This is the first book focusing exclusively on the Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) case [“the Judgment”] brought to the International Court of Justice [ICJ] in April, 2010. The most decisive crucial point in the Judgment was as to whether Japan’s Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic [JARPA II] was “for purposes of scientific research”.Footnote 4 The volume resulted from a symposium organized by the Kobe University Centre for International Law two months after the Judgment was delivered on 31 March 2014. I commend this book because it incorporates a number of perspectives from academics, government representatives, and practitioners, and from all the relevant countries, Australia (the applicant), New Zealand (the intervener), and Japan (the defendant).
From a legal perspective, most of the chapters (especially those of the Japanese authors) uphold a traditional way of understanding the Whaling case. That is, they are critical of the ICJ on several grounds: for having moved too far from the traditional way of treaty interpretation, for having reversed the standard rule of burden of proof without any legal justification, and for having converted a non-legally binding resolution adopted unanimously by the International Whaling Commission into a de facto legally binding resolution by excessively emphasizing the duty to co-operate. These choices made by the ICJ all favoured the position of Australia and New Zealand.
Furthermore, most of the Japanese authors rather nationalistically point out that the Judgment acknowledged that Japanese Antarctic whaling constitutes science to some extent, and that the objective of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling [ICRW], namely “the orderly development of the whaling industry”,Footnote 5 is still legally valid.Footnote 6
Some other authors provide views that differ from those in the “traditional” camp. For example, Caroline Foster provides a careful and positive view of the Judgment arguing that, because science was basically confined to the standard of review, this in turn made it possible for the ICJ not to bother defining science in the context of the Whaling case and to somewhat reverse the standard rule of burden of proof (Chapter 1). Mika Hayashi borrows Abbott and Snidal’s International Relations approach to defining soft law—which takes into account the level of obligation, precision, and delegation of the law in questionFootnote 7 —to argue that the Judgment allowed some aspects of soft law to be incorporated into the interpretation of the ICRW (Chapter 7).
Although the book usefully gathers multiple perspectives, there is still considerable scope for further research. Unfortunately, the concluding chapter of the book does not offer any suggestions in this regard. To my mind, it would be very interesting to investigate why the ICJ delivered such a controversial Judgment combining the fields of international law and international relations. Furthermore, because traditional treaty interpretation avoids “entering into scientific questions, which should be distinguished from the interpretation of the [ICRW]” (p. 324), but this was fundamentally impossible in the Whaling case, the Judgment can be regarded as a wake-up call to further investigate the appropriate role for science in international adjudication, and how scientific considerations can most appropriately be integrated into legal analysis. As a scholar of international politics and of science and technology studies [STS], I would suggest that one of the most promising ways would be to investigate how the boundaries between scientific and legal arguments are constructed in international adjudication and what the legal discursive devices are for that purpose. In the Whaling case, such a boundary was constructed, through the legal discourse of “standard of review”, between the internal consistency of the scientific objective and the actual operations of Japan’s Antarctic whaling programme as the legal side and the rest of the programme (the objective, etc.) as the untouchable scientific side. It may be said that such a boundary necessitated the conversion of the non-legally binding resolution of scientific review guidelines into a de facto legally binding resolution, which was a new legal order that was criticized by the Japanese authors as mentioned above. In such ways, just how the boundary between science and legal arguments is arrived at impact legal order and discourses.
