Hal Brand's study of the Cold War in Latin America distinguishes itself from many new works on the subject both in its breadth and in some of the conclusions it reaches. Brand examines events throughout Latin America over the course of more than three decades while drawing on archival sources from 13 different countries. He argues that external actors frequently had far less influence than they are often credited with, and that domestic actors and conditions as well as nation-specific factors tended to be decisive in determining the course of the region's development during this period. Furthermore, he argues that the Cold War never constituted a single conflict but was rather a conglomerate of conflicts that were the product of both internal and external forces. Although he adheres to the scholarly convention of viewing the Cold War as playing itself out between the 1960s and 1980s, he also offers strong evidence to suggest that the Cold War as traditionally understood effectively came to an end by the beginning of the 1970s. That final point can be inferred early on in the book when Brand engages with some of the events that are usually considered to constitute the core of Latin America's Cold War.
The author does an impressive job of recounting the eruptions of both hope and fear triggered in the region by the Cuban Revolution, and the roles of the United States, the Soviet Union and the Castro government in the years that followed. Brand concludes that neither the Cubans nor their Soviet allies were terribly effective in promoting leftist militancy or guerrilla insurgencies in particular. By the same token, Washington's Alliance for Progress, which linked development aid to social and economic reforms, had few positive effects. Domestic actors, whether civilian politicians like Romulo Bettencourt of Venezuela or the senior military officers of Brazil, ultimately had far more say in the outcome of the struggles that marked this iconic era of the Cold War. But Brand's most interesting conclusion on this period concerns the demise of significant armed insurgencies by the end of the 1960s.
In characterising the decade that followed the insurgent years, Brand argues that during the 1970s the conflicts that dominated the region's politics and external relations were clearly focused on North–South as opposed to East–West issues. With the immediate threat from armed militants fading, the attention of Latin American politicians turned to more traditional concerns, especially anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism, with a particular focus on Latin America's role in third world struggles to achieve more equitable economic relations with the industrial powers. Buoyed by rising commodity prices, Latin American politicians took a more strident nationalist posture and even expropriated important US holdings in oil and copper. Given the North–South orientation of Latin America's political dialogue and the fact that the Soviet Union was clearly ratcheting down its commitment to leftist causes in the region (most notably its tepid support for the Allende government), Brand's analysis raises serious doubts about characterising the entire period from the 1960s through the 1980s as the Cold War, a term which clearly suggests a period in which the Soviet Union and the United States were engaged in a global struggle for power. While that conflict was certainly continuing in places like Angola and Vietnam, it seems that Latin America was no longer a major theatre for this East–West drama. It could be argued, however, that the 1980s represented a resurgence in that superpower conflict in the western hemisphere.
In his chapters on the 1980s, the author not surprisingly focuses on Central America and on Washington's efforts to subdue the revolutionary forces that toppled America's ally in Nicaragua and threatened to do the same in El Salvador and Guatemala. Especially in Nicaragua, the Cold War seemed to have resumed as the Soviet Union and Cuba offered tangible aid to the Sandinistas while President Ronald Reagan envisioned US involvement as a way to roll back the Brezhnev doctrine and erase the timidity that he believed had characterised US foreign policy since the end of the Vietnam War. To be sure, the Cold War was alive and well in Latin America during the Reagan years – but while other Latin American nations were concerned with events in Central America, especially the resurgence of US interventionism, the direct impact of this mini-Cold War was hardly pervasive in a region where most large nations were transitioning back to democracy and grappling with a debt crisis that threatened to plunge their economies into depression. As much as events in Central America may have contained echoes of the Cold War in the 1960s, they were even more reminiscent of US policy in the circum-Caribbean in the early twentieth century, when the US used its military and economic might to assert its domination of the region and exclude any other major power. This study suggests the need for a serious rethink of the wisdom of labelling more than three decades of Latin American history as a Cold War era.
With all its strengths, the book does suffer from several shortcomings. There is an over-reliance on ideologies to explain events; for example, the 1970s are cast in terms of a struggle between Marxism, dependency theory and national security dogmas, but while ideologies help give form to political mobilisations, they do not explain the material conditions that give rise to the dreams and aspirations that underlie those movements. And in explaining the violence that marked much of this era, Brands seems to employ a much-used and quite flawed argument that the armed elements of the Left brought on violent repression by the military. That interpretation ignores the fact that the military's principal targets were not armed insurgents but elected governments and mobilised civilian populations. The military toppled elected governments and replaced them with long-term, institutionalised authoritarianism that empowered it to violently repress the civil societies it was supposedly defending.
