Güneş Murat Tezcür's well-written and meticulously researched, though by no means flawless, book is a welcome and timely addition to the literature that critically assesses the applicability of a variant of moderation theory—the notion that the inclusion of hitherto radical groupings in the political process results in their moderation and, by implication, helps to advance the cause of democratization—to Muslim-majority countries governed by guardian regimes. The latter are ideological regimes in which real power is wielded by nonelected and self-perpetuating elites who purport to govern in accordance with the “true wishes” of the regime's deceased founding father and chief ideologue (e.g., Ataturk in Turkey or Khomeini in Iran).
Tezcür is intrigued by what he sees as two broad and overarching historical puzzles: first, the question of why the most significant Muslim reform movements in the contemporary Middle East emerged in the highly dissimilar settings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the uber-secular Republic of Turkey; and second, the question of why the evolution of Muslim reformers in Iran and Turkey followed what he calls a “similar trajectory.” Although Tezcür's first research question is both factually and conceptually sound, the premise upon which the second one is predicated was already problematic in 2010, when the book was published; it has proven to be false today.
While Iranian reformers (now castigated by the Islamic Republic's various “principlist” or conservative factions as the “seditious clique”) have been expelled from centers of power and severely repressed in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections by the self-proclaimed guardians of Ayatollah Khomeini's legacy, Muslim reformers in Turkey have managed to both subdue and humiliate the once unassailable military and judicial guardians of secularism, who had arrogated the power of interpreting the main tenets of Kemalism unto themselves. The coup de grâce was delivered in 2012, when overzealous prosecutors aligned with the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) arrested and imprisoned General Ilker Bashbug, former chief of staff of the Turkish armed forces, on the charge of leading a terrorist organization. How, then, one may ask, has the evolution of reforms in the two countries followed a “similar trajectory” when the reformers in Turkey have imprisoned and marginalized both the army and the nonelected power holders they commanded, while the converse has occurred in Iran? It is true that the distinctions between outcomes of reform in Turkey and Iran have come into sharper focus with the passage of time and that Tezcür had not set out to write a predictive treatise. Nevertheless, the contours of dissimilarity were already evident at the time of the publication of this book and are even occasionally pointed out by Tezcür himself.
Part of the problem lies in the fact that Tezcür's scholarly and rigorous comparative analysis of Iran and Turkey is based on an analytical framework whose capacity for accounting for the rise of Muslim reformists in both countries is greater than its ability to illuminate their evolution and trajectory. In Tezcür's rendering, the ideological (theocratic vs. secular), sectarian (Shiʿa vs. Sunni), and economic (a blurred case of a state-run mixed with private-sector economy) distinctions between Iran and Turkey only serve to underscore the similar causal dynamics that account for both the rise and evolution of Muslim reformers in both countries. But what, exactly, are these dynamics?
To account for the rise of Muslim reformers in Turkey and Iran, Tezcür opts for the application of a more nuanced variant of moderation theory, whose origins he traces back to the enunciations of Robert Michels on the salutary consequences of including socialist parties in the political process. While Tezcür accepts the theory's key insight (the inclusion/moderation proposition), he finds the rationale behind it excessively mechanical and deterministic. In other words, relegating the embrace of ideological moderation on the part of erstwhile radicals to a mere (and potentially insincere) byproduct of opportunistic behavioral changes designed to increase their votes by appealing to the broadest societal cross-section is in his view excessively reductive. As Tezcür clearly illustrates with reference to the AKP in Turkey and the Reform Front (RF) (Jibhah-yi Musharikat) in Iran, the adoption of democratic (though not full-fledged liberal) platforms preceded and accompanied, rather than simply followed, the perception of opportunities for political gain through electoral participation. Indeed, prior to the establishment of their respective organizations, the founders of the AKP and RF had both experienced a sense of disillusionment with the ideological dogmatism and inflexibility that predominated in their ranks while deriving inspiration from the ideological ascendance of pragmatism, anti-utopianism, and democracy that followed the demise of European communism.
