is it in their role as periodic guidelines reviewers. According to a federal study of state guidelines reviews, only 14 states rely on administrative agencies to conduct the review; the remaining states refer the work to the state courts, the legislature, the office of the governor, or an independent commission (CSR 1996, vol. 2).1
A description of the responsible entity for each state's guidelines review is provided in Appendix 6 to CSR 1996, vol. 2. However, none of the appendices are available in the electronic version of the study. I obtained a copy of Appendix 6 directly from the American Bar Association, under whose auspices the study was completed. Interested scholars may contact me directly via email for a copy of the document.
Professor Baskerville's claim that “the police are effectively writing the laws” also rests on the assumption that the recommendations of an advisory panel are translated directly into the substance of the child support guidelines themselves. Once again, the evidence suggests otherwise. The same federal study of state child support guidelines notes that “States often limited the authority of their review bodies. Many reviewers could recommend changes, but they could not alter the statutes or court rules to implement their suggestions” (CSR 1996, 2:3). This limitation on the influence of guidelines review entities, whether executive, legislative, judicial, or independent, is quite real. While some review recommendations make their way into state child support guidelines, many do not, even when the promulgating authority agrees that their existing guidelines need improvement. The federal study cites numerous examples of review recommendations that were never enacted, referencing states as diverse as Utah, South Dakota, Illinois, Colorado, North Dakota, and Maryland (CSR 1996, vol. 2).2
So far as I am aware, there are no academic studies that examine why it is so difficult to change state child support guidelines. My own hypothesis, as yet untested, is that child support reform resembles health care reform, in that the issues are genuinely complex and reasonable people can and do often disagree. Even when problems are clearly identified—as they often are in guidelines reviews—it is exceedingly difficult to build consensus around solutions, particularly when those solutions create new and unintended inequities, necessitate increased public expenditures, or run counter to the intent of related public policies (as is the case with child support reforms which reduce support orders for low-income obligors).
At the same time, his essay understates the contributions of economists and economic research to the guidelines review process. It may be true that many states' guidelines review panels do not include a professional economist (Baskerville 2003, 719).3
To my knowledge, there are no nationwide studies of the composition of child support guideline review panels. The federal study referenced above does not provide state-level data, only a general description of interstate variation in guidelines review panel membership (CSR 1996, vol. 2). Consequently, the accuracy of Professor Baskerville's assertion that “most states do not require an economist on their review panel” cannot at present be evaluated.
In fairness, states do vary in the resources they commit to the economic analysis of their child support guidelines. While most states have complied with the federal requirement to examine the economic literature on the cost of raising children, and many have invested considerable resources in this effort, some have not. The federal study of state guidelines reviews observes that although “most States conducted thorough, thoughtful reviews that examined numerous issues and considered varied perspectives,” only 35 states reported that their reviews included an examination of research on the cost of raising children (CSR 1996, 1:ES-1–ES-2).4
It is likely that more states have conducted the required economic analysis in the seven years since the completion of the study.
But Professor Baskerville's charges go beyond the assertion that state guidelines reviewers are woefully, and sometimes willfully, ignorant of salient economic research. He also asserts that administrative agency involvement in guidelines review and revision processes is shaped by economic incentives derived from federal funding formulas (720). On this point Professor Baskerville is sadly misinformed. It is true that the federal government provides supplementary funds to state and local child support agencies to enhance their programs and services, and that the amount of funding depends on the effectiveness of an agency's performance (Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998, Title II, Sec. 201). But “agency performance” is not operationalized as “the absolute number of child support dollars collected by the agency.” If it were, the incentive would be exactly as Professor Baskerville describes it: “make guidelines as onerous as possible and squeeze every dollar from every individual available” (720). Rather, performance is measured by five different criteria, only two of which involve collections (45 CFR 305.2). Furthermore, neither collections criterion (one pertaining to current support and one pertaining to arrears) is expressed in terms of the amount of collections. Instead, current collections performance is measured as the percentage of ordered amounts collected (45 CFR 305.2 (a) (3)). Arrears collection performance is measured by the percentage of cases with arrears in which collections (in any amount) are made on the arrears owed (45 CFR 305.2 (a) (4)). Ironically, the federal performance incentives program thus creates an incentive system that runs completely counter to the one Professor Baskerville alleges. Instead of encouraging state agencies to recommend exorbitant and unrealistic guidelines, it encourages agencies to recommend guidelines which produce orders that parents can afford to pay. The bigger the difference between orders and collections, the poorer the agency's collections performance (and, incidentally, the more expensive it will be for the agency to increase collections, thereby compromising the cost-effectiveness of the agency's performance—another criterion embedded in the federal funding formula; 45 CFR 305.2 (a)(5)).
