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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 February 2005
This work, a revision of Saleh Said Agha's Ph.D. dissertation, looks at the origins of the revolution that toppled the Umayyads. Agha's principal thesis is that this was not an Arab revolution but, rather, an Iranian revolution, and that the leadership was not Abbasid, at least at the onset. Agha argues that the leaders of the “Organization” (this is the name that he uses for the followers and leaders of the revolution that toppled the Umayyads) had no particular person—neither Alid nor Abbasid—in mind for the leadership. The only qualification was that he be from Al Muhammad—that is, from the al-Banu Hashim clan. He argues further that it was through the machinations of Abu Muslim that the Abbasids were able to usurp leadership of the revolution.
Agha uses two sets of data to support his theses. For the first thesis, discussed in Part 3 of the book, he uses statistical analysis to back up his claim regarding the make-up of the members of the Organization. As for the second thesis—the Abbasids being “Johnny come latelies”—it rests, for the most part, on critical analysis of the sources. It should be noted that the author sees the three-month period between the triumph of the revolution and the eventual proclamation of an Abbasid caliph as the “smoking gun.” These theses, as Agha admits, are a reaffirmation of Wellhausen and his Das Arabishe Reich und sein Sturz. Still, students and scholars in the field would do well to read Agha's work for his new take on the (un)-Abbasid revolution. The unfortunate problem, as is the case with many Brill books, is that the price remains a formidable deterrent.
In Part 1, the author successfully presents his ideas with regard to the leadership of the Organization. Agha's analysis and short biographies of the main players in the Organization are based on sound and accurate scholarship and reflect well on his capabilities with regard to the sources. One problem is the scarcity of isnād analysis as part of the overall approach to the narratives. A case in point is his discussion of Abu Muslim's true origins and identity. It would have been helpful to the reader to have more discussion of the sources of these narratives. The argument that some stories are unreliable while others make perfect sense simply because of an author's own sensibilities does not wash anymore. There has to be a discussion of the sources of these stories and an explication of why the author believes some and not all of what they report. When Agha does mention the transmitters, he provides only basic information or a few sentences with little or no analysis.
This is a dense book that contains a tremendous amount of information for the reader to digest. The book is divided into three sections, some of which—more precisely, Parts 2 and 3—could be made into appendixes. This judgment may stem from my own prejudice, but these parts were rather tedious and seemed unnecessary, especially in the body of the text. This is in no way a comment on the usefulness of the quantitative approach. The field would do well to encourage more of its students to use such tools, which would indeed help to buttress many theses that depend on too little data. But such information does better as one of the many foundations for a work rather than being the work itself.
On the whole, this is an interesting scholarly work that should be consulted by all students of the Abbasid movement. There are two problems that detract from the work. The first is the form in which this book is presented: this work has not easily made the transition from a dissertation to a book. As noted earlier, the author would do well to condense or even omit much of the statistical information. The other problem relates to theory on the revolution that toppled the Umayyads. The premise that Abu Muslim was the one who made the connection with the Abbasid house (which had nothing to do with the revolution to begin with), and was responsible for taking over the Organization and eliminating the organizers themselves, is intriguing and definitely a new approach. But it does not affect in any way the older theory that Abu Muslim was the agent of the Abbasids, who were using him to bring people to their cause. It is, after all, an optical illusion, like the young girl–old woman picture. Depending on how you look at it, you will see what you are already imagining.