Tezcür's core thesis and most significant theoretical and empirical contribution to the debates over the prospects for democratic reform in guardian-led regimes in general, and in Turkey and Iran in particular, however, is what he refers to as the “paradox of moderation.” This paradox concerns the fact that the implementation of a democratic agenda in the face of well-entrenched and intransigent elites dedicated to cosmetic or minimal changes to the status quo requires audacity and assertiveness rather than moderation and compromise. According to Tezcür, the embrace of nonviolent though contentious tactics offers the best means of altering the balance of power in favor of reformers, as it compels the “guardians” to yield to democratization. However, the imperatives of organizational survival, combined with the desire to avert being expelled from elected institutions by “guardians” who control the coercive apparatus of the state, can invariably inhibit would-be reformers from energetically asserting their agendas—thereby leaving the drive for democratization incomplete (Turkey) or unfulfilled and stillborn (Iran).
In line with the previous framework, Iran seems to present a clear illustration of the baleful effects of moderation on democratic promotion. Tezcür capably shows how the inability of the factious reformers in Iran to present a cohesive front and establish grassroots organizations to rally their base for the purpose of exerting pressure on conservative guardians helped to pave the way for their eventual marginalization. The reformers’ insistence on compromising with the “guardians,” who were adamant against budging, even caused RF to abandon its core base of support, composed of students and women's rights activists as well as intellectuals and educated professionals, at crucial junctures, further undermining the credibility of reformist factions in the eyes of their constituencies
But would Tezcür's prescription for the RF of relying on peaceful and sustained rallies on the part of its constituencies have enabled it to turn the tide, compelling the Council of Guardians to acquiesce in the implementation of the RF's platform? The regime's brutal suppression of the massive and peaceful demonstrations in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential election would seem to indicate not. Failing to enter into broad-based alliances with a significant proportion of the underclass, which for the most part appears to have taken a “wait and see” approach and did not participate in the demonstrations, the primary base of the reform movement (composed of students and the middle classes) could not compel or dislodge a cohesive ruling elite determined to resort to overwhelming force to sustain its hold on power.
Also contrary to Tezcür's model, the divergent outcome of guardianship unraveling in Turkey can be attributed to the key differences, rather than similarities, between the two countries. Among the most important (some of which are captured by Tezcür) of these was the willingness on the part of primary decision makers in the Turkish military to gradually accommodate the AKP and allow it to fulfill many of the elements of Copenhagen's criteria for European Union accession. Also important was the AKP's presiding during an era of unprecedented and sustained economic growth through the attraction of direct foreign investment, resulting in the expansion and diversification of industry, trade, and commerce. Crucially, the AKP was able to channel the fruits of prosperity to both its affluent and its dispossessed supporters. The awarding of government contracts, foreign bids, and favorable credit kept the rising pious bourgeoisie and the emerging middle class that was tied to it happy, while improvements in infrastructure, social welfare, health care, and the minimum wage resulted in the increasing empowerment and political awakening of the periphery. The rising prosperity and limited, though by no means complete, democratization also prompted a significant proportion of the established business elite and the media to withdraw its unconditional support of the “guardians.” Meanwhile, revelations of coup plots, involving plans to blow up mosques and kill innocent Turkish civilians, served to undermine the credibility and once stellar reputation of the Turkish military. Finally, although the AKP did become more assertive in its interactions with the “guardians” as its popularity increased and its economic resources and independent sources of power multiplied, it did not resort to the kind of contentious politics referred to by Tezcür in order to subdue them. Instead, it made effective use of the undemocratic constitution written by the generals in the aftermath of the 1980 coup to hoist the guardians on their own petards.
Meanwhile, the goal of democratic consolidation remains unfulfilled. Both the diminishing lure of joining the European Union in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the negative attitudes of major European powers toward Turkey's accession have removed the AKP's incentives for transforming Turkey into a liberal democracy to fulfill the requirements of joining the European Union. In addition, as Tezcür shows, Erdogan's authoritarian tendencies and disdain for criticism, combined with the AKP's vote maximization strategies, have transformed the AKP from a democratizing institution into a patronage-based political party. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the ability of Tezcür's book to present clearly and effectively a wealth of information on moderation theory and the contemporary history of Iran and Turkey make it an ideal addition to the syllabi of classes on democratization in the Middle East. Beyond the classroom, it will appeal to the general reader interested in Middle Eastern politics.