Professor Baskerville is not only mistaken in his assessment of the independent variables in his implicit model of child support policy making (agency influence, agency information, and agency incentives). He is also mistaken in his account of the dependent variable: the content of child support guidelines themselves. The self-support reserve, for example (a mechanism that “reserves” income for a parent who pays child support to meet his or her own basic needs), is not merely a recommendation of guidelines reviewers or policy consultants (720); it is incorporated (though in different forms) in the actual guidelines of most states (Morgan 2002a, 1–18). Downward adjustments in support orders to accommodate parenting time expenses for the parent who pays support are built into the child support formulas in 23 states; another 21 states list shared parenting as a deviation factor (Venohr and Williams 1999, 19). Almost every state addresses the needs of other children living with a parent in their child support guidelines. Fifteen states require an income deduction to help meet the needs of other children living with a parent before calculating a support order; another four states permit it; and 28 states list the needs of other children as a deviation factor (Morgan 2002a, 3–47). As for the guidelines revisions currently under consideration in Minnesota, while they would indeed result in increased support orders for some families, orders would be reduced for even more families, particularly those where the obligor is low-income or where support is being ordered for only one child (the majority of child support cases in this state; Beld 2003a). In this respect, Minnesota is not unusual: “As states have gained experience with guidelines, a great deal of modification and refinement has occurred as states attempt to apply them equitably to even broader circumstances…. There has been a general trend toward more adjustments for shared parenting time [and] more protection for low-income obligors” (Venohr and Williams 1999, 36–7).
Finally, Professor Baskerville challenges the constitutionality of the “complex connections” (my term; Beld 2003b, 714) characterizing the “child support machinery” (his term; Baskerville 2003, 719). However, none of the cases he cites involves the relationship between the guidelines review process (whether assigned to an administrative agency or some other entity) and the content of state child support guidelines. The Holmberg decision in Minnesota declared unconstitutional the administrative process for establishing child support orders5
It is worth noting that the Holmberg opinion acknowledged the “interdependence of the government's branches”: “As government has grown larger and more complicated, the separation of powers doctrine has become harder to define. Increased use of administrative agencies has further blurred boundaries between government branches.” In short, the line between “constitutional” and “unconstitutional” divisions of labor is not nearly so bright as Professor Baskerville suggests.
Interestingly, the Holmberg opinion affirmed the intent of the administrative process to promote “timely and equitable distribution of family financial resources.” Moreover, within less than a year, the administrative process for establishing child support orders was replaced by an “expedited” process housed in the judicial branch rather than in the executive branch of state government. A recent evaluation of the expedited process concludes that it meets all the goals established by the Minnesota state legislature (issuing timely and consistent orders, reducing the need for parents to retain attorneys, promoting cost-effectiveness, and complying with applicable federal law; State Court Administrator's Office 2003).
Despite the fact that Professor Baskerville and I part company on the role of government agencies in child support policy making, we agree on the bottom line. Child support guidelines need to be improved, and those improvements must be grounded in better data about how parents who do not live together provide for the economic needs of their children. Public policies must encourage the presence of two fullycommitted, fully-involved parents in children's lives, and must acknowledge the connections between the economic and emotional well-being of separated families. Finally, political scientists should examine the barriers to improved policy in this important arena of public and private life. The welfare of millions of children and their separated parents is at stake.
This issue of PS premieres the “Point/Counterpoint” section. For the past several issues the editors have grappled with exactly where to place author's responses to previously published PS articles. This section will here forth contain article length responses; the “Forum” section will continue to feature shorter responses. The “Point/Counterpoint” section will highlight debate within the discipline on various topics and will, in the future, contain articles from both the original author and from the dissenting scholar.