The asynchronization between social and political development has become a pressing issue with the ascendance of international powers such as China. This book argues that the perplexity that such asynchronization instigates is based on the singular ontological conception of development in the available literature. The Eurocentric conception of social development and modernity has locked up the theoretical literature in a unilinear, homogenous, symmetric, and localized perspective. Such a perspective not only underinterprets any non-European experience of development, but it also constructs an imaginary and unrealistic distinction between what is internal and what is external to individual social development experiences. By assigning an ethnocentric definition to development and modernity, the available liberal but also Marxist literature has missed the international venues of modernity in individual experiences and created a dual classification of development between European and non-European. Such lacunas in the Eurocentric paradigm are based on a singular conception of the social that is not only endogenous/internalist to each case but is also based on the sole capitalist English experience and a secularist assumption of modernity.
The author argues that such a conception is behind the convoluted understanding of the Iranian experience of modernity starting with the Qajars and leading up to the Pahlavis. He thus proposes using Leon Trotsky's conception of uneven and combined development to apprehend the Iranian modernity experience beyond its classification as a non-European, nonsecularist, and native experience of development. For Trotsky, development is a social process that occurs unevenly across countries and history. Development is thus not a European experience by definition but an international one where the international interaction between nations has a direct impact on the internal development of the social. Development goes beyond a superficial distinction between what is native and what is not. International venues of development are therefore a crucial element that allows explaining the various stages of development in each experience even if domestic variables shape the domestic discourse and final outcomes. Development is thus combined because it associates the political, the economic, the social, and the ideational while amalgamating the various stages of transformation as well as internal and external determinants. Social backwardness, as defined relative to modern societies, can and did exist in parallel to economic modernization.
This is what happened in Iran, where capitalist Westernization/modernization was imposed from above without reflecting or implying a capitalist transformation of society like what happened in Europe's experience. In Iran, the state consecrated existing precapitalist socioeconomic relations between various classes in what the author calls a defensive modernization triggered by the state to save the ruler's absolutist anachronistic rule. The social was not static, however. The paradoxes of the modernization experience produced the citizen-subject, a complex agency that combined both the capitalist experience of modern state institutions and the precapitalist subjugation to Shiʿi Islam and to authoritarianism. Such a complexity, according to the author, is what explains the Iranian's proneness to a revolution in 1979 led by a Shiʿi revolutionary ideology that also defies the secularist assumption inherent to the Eurocentric ontology of modernization.
The author's thesis of a plural ontology of the social that redefines the conception of development and modernity is persuasive, especially in the parts where he uses the Iranian case to illustrate his critique of Eurocentric static theories of development and modernization. The book covers the main arguments in the field and provides alternative and critical definitions to what the author calls the “intermediate concepts” that he borrows from other scholars to operationalize Trotsky's conception of development as uneven and combined. The author also introduces new concepts from the Iranian experience to illustrate the failure of existing Eurocentric concepts to capture the international dimension that he perceives as intrinsic to all development experiences. However, the author at times fails to emphasize the addition that native Iranian conceptions make to the existing Eurocentric paradigm. This is an important drawback since the book focuses on the theoretical contribution of the Iranian perspective. The parts devoted to the critique of the theory and its development indeed overwhelm the parts dedicated to recounting the Iranian experience. It is possible that this stems from what the book's conclusion states as its aim, which is to contribute to the literature on historical materialism. Yet, it is quite unfortunate that the significance of the Iranian experience as a whole to the book's theoretical contribution is the clearest only in the book's final chapter and conclusion.
The author's style and argument are also the clearest in those final sections. Although the book is generally easy to read, the author's writing is sometimes complicated through the use of long sentences. The author uses references that cover the latest contributions on Iran, modernity, revolution, and capitalist development. He draws on these references to make his own contribution to the scholarship on these concepts in general, and he undeniably succeeds in making a remarkable non-European and non-Eurocentric contribution to the theoretical construction of such concepts in particular. It is therefore recommended for an audience that goes beyond students and scholars of Iran to students and scholars interested in the international incubators of modernity. It courageously challenges well-established paradigms and worldviews of development, modernity, and historical materialism. The book thus provides an original and fresh engagement with the scholarship on Iran and the scholarship on social revolutions at a time when Iran's neighbors are witnessing the wave of social revolutions that came to be known as the Arab Spring.
