The question of how the United States military should adapt to a changing security environment is an important area of study for academics and policymakers. These two books by David Koplow and Keith Shimko assess the American military's efforts to maintain its combat effectiveness in the post–Cold War period. Both are readable and interesting, raising crucial points about the challenges the U.S. military faces as it attempts to integrate information-age technologies into its military forces.
Shimko's well-argued book focuses on what America's wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan suggest about the debate over the utility of information-age advances for the American military. The author delves into the literature on revolutions in military affairs (RMAs)—large-scale changes in the ability of military organizations to produce force. He evaluates whether there has already been an information-age RMA by looking at the American military's performance in the first Gulf War in 1991, the ongoing Iraq war, which began in 2003, and the war in Afghanistan. He concludes that while an RMA did, in fact, occur in the post–Cold War period, it is most relevant for more traditional state-on-state military operations. Shimko finds that the information-age RMA has proven less useful in helping the American military combat insurgents and terrorist groups.
In contrast, while Koplow references the debate over whether the American military experienced an RMA during the last few decades, he focuses mainly on what he calls the quest for “useability.” He outlines the military's desire to produce weapons that are effective, but not so blunt that they generate massive civilian casualties and become less practical to use in wars. For example, international legal guidelines on the use of force have begun to constrain militaries, especially when it comes to civilian casualties. The American military, therefore, wishes to obtain weapons systems whose use on the battlefield is less likely to trigger international condemnation and legal challenges. Koplow covers series of weapons relevant across the military services and areas of warfare, such as low-yield nuclear weapons, antisatellite weapons, and land mines, which the United States is developing, and he concludes by discussing some of the benefits and drawbacks of the quest for useability.
Both of these books helpfully address debates in the American defense establishment over the last few decades and some of the options the American military has as it prepares for the next generation. Several factors link these books together and are worth considering in light of the subject matter. Each book in some ways is useful for addressing issues that the other book does not study in depth.
The broad question underlying both books is whether or not the American military is undergoing an information-based revolution in military affairs. While there are a multitude of definitions for RMAs—almost as many as there are studies of the topic—the basic idea is that an RMA is something that represents a large-scale change in the way that militaries fight. It often (or always, depending on the writer) involves the application of new technologies and always involves significant changes in how militaries organize themselves. The shift in the organization of European militaries to take advantage of firepower, the so-called Early Modern European RMA, is a canonical example, as is the shift in the naval realm from battleships to aircraft carriers.
Those who believe that the American military has undergone, or is undergoing, an RMA at present tend to point to developments such as precision-guided munitions, real-time networked communications, cyberwarfare, and unmanned aerial vehicles as evidence. Proponents argue that these technologies have already fundamentally shifted how the American military conducts operations and will continue to do so over the next generation. Few topics in the American defense establishment, however, have generated as much heat as whether or not the American military has experienced an information-based RMA since the end of the Cold War.
Not surprisingly, those who tend to think an information-age RMA has occurred view its implications for the United States in a positive light, while those more critical of the claim that an information-age RMA has occurred doubt its utility. Both of these books conclude that an RMA has occurred, but each approaches the topic differently than much of the existing literature. Shimko conducts an in-depth assessment of the RMA literature and is careful in his writing to focus on both organizational and technological change as a critical characteristic of RMAs. He helpfully draws on Richard Hundley's definition of RMAs, among others, as requiring the replacement of old-core competencies for military operations or the creation of new ones. This makes the central element of an RMA the organizational change that is occurring to take advantage of new technologies. Koplow, however, while citing some of the same literature, focuses more on the technologies themselves. To avoid criticism from RMA skeptics such as Stephen Biddle, Koplow's work could have benefited from a greater consideration of the RMA literature and the organizational factors that will influence how the American military integrates nonlethal weapons, “smart” antipersonnel land mines, and the other technologies under study into its arsenal.
A second question uniting these works is their emphasis, in their conclusions, on what all of these developments should and will mean for the American military. Shimko emphasizes how information-age changes influenced the American military in the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq. He does not dwell, however, on what is likely to happen in the future and whether or not the current path is the correct one. Koplow's conclusion, in contrast, revolves around how the “quest for useable weapons” is influencing the American military. He also discusses whether or not having more useable weapons will actually be a good thing. On the plus side, less lethal and more precise weapons may help make war more humanitarian and less disastrous for civilians. Alternatively, if the American military has more precise weapons that enable it to conduct operations at lower risk to its own soldiers and civilians, military adventurism may be more likely. Koplow adds an important caveat about the humanitarian benefit of useable weapons: more precision and lower levels of lethality will not eliminate the destructiveness of warfare, nor should it be sold to the public as such (p. 242).
A third question is what these works have to say for ongoing American military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shimko devotes a chapter to the question of whether the aftermath of the Iraq invasion and the shift toward counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq represents evidence against the existence of an information-based revolution in military affairs. He argues that these wars show the limitations of current information-age advances—for the author, they have proven to be more useful for more conventional operations than for winning the hearts and minds of local populations (pp. 207–9). Koplow mostly avoids the issue of the wars being fought by the United States right now. Instead, he devotes full chapters to topics such as low-yield nuclear weapons, smart antipersonnel land mines, and antisatellite weapons. Understanding all three categories of weapons might prove crucial for predicting the next generation of American military operations. However, it might have benefited Koplow to spend a bit more time, perhaps in his conclusion, assessing what these developments mean for American military operations at present.
A limitation of both works is their almost exclusive focus on the United States. Both authors recognize this issue, to their credit. As Koplow notes throughout his book, but especially in the conclusion, periods of revolutionary change in the production and use of military power can generate significant shifts in the balance of power. As the predominant military power in the world, the United States faces potential risks during the present period despite its leadership in the areas described by both authors. It would have been helpful to get a better sense of what other nations are working on in these areas of development. It also would have improved both books if the authors had drawn more extensively from international sources. While Shimko, for example, exhaustively assessed the American literature on RMAs, he could have enhanced his analysis by examining what Chinese, Indian, and Russian authors have been writing about RMAs and what that might mean for their countries' militaries. Substantively, both books could have benefited from a comparison of developments in the militaries of the United States and other countries. Koplow does this, to some extent, at the end of his discussion of antisatellite weapons, pointing to the way in which future research on this topic could contrast American military modernization efforts with the developments of other countries.
These comments aside, both Death by Moderation and The Iraq Wars and America's Military Revolution are extremely welcome additions to ongoing debates about how the American military has and should continue to adapt to a changing security environment. Both are well written, both contain a great deal of useful information on American military developments, and both should contribute to debates over the future of military power.
