The central thrust of Erik Grimmer-Solem's work is captured in one key phrase in the book's subtitle. By emphasizing the German quest for “world status” (Weltstellung), Grimmer-Solem pointedly rejects Fritz Fischer's famous claim regarding the supposed German quest for “world power” (Weltmacht) during the Kaiserreich. Grimmer-Solem argues, against interpretations that emphasize some form of German exceptionalism, that German foreign policy was driven by the same liberal imperialist forces that motivated British, French, Japanese, and American imperial expansion in this same period. He even goes so far as to assert, at least implicitly, that German policymakers were often more committed to liberal market principles than their counterparts and competitors around the world. The result is a compelling critique of previous scholarship that at times runs the risk of slipping into an outright apology for late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century German imperialism.

There is much to admire in this book—in fact, too much in its 600 pages to do justice in this review to its insights and skillful use of sources. Grimmer-Solem is able to provide a new interpretation of German foreign policy and military planning through the use of sources that have too long been overlooked, in large part because of previous historians’ assumptions about the origin and nature of German imperial policies (i.e., that they were primarily militaristic). He relies heavily on published primary sources as well as unpublished memoirs and correspondence of five major German economists—Ernst von Halle, Karl Helfferich, Karl Rathgen, Hermann Schumacher, and Max Sering—and one American, Henry Farnam. Through these sources, Grimmer-Solem traces the expanding worldview of German academics alongside the expansion of Germany's economic, political, and military interests during the Kaiserreich. These men's world travels are at times reminiscent of Alexander von Humboldt's voyages of naturalist exploration in the early nineteenth century, as they searched for new methods of production, transportation, and market integration. They were economic nationalists, always seeking to advance German interests, but they were also very much liberal nationalists who sought to advance those interests through global market forces. These men “learned empire,” as Grimmer-Solem puts it, and brought these lessons back to Germany, where they helped shape economic policy, diplomacy, and even military strategy.

In recent years, numerous historians, most notably Christopher Clark, have argued that the growing antagonism between Germany and Britain was the result of a British policy of appeasement toward their old colonial rivals, France and Russia. Grimmer-Solem leans heavily on this scholarship, but adds a new hitherto-neglected theme, British appeasement of their new colonial rivals, Japan and the United States. In fact, at least in the medium to long term, British policy toward these emergent powers may have had more impact on British–German relations than changing attitudes toward France and Russia because of the rapid growth of Japanese and American naval power. To the frustration of Grimmer-Solem's economists, Britain tolerated the expansion of the Japanese and American navies and imperial ambitions at the same time that Britain responded with righteous indignation and even threats of violence to less aggressive actions by Germany. Britain's dramatically different responses to the Venezuelan (1895, 1901) and Moroccan (1905, 1911) crises offer a compelling case in point.

In response to the Spanish–American War (1897) and other developments, German observers expressed alarm about “the ruthless advance of Pan-Americanism” (200), spurred on by an aggressively nationalist press and the fervor of American public opinion. (Grimmer-Solem points out in several places that, unlike the United States and other countries, Germany did not acquire any new territories through force from 1895 till 1914, the period in which the other great powers grew so alarmed by supposed German militarism.) The economists thus learned empire well from the Americans and turned their expertise and reputations toward the cause of stirring up broad middle-class support for the Bülow Bloc in the 1906–1907 elections as well as the chancellor's naval armament program that culminated in the 1908 Navy Bill. As Grimmer-Solem points out, the economists’ publicity worked perhaps too well, creating public support for a naval program that threatened to get out of control. The Mahanian thinking of these “fleet professors” led them to advocate energetically for the naval power required to defend and expand German access to international markets. Through their influence, economic competition fed too easily through public enthusiasm into a fateful arms race with Britain—a nation in relative decline, unable to contain the new threats from Japan and the United States, but determined to deny Germany an increased share of naval and hence economic power.

When the First World War broke out, the “fleet professors” became “U-boat professors” and advocated unapologetically for the aggressive use of submarines to counter the illegal British blockade of Germany. Spurred by “longstanding frustrations over Germany's failed prewar Weltpolitik” (544), the “U-boat professors” came to see the war as Germany's last, best opportunity to redress the imbalance in world power. As Grimmer-Solem admits, their advocacy of expansive war aims “underscores the difficulty of making any meaningful distinctions between ‘liberal imperialism’ and the imperialist war aims of the nationalist right during the First World War” (545). Even in response to Hermann Schumacher's stark memorandum envisioning significant annexations of French and Belgian territory after the war, Grimmer-Solem might well respond that such a step would have differed little from the imperialist practices of the other great powers in the decades before the war.

This review can only scratch the surface of Grimmer-Solem's tome. The combination of new and underutilized sources with an extraordinarily rich use of the secondary scholarship results in a comprehensive revision of our understanding of the economic, political, and military developments that led to the First World War (and beyond). This is an impressive scholarly accomplishment that should stimulate new and fruitful debates.