Based largely on British documents from The National Archives in London, The British and the Turks is a detailed survey of the development of British policy toward the late Ottoman empire. It examines how the British political elite systematically sought “the progressive end of the power of the Ottoman Empire over its provinces” (56–57), an aim that, according to Justin McCarthy, was strengthened in particular under the premiership of Lord Salisbury who had adopted the principle of “no land that come under Christian rule, even for a short time, should ever be returned to Muslim rule” (95). From then onward, McCarthy argues, the British openly or covertly but always consistently sided with the Christian irredentist movements within the Ottoman empire. In this the British were more steadfast even than the Russians who were perceived as the Ottomans’ most fearsome enemy, threatening the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire from the late eighteenth century.

The British and the Turks is made up of two major parts. The first part, entitled “Broken Promises” and consisting of nine chapters, discusses the British role in the events which threatened the existence of the Ottoman state. Beginning with the British support of and plans for the Ottoman Armenians, which started around 1893, McCarthy then continues respectively with an examination of the British support for the Greeks in the Cretan crisis and the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897; the British position in Macedonia at the expense of the Ottomans; and the cautious British policy of not alienating its Great Power allies in the Ottoman-Italian War of 1911 and the Balkan Wars, which threatened Ottoman territorial integrity and came with a huge human cost. This section of the book concludes with chapters on the establishment of the Inspectorates in Eastern Anatolia and on the First World War. In view of Britain’s systematic policy of dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, the Ottomans’ allying with the Germans in the First World War did not come as a surprise, as McCarthy clearly demonstrates. McCarthy also considers and emphasizes the power of public opinion in Britain in this first part of the book. For McCarthy, British press coverage of the Ottoman empire both shaped public opinion and was a manifestation of it.

The second part of the book, “The Final Confrontation,” made up of eleven chapters, explores the British attitude and policy toward the Ottoman empire and the Turkish nationalist movement in the period between 1918 and 1923. Here McCarthy shows how the anti-Ottoman mindset, which had been created and nurtured earlier, shaped British policy. This part, which covers only a five-year period, is very detailed and includes many direct quotations from primary sources, although the use of non-British archival material such as newspapers is very limited.

McCarthy draws a detailed picture of how the British establishment constructed its approach to the Ottomans within a framework which rested partly on a British feeling of civilizational superiority, both Western and Christian, and partly on the British imperialistic mind-set. This framework, he argues, then led the British ruling elite to ignore or at times connive at atrocities against Ottoman Muslims, such as those in Macedonia (for instance, see page 183) or during the Balkan Wars (270–77), and to manipulate statistical data, such as the population figures for Eastern Anatolia which presented the majority population as Armenian when in fact it was not (293). It also resulted in the British perception of an Ottoman government and administration which was incompetent and insincere and in need of strict supervision (192), but even then destined to be unsuccessful in any reform effort (306). But, McCarthy argues, this framework eventually entrapped the British political elite within a world of post-truth during the Turkish National Liberation War, when the British incited and supported the Greek invasion of Anatolia to the end. It blinded Prime Minister Lloyd George to the realities on the ground, to the extent of ignoring the reports provided by his own British officers and officials, and in the end it cost Britain both its prestige and power (588–628).

Although the book is exceedingly detailed and in many ways convincing in its portrayal of the British approach, there are two major issues that should be mentioned. McCarthy places great emphasis on the role of British public opinion both in legitimizing and in shaping British policy toward the Ottoman empire. There is, however, no comprehensive discussion of this British public opinion either in general or specifically in relation to the Ottoman empire. The question of whether British public opinion really had an impact on British policy toward the Ottoman empire or was rather guided in such a way as simply to mirror the views of the British establishment is thus left with no answer.

The second issue concerns the shadowy presence, or lack thereof, of the Ottoman/Turkish side of the history of the period. In contrast to the plethora of British primary data, McCarthy uses mostly only secondary sources when it comes to the Ottoman/Turkish side. This, however, is not sufficient, for although the book is primarily about the British attitude and policy toward the Ottomans/Turks, there is still a need for a comprehensive analysis of the Ottoman/Turkish position vis-à-vis the British one in order to make better sense of the framework within which the British operated and by which they were eventually entrapped.

That said, however, McCarthy’s book, by drawing a comprehensive picture of the British attitude and policy toward the Ottoman empire, presents the reader with a very clear and detailed expose of the realities of the consistent and persistent British strategy of dismembering the Ottoman empire.